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Abstract 
Using universalistic and contingency perspectives, this study investigates the relationships 
between pay practices, organisational contingencies (business strategy, workforce 
employment groups, industry sector and organisation size) and human resource (HR) 
performance outcomes in the United Kingdom (UK) private sector.  It tests the propositions 
of the strategic pay literature that a) selection of pay practices will have an effect on HR 
outcomes; b) internal and external organisational contingencies will have an effect on pay 
practice selection; and c) selection of pay practices aligned to organisational contingencies 
will have a positive effect on HR outcomes. Data were collected via the Chartered Institute 
of Personnel and Development (CIPD) Reward Management Survey in 2012.  Results 
support hypothesised associations between a) pay selection and both business strategy and 
workforce employment groups; and b) specific pay practice approaches and HR outcomes.  
There is limited support however for the hypothesised effect of strategically aligned pay on 
HR outcomes although there are suggestions that certain configurations of pay practices and 
organisational contingencies have the potential for such an effect. These findings have 
practical implications for reward and HR professionals in designing and implementing pay 
systems.  The study directly contributes to the theoretical development of strategic pay to 
better understand the complex and context-laden practice of strategic pay and its 
consequences.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
This thesis focuses on analysing both the concept and practice of strategic pay. It investigates 
the relationships between pay practices, organisational contingencies and consequent 
human resource (HR) performance outcomes, and it proposes an extension to existing 
theoretical perspectives in order to understand more fully this important area of 
organisational practice. Detailed operational definitions will be offered in the following 
chapters but here, in summary, ‘pay practices’ denotes the design, level, form and basis for 
monetary payments within employment relationships; ‘organisational contingencies’ refers 
specifically to business strategy, workforce employment groups, industry sector and 
organisation size; and ‘HR performance outcomes’ relates to employee relations climate, 
levels of pay discontent, employee productivity, absenteeism problems and difficulties in 
recruitment and retention.  ‘Strategic pay’ is the central concept of this study, one with an 
established background in both academic and practitioner fields of theory and research but, 
as will be shown, it is a concept that is ready for reassessment and rethinking.     
1.1 Theoretical background  
The strategic pay concept builds on longstanding research demonstrating that pay has an 
effect on employee decisions to join and stay with organisations (Salop, 1979; Weiss, 1980; 
Lazear, 2000; Shaw, Dineen, Fang and Vellella, 2009; Gerhart and Fang, 2014) and that 
pay can act as a powerful incentive mechanism (Vroom, 1964; Locke, Feren, McCaleb, 
Shaw and Denney, 1980; Gerhart, Rynes and Fulmer, 2009).  Strategic pay theories propose 
that firms will benefit from operating pay practices aimed at influencing employee 
behaviour and performance to support the achievement of organisational objectives 
(Gerhart and Rynes, 2003; Shields, 2015).  Early iterations of strategic pay saw ‘new pay’ 
writers, during the socio-economic turbulence of the 1980s and 1990s (e.g. Lawler, 1990; 
Schuster and Zingheim, 1992; Zingheim and Schuster, 2000), rejecting the traditional forms 
of pay associated with a perceived bureaucratic era of management. Instead, they sought to 
target the potentially positive effects of pay at improving organisational performance, 
ostensibly by enhancing organisational flexibility and market competitiveness.  Pay became 
thought of as a strategic management tool; a lever that could be pulled to direct employee 
actions and enhance corporate profitability. This approach has arguably dominated both 
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academic and practitioner discourse to the present day (Perkins, White and Jones, 2016) 
despite critical questions (Heery, 1996) and alternative interpretations (Trevor, 2010).  
There are a number of perspectives informing this strategic pay paradigm.  First, a 
universalistic approach to pay, as taken by many of the ‘new pay’ proponents (e.g. Zingheim 
and Schuster, 2000) encourages organisations to adopt strategic pay practices directed at 
enhancing organisational performance as opposed to traditional, bureaucratic methods of 
administering pay.  Here, there is a notion of ‘one best way’; a superior set of pay practices 
that, regardless of context, will result in enhanced organisational performance.  But the 
strategic pay model also draws on alignment perspectives contending that optimal pay 
practices are those which align most closely with an organisation’s external and internal 
characteristics; closer alignment results in improved employee and organisational outcomes 
(Balkin and Gomez-Mejia, 1990; Lepak and Snell, 2002).   
Researchers have sought to model strategic pay alignment (e.g. Heneman and Dixon, 2001) 
or to test empirically the relationship between contingencies, pay practices and 
organisational performance (e.g. Allen and Helms, 2002; Chen and Jermias, 2014; Tenhiälä 
and Laamanen, 2016).  However, there remains limited evidence for such relationships 
(Shields, 2015).  Indeed, it has been argued that of all the fields of human resource 
management (HRM), it is strategic pay that has the widest gap between rhetoric and reality 
(Bevan, 2005; Trevor and Brown 2014).  The proposition that making pay practices 
contingent on organisational conditions will have positive effects on employee behaviours 
and organisational performance, was described by Milkovich (1987, p.3) as “probably the 
greatest leap of faith” given the lack of empirical evidence.  And, in the intervening thirty 
years, questions about the theoretical and empirical underpinning of the strategic pay model 
have not yet been fully addressed (Conroy, Yoon, Bamberger, Gerhart, Gupta, Nyberg, 
Park, Park, Shaw and Sturman, 2016). This gap in knowledge provides the starting point for 
this study. 
Strategic pay, like its precursor strategic HRM, is necessarily multi-disciplinary (Godard, 
2014; Jackson, Schuler and Jiang, 2014). The underlying assumption of the strategic pay 
concept, that money is a means to influence human behaviour, spans boundaries between 
academic disciplines (Trevor, 2010; Nyberg, Pieper and Trevor, 2016) and this research 
study therefore draws on a multi-disciplinary theoretical framework which includes 
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strategic management and HRM concepts, as well as theories from the fields of labour 
economics and both management and motivational psychology.    
Research on strategic pay is important. The role of pay within organisations as a means to 
attract, hire, retain and motivate employees to behave or perform in organisationally desired 
ways is hotly debated. On one hand, theory and evidence suggests that pay is an incredibly 
powerful tool in sorting and incentivising employees (Saks, Wiesner and Summers, 1996; 
Jenkins, Mitra, Gupta and Shaw, 1998; Lazear, 2000; Dineen and Williamson, 2012). On 
the other, there are strong arguments for dysfunctional and even harmful effects of 
misconceived pay systems on individuals and organisations (Kohn, 1993; Deci, Koestner 
and Ryan, 1999; Pink, 2009).  For organisations then, the consequences of pay choices have 
the potential to be incredibly successful or absolutely disastrous. Only by building theory, 
based firmly on empirical evidence, can the academic community claim to be in a position 
to offer knowledge with which to shape organisational practice.  The contribution of this 
thesis is to add to that capacity in its unique contribution to knowledge about why 
organisations select the pay practices they do and how those practices influence 
organisational outcomes.  
1.2 Research context  
This research study came about as a result of an initial collaboration between the Chartered 
Institute of Personnel and Development (CIPD) and a team of academics including the 
researcher (see Appendix A for list of participants) which involved the collection of pay data 
from CIPD members and the production of Reward Management Survey Reports (Jones, 
Marriott, Perkins, and Shields, 2011; Jones, Marriott, Brown, Perkins and Shields 2012).  
The survey reports in previous years had provided CIPD members with benchmarking data 
about the frequency of different pay practices and commentary on contemporary 
developments in pay policy and practice that would be relevant for the practitioner 
community.  The involvement of the researcher and academic team brought a more 
theoretical perspective to the research with the intention of exploring pay issues in greater 
depth, particularly emphasising the relationships between strategy, pay and HR 
performance outcomes. During completion of the 2011 survey report it became clear that 
there was an opportunity for a notable contribution to theoretical and empirical studies of 
strategic pay, but that a project of such depth was beyond the scope of the annual CIPD 
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survey reports. This thesis is the result of those initial ideas and conversations about an in-
depth investigation of strategic pay in the UK which could provide both empirical evidence 
and theoretical rigour for both the academic and practitioner pay communities.   
1.3 Aim, objectives and research questions 
Given the theoretical background and research context, the aim of this research is to reassess 
the strategic pay model by evaluating the extent of strategic pay practices in UK private 
sector organisations and their impact on HR performance outcomes.  Having done so, this 
thesis aims to further develop strategic pay theory by incorporating empirical and theoretical 
findings into a new framework contributing to both knowledge and application of pay 
practice.   
The research has three main objectives. 
1. The first objective of the study is to test the proposition that pay practices will have 
an effect on HR performance outcomes. This is a key tenet of the strategic pay 
concept as introduced above; the design, choice and management of pay influences 
employee behaviour and performance and therefore improves HR performance 
outcomes such as productivity, absence, recruitment and retention. Testing the 
strength of evidence for this universalistic claim then is fundamental in reassessing 
the strategic pay model. 
2. The second objective is to test the proposition that organisations will select pay 
practices that are in alignment with internal and external organisational 
contingencies.  This objective relates to the contingency strands of the strategic pay 
concept; different organisations will have different employee behaviour and 
performance requirements due to different business strategies, types of 
employment, sectoral differences (services or manufacturing) and sizes of 
organisation (numbers of employees) and different organisations will therefore 
select different pay practices in order to encourage these different behaviours.  If 
there is strong evidence to suggest that pay practice selection is related to 
organisational contingencies this would lend support to this aspect of the strategic 
pay model. 
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3. Finally, the third objective of the study is to test the proposition that positive HR 
performance outcomes will result from selecting pay practices that are strategically 
aligned with organisational contingencies. This builds on the two previous 
objectives and further tests the contingency precept that aligned pay results in 
improved outcomes. 
To meet these three research objectives, three associated research questions have been 
framed.    
1. What effect do pay practices have on HR performance outcomes?  
2. To what extent do organisations align pay practices with external organisational 
contingencies such as business strategy and industry sector or internal contingencies 
such as employment group and organisation size?  
3. To what extent does alignment of pay practices with organisation contingencies 
have an effect on HR performance outcomes? 
The thesis responds to these research questions through an in-depth, critical review of extant 
literature on both theoretical and empirical aspects of strategy pay and related, underpinning 
concepts. This leads to a tightly defined set of hypothetical propositions which are then 
tested empirically. 
1.4 Contribution and impact 
This research contributes to strategic pay theory and has important implications for 
organisational practice. It has been noted that pay remains “neglected” and “under-
researched” (Conroy, et al., 2016, p.207-8). In contrast to other HRM topics (such as 
performance appraisal and selection), research on pay is “sporadic and sparse” being 
“among the most under-researched areas in HR” (Gupta and Shaw, 2014, p.1-2).  Much of 
the research on strategic pay appears to have been completed in 1980s and 1990s with far 
fewer contributions in the twenty-first century, and yet the prevailing assumptions about 
pay, strategy and performance outcomes still inform standard models in current textbooks 
(e.g. Armstrong and Brown, 2009; Perkins, et al., 2016).   
This study responds to Gupta and Shaw’s (2014, p.2) call for “better thinking and better 
evidence” in research on pay.  It presents large-scale, cross-sectional empirical evidence of 
24 
 
 
the extent and effect of strategic pay in UK private sector organisations and, based on this 
empirical evidence, the study contributes to the debate on and development of strategic pay 
theory and practice.  
This thesis contributes to knowledge in finding that organisations are practising strategic 
pay; they select pay practices that align with workforce human capital requirements and 
that support their business strategies. The organisation’s size and industry sector also 
influence the type of pay practices selected.  Furthermore, this study proposes that pay 
practices are operated in bundles with distinctive characteristics related to the orientation of 
the organisation.  A significant part of the thesis is the proposition that pay does shape HR 
performance outcomes; not only do specific approaches to pay practice have definite 
positive or negative effects but configuring practices in bundles with organisational 
contingencies can enhance or diminish those effects. This strongly suggests that pay choices 
can have significant consequences for organisational outcomes. Finally, the thesis proposes 
that the standard theoretical frameworks for analysing strategic pay practice: universalism, 
contingency or configurational theories (Delery and Doty, 1996; Martín-Alcázar, Romero-
Fernández, and Sánchez-Gardey, 2005), should be extended to take account of the 
contextual complexity and often conflicting imperatives inherent in organisational 
decision-making  
There are important implications here for the development of strategic pay theory. Pay 
practices are often selected because of organisational contingencies, distinct approaches to 
pay strategy are evident and there can be significant effects on HR performance, but the 
linear assumptions that often characterise strategic pay literature need to be rethought. As 
this study shows, the picture of strategic pay in the UK is a more complex and varied one 
than these perspectives suggest.  
Aside from theoretical contributions, these findings will have high impact in the HR/reward 
practitioner arena.  There is a clear indication from this study that pay practices have 
strategic importance for organisations and dissemination of these findings will contribute 
to understanding of the role and impact of pay decisions on organisational performance.  
1.5 Thesis outline 
This thesis is organised in 9 chapters: 
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The following two chapters provide a detailed examination of relevant theory and research 
on strategic pay. Chapter 2 sets out the theoretical background and context of strategic pay, 
critically discussing the language, meaning and function of pay in organisations. This is 
followed by an evaluation of different theoretical perspectives of strategic pay in Chapter 3 
which examines a) the universalistic perspective incorporating ‘new pay’ approaches that 
propose strategic pay practices improve organisational performance and b) contingency and 
configurational perspectives that advocate greater alignment between pay and internal and 
external organisational features.  This first half of the thesis concludes with a delineation of 
the strategic pay conceptual framework drawn from the literature and a full statement of the 
hypotheses.  The thesis continues with a detailed explanation of the adopted methodology 
and overall research approach and design in Chapter 4. The subsequent three chapters report 
empirical results and analyse findings for relationships between pay and: business strategy, 
industry sector and organisational size (Chapter 5); employment group (Chapter 6); and HR 
outcomes (Chapter 7).  Chapter 8 discusses the implications of the findings for the extant 
strategic pay model. Finally, Chapter 9 presents overall conclusions, explores limitations of 
the study and offers suggestions in directing future research and pay practice.   
A brief Glossary is provided for reference, followed by Appendices A-R which provide 
supporting documents regarding the CIPD Reward Management Survey context, research 
ethical approval and ancillary data relating to the statistical analyses presented in Chapters 5 
to 7. 
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Chapter 2: Strategic pay - context and 
background  
2.1 Chapter introduction  
This chapter provides a contextual and theoretical background to the study.  Pay has 
meaning for people; it is an economic exchange; an entitlement and a reward. Pay has a 
function in organisations; it attracts employees, retains and incentivises them. And pay plays 
a central role in concepts of organisational justice; it provides information with which groups 
and individuals measure their worth as defined by their employers.  
The first section of the chapter analyses different perspectives on pay held by various 
stakeholders in society, the multifaceted meanings of pay’s central component, money, and 
as a starting point, the implications of the language of pay and reward choices. 
2.2 The meaning of pay: money, contexts and terminology 
2.2.1 Alternative terms: scoping the ‘pay’ territory 
Accepting the premise that socially constructed language choices have meaningful 
consequences for our understanding of reality (Burger and Luckmann, 1967), it seems 
appropriate to start by critically examining the terminology used to denote ‘pay’ in academic 
literature and organisational practice.  In doing so, the intention is twofold: as a practical 
delineation and clarification of terms but also to begin to unpack some of the main themes 
in this study around the role of pay in organisations. 
In simple terms, ‘pay’ is defined as the “money, or a sum of money, paid for labour or 
service” (OED, 2018a) ‘Pay’ is the term chosen in this study to refer to the monetary 
component of the employment transaction as a deliberate choice based on both the relative 
neutrality of the term in comparison to alternatives (as explored below) and its specific 
reference to the financial element of the employment deal. 
An alternative term to ‘pay’, ‘reward’, is used in both literature and practice although it 
clearly has a wider meaning than its use in an employment context. The OED online entry 
describes reward as “a recompense or return given to (or received by) a person for some 
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service, merit, or favour” (OED, 2018b) implying that those three elements are not only 
distinct but equally worthy.  In the study of psychology, ‘reward’ refers to, “any pleasurable 
or satisfying event or thing that is obtained when some requisite task has been carried out” 
(Reber, Allen and Reber, 2009 pp.687-8). This definition has close links to the concept of 
‘reinforcement’; the strengthening of a connection between response (e.g. behaviour) and 
stimulus (e.g. a reward) (Ibid.). So, in both general English language and psychological 
literature there is a clear indication of reward as a potentially motivating factor in influencing 
employee actions. As noted by Druker and White (2000a), particularly in UK practitioner 
contexts, ‘reward’ and ‘reward management’ are favoured terms.  These are used by the 
Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development to refer to all matters related to pay and 
benefits (CIPD, 2017) and many text-book titles adopt the nomenclanture (e.g. Armstrong 
and Murlis, 2007; Armstrong and Brown, 2009; Armstrong, 2015; Perkins et al., 2016).  
Heery and Noon (2009, p.311) in A Dictionary of Human Resource Management, define 
‘reward’ as referring to “the benefits which employees receive in return for working on 
behalf of an employing organization”, but they also comment on its use as a more HRM-
oriented, “fashionable” and “positive” way of referring to tangible pay and benefits than 
alternatives.  The inclusion of the term ‘management’ indicates a deliberate approach and 
suggests reward practices have the potential to be directed towards achieving organisational 
objectives. There is some indication here then that the very terms ‘reward’ and ‘reward 
management’ are loaded expressions presupposing a positive employee experience but also 
a purposeful managerial approach. 
‘Compensation’ is a term widely used interchangeably with ‘reward’ and ‘pay’ in practice 
as well as literature, predominantly in the United States (Perkins and White, 2009). The 
OED online cites this particular meaning and again situates it in a chiefly North American 
context: “Salary or wages, esp. of a public servant; payment for services rendered. US” 
(OED, 2018c). The emphasis being on monetary elements of pay.  ‘Compensation and 
benefits’ are often coupled as an expression that encompasses other elements besides pay.  
There are, of course other connotations associated with ‘compensation’: “that which is given 
in recompense, an equivalent rendered, remuneration, amends” or “amends or recompense 
for loss or damage” (Ibid.) are suggestive of reimbursement and have far more negative 
connotations than the more upbeat ‘reward’. There is an implication that the employee needs 
to be compensated by the employer for enduring employment and expending effort; what 
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economists term the ‘disutility of labour’ (Heery and Noon, 2009; Knabe and Ratzel, 2012). 
However, the origin of ‘compensation’, from the Latin verb compensare: ’to weigh against’, 
also suggests a notion of balance, signifying the need for equilibrium between what is given 
and taken by employer and employee.  ‘Remuneration’ is yet another term used 
interchangeably with those above and is much more clearly defined as, “money paid for 
work or a service” (OED, 2018d). As with ‘compensation’, definitions of ‘remuneration’ 
tend to refer to “money” only.   
 In addition to these semantic choices, the inclusivity of such terms is a consideration. As 
noted above, ‘compensation’, ‘remuneration’ and ‘pay’ tend to refer to pay and monetary 
benefits only, whereas ‘reward’ can also encompass other aspects of work that are in 
themselves rewarding. The concept of ‘total reward’, which has been developed largely in 
the practitioner arena, has taken this to its logical conclusion with definitions that include 
compensation, benefits, work-life arrangements, performance management and recognition 
as well as career development and opportunities (WorldatWork, 2018). This extension of 
the traditional pay and benefits remit explicitly sets out to incorporate aspects of the 
employment relationship that are: ‘relational’ in addition to ‘transactional’, and ‘intangible’ 
as well as ‘tangible’, drawing on the concept of psychological contract proposed by Argyris 
(1960) and Rousseau (1989, 1995).  This approach to rewarding employees, in its broadest 
definition, can be understood as expanding to encompass everything that is ‘rewarding’ 
about working for an employer or everything employees receives as a result of their 
employment (Davis, 2007, Corby and Lindop, 2009). 
Various models of total reward have been developed in recent years (Armstrong and Brown, 
2009; Nienaber, 2010; World at Work, 2018). Figure 2.1 delineates a representative total 
reward framework originally developed by Helen Murlis and Clive Wright (in personal 
correspondence) and adapted by Perkins et al. (2016) for publication. The range of ‘reward 
elements’ starts with basic cash payments, moves through variable elements of pay and 
benefits all the way up to aspects of employment that seek to generate engagement and 
emotional connections between employer and employee. Employers can design total 
reward offers that fulfil ‘core’ employee needs and that flex to allow ‘optional’ benefits 
meeting differing or changing employee needs dependent upon age or gender for example 
(Corby and Lindop, 2009; Hoole and Hotz, 2016). 
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The combination of rewards that offer employees both ‘extrinsic’ (externally derived) and 
‘intrinsic’ (derived from the job itself) fulfilment appears to provide employers with a 
system to maximise the organisational benefit of employee rewards (Hoole and Hotz, 2016).  
So, ‘total reward’ conceptualises pay and reward as being about far more than a transactional 
exchange; there is a clear indication that the value of the whole ‘total reward proposition’ is 
far greater than the sum of each individual part.  
 
Figure 2-1. Total reward model (Source: Perkins et al, 2016) 
While there appears to be some evidence for positive organisational benefits of a total 
reward approach (e.g. Schlechter, Thompson and Bussin, 2015; Hoole and Hotz, 2016), 
total reward has also attracted much criticism as a consultancy staple with little academic 
underpinning or empirical evidence-base (Perkins et al, 2016).  One of the difficulties of 
justifying a total reward approach is the very breadth of its scope; if everything and anything 
can be subjectively rewarding in employment it becomes meaningless (Ibid.).  Moreover, 
Brown (2014) argues that both the terminology and concept of ‘total reward’ have become 
increasingly meaningless in the economic uncertainty of the last 10 years.  Paton (2014) 
goes as far as asserting that total reward may well be ‘dead’ as a concept.  The argument is 
based on the primacy of take-home pay for employees in economies that are putting 
downward pressure on pay alongside erosion of traditional ‘benefits’ such as pensions and 
job security (Brown, 2014; Paton 2014). In this context, higher-order intrinsic elements 
cease to have meaning when lower-order fundamentals of the model are not being met.  The 
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authors argue that providing ‘chocolate box’ style flexible benefits packages under a ‘total 
reward’ rubric cannot make up for stagnant pay increases, work intensification and 
continued insecurity (Ibid.).  
Taking the above arguments into consideration, the focus (and terminology) chosen for this 
study is pay (the area labelled ‘total direct remuneration’ in Figure 2.1 above). First, in terms 
of language, this is in recognition that, of all the options examined above, it is a relatively 
neutral term.  But it also delimits what is included and excluded in the scope of the study. 
Pay denotes more tangible aspects of the employer-employee exchange and includes all 
monetary aspects of pay and those with a direct financial equivalence (e.g. stock options). 
Pay is always a central component of the employment deal (regardless of economic 
conditions) and while the intangible and relational aspects of the employment relationship, 
no doubt offer the potential to be rewarding in an employment context, sit outside the bounds 
of this particular study.  While there is some evidence to suggest that the total reward model 
has become a staple of pay and reward rhetoric (Brown, 2014) it is arguably conceptually 
distinct from tangible and monetary remuneration because it relies on psychological 
reactions to intangible aspects of the employment relationship (Perkins, et al., 2016).   And 
these reactions are far more difficult to measure being subjective at an employee level 
(Ibid.). 
2.2.2 Stakeholders 
Taking this further, and moving on from language alone, it is important to consider that the 
actuality of pay (whatever terminology is used to denote it) has meaning too. Milkovich and 
Newman (2002) offer a useful starting point by outlining the differing perspectives on pay 
taken by various stakeholders and actors.  At the broadest level, all of society has an interest 
in pay matters. Voters for example, may see the pay and pensions of public sector workers 
as the reason for increased taxes; consumers too, may regard high labour costs as responsible 
for higher prices whereas low labour costs in less developed economies are cited as reasons 
for domestic job losses and off-shoring of production and services (Ibid.). Conversely 
however those same voters, consumers and citizens may see pay as a social justice issue. In 
the UK, austerity cuts to public sector pay (Wakefield, 2015) and pensions (Cutler and 
Waine, 2013), the persistence of the gender pay gap (The Lancet, 2018), the widening gap 
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between the highest and lowest paid in society (Allen and Ball, 2011; Hutton, 2011), the 
continuing issues of a ‘living’ wage and in-work poverty at home (Swaffield, Snell, Tunstall 
and Bradshaw, 2018) and an end to pay exploitation abroad (Badham, 2017) have all 
become widespread matters of debate and concern for many.  
Within organisations too, pay signifies different things and plays different roles. Pay issues 
for most shareholders are centred on executive pay and how closely it is tied to the financial 
performance of the company. For managers, pay is an operational cost to be weighed against 
productivity but may also have the potential to be a means of improving that productivity 
(Milkovich and Newman, 2002).   
For the recipients of pay, employees, pay can be the main source of economic security and 
the means to provide both essential and desirable goods and services; both material and 
social wellbeing.  As Milkovich and Newman (2002, p.6) point out, pay can be seen 
variously by employees as, “a return in an exchange between their employer and 
themselves, as an entitlement for being an employee of the company, or as a reward for a 
job well done.” (emphasis added). Each of these perspectives comes with its own differing 
meanings and implications.  In an exchange relationship both parties will accept a level of 
contingency; what is given will depend on what is provided in exchange.  In contrast, 
employees with an entitlement perspective are likely to see pay as something owed to them 
regardless of their contribution; indeed ‘entitlement’ has become a pejorative term in recent 
years in the UK referring to workplace cultures, usually in public sector contexts, where 
workers are framed as unreasonably demanding pay rights regardless of economic 
circumstances (e.g. McKinstry, 2008).  The connotations of ‘reward’, as a managerial term 
used to refer to pay and benefits based in psychological notions of satisfaction on task 
completion, have been discussed above. However, Milkovich and Newman (2002) suggest 
that employees are unlikely to view pay in this way despite managers’ and consultants’ 
preferences for the terminology. Instead, the authors suggest, pay for employees is a return 
on investments of human capital; education, training and contributions of time and energy 
in work.  
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2.2.3 The meaning of money 
However, it is unlikely that all employees will regard pay in such straightforward terms. 
One aspect of pay and its meaning for employees which has been explored in the literature 
is its conceptual overlap with the construct of ‘money’. Of course, pay is usually monetary, 
and, for the majority of people, paid employment is the primary means of accessing money. 
Gomez-Meija and Balkin (1992, p.5) make this interconnection clear in their introduction 
to a seminal contribution to the strategic pay literature, Compensation, Organizational 
Strategy, and Firm Performance: “Compensation’s central variable – money – represents 
the most generalized medium of exchange known to humankind.”  It is therefore not only 
“an integral part of practically all transactions occurring within and across organizational 
boundaries” but also, “the quintessence of all business language” (Ibid., p.5). 
It follows, therefore, that pay may have differing meanings for different employees because 
money has been found to have different meanings for different people; according to gender, 
socio-economic group, work experience and cultural background (Wernimont and 
Fitzpatrick, 1972; Tang, 1993). Tang (1992, p.201) goes as far as suggesting that the 
meaning of money is “a frame of reference in which one examines one’s everyday life”.  It 
is theorised that childhood socialisation is largely responsible for the different meanings 
attached to money (Kirkcaldy and Furnham, 1993) and that much of this differentiation has 
to do with the values individuals attach to money and therefore pay (Mahoney, 1991; 
Mitchell and Mickel, 1999; Tang, Tang and Luna-Arocas, 2005). Money, and by 
implication pay, it is argued, can be associated with consumption opportunities, security, 
power, status and achievement as well as stress and anxiety (Mitchell and Mickel, 1999; 
Barber and Bretz, 2000). An example of these different associations is shown in an early 
study of pay increases by Krefting and Mahoney (1977) who find that the meaningfulness 
employees attached to increases in pay was less to do with the amount of the increase itself 
than the employees’ orientation towards either money or organisational recognition. Indeed, 
they find that for those for whom recognition was the primary orientation, the pay itself had 
“little inherent meaning” (p.85) i.e. the pay increase is valued as a symbol of recognition and 
organisational approval rather than having meaningful value in monetary terms.  Tang and 
various associates  (Tang, 1992; Tang 1993; Tang, Kim and Tang, 2002; Tang, Tang and 
Luna-Arocas, 2005) have conceptualised these differing attitudes towards money as a 
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‘money ethic’ and, through empirical work, have developed scales for differentiating 
attitudes including: positive attitudes (money is good, important, valuable and attractive); 
negative attitudes (money is evil, shameful and useless); achievement (money is a symbol 
of success); respect (money makes people in your community respect you and money is 
honourable); and power (money allows autonomy and freedom and confers power) (Tang, 
1993).  So, money, and by extension pay, clearly has far more meaning for people than its 
‘face value’ monetary worth and has a range of psychological, social and cultural 
dimensions.  
2.3 The function of pay in organisations: sorting, incentive and 
equity effects 
Moving from the meaning of pay, to consider its function, the treatment of the role of pay in 
the literature is largely divided into three main strands.  
First, pay has been theorised to have a sorting effect: impacting the composition of the 
workforce via attraction, selection (both organisational and self-selection) and attrition 
processes.  Key theoretical frameworks include efficiency wage theory (Weiss, 1980) and 
human capital theory (Becker, 1993). 
Second, pay has been theorised to have an incentive effect; influencing employee behaviour, 
motivation and performance (Lazear 1986; Gerhart and Rynes, 2003; Gerhart, Rynes and 
Fulmer, 2009; Gerhart and Fang, 2014).  Key theories applicable here include agency theory 
(Fama, 1980), expectancy theory (Vroom, 1964) and cognitive evaluation theory (Deci, 
1972). 
Third, pay decisions have been theorised to have an effect on perceived equity; influencing 
employee action: joining, staying with, and applying task effort in, organisations. 
Distributive justice and equity theory predictions (Homans, 1961; Adams, 1963, 1965), 
procedural justice (Leventhal, 1980; McFarlin and Sweeney, 1992) and forms of 
interactional justice (Greenberg, 1993) as well as underpinning ideas from social 
comparison theory (Festinger, 1954) and cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957) are 
relevant conceptual frameworks in this final strand. 
This section will examine both theory and evidence for each of these proposed effects.  
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2.3.1 Sorting effects 
The argument for a sorting effect proposes that pay influences workforce composition 
because different pay practices attract and retain different types of employee (Gerhart and 
Rynes, 2003).  Much of the work on the sorting effect is based on established theories of 
labour and institutional economics including efficiency wages (Salop, 1979; Stiglitz, 1987; 
Weiss, 1980) and human capital (Becker, 1993).  The premise of these models is that 
organisations pay at a higher level in order to attract and retain workers who have invested 
in their own human capital through education and training and therefore have valuable skills 
or knowledge.  
A key proposition is that higher pay levels aid the attraction and selection of better quality 
employees. Weiss’s (1980) efficiency wage model predicts that better employees will be 
attracted by wages higher than their ‘reservation’ wage (the lowest wage a worker would be 
willing to accept); in effect, better quality employees self-select into higher paid jobs. 
Weiss’s (1980) model however assumes information asymmetry; that organisations cannot 
know either what employees’ reservation wages are or their true productive ability.  Despite 
this, variants of the model propose that an efficiency wage effect will still occur when 
information asymmetry is reduced because employers can accurately assess and select job 
applicants and only better candidates are selected (Stiglitz 1987; Schlicht, 2005). Hosios and 
Peters (1993) too propose that forms of communication (e.g. contract negotiation) between 
employer and employee, as well as monitoring of performance in short-term contracts, will 
influence overall contractual and pay outcomes. 
Efficiency wage theorists also propose a turnover model where higher pay levels positively 
influence employee retention. Salop (1979) proposes that employee turnover is costly to the 
organisation through direct costs of replacement and indirectly through lost productivity and 
therefore organisations will increase pay rates to a level which secures the on-going 
employment of employees. Toulemonde (2003), extending the theory, indicates that the 
prohibitive cost of turnover to the organisation protects ‘insider’ employees who are able to 
bargain for their wage and are less likely to leave (voluntarily or involuntarily).  
Both the selection and turnover models of efficiency wage theory have been subject to 
criticism for both unwarranted assumptions and lack of empirical support (Beaudry, 1994). 
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Testing these predictions empirically has proved difficult because the type of organisation-
level data required is rare (Campbell, 1993) and many potential variables, such as ‘effort’ or 
‘asymmetric information’, are unobservable (Agell and Lundborg, 2001). In addition, the 
focus of empirical research on efficiency wage theory has been the proposed relationship 
between higher wages and productivity (e.g. Konings and Walsh, 1994; Hibbs and Locking, 
2000) rather than the lesser examined selection and turnover models.  The evidence for the 
existence and effectiveness of efficiency wages for aiding, selection and minimising 
turnover is largely inconclusive. Leonard (1987) tests the turnover model in a study 
involving more than 200 locations and 70,000 employees in the United States high-tech 
sector and finds evidence that while higher wages are associated with lower turnover rates, 
the actual reduction in turnover rates is not sufficient to offset the higher wage costs.  
Campbell (1993) finds evidence that firms with higher turnover costs also pay higher wages. 
Agell and Lundborg’s (2001) study surveys Swedish HR Managers and finds a belief that 
productivity differentials between potential employees are signalled by employees’ 
willingness to accept pay offers, suggesting limited support for the selection model. This 
finding is in direct contrast however with Blinder and Choi (1990 p.1006) who find 
“damaging evidence against the adverse-selection model” in that United States managers 
unanimously disagree with the suggestion that employee rejection of pay offers was related 
to unobserved high productivity. More recently though, Macpherson, Prasad and Salmon’s 
(2014) research on students suggests a marked preference for a wage profile fitting the 
traditional ‘efficiency wages’ model in comparison to a ‘deferred compensation’ alternative, 
despite it not necessarily being in their best economic interests over time.  Although here the 
question of generalising results from a population of students to workers has to be raised. 
So, while there is no doubt that the empirical support is far from complete, efficiency wage 
theories proposing that higher pay levels can lead to better employees either self-selecting 
or being selected and that higher pay levels can prevent better quality employees leaving 
organisations are clearly well established. 
Aside from pay level, there has also been considerable attention to the basis for pay, in the 
literature proposing that pay has a sorting effect in organisations. Many of these studies 
examine the proposition that pay-for-performance (PFP) systems have a sorting effect on 
workforce composition because individuals are attracted to different types of pay systems 
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according to their productivity-related attributes and will self-select into jobs in which they 
can earn more through performance incentives (Gerhart, Rynes and Fulmer, 2009; Gerhart 
and Fang, 2014). However, distinguishing a sorting effect independently from the better 
researched incentive effect (discussed at greater length below) has not proved a 
straightforward task for researchers.  This is because, again, the organisational data is 
difficult to come by (Eriksson and Villeval, 2008), but also because organisations do not 
tend to use pay practices in isolation; they are more likely to operate a number of pay 
practices in conjunction with one another (Prince, Prince, Skousen and Kabst, 2016).  One 
approach has been to perform laboratory experiments with students as proxy employees 
(Cadsby, Song and Tapon, 2007; Eriksson and Villeval, 2008). Cadsby et al. (2007) find 
that more productive ‘employees’ select PFP over fixed wages while more risk-averse 
individuals are less likely to select PFP.  Eriksson and Villeval (2008) too find that high skill 
‘employees’ favour variable pay schemes suggesting that individuals with higher level skills 
are more likely to self-select into jobs with such schemes. There are however considerable 
limitations of these studies, acknowledged by the authors. One limitation is the question-
mark over generalisability of results from a student to an employee population. In addition, 
the low-value monetary stakes risked by participants cannot replicate real PFP schemes and 
laboratory conditions cannot truly emulate the complexity of real world organisational 
settings, so these results must be treated with some caution. 
An alternative research strategy, employed by Lazear (1986, 2000), is to study organisations 
changing their pay system and moving from fixed pay to variable piece rates as it allows the 
researcher an opportunity to analyse any differences in outcome.  An initial study found that 
more able workers select firms where performance has a payoff (i.e. they are paid according 
to output) while less able workers go to firms where ability has no effect on salary (Lazear, 
1986).  A further large-scale field study in a glassworks factory identifies a strong sorting 
influence on the productivity of the organisation; of the 44% improvement in productivity 
overall, Lazear (2000) finds roughly half is attributable to the outcome that, over time, less 
productive employees left and were replaced by more productive employees.   
However, all the above studies are confined to examining the sorting effect of piece rates 
which is just one form of PFP and one that is increasingly rare in organisations (Perkins et 
al., 2016). In addition, the sorting effect observed is limited to self-selection only.  This issue 
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is addressed somewhat by Trevor, Gerhart and Boudreau (1997) in a study of voluntary 
turnover and job performance that finds high performers are less likely to leave if their pay 
growth is commensurate with their performance. Work by Nyberg (2010) supports these 
findings in a study of insurance workers as does that by Shaw et al. (2009) showing 
‘expectation-enhancements’, including PFP, are negatively related to high performers’ quit 
rates and positively related to poor performers’ quit rates suggesting a sorting effect in the 
organisations studied.  So, the proposition that the basis for pay can lead to more productive 
employees being attracted to and retained by organisations has a reasonable body of 
supporting evidence.  
However, while the sorting effect has been proposed as an important function of pay 
systems, it is overshadowed in the literature by the huge body of work focussing on the 
incentive effect.  
2.3.2 Incentive effects 
The central proposition of the incentive effect is that pay influences the level or intensity of 
individual and aggregate motivation and therefore output (Gerhart et al., 2009). There are a 
number of theoretical frameworks proposed to underpin the incentive effect of pay coming 
from both the disciplines of labour economics and management psychology (Gerhart and 
Rynes, 2003). But there are also theories that counter claims of an incentive effect, 
particularly from the field of motivational psychology.  This section will examine both 
theories and empirical evidence of the incentive effect of pay on employee performance. 
For economists the incentive power of pay is rarely in question; principles of classical 
economic theory predict that homo economicus wishes to obtain the greatest amount of 
wealth possible and will therefore act in order to get it (Mill, 2009a).  Rottenberg (1956) 
explains that, in comparison to other job qualities (such as job security), money is not only 
continuously quantifiable as a highly visible scale, but also that preference patterns are 
consistent; all else being equal, people will nearly always prefer more money, rather than 
less.   
More recently, agency theory has sought to make sense of the dynamics of pay as an 
incentive, framing organisational shareholders as the ‘principal’ and managers their ‘agent’.  
The theory assumes that agents will act in their own best interest unless the economic 
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interests of the agent are aligned with those of the principal (Stroh, Brett, Bauman and Reilly, 
1996).  Agency theorists have sought to explain the pay choices available to principals and 
how these relate to agent outcomes (Bloom and Milkovich, 1998). Ross (1973, p.138) 
defines the problem for the principal: a “fee-to-act” can be agreed with the agent but 
monitoring of performance, particularly for multiple agents, will prove costly.   Fama (1980) 
presents one solution in the form of competition from the market which will force evolution 
of performance management devices; the market will effectively impose a wage revision 
process which constrains managers’ self-interest.  However, as Perkins and Hendry (2005) 
explain, agency theory’s premise is that it is not easy to align managers’ pay with their 
performance outcomes, otherwise organisations could just rely on fixed salaries, the fact that 
they more often adopt variable PFP systems is a function of the assumed principal-agent 
problem i.e. shareholders believe that managers are likely to shirk and act primarily in their 
own self-interest unless appropriately incentivised.   
On one level there is empirical support for pay incentives working as a solution to the 
principal-agent problem. In his large-scale field study of a glassworks company’s move 
from hourly rates to piece work, Lazear (2000) finds a significant incentive effect increasing 
employee output alongside the sorting effect cited above. Cadsby et al. (2007) observed 
incentive effects in their laboratory study where, regardless of pay preferences, participants 
produced more working under a PFP scheme than on fixed wages.  However, in the field of 
executive pay it is harder to find such unambiguous results. Bloom and Milkovich (1998) 
in a study of large-scale United States databases on managerial pay, stock market risk and 
accounting data find that, counter to what would be expected if a principal-agent effect was 
at work, firms at higher risk did not use short-term incentives and indeed those that did so 
suffered poorer firm-level performance outcomes. The authors suggest this implies a more 
complex employment contract than agency theory predicts.  Perkins and Hendry (2005, 
p.1464) also suggest agency theory is inadequate to explain the complexity of executive pay 
which does not operate in a “hermetically sealed” world but rather one where governance 
of executive pay and performance is subject to multifaceted social processes. 
In the psychological literature there is also a mixed view of the incentive effect of pay. There 
are some that have argued strongly in favour of pay acting as an incentive, for example, 
Locke et al. (1980) propose that no other incentive or motivational technique can compare 
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to money with respect to its instrumental value. The ‘instrumentality’ of incentives is an idea 
largely deriving from expectancy theory developed initially by Vroom (1964). The premise 
of the theory is that incentive effects are dependent on:  
1. The individual believing that s/he has the capability to perform the given task if s/he 
exerts performance-related effort (expectancy - E)  
2. That performance, at a certain level, will lead to outcomes or consequences 
(instrumentality - I) and;   
3. The outcomes or consequences are valued (valence - V)  
(Schwab, 1973)  
The implications for the incentive effect of pay in general, and PFP in particular, have been 
widely studied and the core components of expectancy theory have become a standard part 
of the language of motivational psychology (Gerhart and Rynes, 2003). Expectancy theory 
also seems to offer practical principles for designing performance-pay systems that have 
clear, achievable performance objectives which are rewarded with sufficiently valued pay 
outcomes (Armstrong and Brown, 2009).   
In terms of empirical evidence for an expectancy effect, a meta-analysis by Van Eerde and 
Thierry (1996) find some support for the individual components of the model (E-I-V) 
although it is proposed that the validity of the construct as a whole is uncertain. The authors 
attribute this in part to the different interpretations of the theory by researchers and inaccurate 
analysis techniques in decades-old research.  However, a subsequent meta-analysis finds 
monetary incentives have a large mean effect on employee productivity although only in 
terms of quantity not quality (Jenkins et al., 1998) and the incentive effect of pay, based on 
its instrumental properties, remains a strong component of some strands of management 
psychology. 
This view, however, is in direct contrast to pervasive psychological theories of motivation 
developed in the middle and second half of the twentieth century by Maslow (1943), 
Herzberg (1974, 1987; Herzberg, Mausner and Synderman, 1959) and Deci (1972, 1976; 
Deci and Ryan, 1985). Collectively, these authors reject the dominance of monetary reward 
as the primary incentive to explain human behaviour in organisational contexts. Maslow’s 
(1943) hierarchy of needs theory categorises money as a basic need (it enabled the fulfilment 
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of physiological and instinctive requirements such as food, shelter and warmth) as opposed 
to the higher needs of love (belongingness), esteem and self-actualisation which could be 
better fulfilled by meaningful, satisfying work. For Herzberg et al. (1959), who developed 
a two-factor theory of motivators and ‘hygiene factors’, money is a hygiene factor; it can be 
a source of dissatisfaction for employees but not a source of satisfaction and therefore 
motivation.  
The work of Deci and colleagues (Deci, 1972, 1976; Deci and Ryan, 1985; Deci, Koestner 
and Ryan, 1999; Ryan and Deci, 2000; Baard, Deci and Ryan, 2004) on the effects of 
external reward on motivation has also questioned the incentive effect of pay suggesting that 
contingent rewards such as PFP could have a negative effect on motivation.  Deci’s (1972) 
starting position is that there are two broad classes of human motivation: intrinsic motivation 
and extrinsic motivation. Intrinsic motivation occurs when the individual undertakes an 
activity for no other reason than the activity itself (e.g. reasons of satisfaction, enjoyment) 
whereas extrinsic motivation occurs when the individual undertakes an activity because it 
leads to an external reward (e.g. pay, approval and status).  His findings over time have led 
to the development of cognitive evaluation theory (CET) which suggests that pay is likely 
to ‘crowd out’ an individual’s interest and satisfaction in the work itself, thereby lessening 
the strength of intrinsic motivation. This happens because external reward has a ‘controlling’ 
aspect. When money is the external reward, intrinsic motivation decreases because the 
individual perceives their behaviour to be governed by acting to gain the reward; they are 
controlled by it (Deci, 1972). This on-going research has concluded that external rewards, 
particularly tangible rewards that are contingent upon individual actions, undermine 
intrinsic motivation (Deci, Koestner and Ryan, 1999).  
The work of Maslow, Herzberg and Deci has been taken up by those authors arguing that 
monetary rewards (particularly variable, performance-based payments) are ineffective as 
incentives for performance. Pfeffer (1998) proposes that financial incentives undermine job 
satisfaction, employees perceive them as controlling and they therefore provoke resistance 
and also, over time, they come to be taken for granted as an expected part of the package so 
cease to have an incentive effect.  Deming (1986) exhorts organisations to abandon financial 
incentives as they lead to lack of co-operation and low productivity.  Kohn (1993, p.54) 
takes a more robust view labelling all external rewards “bribes” that not only fail to motivate, 
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they also: punish, rupture relationships, ignore reasons for poor performance and discourage 
risk-taking as well as undermine interest in work.  Pink (2009) has drawn directly on Deci’s 
work to underpin his popularist take on the power of intrinsic motivation and the limited 
contribution of PFP as a performance incentive.  
However, the argument is a complex one and criticisms of the motivational psychologists’ 
claims have been robust.    Fang and Gerhart (2012) make the point that much of the research 
that went into forming cognitive evaluation theory was conducted in non-work settings 
(often among children in educational contexts) and there is limited workplace-based 
evidence.  Indeed, in their own study of white-collar workers in Taiwan, the authors find 
evidence that, contrary to the expected CET view, PFP has a positive impact on intrinsic 
motivation. The possibility of pay incentives increasing intrinsic as well as extrinsic 
motivation has been noted before by Ryan, Mims and Koestner (1983) who propose that 
monetary reward can also provide feedback on performance and therefore increase intrinsic 
motivation by providing meaningful information about self-competence.  An issue here 
may well be that a core component of motivational theory, the validity and reliability of the 
‘intrinsic’ vs. ‘extrinsic’ construct is weak.  Certainly, definitional inconsistencies have been 
cited as problematic, largely due to the operationalization of different definitional 
frameworks (Guzzo, 1979; Kanungo and Hartwick, 1987).   
Another key factor in the debate is that too little attention has been paid to the ‘meaning of 
money’ discussed in Section 2.2.3 above; pay takes on symbolic meanings for individuals 
aside from, or in addition to, its tangible characteristics.  Even Herzberg (1974, p.20), one 
of the originators of two-factor theory which proposes that pay is not a motivator, later 
concedes that pay can act as motivator and hygiene factor because “although primarily a 
hygiene factor, it also often takes on some of the properties of a motivator with dynamics 
similar to recognition or achievement”. 
An alternative view which responds to some of the criticisms of PFP comes from Baker, 
Jensen and Murphy (1988, p.597) who are unequivocal in their belief that pay has an 
incentive effect. They go as far as claiming that the only problem with incentives are that 
they are “too effective” and, whilst they acknowledge unintended or counterproductive 
results, imply this is a problem of management rather than a fault with the theory. 
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It is clear from the evidence outlined above that pay can have an incentive effect, despite 
questions over the alignment with shareholder interests, durability and impact on other 
organisationally desired behaviours such as teamworking.  The effect of other motivational 
elements, particularly those identified as ‘intrinsic’, may be stronger for some depending on 
the type and context of work tasks, but nonetheless there is a body of evidence to suggest 
that pay can have a powerful effect on employee behaviour and, where managed well, this 
can have positive organisational outcomes.  
2.3.3 Equity and justice effects 
Wallace and Fay (1983, p.69) state that “the critical theme that exists at the center of all 
compensation theory and practice [is] equity”.  Alongside the sorting and incentive effects 
of pay, the influence on employee behaviour of perceptions of equity, fairness and justice in 
pay decisions, distributions and procedures is a conceptual strand of the literature that is 
crucial in understanding how pay works in organisations.  
While notions of equity and distributive justice can be traced as far back as Aristotle’s 
Nichomachean Ethics, written circa 350 B.C.E. (Aristotle, translated by Ross, 2009), these 
theories gained traction in the social psychology and compensation literature in the 1960s 
with a number of publications on the subject by Jacques (1961), Homans (1961), Adams 
(1963, 1965), and Lawler (1971).  These theories centre on perceived fairness of an 
individual’s pay provided within the context of the wage-effort exchange. Equity theories 
generally propose that the perception of fairness is related to the comparative nature of 
equity i.e. an individual will compare the experienced effort-reward ratio with that of another 
individual or one that had been experienced in the past or was anticipated to experience in 
the future.  
In an early model, Jacques’ (1961, p.219) proposes a ‘psycho-economic equilibrium’ where 
work and individual capacity must be matched, and payment for the work done must be 
equitable in order for the individual to experience “the maximum psychological equilibrium 
which we are capable of experiencing with regard to our work and payment”.  Where there 
is ‘over equity payment’ Jacques (1961) proposes there will be some initial feelings of 
satisfaction followed by unease, guilt, and fear of envy or retaliation by others. If, in addition, 
the work level is above individual capacity then stress disorders and breakdown may result.  
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On the other hand, where there is ‘under equity payment’, even for the correct work level, 
there will be feelings of unfairness, falling morale and criticism of the organisation. Where 
under equity payments are provided for work that is above or below our capacity, Jacques 
(1961) claims, feelings of contempt for the employer, dissatisfaction and economic 
insecurity will arise leading surely to labour turnover.  Jacques’ (1961) conceptualisation of 
equity effects centres on perceptions of payment in relation to individual capacity (the 
amount or quality of work performed) rather than equity in relation to payments received 
by other workers. His key contribution is the identification of the worker’s psychological 
reactions to perceptions of inequity and the suggestion that workers would act to reach or 
maintain the desirable psychological state of equity equilibrium. 
Meanwhile, drawing directly on Aristotelian ideas, Homans (1974, p.249) proposes that 
“the condition of distributive justice is satisfied when the ratio of the measures of the persons 
is equal to the ratio of the measures of their respective rewards”.  This means that rewards 
should be in proportion to the investments and contribution made and, as long as this is the 
case for all participants, equity or distributive justice is maintained. So here the ‘respective’ 
element is just as important for the achievement of equity. Homans (Ibid.) notes however 
that reaching consensus on what constitutes ‘investment’, ‘contribution’ and ‘reward’ is not 
easy as these factors are contextual in both time and place as well as driven by highly 
personal perspectives. 
Homans’ work was followed by John Stacy Adams who is perhaps the best known and oft-
cited equity theorist despite the initial concept being presented as a ‘theory of social inequity’ 
(1963). Adams (1963, p.424) defines inequity as follows:  
Inequity exists for Person whenever his perceived job inputs and/or outcomes stand 
psychologically in an obverse relation to what he perceives are the inputs and/or 
outcomes of Other.   
Therefore, equity for an individual is achieved when inputs and outcomes are relative or 
proportional to those of another.  Building on Homans’ (1961) ‘investments’ and 
‘contributions’, Adams (1963) defines ‘inputs’ as all those things an individual brings to an 
employment exchange relationship. This might include: education, intelligence, experience, 
training, skill, seniority, age, sex, ethnic background, social status, and effort.  Crucially 
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these are inputs as perceived by the individual themselves rather than the employer for 
whom only some ‘inputs’ will be recognised as relevant to the exchange taking place.  In 
terms of the ‘outcomes’ of the exchange, these are the rewards received and may include: 
“pay, rewards intrinsic to the job, seniority benefits, fringe benefits, job status and status 
symbols, and a variety of formally and informally sanctioned perquisites” (Ibid., p.423). 
Adams (1963) also draws on Festinger’s (1954) social comparison theory making the 
comparative ‘Other’ a central component of the theory.  It is the individual who determines 
who the comparator is and while it might well be “a co-worker or colleague” (as an 
employer might expect) it might equally be “a relative or neighbour” or even “a group of 
co-workers, a craft group, an industry-wide pattern” (Adams, 1963, p.424).  In addition, as 
Patchen (1961) indicates, the referent Other might be the individual themselves six months 
ago i.e. comparing past inputs / outcomes with present inputs / outcomes, or Other might 
even be a future version of themselves in an aspirant position, envisaging the inputs / 
outcomes they are capable of achieving.  Goodman (1974) finds that most people use more 
than one referent as ‘Other’ which therefore could be any of the above comparators 
simultaneously.  
Adams (1963) also uses Festinger’s (1957) work on cognitive dissonance theory as well as 
Jacques (1961) psycho-economic equilibrium concept discussed above, to propose that 
‘inequity’ results for Person if they feel themselves to be underpaid or overpaid and that this 
inequity results in a ‘tension’ (although he notes that the threshold for feelings associated 
with inequity is likely to be higher for overpayment than underpayment). The presence of 
tension created by inequity, Adams (1963, p.427) argues, “will motivate Person to achieve 
equity or reduce inequity, and the strength of motivation to do so will vary directly with the 
amount of inequity”. This direct link between equity and employee motivation in Adams’ 
(1963, 1965) model proposes that an individual could seek to achieve equity and reduce 
inequity in a number of ways.  They could either increase inputs (greater job effort, 
productivity, more training or education); decrease inputs (less job effort and productivity); 
increase outcomes (pay rise, additional benefits or higher status); decrease outcomes (lower 
pay) or ‘leave the field’ (quit the job, transfer, reassignment or increase absenteeism). So, 
even in these early conceptualisations a direct link is envisaged between equity and 
employee behaviour. 
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The field of equity and organisational justice has evolved to incorporate four distinct 
categories of justice which are theorised to influence employee responses to pay (Colquitt 
and Rodell, 2011). Equity and distributive justice refer to the fairness of reward distribution 
(Adams, 1963, 1965); procedural justice refers to the fairness of reward decision-making 
(Leventhal, 1980); interactional justice refers to the fairness of treatment received in the 
implementation of distributions and procedures. This last category has been further divided 
into two distinct components by Greenberg (1993): interpersonal justice refers to the 
fairness received in interpersonal treatment by others and informational justice refers to the 
fairness and truthfulness of explanations and information provided (Greenberg, 1993).   
Each of these constructs is theorised to influence employee attitudes and behaviour 
outcomes; for example: job satisfaction, organisational commitment, evaluation of 
authority, organisational citizenship behaviour, withdrawal behaviours, and job 
performance (Colquitt and Rodell, 2011).  In particular though, both procedural and 
distributive justice have been theorised to have a direct effect on pay satisfaction and 
dissatisfaction with resultant positive or negative organisational outcomes (Heneman and 
Judge, 2000).  Lawler (1971) was among the first to set out a case for pay systems to be 
based on equity and merit on the basis that this would determine pay satisfaction, motivation 
and organisational effectiveness.  Lawler’s (1971) proposition is that any discrepancy 
between the amount an individual perceived they should be paid and the actual amount paid 
will contribute to determining pay satisfaction with resultant organisational benefit or 
disadvantage. 
One of the challenges in assessing the evidence in support of these theories is in the differing 
conceptual constructs of equity adopted by different researchers.  Comparison of two similar 
studies that superficially reach the same conclusion, that equity predicts employee 
satisfaction, illustrate this point.  Klein (1973) in a study on US manufacturing workers, 
operationalises ‘equity’ as a salary comparison with the same, higher, and lower level jobs 
drawing predominantly on the social comparison aspects of the equity concept.  Findings 
indicate that equity predicts employment satisfaction with a predictive power far greater in 
terms of the variance accounted for than either of the other two tested predictor variables 
(reinforcement and expectancy).   Another study of equity and employee satisfaction by 
Berkowitz, Fraser, Treasure, and Cochran (1987) on 248 full-time employed US men also 
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finds that equity plays a significant part in predicting pay satisfaction.   However, the 
operationalisation of equity (the extent to which individuals feel their rewards are fair or 
deserved) is very different to Klein’s (1973). Indeed, the authors separately test 
‘comparisons with other people’s pay’ and find it does not influence satisfaction to any 
significant degree.  They therefore go on to make a clear distinction between equity and 
social comparison, proposing that the two concepts may operate entirely independently of 
one another.  
Taking these sorts of discrepancies into account however, in general there are a number of 
studies that generally support the theories proposed by Jacques (1961), Homans (1961), 
Adams (1963, 1965) and Lawler (1971).  The most comprehensive of these is a meta-
analysis of the antecedents and consequences of pay satisfaction undertaken by Williams, 
McDaniel and Nguyen (2006) evaluating 203 studies published in the preceding 35 years.  
Their findings generally support the predictions of equity and justice theories.  First, they 
find that “pay comparisons were among the strongest predictors of pay satisfaction” (Ibid., 
p.403) and both internal and external comparisons are strongly related to pay level 
satisfaction.  They also find that distributive justice is strongly related to pay satisfaction and 
where procedural justice measures are focused on pay (rather than on general organisational 
procedures), procedural justice is also strongly related to pay level satisfaction.  Second, the 
meta-analysis findings for the outcomes of pay satisfaction indicate that pay satisfaction is 
moderately related to attitudinal outcomes (such as turnover intentions) although only 
weakly related to behavioural outcomes (such as absenteeism and performance). This 
second finding appears to contradict Heneman and Judge (2000, p.85) who claim that prior 
research had “unequivocally shown that pay dissatisfaction can have important and 
undesirable outcomes”, although both sets of authors acknowledge the need for further 
research and in particular the need to construct more “behaviourally specific” (Heneman 
and Judge, 2000, p.85) and more precise rather than “global” (Williams et al., 2006, p.406) 
models.  
Another, related, problematic element of these studies is the multi-dimensional nature of the 
pay satisfaction construct and its measurement (Heneman and Schwab, 1985). For example 
in the pay satisfaction questionnaire used by 19 of the studies in Williams et al.’s (2006) 
meta-analysis, three of the 18 measurement items relate to equity or distributive justice (pay 
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of other jobs in the company; consistency of the company’s pay policies; and differences in 
pay among jobs in the company); two items relate to procedural justice (influence my 
supervisor has on my pay; how my raises are determined) and one item relates to 
informational justice (information the company gives about pay issues of concern to me) 
whereas the remainder of items concern the size, level or amount of benefits, salary or other 
elements of pay (Heneman and Schwab, 1985).   Teasing out not only the equity-specific 
effects on pay satisfaction, but also the effects of different types of equity and justice is a 
challenge for researchers.    
Responding to this deficiency, Till and Karren (2011) have conducted a focused study on 
pay comparisons and the perceptions of different types of fairness and organisational justice 
as antecedents of pay level satisfaction.  They use three different constructs of distributive 
justice: individual equity (comparisons of people doing the same job in the same company); 
external equity (comparisons of people doing the same job in other companies); internal 
equity (upward and downward comparisons within the organisation) as well as procedural 
justice and informational justice. Findings indicate that the three types of distributive justice 
are most important for pay satisfaction with individual equity having the largest effect.  They 
also find that while both procedural and informational justice have an effect on pay 
satisfaction it is not to the same extent as the three types of distributive justice.  A secondary 
finding is that none of the participants in their policy-capturing survey relied on a single 
referent against which to compare themselves.  These findings support theories that 
emphasise the importance of social comparisons with those in similar positions (Homans, 
1961; Adams, 1963), the propensity towards multiple referents (Goodman, 1974) as well as 
the dominance of distributive justice over both procedural and informational justice 
(McFarlin and Sweeney, 1992; Colquitt and Rodell, 2011).   However, the study was small, 
just 52 respondents, all from management and executive grades which could limit the 
generalisability to general workers. 
While there is broad consensus in the literature that equity theories have a level of empirical 
support, the relevance of equity theories in the twenty-first-century workplace has been 
questioned.  In a theoretical paper, Skiba and Rosenberg (2011) claim that despite 
widespread operationalisation in late twentieth-century developed economies, equity theory 
no longer has a place in contemporary management practice.  The authors argue that sectoral 
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changes have resulted in imbalances between the institutions of business, government and 
society and have led to extreme and increasing inequity which has manifested as the 
widening gap between the pay of the highest paid CEOs and average workers’ salaries, 
wage stagnation, and the prevalence of redundancies and long-term ‘temporary’ 
employment among other issues.  The authors call for measures to be taken to tackle the 
imbalance and restore the equity equilibrium.    
However, it seems the demise of equity, at least at a conceptual level, may well have been 
exaggerated.  Recent work by Pepper, Gosling and Gore (2015) has contributed to a new 
phase in the development of equity theories.  The authors adopt an economic model of 
equity based on Fehr and Schmidt’s (1999) fairness model.  The construct is compatible 
with that of the social and management psychologists as it is based on an assessment of 
individual assets in relation to a comparator (as in Homans, 1961; Adams, 1963) and 
incorporates outcomes evoked by individuals experiencing inequity – either under-equity 
payment (termed envy) or over-equity payment (termed guilt).  This framing of envy and 
guilt is comparable with Adam’s (1963) ‘tensions’ based on Festinger’s (1957) ‘cognitive 
dissonance’; indeed Jacques (1961) also uses the term ‘guilt’ to describe feelings associated 
with over-equity payments.  Finally, the authors also concur with the social psychologists 
that “envy weighs heavier than guilt” (Pepper et al., 2015, p.1296) a direct echo of Adams 
(1963).  Pepper et al.’s (2015) study tests the fairness model against standard rational 
economic models on senior executive choices in relation to problem scenarios involving 
questions of distributive justice. The authors find that the fairness model is much better at 
explaining senior executive behaviour than the standard economic model. They conclude 
that “fairness considerations are salient to senior executives”, and that while prevalent views 
of executive pay emphasise incentives, they “underestimate the role and significance of 
fairness” because they are dominated by agency theory and related concepts (Pepper et al., 
2015 p.1308).   The authors make the case for building equity and ‘behavioural’ concepts 
into standard agency models; possibly a unifying concept in the psychological and 
economic academic fields. 
So, concepts of equity and justice remain central to understanding how pay functions in 
organisations.  Equitable pay influences employee satisfaction with both pay and more 
generally with the employment exchange being entered into.  This satisfaction can translate 
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into motivation and positive organisational outcomes.  Conversely, pay inequity has been 
found to cause dissatisfaction which leads to negative employee attitudes and behaviours. 
2.4 Chapter summary  
This chapter has set out the contextual and theoretical background against which the current 
study is set.  First, differing perspectives and meanings attributed to pay in organisations 
have been presented.  The central theme emerging from this analysis is that pay is 
multidimensional and multifaceted; individual and cultural values are likely to influence 
responses towards pay and resultant behaviours.  The function of pay in organisations has 
also been examined through a theoretical lens that provides three central contentions: 
Pay has a sorting effect on the workforce; pay levels and the basis for pay operate, 
through attraction, selection and attrition processes, to influence the makeup of 
employees joining and remaining in the organisation. 
Pay has an incentive effect on employees; pay is a powerful, instrumental lever in 
changing employee behaviour and influencing HR and organisational outcomes. 
Perceptions of pay equity affect employee satisfaction and motivation, also 
influencing individual and organisational outcomes.   
These propositions provide a baseline for understanding and examining the strategic pay 
construct that is central to this study.  It is clear that each of these propositions has 
implications for organisational practice.  Pay has meaning for people; it evokes a response.  
Pay responses can be influenced by organisations with the potential to utilise the powerful 
effects of pay to shape the character of their workforces, incentivise and motivate 
employees, change employee behaviour and achieve desired organisational objectives.  This 
is a seductive and compelling prospect, and one that has not escaped strategic pay thinkers 
and practitioners over the past thirty years.  
The next chapter will provide an analytic critique of the strategic pay concept, its underlying 
assumptions and competing perspectives.  It will critically examine the development of 
universalistic strategic pay concepts against the context of changing employment and 
structural environments giving rise to a ‘new pay’ paradigm and evaluates contingency and 
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configurational treatments of strategic pay which suggest optimum performance can be 
achieved by aligning pay with organisational characteristics.  Finally, a conceptual 
framework integrating these perspectives is proposed.   
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Chapter 3: Strategic pay perspectives 
3.1 Chapter introduction  
This chapter evaluates alternative perspectives of strategic pay; those associated with a 
universalistic view of strategic pay which propose a set of new pay principles an alternative 
to the traditional pay model and those associated with alignment perspectives which 
proposes strategic pay practices should be configured to fit with organisational 
contingencies.  However, this thesis does not view these, admittedly differing, perspectives 
as incompatible. Indeed, after Youndt, Snell, Dean and Lepak (1996), Martín-Alcázar et al. 
(2005) and Kaifeng, Lepak, Jia and Baer (2012), this chapter seeks to integrate these 
perspectives to build a holistic conceptual framework to guide the empirical phase of the 
study. 
3.2 Universalistic perspectives and new pay 
Heavily influenced by notions of ‘best practice’ HRM, and characterised as a ‘new pay’ 
approach, strategic pay challenges established thinking about pay and argues for the 
introduction of pay practices aimed at achieving organisational objectives in changed and 
changing socio-economic environments.   The analysis in this chapter will explore how 
traditional compensation models came to be rejected in favour of a ‘new pay’ orthodoxy 
which favours ‘strategic’ flexibility, market competitiveness, performance-orientation and 
individualism.  
3.2.1 Strategic pay as a component of HRM best practice 
Universalistic approaches to strategic pay have been heavily shaped by principles of ‘best 
practice’ HRM which hold that a defined set of strategic HRM activities; a prescribed 
‘bundle of practices’, leads to high employee commitment and enhanced organisational 
performance (Walton, 1985; Huselid, 1995; Purcell, Kinnie, Hutchinson, Rayton and Swart, 
2003; Pfeffer, 1998, 2005; Appelbaum, Bailey, Berg and Kalleberg, 2000).  These authors 
propose that business success can be achieved through practices that empower and engage 
employees, promoting elevated levels of discretionary behaviour and contributing to 
organisational performance. As a concept, ‘best practice’ HRM has prompted a significant 
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amount of criticism for both resting on weak theoretical foundations (Martín-Alcázar et al., 
2005) and prizing rhetoric over reality (Godard, 2004; Legge, 2005; Wright, Gardner, 
Moynihan and Allen, 2005).  
In theoretical terms, universalistic arguments are the simplest approach to examining the 
link between practice and performance in the strategic HRM literature because they suggest 
that there is a linear relationship between an independent variable (such as performance-
related pay) and a dependent variable (such as increased productivity) and that this is 
applicable across the population of organisations regardless of sector, size, location, strategy 
or culture (Delery and Doty, 1996).  It is this linear simplicity that has prompted questions 
about both the universalistic approach’s lack of solid theoretical foundations and its failure 
to acknowledge “either the synergic interdependence or the integration of practices” and 
their effects (Martín-Alcázar et al. 2005, p.634).   Nevertheless, empirical testing of the 
HRM practice-performance relationship has found high levels of statistical significance 
(Ibid.) and given rise to strong arguments for accepting the universal application of the 
approach (Delery and Doty, 1996). 
The role of pay practices within these ‘bundles’ of best practice HRM activity is primarily 
to motivate and reward high performance but these studies rarely examine the effect of 
strategic pay practices in isolation. They are usually designed to test the additive effect of a 
wider bundle of strategic HRM practices (Martín-Alcázar et al. 2005).  And, while there 
may be compelling evidence for a positive relationship between such practices and 
organisational performance (Huselid, 1995; MacDuffie, 1995; Delery and Doty, 1996; 
Guest, Michie, Conway and Sheehan, 2003; Katou, 2017), there are critical questions over 
the strength of this association (Wood and De Menezes, 1998) and both the consistency of 
inclusion/exclusion of HR practices in bundles (Boselie, Dietz and Boon, 2005) as well as 
the variations in proxies used to measure performance (Guest et al., 2003; Purcell and 
Kinnie, 2007).  Moreover, the operationalisation of strategic pay practices in these studies is 
generally limited to those that are contingent on organisational performance (usually PFP or 
profit-sharing) and does not incorporate a range of other pay practices that could be equally 
considered worthy of inclusion as having potential to influence organisational performance 
such as individual and team-based schemes, pay structures or long-term incentives such as 
share options.  However, the inclusion of strategic pay in universalistic treatments of the 
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HRM practice-performance link provides a clear imperative for examining universalistic 
approaches to the pay-performance link in more granular detail.   
3.2.2 Drivers for a new approach to pay 
‘New pay’ thinking (e.g. Zingheim and Schuster, 2000) has dominated the universalistic 
approach to strategic pay in its rejection of traditional ways of designing and managing pay 
systems and its emphasis on a ‘better’ way of rewarding employees for enhanced business 
performance.  From the late 1980s onwards there has been a shift in the conceptual 
development of pay to focus on its potential for driving organisational performance; a role 
that the traditional pay model is seen as wholly inadequate to perform.  New pay writers 
perceive a dichotomy between the old and new worlds of work and pay (Heery, 1996).  The 
old world is represented by Taylorist notions of command and control, predictable job 
environments, bureaucratic organisation designs and structured pay based on service, 
seniority and job evaluation (Risher, 1999; Trevor, 2010).  Although they may have been 
an appropriate response for organisations operating in mid twentieth-century environments, 
new pay writers argue that in the face of forces of global competition, traditional pay systems 
in the developed economies are expensive, unproductive and inflexible (Schuster and 
Zingheim, 1992; Risher, 1999).  North American and European organisations are unable to 
respond to the high quality, low cost products offered by global competitors and traditional 
pay systems are often seen as directly responsible for contributing to their lack of 
competitiveness (Lawler, 1990).  The view clearly articulated is that the traditional pay 
model is both out of date and lacking in credibility (Risher, 1999; Willems, Janvier and 
Henderickx, 2006). 
3.2.3 The traditional pay model 
Pay systems characterised as ‘traditional pay’ or ‘old pay’ in the literature are those that 
operated from the early twentieth century onwards and focused on “job-evaluated grade 
structures, payment by time, salary progression as the basis of seniority, internal labour 
markets and service-related benefits” (Trevor, 2010, p.8).  They were largely developed in 
industrial economies where mass production and large, low- or semi-skilled workforces 
were managed according to principles of scientific management endorsed by Taylor (1911).   
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Gomez-Mejia and Balkin’s (1992) depiction of the traditional compensation model 
emphasises job roles, hierarchy and structure.  There is a clear focus on determining the pay 
for the job rather than characteristics of the individual post-holder. Pay ranges are established 
through an assessment of the job content and its worth within the context of the organisation. 
Only in the latter stages of the process do personal inputs such as performance or experience 
feature in positioning individual pay within the established pay range. The model also 
emphasises traditional, hierarchical structures; sorting jobs according to their worth into 
grade structures upon which pay ranges are super-imposed. The key mechanism in this 
model is job evaluation which centres on establishing and maintaining internal consistency 
and equity in pay relationships within the organisation.  Beal (1963) stresses the 
“objectivity” of job evaluation plans, because human judgement is “pooled judgement, 
systematically applied” (Ibid. p.11).  Beal (1963, p.9) goes as far as claiming that JE was 
universally accepted by employees, managers, unions and governments alike: “no one 
opposes it or objects to it”.  Beal’s (1963) view may have been extreme but there is little 
disagreement that the traditional pay model was generally accepted before the 1980s 
(Lawler, 1990).  In essence, the traditional pay model is largely related to principles of 
distributive and procedural justice (Jacques, 1961; Adams 1963; Leventhal, 1980) which 
can be easily justified to stakeholders and legally defended where necessary.  
By the 1990s however, this traditional pay model was coming to be seen as reflecting an era 
that was largely over in developed economies (Risher 1999; Willems et al., 2006). The 
model was developed in a time when jobs and working environments were rigid and 
structured, people were not mobile between employers and personnel specialists (prompted 
by extensive trade unionism) constrained supervisors’ discretion by the development of 
systems and rules (Gomez-Mejia and Balkin, 1992). In this context, internal equity concerns 
were paramount and therefore the traditional pay model, emphasising structure, hierarchy 
and consistency of application, was an appropriate response. In a changing socio-economic 
environment however, where global competitive markets for products and services were 
becoming common, the traditional pay model appeared restrictive, unproductive and 
expensive for many businesses (Risher, 1999). 
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3.2.4 The new pay paradigm 
Criticism of the traditional pay model laid the groundwork for the development of a new 
framework for managing pay in organisations.  It was Lawler (1984) who first coined the 
term ‘new pay’ in a working paper of the same title.  In it he introduces a new approach to 
pay, “that fits the [new] approaches to management that are being developed” (Ibid. p.10).  
This was not just an isolated area of practice, new pay sat comfortably alongside other new 
management and HR approaches.  Later ‘strategic pay’ became the more dominant term 
(Lawler himself used Strategic Pay as the title of his 1990 book on the subject) but the two 
terms are often used interchangeably.  In defining what new pay is, its chief architect 
describes it, rather loosely, as “a way of thinking” (Lawler, 1995, p.14) about the role of pay 
systems in complex organisations that allow them to operate successfully in competitive 
global markets.  Although Lawler (1995) argues that new pay is not alternative pay, and not 
a set of pay practices or any specific practices, other new pay proponents do set out an 
‘alternative’ to traditional pay models. Schuster and Zingheim (1992) specify components 
of “new base pay” (p.83); “new variable pay” (p.153) and “new indirect pay” (p.223), 
particularly emphasising practices such as skill-based pay, market-based pay, profit-sharing, 
gainsharing, group-based rewards, bonus plans and long-term incentives.  Risher (1999) 
also focuses on specific practices such as broadbanding, market pricing and pay-for-
performance. Lawler (1990) himself, regardless of his stated view, emphasises 
performance-driven incentives including group or team performance evaluations and 
rewards based on organisational performance such as gainsharing or employee ownership.  
Lawler (1990) also advocates “paying the person” (p.153) rather than “paying the job” 
(p.135) through skill-based pay rather than traditional job evaluation processes.  
Intentionally or not then, new pay is often presented as an alternative to traditional pay 
models. Moreover, there are a number of pay practices associated with the new pay 
approach which emphasise performance incentives, group working and flexibility. And 
finally, there is a universalistic implication evident in much of the new pay literature that 
suggests adoption of strategic pay principles and practices will deliver competitive 
advantage to the organisation. 
It is clear that the new pay approach is representative of a shift in thinking about pay and a 
number of clear themes emerge from the literature.  These are often direct responses to the 
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criticisms of the traditional pay model; if traditional pay methods suited ‘old world’ 
organisations, strategic pay methods were needed for ‘new world’ companies competing in 
a global environment.  These responses are often framed as competing alternatives, with 
organisations exhorted to follow a prescribed path: ‘be strategic, not bureaucratic’, ‘be 
flexible, not inflexible’ and so on.   
3.2.4.1 Strategic vs. bureaucratic  
Above all, new pay writers propose shedding the traditional image of pay as an 
administrative, often bureaucratic and procedure-driven function and replacing it with a 
business-oriented, flexible and strategic role. The argument against the traditional model of 
pay centres on its inextricable link with bureaucratic management (Lawler, 1986; Risher, 
1999). By placing importance on the worth of the activities an individual can be held 
accountable for, the traditional pay model facilitates a top-down management style 
emphasising control and encouraging employees to do what they are told to do (but little 
more).   
The function of pay in this bureaucratic context was seen as chiefly administrative, 
characterised, rather pejoratively, as “record keeping and paper shuffling” by Gomez-Mejia 
and Balkin (1992, p.17).  But it is its emphasis on hierarchical structures that is seen as its 
most undesirable feature.  Bureaucracies rely on a control and command style of 
management which is only effective with clear lines of command and explicit graduation of 
roles (Lawler, 1986).  Job evaluation is seen as inextricably linked with this management 
style as it facilitates the creation of organisational hierarchies through grade structures. The 
unnecessary pecking orders and unhealthy power relationships created by hierarchies 
(Lawler, 1986) were, it was argued, the antithesis of the co-operative, teamwork-oriented 
working environments which many organisations were seeking to promote in a changing 
economic and competitive environment (Risher, 1999). 
3.2.4.2 Flexible vs. inflexible 
A lack of flexibility is often cited by new pay writers as a negative aspect of the traditional 
pay model.  Partly, this is because traditional pay systems were designed for industries 
operating in stable markets and were effectively the operationalisation of notions of stability 
and continuity. These traditional pay systems became “a high investment in the status quo” 
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(Lawler, 1986, p.24) which were “difficult to change” (Gomez-Mejia and Balkin, 1992, 
p.14). 
According to critics of traditional pay, this lack of flexibility has negative consequences for 
organisations wishing, or needing, to change in response to rapidly shifting business 
environments.  For Gomez-Mejia and Balkin (1992) the lack of flexibility in traditional pay 
systems means organisational change more often results in redundancies and undermines 
trust and loyalty in the firm. In the medium-long term this has negative socio-economic 
consequences such as higher unemployment rates and results in a “shell-shocked, apathetic 
and risk adverse labor force” (Ibid., p.14) damaging innovation, creativity and 
competitiveness.  The authors put this down to a lack of variability in the pay mix in 
traditional pay models and organisations’ “limited manoeuvrability to control the cost 
structure other than through employee dismissals” (Ibid.).  
New pay promises an end to the imposed managerial inflexibility of traditional pay systems 
and its proponents make a strong business case for doing so. Martocchio (2015) for 
example, argues for pay variability in order to lower payroll costs during lean periods and 
then enhance the level of reward when business activity improves.   
While variable, incentive-based pay had existed in traditional organisations before the new 
pay era, usually in the form of piece rates for manufacturing workers or commission for 
salespeople (Lawler, 1990), the new variable pay was a far more systematic approach to 
controlling fixed pay costs for organisations.  Schuster and Zingheim (1992) set out a 
number of components of new variable pay; first, including a variable, non-consolidated 
element of pay into the pay mix of employees who might have been traditionally been paid 
base pay only; second, introducing performance measures on a group basis as well as 
individual; and third, emphasising a ‘partnership’ in which employee and organisation share 
the financial success of the organisation. The alternative forms of these variable pay 
practices are numerous and can include recognition awards, individual variable pay; group 
variable pay; profit-sharing, gainsharing; long-term variable pay; discretionary bonuses and 
stock options (Lawler, 1990; Schuster and Zingheim, 1992).   
The unitarist rhetoric of ‘partnership’, ‘collaboration’ and ‘shared success’ in this literature 
downplays the increased risk that employees now would share with their employers and 
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glosses over the consequence that the level of risk was being transferred from employer to 
employee.  Organisations sharing success by implication would share financial failure and 
despite claims by Gomez-Mejia and Balkin (1992) that variable pay could ‘cushion’ 
organisations against possible redundancies by allowing an organisation to flex its pay costs, 
the unspoken but logical conclusion is that employees would face decreased take-home pay 
when the organisation was performing badly.  Under many new pay practices, it would be 
the employee to suffer directly the consequences of poor organisational performance while 
organisational exposure to loss was minimised.  Heery (1996) critically examines the 
consequences for employees of such a system, arguing that new pay poses a direct threat to 
employee wellbeing because it contradicts both economic and psychological needs for 
stable and secure income (Ibid.). 
3.2.4.3 External vs. internal focus 
Strategic pay writers criticise the traditional pay model for its internal focus at the expense 
of appreciation for external market conditions. They argue that emphasising internally 
benchmarked pay leads to external uncompetitiveness and constrained managerial 
discretion (Lawler, 1986). This internal focus, according to Lawler (1986) undermines 
external competitiveness because it encourages employees to benchmark their job ‘points’ 
against each other with a view to improving their relative pay position.  Over time this 
ratchets up pay rates out of kilter with the market, leaving the organisation paying more in 
wages than it needs to.  
Rejecting pay systems that were based primarily on internal comparisons to establish 
compensation levels, strategic pay writers advocate using external market comparisons. 
Lawler (1990, p.151) stated a preference “to take all or virtually all jobs to the market 
individually” and similarly, Schuster and Zingheim (1992, p.xvi) propose that “under new 
pay, base pay levels are matched as closely as possible to the competitive labor market”.  In 
this market-based pay model, internal comparison is treated as secondary to external 
considerations and pay is largely (if not exclusively) determined through market surveys 
and benchmarking (Mitra, Gupta and Shaw, 2011). 
From a theoretical perspective, market-based pay comparisons have the effect of providing 
external equity (comparisons of people doing the same job in other companies) but 
minimise both individual equity (comparisons of people doing the same job in the same 
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company) and internal equity (upward and downward comparisons within the 
organisation), both of which were found by Till and Karren (2011) to have far greater effects 
on employees’ pay satisfaction than external equity.  And yet the recurring message in new 
pay writing is that in order to implement new, strategic pay ideas, organisations should 
largely abandon the concept of internal equity (Gomez-Mejia and Balkin, 1992) and replace 
it with a market-based approach. In arguing against consistent application of pay practices 
across the workforce and in favour of greater discretion and flexibility for managers, the 
critics of traditional pay systems are rejecting the idea that equity is central to pay 
considerations and decision-making.  Once again, within this unitarist paradigm, the distinct 
needs of employees barely feature as a consideration, despite the likelihood that 
undermining procedural and distributive justice in organisations will have negative 
consequences for ethical employee treatment (Heery, 1996; Skiba and Rosenberg, 2011). 
3.2.4.4 Performance vs. service 
One of the central themes of the new pay literature is its focus on the importance of linking 
pay to performance.  Performance can be associated with results and outputs at the 
individual, group or organisational level, but, proponents of strategic pay argue, it is only by 
connecting performance with financial reward that organisations will improve their results 
and gain competitive advantage in the market (Lawler, 1990; Schuster and Zingheim, 
1992). 
By contrast, a negative consequence of the traditional pay model, according to its critics, is 
that factors besides performance are reinforced as the primary means of increasing pay.  
Schuster and Zingheim (1992) criticise traditional pay systems founded on length of service 
for creating a sense of entitlement (to regular pay increases and to retention by the 
organisation) as well as being unrelated to performance.  According to the authors, if 
organisational success is dependent on employee performance, the primary focus of pay 
must be on results achieved, regardless of service.  Furthermore, they claim, a pay system 
based on tenure undermines the organisation’s ability “to create an alliance between the 
organization and the employee based on shared results” (Ibid., p.162).  So, from the unitarist 
perspective, time served, and experience gained are of less ‘value’ than the ultimate (shared) 
goal of organisational performance and therefore should not be rewarded through pay. 
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Instead, variable PFP systems such as individual or group based variable pay, gainsharing, 
profit-sharing and long-term incentives are promoted as a far better alternative.  
There is sound empirical evidence over many years for the relationship between pay-for-
performance and organisational performance, underpinned by theories of incentive and 
agency discussed in the previous chapter.  Leonard (1990) finds that organisations using 
long-term incentives for executives have substantially larger increases in return on 
investment than other organisations.  Similarly, Abowd (1990) finds management pay based 
on organisational financial performance is significantly related to the future financial 
performance of the organisation. Gerhart and Milkovich (1990) find that organisations with 
pay plans that include a greater amount of performance contingent pay achieve superior 
financial performance.  Imberman (1992) cites the positive impact of gainsharing 
programmes on American manufacturing companies as improvements in productivity, cost 
reduction, quality, employee relations and absenteeism. Arthur and Huntley (2005) find 
positive performance effects of a gainsharing scheme in a longitudinal case study of a 
manufacturing plant. And Nyberg et al. (2016) also find PFP schemes positively associated 
with employee performance.  
New pay proponents are careful to distinguish ‘new’ performance-based pay from 
traditional forms of incentives such as piece-work and commission payments (Lawler, 
1990). These new incentives forms are heralded as significantly different in approach from 
traditional methods that could encourage dysfunctional behaviour in organisations 
especially when managed badly (Baker, et al., 1988; Lawler, 1990).  Despite this, the type 
of performance-related pay schemes advocated by new pay writers continues to come under 
scrutiny from critics such as Kohn (1993), Pfeffer (1998) and Pink (2009) for failing to 
incentivise over time, decreasing intrinsic motivation and being detrimental to the 
employment relationship.  This is supported by empirical studies such as Bloom and 
Milkovich (1998) who find that short-term incentives in particular lead to poorer firm-level 
performance outcomes in some organisations. PFP has similarly been negatively associated 
with innovation (Ederer and Manso, 2013) and, in some conditions, employee creativity 
(Zhang, Long and Zhang, 2015).  Criticism has also come from an equality perspective: 
PFP can be negotiable and discretionary and therefore provides an opportunity for unfair 
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discrimination (Bevan and Thompson, 1993; Heery 1996; Kulich, Trojanowski, Ryan, 
Haslam and Renneboog, 2011; Koskinen Sandberg, 2017). 
Despite these concerns, performance-based pay schemes have become a central pillar of the 
new pay approach largely aimed at replacing traditional pay systems that emphasise 
seniority and service as the basis for pay enhancement. 
3.2.4.5 Person vs. job focus 
Another common theme of traditional pay criticism is that it focuses on tasks and duties 
associated with the ‘job’ rather than the attributes of the individual post-holder, the ‘person’. 
In the traditional model, employees are paid depending on the job they do and where the job 
is positioned in the pay structure according to job evaluation, therefore their pay rate only 
changes if they change job (Gomez-Mejia and Balkin, 1992).  This, Lawler (1986) argues, 
depersonalises employees and equates them with a list of duties, underemphasising their 
unique skills and performance. In addition, the job-focus places importance on the 
enactment of specified duties establishing implicit limits on what employees are willing to 
do (Risher, 1999), leading to a ‘it’s not in my job description’ culture (Lawler, 1986).   
The most commonly cited person-based pay approach in new pay writing is skill-based pay 
(also known as knowledge-based pay) and competency pay (Lawler 1990, 1994; Schuster 
and Zingheim, 1992).  In a skill-based pay system, “pay is determined by the skills of the 
employee rather than the job to which the employee is assigned” as well as “the depth, 
breadth, and types of skills they obtain and apply in their work” (Schuster and Zingheim, 
1992, p.95).  Skills-based pay rewards employees according to “abilities that can be 
successfully applied to a variety of tasks and situations” (Gomez-Mejia and Balkin, 1992, 
p.39).  Competencies are defined by Boyatzis, (2008) as abilities or capabilities that have 
behavioural characteristics.  In competency pay, these underlying characteristics, such as 
leadership or flexibility, which may lead to organisationally desired behaviours, are assessed 
and rewarded (Cira and Benjamin, 1998).  In short, competency and skills-based pay 
disassociates an employee’s pay from the tasks they perform and emphasises achievement 
of defined knowledge, skill and competency levels as well as multi-skilled functional 
flexibility.  
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Another new pay initiative, broadbanding, helps facilitate payments based on employee 
value in the market, skills and competencies. Broadbanding was given new impetus in the 
1990s by flatter, leaner US organisations seeking to pay the person not the job (Neubauer, 
1995).  It was offered as an alternative to traditional pay structures such as narrow-grading 
that was often closely associated with job evaluation (Hofrichter, 1993). The benefits for 
companies are cited as increasing flexibility by downplaying salary ‘controls’ such as mid-
points and compa-ratios; facilitating employees’ personal growth by paying for skills and 
competencies; supporting team-based systems with multi-skilled jobs that de-emphasise 
hierarchy and generally allowing organisations to rethink what they pay for (Hofrichter 
1993).  Broadbanding is heralded as a pay management approach which offers employers 
freedom from rigidity and pay ‘drift’ and is not only far more suitable to de-layered and 
flexible organisations but also facilitates both market pay and lateral career progression 
(Armstrong and Brown, 2009). 
In line with many of the other new pay initiatives, broadbanding’s apparent flexibility has 
given rise to concerns about internal equity, managerial latitude, pay inconsistencies and 
potential for discrimination.  Arnold and Scott (2002) discuss the effectiveness of 
broadbanding and find that the potential for inconsistent allocation of compensation 
between employees can escalate pay costs as well as cause potential legal problems.  In 
addition, they argue that employee commitment and motivation can be undermined by 
fewer promotional opportunities.   
The other structured approach to facilitating pay based on skills and competencies is a job 
family or career-graded pay structure.  While early new pay writers often criticise traditional 
job family approaches as being too focused on job content (Schuster and Zingheim, 1992), 
throughout the 1990s they became increasingly associated with skill- and competency-
based pay systems as they were able to emphasise “groupings of broadly similar jobs, with 
the same skill and competency sets and common career and development paths” (Brown, 
2001, p.22).  
So, alongside performance as a basis for pay rather than length of service, new pay systems 
also emphasise individual skills and competency. To facilitate the requirements of these 
more flexible, discretionary pay plans, broadbanding and job family pay structures are used 
to manage base pay in new pay systems. 
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3.2.4.6 Group vs. individual pay 
According to Schuster and Zingheim (1992), most traditional variable pay plans focus on 
individual performance, while new variable pay schemes focus primarily on groups of 
employees. This emphasis on group or team pay is reflective of a corresponding shift away 
from individual performance in workplace redesign, “placing greater importance on the role 
of teams and work groups” (Heneman and von Hippel, 1995, p.63).   
Group-based incentive schemes such as gainsharing, goal-sharing and profit-sharing 
measure performance at group level and reward individuals accordingly.  Heneman and von 
Hippel (1995) suggest these schemes could be effective in directing group members towards 
contributing to the achievement of organisational goals and critical success factors.  
Furthermore, they are promoted as encouraging organisational cultural values such as co-
operation, collaboration and teamworking whereas individual variable pay schemes are 
criticised for leading to dysfunctional behaviours such as gaming the system, competition 
and conflict between employees as well as an unhelpful focus on a limited, formula-driven, 
scope of behaviours (e.g. sales at the expense of customer satisfaction; quantity rather than 
quality of output) (Lawler, 1990).  This is supported by Tremblay and Chênevert’s 
(2008) study of Canadian high technology firms where greater emphasis on group 
performance pay is positively associated with productivity and negatively related to 
turnover whereas extensive use of individual performance pay is positively associated with 
turnover.  Conroy and Gupta (2015) find evidence for positive sorting and incentive effects 
of team-based performance pay and a more recent meta-analysis by Nyberg, Maltarich, 
Abdulsalam, Essman and Cragun (2018) also finds positive outcomes relating to collective 
performance-related schemes such as profit-sharing, gainsharing and broad-based stock 
option schemes. 
So, while some individual pay schemes remain part of the new pay approach, the preference 
is for group-based incentives such as gainsharing, and profit-sharing as opposed to 
traditional individual incentives such as sales commission and piece-rates. 
3.2.4.7 Individualism vs. collectivism 
Despite the emphasis on group pay plans, for new pay writers, collective employee 
representation hardly features in the portrayal of organisations moving from traditional to 
new pay practices. Where trade unions are mentioned it is as enforcers of the traditional pay 
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model, hindering progress (Schuster and Zingheim, 1992) or, alongside legal interventions 
in employee protection such as minimum wage legislation, unions are cast as responsible 
for ratcheting up wages and making American businesses uncompetitive in global markets 
(Lawler, 1990).   
For Heery (1996, p.60), the new pay is essentially a unitarist concept that, by emphasising 
mutual economic gains for employer and employee based on business needs, “effectively 
squeezes out any alternative pluralist conception of pay as the meeting place for competing 
but equally legitimate interests”.   In the unitarist paradigm, employee commitment and 
motivation come from incentives that not only align interests but also foster co-operation 
and minimise conflict.  
Heery (1996, 2000) also notes that the new pay writers have an attachment to the principle 
of direct individual employee involvement in the management of pay, minimising trade 
union and collective participation in pay decisions.  Schuster and Zingheim (1992) devote a 
whole chapter to it and for Lawler (1995, p.20) employee involvement promotes 
“understanding and acceptance of the system”. Similarly, Ledford (1995, pp.53-54), 
acknowledging that, “the [new pay] systems are almost certain to generate concern among 
employees about the potential for arbitrary management action, risk, and pay equity”, 
suggests managers, “actively involve employees in designing systems they understand and 
accept”.  The emphasis here appears to be in smoothing the way for employee acceptance 
of management wishes rather than as a recognition of potentially conflicting interests or the 
enactment of democratic principles.  New pay systems then, favour individual, but 
participative, base pay setting while rejecting traditional collective pay bargaining. 
It is evident from the analysis in this section that universalistic approaches to strategic pay 
heralded ‘new pay’ as the perfect strategic solution to facilitate new management initiatives 
in the changing landscape of late twentieth-century employment by emphasising flexibility, 
skills and competencies, market-sensitivity, performance, group outputs and simultaneously 
downplaying hierarchy position, length of service, job tasks, internal equity considerations 
and collective mechanisms.   
While these approaches have prompted criticism for failing to acknowledge pluralistic 
dynamics in organisations and as having the potential for employee disadvantage and 
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exploitation, the rhetoric of strategic pay and its role in helping organisations achieve their 
objectives has apparently become a common feature of HRM practice in the twenty-first 
century.  Furthermore, these strategic pay practices are theorised to have a positive effect on 
organisational performance measured by financial performance, efficiency and quality 
because they give rise to positive HR outcomes such as improved productivity, improved 
employment relations climate, ease of employee recruitment and retention and declining 
absenteeism.  Empirical studies have provided evidence for these relationships although 
research is sparse and often specific to certain groups of employees, locations or industry 
sectors.  And there remains a critical question as to the extent of strategic pay’s effect on 
employee and organisational performance. 
Drawing these ideas together in Table 3.1, it is apparent that there is a clear set of strategic 
pay practices associated with the new pay paradigm as distinct from traditional pay 
practices. 
 Table 3.1 Strategic and traditional pay practices 
Strategic pay practices Traditional pay practices 
Market-based pay and reviews Job evaluation to determine pay 
Individualised but participative base pay setting Collective pay bargaining  
Performance-based pay, skills-based pay and/or 
competency pay 
Seniority/service-based pay 
Group incentives: gainsharing / goal-sharing / 
profit-sharing 
Individual output-based incentives: piece-rates and 
commission 
High levels of variable pay High levels of consolidated pay 
Broadbanding and/or job family pay structures Narrow-graded pay structures 
By examining universalistic perspectives in the strategic pay literature, this section has 
identified individual strategic pay practices as well as pay practices that might be considered 
a ‘bundle’ constituting a coherent strategic pay approach.  In addition, the evidence for a 
significant association between those practices and HR / organisational performance 
outcomes has been evaluated. 
Based on universalistic, new pay predictions therefore, two hypothetical propositions can 
be articulated:  
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H1.    HR performance outcomes will be positively related to strategic pay practices 
and negatively related to traditional pay practices.  
H2.  Organisations will bundle strategic pay practices and bundling will have an 
additive effect on HR performance outcomes. 
For many strategic HRM researchers universalistic and alignment perspectives are treated 
as wholly irreconcilable paradigms (Delery and Doty, 1996).  There is, however, 
recognition in the literature that the two are not mutually exclusive.  Youndt et al (1996) 
argue for complementarity rather than competition between the rival perspectives.  Whereas 
universalistic approaches examine the benefit of a set of HR practices across all contexts, 
contingency perspectives offer a deeper insight into organisational phenomena on which to 
base more situationally specific theories and ultimately to guide management practice.  
Martín-Alcázar et al. (2005) propose an integrated conceptual framework for use in SHRM 
research that starts with the universalistic proposition that HR practices have an effect on 
organisational outcomes and builds in moderating layers of contingency factors and 
configurations interacting to determine the central practice-performance relationship.  
Kaifeng et al (2012) argue for yet more integrated approaches to SHRM research noting 
that while researchers from different perspectives may adopt different angles to examine the 
relationships between HR practices and more distal outcomes, the theorised critical path 
from HR practices to HR outcomes to operational and financial outcomes remains 
consistent. 
On this basis, the universalistic propositions articulated in this section provide the starting 
point from which to begin to construct a conceptual framework; the first, and foundational, 
propositions that pay practices have an effect on employee outcomes and that differing 
bundles of practices will have differing effects. Drawing on Martín-Alcázar et al. (2005) 
contingency and configurational perspectives will also be used to provide a deeper 
examination of the strategic pay model.  These perspectives propose that improved HR 
outcomes are dependent upon an alignment between pay practices and contingency factors 
such as business strategy; industry sector; employment groups and organisation size.   
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3.3 Alignment perspectives:  contingencies and configurations 
Whereas the universalistic new pay paradigm examined in the previous section promotes a 
change in pay practices as a generalisable, ‘better’ alternative to the traditional pay model, 
there is another, arguably more pervasive, perspective evident in the strategic pay literature. 
This approach adopts the ‘best fit’ premise that in order to maximise HR and organisational 
performance, pay practices should be aligned with aspects of organisational contingencies, 
either aligned with specific internal or external characteristics or as an integrated component 
of an ideal type, a configuration of internal and external organisational characteristics.  
This section evaluates these propositions.  First, it examines the conceptual architecture of 
both contingency and configurational perspectives.  And second it assesses theoretical 
arguments and empirical evidence for a relationship between HR performance outcomes 
and alignment of pay practices with organisational contingencies; business strategy, 
employment group, industry sector and organisation size. 
3.3.1 Contingency perspective 
Contingency approaches to strategic pay have been widely questioned in the academic 
literature. Milkovich (1987, p.3) queries the central proposition of strategic pay that making 
pay practices contingent on organisational conditions has positive effects on employee 
behaviours and organisational performance as, “probably the greatest leap of faith” with no 
“solid footings”.   Both Gerhart and Rynes (2003), and Shields (2015) conclude that there 
is limited evidence that pay alignment does improve HR outcomes or organisational 
performance.  And Bevan (2005) argues that of all the fields of HRM, it is strategic pay that 
has the widest gap between rhetoric and reality.  
Despite this apparent dearth of evidence however, the central premise of contingency 
theories, that internal organisational capabilities or functionality should be matched to other 
internal and/or external conditions for enhanced organisational performance has an 
established pedigree in academic literature (Nadler and Tushman, 1980; Wright and Snell, 
1998). In the strategic HRM literature, many different conceptual variations have been 
deployed, termed variously as: contingency (Ginsberg and Venkatraman, 1985), 
congruence (Balkin and Gomez-Mejia, 1990; Montemayor, 1996), fit (Baird and 
Meshoulam, 1988; Wright and Snell, 1998) and alignment (Semler, 1997; Christiansen and 
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Higgs, 2008). There seems to be recognition that some of these terms can be used 
interchangeably (Snow, Miles and Miles, 2005).  And, although there are conceptual 
variations within these approaches, in general there are two proposed dimensions of 
alignment, both predicated on a behavioural perspective.  Schuler (1987) argues either for 
alignment with externalities, chiefly the competitive market environment and the 
organisation’s response to it; or for alignment with and between internal characteristics.  
These two aspects of alignment can be summarised as follows: 
Vertical alignment: practices and policies are selected to best meet the requirements 
for external competitive success in the organisation’s chosen industry, product or 
service markets (Miles and Snow, 1984; Schuler and Jackson, 1987a, 1987b; 
Jackson, Schuler and Rivero, 1989; Christiansen and Higgs, 2008).  
Horizontal alignment: practices and policies are selected to best support internal 
components of the organisation such as: other HRM practices and organisational 
life-cycle stage (Baird and Meshoulam, 1988; Delery, 1998), organisational culture 
(Cabrera and Bonache 1999), the organisation’s structure, size and technology 
(Jackson, Schuler and Rivero, 1989), and the employment modes of its workforce 
(Wright, McMahan and Williams, 1994; Wright and Snell, 1998; Wright, Dunford 
and Snell, 2001; Lepak and Snell, 2002). 
Early conceptualisations of HRM alignment are oriented to the contingency perspective. 
The Michigan or ‘matching’ model of HRM advocates a tight fit between organisational 
strategies and HRM processes (Devanna, Fombrun and Tichy, 1981; Tichy, Fombrun and 
Devanna, 1982; Fombrun, Tichy and Devanna, 1984). The fundamental assumption being 
that different HRM practices are required by organisations adopting different business 
strategies; organisations with “greater congruence between their HR practices and their 
strategies should enjoy superior performance” (Delery and Doty, 1996, pp.802-3).  
Subsequent models also argue for the achievement of fit between HRM strategies and 
overall business strategy; moving HRM practices into alignment with the competitive 
market position of the organisation (e.g. Schuler, 1987; Schuler and Jackson, 1987a, 1987b; 
Jackson, Schuler and Rivero, 1989).  
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The contingency approach holds that in order to support organisational performance, HRM 
practices should be designed to create and support desired employee ‘role behaviours’ 
according to the needs of the chosen competitive strategy (Schuler, 1987).  The rationale for 
this approach to HRM is based on the premise that a) organisations pursuing different 
competitive business strategies will require employees with different behaviours and b) 
desired behaviours are those that are imperative in contributing to organisational 
performance.  Schuler and Jackson (1987a) describe role behaviours as distinct from task-
specific knowledge, skills, and abilities and as instead related to employees working with 
other employees in social environments.  Role behaviours could include a high degree of 
creative behaviour and risk taking for firms pursuing a competitive strategy of innovation; 
a high concern for quality and process for firms pursuing a strategy of quality enhancement; 
and relatively repetitive and predictable behaviours alongside concern for results for firms 
seeking to gain competitive advantage by pursuing a strategy of cost reduction (Ibid.).   
As opposed to the universalistic perspective, the contingency model takes a different starting 
assumption in terms of the relationship between variables. Whereas universalistic 
approaches assume a linearity between variables and see HRM practices directly 
influencing employee and organisational outcomes, contingency approaches propose a 
model based on interactivity of variables (Martín-Alcázar et al., 2005). The relationship 
between the dependent and the independent variable will vary depending on other 
contingency variables that moderate the relationship.  So, for example, the relationship 
between an organisation’s pay practices and its performance will vary depending on the 
business strategy pursued.  The implication therefore, is to suggest a more complex view 
than the universalistic argument that a set of best practices can lead automatically to superior 
organisational performance under any and all circumstances (Delery and Doty, 1996).  
So, contingency perspectives seek to offer co-variables such as business strategy or 
organisation size to the study of relationships between pay practices and HR outcomes / 
organisation performance.  However, this approach tends towards bivariate, either/or, 
choices (Doty and Glick, 1994) and an alternative perspective, configurational theory, may 
offer a more holistic view of the pay-performance link. 
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3.3.2 Configurational perspective 
Configurations are “any multidimensional constellation of conceptually distinct 
characteristics that commonly occur together” (Meyer, Tsui and Hinings, 1993, p.1175). 
They can be composed of numerous dimensions including “environments, industries, 
technologies, strategies, structures, cultures, ideologies, groups, members, processes, 
practices, beliefs, and outcomes” (Ibid).  Configurational perspectives differ from both 
universalistic and contingency theories in several important respects.  First, configurational 
theory takes a more holistic approach to identify “unique patterns of factors that are posited 
to be maximally effective” (Delery and Doty, 1996, p.808).  It explores, “nonlinear 
synergistic effects and higher-order interactions” (Ibid.) implying a gestalt approach which 
takes account of organisational complexities.  Moreover, configurational theories, unlike 
either universalistic or contingency approaches, adopt the systems theory tenet of 
equifinality that the same end result can be achieved by multiple means (Meyer et al., 1993) 
implying that different configurations of pay practices could be equally effective in 
improving organisational performance (Martín-Alcázar et al., 2005).  Lastly, 
configurational perspectives acknowledge that configurations can be represented in 
typologies which have been developed only conceptually (Meyer et al., 1993). This 
indicates that configurations are ‘ideal types’; theoretical constructs that may not always be 
empirically observable and while actual organisations may be more or less similar to an 
ideal type, they can rarely, if ever, be assigned to one of the ideal types in the typology (Doty 
and Glick, 1994).  
According to Delery and Doty (1996), in order to build theory from a configurational 
perspective, internally consistent configurations of practice should be constructed for 
maximal horizontal alignment, and these should be linked to alternative strategic 
configurations to maximize vertical alignment.  Snow, Miles and Miles (2005, p.433) also 
predict that high-performing configurations are those with “internal and external 
congruence, alignment or fit”.  This implies that in order to fully understand the pay-
performance relationship, both internalities and externalities as well as their interactions 
need to be examined in a nonlinear and holistic approach.  
As set out above, universalistic, contingency and configurational perspectives are not 
mutually exclusive (Youndt et al., 1996). Indeed, by layering these approaches (after 
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Martín-Alcázar et al., 2005) a richer perspective on strategic pay can be achieved and a more 
robust conceptual framework built.  In applying this approach to strategic pay, two key 
organisational contingencies, one vertical (business strategy) and one horizontal 
(employment group), will be assessed in relation to their alignment with pay practices.  Both 
of these contingency factors have been theorised as ‘typologies’ with ideal types constructed 
against which organisations can be positioned (Doty and Glick, 1994).  In addition, two 
further organisational contingencies, one external (industry sector) and one internal 
(organisation size), will be considered as supplementary conditions that may contribute to 
the configurational pattern of organisational contingencies.    
3.3.2.1 Business strategy 
The imperative to align pay systems with business strategy has also long been a feature of 
strategic pay literature (Scott, McMullen, Shields and Bowbin, 2009).  In operationalising 
these two variables: ‘business strategy’ and ‘pay system’ researchers have employed a 
variety of models and frameworks.   
2.3.3.1.1 Business strategy typologies 
In general terms, researchers have made a distinction between ‘low-road’ business strategies 
based on efficiency and cost reduction/control, and ‘high-road’ strategies based on the 
pursuit of quality, innovation or variety (Osterman, 1994). These are largely based on Miles 
and Snow’s (Miles, Snow, Meyer and Coleman, 1978; Miles and Snow, 1984) defender / 
prospector business strategy typology, Porter’s (1980, 2004) generic competitive business 
strategies model and/or Gerstein and Reisman’s (1983) dynamic growth / rationalisation 
typologies. These three typologies have clear overlaps from which business strategy ‘types’ 
emerge: 
Defender / Cost Leader / Rationalisation-maintenance: The first business strategy type has 
narrow and relatively stable product domains, seldom making major adjustments in their 
technology, structure or methods of operation.  Instead they devote primary attention to 
improving the efficiency of their current operations to become the low-cost producer in their 
industry.  They are likely to have a limited product line, a functional structure and prioritise 
production efficiency, process engineering, customer / supplier relationships and cost-
control. These low-cost producers find and exploit all sources of cost advantage which could 
include economies of scale, proprietary technology or access to raw materials, low-cost 
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labour or extremely low overheads. (Adapted from Gerstein and Reisman, 1983; Miles et 
al., 1978; Miles and Snow, 1984; Porter 1980, 2004). 
Prospector / Differentiator / Dynamic growth: The second business strategy type is 
continually searching for product and market opportunities and regularly experiments with 
responses to emerging trends.  These organisations are often the creators of change and 
uncertainty, prompting their competitors to respond. They prioritise product and market 
innovation sometimes at the expense of efficiency.  They seek to be unique in their industry 
in ways that are highly valued by buyers.  They select one or more attributes that many 
buyers perceive to be important such as product quality and/or innovation and position 
themselves to meet that need.  As a consequence of their uniqueness they can charge a 
premium price for their product / service and, as long as they maintain a cost position lower 
than the benefits of the premium price, they can achieve and sustain differentiation. 
(Adapted from Gerstein and Reisman, 1983; Miles et al., 1978; Miles and Snow, 1984; 
Porter 1980, 2004). 
Analyser / Focus: The third business strategy type is likely to have characteristics of both 
other types.  These organisations may well operate in both product / market domains, one 
relatively stable, the other changeable.    They are likely to have a limited basic product line 
and search for a small number of related product opportunities. These organisations can 
compete on either cost focus or differentiation focus and they do so by serving their target 
segments better than either of the other types. (Adapted from Miles et al., 1978; Miles and 
Snow, 1984; Porter 1980, 2004). 
Reactor / ‘Stuck-in-the-middle’: The final business strategy type arguable does not have a 
business strategy. These organisations have poorly aligned strategy, structure and processes 
or operate in strategy-environment inconsistency and are likely to perform less well than the 
other three types. (Adapted Miles et al., 1978; Miles and Snow, 1984; Porter 1980, 2004). 
There are critical questions as to the validity of these business typologies.  They have been 
described as useful for operationalisation by researchers because they are “appropriately 
broad but not vague” (Hambrick, 1983a, p.688) and have “strong theoretical underpinnings” 
(White, 1986, p.220).  However, Porter’s generic strategies model has been criticised for its 
emphasis on the implied mutual exclusivity of its strategic positions.  Porter (1980) argues 
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that the two broad strategy types, cost leadership and differentiation are incompatible; if an 
organisation does not fully commit to one strategy type they are ‘stuck in the middle’ and 
will not be successful.  Yet other researchers have shown that hybrid business strategies can 
be as effective as, and even outperform, those operating one generic strategy (Hall, 1980; 
Prajogo, 2007) and that the two strategic positions may not be incompatible (Hambrick, 
1983b; Murray, 1988).   
Conversely, a key criticism of both typology models is their generic character (Hambrick, 
1983b).  Miles and Snow (Miles et al., 1978; 1984) conducted their research in a variety of 
industries and claim that their typology can be observed, and successfully applied, in all 
industries.  This claim of universality however has been questioned for ignoring the industry 
and environmental context (Hambrick, 1983b).  According to Miles and Snow (1984), the 
robustness of the typology over time is partly due to the development of certain internal 
organisational consistencies which help to perpetuate the strategic orientations they pursue.  
This appears to be contrary to normative contingency perspectives which hold that an 
organisation’s business strategy is an adaptive response to environmental conditions (Hofer, 
1975).  Miles and Snow’s typology suggests the opposite; that entrenched strategic 
positioning may constrain an organisation’s responses to industry and environmental 
change (Hambrick, 1983b).   It is however more consistent with configurational 
perspectives that acknowledge the potential for multidirectional, interactive effects between 
organisational characteristics (Martín-Alcázar et al., 2005). Moreover, tests of the 
typology’s reliability and validity have shown robustness across a variety of measures 
(Shortell and Zajac, 1990). 
In synthesising the strategic typology frameworks, two fundamental business strategy types 
emerge. On one hand there is a strategic position which emphasises stability and efficiency 
(defender / cost leader / rationalisation-maintenance) and on the other, there is a strategic 
type that is entrepreneurial and innovative (prospector / differentiator / dynamic growth).  
To this could be added a third ‘focused’ strategy however focusers/analysers must still 
choose to compete either on cost or differentiation – just in a narrower market (Porter, 1980, 
2004).  The fourth type, stuck-in-the-middle / reactor ‘option’ is based on the absence of a 
coherent strategic position and is difficult to justify as a competitive strategy at all.  What is 
left therefore is a distillation of business strategy types which reinforces Osterman’s (1994) 
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observation of two main strategic positions: ‘low-road’ and ‘high-road’. Table 3.2 shows 
the typologies and their broad alignments. 
Table3.2 Business strategy typologies 
Miles and Snow (1978, 
1984) 
Porter (1980, 2004) Gerstein and Reisman 
(1983) 
Osterman (1994) 
Defender Cost leader  Extract profit / 
rationalisation  
Low-road  
Analyser Focus - Cost - 
Focus - Differentiation High-road 
Prospector Differentiator Dynamic growth  
Reactor Stuck in the middle - - 
 
2.3.3.1.2 Strategic pay systems 
While there appear to be two broadly aligned business strategy types, low-road and high-
road, organisations face considerable choice in aligning their pay practices with their 
business strategies.  Based on the impetus to create and support effective employee role 
behaviours that support strategic orientations, Schuler and Jackson (1987a, 1987b) and 
Heneman and Dixon (2001) propose a set of dimensions of ‘compensating choices’ for 
organisations: 
Low base salaries….……..High base salaries 
Internal equity………….External equity 
Few perks………….Many perks 
Standard, fixed package……………Flexible package 
Low participation………….High participation 
No incentives…………..Many incentives 
No employment security…………High employment security 
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Hierarchical………….Egalitarian  
Monetary……….Non-monetary 
Job-focus…….Person–focus for pay 
Behaviour-based…….Results–based rewards 
Open…..Closed pay communications 
(Schuler and Jackson, 1987a, 1987b; Heneman and Dixon, 2001) 
These dimensions reflect many of the strategic pay themes discussed above although 
whereas universalistic new pay writers frame these dimensions as choices between 
‘old/traditional’ and ‘new/strategic’ with the emphasis very much on promoting the new 
pay model, others (including Miles and Snow, 1984; Schuler and Jackson, 1987a, 1987b; 
Gomez-Mejia and Welbourne (1988); Jackson, Schuler and Rivero, 1989; Balkin and 
Gomez-Mejia, (1990); Gomez-Mejia and Balkin (1992) and Gomez-Mejia, (1992)) 
question whether pay choices are more likely to be contingent on business strategy.  
Synthesising this literature, two clear pay systems emerge, aligned to the two business 
strategy types:  
Algorithmic pay systems are aligned to the low-road strategic type. They are mechanised, 
pre-determined and standardised; oriented toward position in organisational hierarchy, 
internal consistency, total compensation heavily oriented toward cash and driven by 
superior / subordinate differentials. Key distinguishing features are: traditional job 
evaluation procedures; seniority as criteria for pay allocation; short-term performance 
orientation; minimal risk sharing between employer and employees; emphasis on internal 
equity and hierarchical position as basis for pay distribution; above market pay; high job 
security; narrowly defined grade structures; pay secrecy; and little employee participation.  
Experiential pay systems are aligned to the high-road strategic type. They are organic, 
flexible and adaptable; oriented toward performance, external competitiveness, total 
compensation heavily oriented toward incentives and driven by recruitment needs. Here, 
key features include: use of personal skills and attributes as the basis for pay determination 
rather than job evaluation; performance rather than service as criteria for progressing pay; 
extensive risk sharing; more sensitivity to the market rather than internal equity concerns in 
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setting pay level; less emphasis on hierarchy position as a determinant compensation; 
multiple rewards at the individual and group level; and greater employee input. 
A number of studies exploring or testing the relationship between business strategy and pay 
have drawn on the theorised experiential / algorithmic pay system framework while other 
empirical work has focused on a limited number of pay practices and their relationship with 
business strategy types.  The evidence presented for an alignment of pay systems with 
business strategies is varied, and reliable comparison between studies is difficult due to 
differences in pay practice selection / operationalisation or different national, industry and 
occupational contexts. Nevertheless, analysis of these studies provides some considerable 
support for aspects of the theoretical frameworks proposed by Miles and Snow (1984), 
Schuler and Jackson (1987a, 1987b), and Gomez-Mejia and Balkin (1992). There is good 
evidence for low-road strategy organisations emphasising labour cost / quality performance 
objectives, less variable pay, narrow-graded pay structures, hierarchy-based pay systems, 
and job evaluation (Montemayor, 1996; Heneman and Dixon, 2001; Allen and Helms, 
2002). High-road strategy organisations on the other hand offer more variable pay, are more 
‘aggressive’ in their pay level policy, use merit-pay, individual performance-based pay, 
employee stock ownership, competency pay, broadbanded pay ranges and are more open 
with respect to pay information (Ibid.). The pattern of these differences conforms to the 
experiential / algorithmic pay system model.   
Other studies however, find little or no support for the model.  Long and Fang (2015) focus 
on profit-sharing finding no evidence for an association between high-road strategy and 
profit-sharing.  Romero and Cabrera (2001) find no support for the overall hypothesis that 
compensation decisions will be dependent on business strategy.  However, using cluster 
analysis, they do find mixed evidence that high-road strategists follow some experiential 
practices and low-road strategists follow some algorithmic practices.  Chen and Jermias 
(2014) ﬁnd high-road strategy ﬁrms do pay higher salaries and give more in bonuses based 
on performance than low-road ﬁrms but there is no significant difference in proportions of 
LTIs awarded to executives between the strategy types.   
Further studies have given rise to similar questions over both the inclusion or exclusion of 
pay practices from the pay model as well as the theoretical basis for assigning particular 
practices to either the experiential or algorithmic pay pattern. Boyd and Salamin (2001) find 
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that strategic orientation accounts for significant variance in base pay levels, bonus levels 
and the pay mix indicating strong support for the alignment of pay practices with business 
strategy.  Results show that the more high-road-like the business unit, the higher the levels 
of bonus pay, and the greater the ratio between base and bonus pay, consistent with the 
experiential pay pattern.  However, they also find that higher base pay levels were associated 
with the high-road strategic orientation which in Miles and Snow (1984) and Gomez-Mejia 
and Balkin’s (1992) models were associated with low-road / algorithmic pay patterns.   
Yanadori and Marler (2006) find something similar in their examination of the relationship 
between innovation strategy and pay systems in the high-technology industry.  Using pay 
data for management and professional employees, they find that an organisation’s strategic 
intention to pursue innovation has positive effects on pay level and long- versus short-term 
pay ratios.  Again, both these features; high pay level and long-term pay orientation are more 
consistent with the hypothesised low-road / algorithmic pattern than the high-road / 
experiential pay pattern.   
In making sense of these apparent anomalies, Hambrick and Snow’s (1989) argument can 
be drawn on: because low-road strategy organisations compete on a basis of efﬁciency and 
cost control, there are fewer ﬁnancial resources available and therefore likely to be lower 
not higher base salaries in these organisations.  Conversely, because high-road strategies 
increase outcome uncertainty, higher base salaries, and longer-term incentives are needed 
to both offset risk and maintain attraction and retention especially for the groups of 
employees in both the Boyd and Salamin (2001) and Yanadori and Marler (2006) studies: 
managers and professionals (Rajagopalan and Finkelstein, 1992).   
In summary then, the proposed alignment between experiential pay and high-road business 
strategies, and between algorithmic pay and low-road business strategies has some support 
in the literature. While some studies find little or no support for the alignment proposition, 
or indeed find results that are contrary to predicted patterns, the applicability of these results 
requires caution because of study design context that focus on specific groups of employees, 
specific sectors, organisation sizes and/or national contexts. And of course, the analysis so 
far has been limited to studies or results that only deal with the first part of the alignment 
proposition; that pay practice selection will depend on business strategy. The following 
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section will go on to examine the evidence for the effect of alignment on organisational 
performance. 
2.3.3.1.3 Strategy-pay-performance relationship 
While a number of studies focus on the extent of alignment between pay practices and 
strategy, there are far fewer that explore the effect of successful or unsuccessful alignment.  
Of those papers that specifically focus on the strategy-pay-performance relationship, there 
is a range of different approaches in terms of operationalisation of variables, sectors and 
employee groups, but nevertheless there are consistent indications of a strategy-pay-
performance link. 
One of the earliest studies, by Balkin and Gomez-Mejia (1990), surveys 212 HR executives 
from the manufacturing sector.  This research is significant for the current study as it 
examines a full set of pay practices in detail unlike others that focus on just one or two 
individual practices.  Moreover, synchronous with a configurational approach, the authors 
construct a pay system for each strategic type based on empirical findings.  This is broadly 
in line with the algorithmic / experiential typologies the authors developed further in a later 
publication (Gomez-Mejia and Balkin, 1992) and discussed above.  However, the key 
finding of this research is that business strategy and pay practices have an interactive effect 
on the effectiveness of pay systems in supporting organisational and HR performance.  
There is a clear distinction between pay practices judged to be ‘effective’ depending on the 
organisation’s business strategy orientation. High-road firms are much more likely to find a 
low salary and benefits / high incentive pay mix, with flexible and less formalised 
procedures and an emphasis on performance more effective, whereas low-road firms find a 
fixed salary / benefit package along with job-based, bureaucratic pay systems more 
effective. These findings indicate substantial support for the hypothesised strategy-pay-
performance relationship.      
Since then a number of other studies have drawn similar conclusions. Montemayor (1996) 
finds alignment of business strategy and pay is positively associated with high-performing 
firms whereas poor alignment is associated with poorer performance. Similarly, Allen and 
Helms (2002) measuring organisational performance using a subjective scale, suggest that 
alignment of pay and strategy leads to higher performance.   
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Tsai, Chou and Chen (2008) use a ‘value added’ purely financial measure of ﬁrm 
performance (the difference between the revenues of a ﬁrm and the cost of its material 
inputs) and find that matching pay policy to high-road strategy is positively associated with 
performance in one high-tech sector but not all three, lending only partial support to the 
hypothesis and leading the authors to question the universal application of the strategy-pay 
alignment model.  
In Chen and Jermias’s (2014) paper on executive compensation, strategy and performance, 
the relationship is approached from a ‘misfit’ perspective and the authors predict and ﬁnd 
that a misﬁt between business strategy and performance-linked pay has a negative eﬀect on 
ﬁrm financial performance.  The authors conclude with support for the contingency theory 
perspective which suggests alignment of pay structures to strategy will aﬀect performance 
positively. 
More recently, Tenhiälä and Laamanen’s (2016) findings show high-road firms benefit 
from individualised incentives and low vertical pay dispersion, while low-road firms 
perform better with non-individualised incentives, low base pay and high vertical pay 
dispersion which is entirely in keeping with alignment predictions. However, Andreeva, 
Vanhala, Sergeeva, Ritala, and Kianto, (2017) find that while rewards can have a positive 
effect on certain kinds of innovation in Finnish companies, it is not the case for all types of 
innovation and the role of ‘fit’ with other HR practices may be key. 
Synthesising the literature on strategy and pay, it is evident that although the theoretical 
arguments for alignment with strategic types and their combined effect on HR and 
organisational outcomes is well developed, the empirical picture is mixed.  A key limitation 
in drawing firm conclusions from the extant literature is the variety of different ways 
organisational performance is operationalised; some studies focusing of purely financial 
measures, others on a combination of financial, operational and HR measures.  Kaifeng et 
al. (2012) however note that while researchers may look at the relationships between HR 
practices and more distal outcomes from different perspectives, HR outcomes are nearly 
always viewed as a critical path from practices to operational and financial outcomes which 
suggests a common starting point. 
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Furthermore, there is a mix of objective and subjective measures employed in the empirical 
studies reviewed. The focus on various pay practices is also problematic; some studies 
include a wide range of practices while others choose one or two. And finally, even though 
there are well developed strategic typologies, the interpretation of these differs with some 
researchers choosing to separate innovators and quality strategies and others retaining them 
as a single ‘differentiator’ group.  However, while there may be contrasting views as to 
whether specific pay practices align to either strategy type and the extent of the effect on 
performance, it is possible to construct a proposed framework of strategic pay practices 
aligned to business strategy types.  
In comparing the pay systems analysed in this section with those in Table 3.1, clear 
similarities are apparent between the ‘strategic’ pay practices identified from new pay 
literature and the ‘experiential’ pay practices theorised to align with a high-road business 
strategy; and between ‘traditional’ pay and ‘alogrithmic’ pay theorised to align with a low-
road business strategy.  While the terminology may be different, the groups of practices are 
essentially the same.  This is logical when considering that the traditional pay model was 
developed by and for mature organisations operating in broad, stable markets (Risher, 1999; 
Trevor, 2010).  These are the same organisations that conform to the low-road strategic type 
as described by Miles and Snow (1984), Porter (1985, 2004) and Gerstein and Reisman 
(1983).  Equally, it is reasonable to assume that organisations adopting new, experiential 
pay practices will be the innovators, the organisations pursuing growth through 
differentiation, in short, the high-road strategists. 
The theoretical framework is illustrated in Table 3.3 and forms the basis of the next two 
hypotheses based on strategic pay literature.  
H3.  Organisations with a low-road strategic orientation will be more likely to select 
an algorithmic pay configuration and organisations with a high-road strategic 
orientation will be more likely to select an experiential pay configuration.  
H4.  Alignment of strategic orientation and pay configuration will have a positive 
effect on HR performance outcomes. 
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Table3.3 Strategic pay configurations for organisational performance 
 Strategic orientation / pay configuration 
Strategic pay policy 
dimensions 
High-road strategy / 
Experiential pay 
Low-road strategy / 
Algorithmic pay 
Hierarchical vs. 
egalitarian 
Broadbanding; individual pay 
structures or job family 
structures 
Low vertical pay dispersion 
Narrow-graded pay structures 
or pay spines 
High vertical pay dispersion 
Pay level – high vs. low Above market pay  At or below market pay 
Cost as pay level / review 
determiner 
External vs. internal 
equity 
Market-based pay 
No job evaluation 
Job evaluation 
Person vs. job focussed 
pay 
Performance, skills, 
competencies or employee value 
as criteria for base pay 
progression 
Service-based pay progression 
High vs. low (employee) 
risk  
Extensive performance-based 
pay  
Minimal or no performance-
based pay 
Group vs. individual 
performance 
Organisation/group/individual/ 
level performance pay e.g. 
combination schemes, 
gainsharing, goal-sharing, profit-
sharing  
Individual performance pay e.g. 
piece rates, sales commission  
Variable vs. fixed pay Extensive variable pay Minimal variable pay 
Open vs. secretive pay Open pay  Pay secrecy 
Long-term vs. short term 
pay 
Long-term pay (share schemes / 
LTIs) 
No long-term pay (no share 
schemes / LTIs 
Adapted from: Balkin and Gomez-Mejia (1990); Gomez-Mejia and Balkin (1992); with additions from: 
Hambrick and Snow (1989); Boyd and Salamin (2001); Heneman and Dixon (2001); Allen and Helms (2002); 
Yanadori and Marler (2006); Chen and Jermias (2014); Tenhiälä and Laamanen (2016). 
3.3.2.2 Employment group 
The rationale for a theorised, horizontally aligned relationship between employment group, 
pay and organisational performance is drawn from SHRM concepts of human capital and 
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resource-based approaches (Wright et al., 1994; Youndt et al., 1996). The emphasis on 
externalities and vertical alignment in the development of strategic HRM and the 
consequential precedence of business objectives above all others has led to criticisms that 
the ‘human’ aspects of the concept have been neglected (Druker, White, Hegewisch and 
Mayne, 1996; Wright and McMahan, 2011). By contrast, the concept of human capital 
enhancement, developed initially by Becker (1993), is founded on the notion that employees 
possess unique sets of knowledge, skills and abilities which, when supported by appropriate 
HR practices, can help to develop an organisation’s core competencies and yield desired 
organisational outcomes sustaining competitive advantage for the firm (Wright et al., 1994; 
Youndt and Snell, 2004; Wright and McMahan, 2011). Configurational arguments propose 
that constructing internally consistent practices to support human capital enhancement 
which are also aligned with strategic orientations will positively influence organisational 
performance (Delery and Doty, 1996). This is a view adopted by Lepak and Snell (1999, 
2002) with the additional proposition that there are likely to be differences in both human 
capital and employment type within organisations and that HR conﬁgurations are likely to 
vary according to the employment group being managed.  
2.3.3.2.1 Differentiating pay by employment group 
There is a strong argument in the pay literature for treating executive and top management 
pay differently from pay for other groups of employees.  One argument holds that only 
executives make strategic business decisions which directly influence organisational 
performance and therefore only compensation for this group of employees can be ‘strategic’ 
(Milkovich, 1987).  And certainly, research on the pay and performance link is dominated 
by a focus on linking executive pay to firm performance (Tenhiälä and Laamanen, 2016), 
largely drawing on concepts of incentive and agency (Fama, 1980; Perkins and Hendry, 
2005).   
Empirical evidence for pay differentiation between top management and other employment 
groups comes from Schuler and Jackson (1987b) who include ‘organisational level’ as a 
variable in their study of strategy and HRM practices.  They operationalise organisation 
level as being four distinct employee groups: top management; other management; non-
exempt salaried employees (i.e. not exempt from the Fair Labor Standards Act (US) which 
protects overtime for lower paid employees) and hourly paid employees.  They find 
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evidence for the differentiation of pay practices not only between strategy types but also 
between top management and others, with this group more likely to receive stockholdings 
and flexible benefits packages whereas hourly paid employees are more likely than other 
employee groups to receive cost of living increases and incentive payments.   
Human capital theory suggests however that both organisational leaders and employees at 
lower levels within the organisation will receive higher pay levels when they have higher 
human capital (Judge, Klinger, and Simon, 2010; Harris and McMahan, 2015). This is 
because employees with human capital (i.e. high levels of knowledge, skills and abilities) 
can be organisational resources which are valuable (create value for the organisation); rare 
(are difficult to source in the labour market); inimitable (are not easily imitated); and non-
substitutable (are not easily replaced by technology) (Wright et al., 1994).  The argument 
made by Wright et al. (1994, p.304) is that these criteria for sustained competitive advantage 
only apply to human resources as a “pool of human capital”.  In contrast to Barney (1991) 
and Castanias and Helfat (1991), who view individuals and elite groups (such as top 
management) as potential sources of competitive advantage, Wright et al. (1994) propose 
that a wider base of employees may play a greater role in generating competitive advantage 
because a) they are directly involved in the production of the product or service and b) 
because of their lower visibility, lower mobility (between firms) and advantages such as 
social complexity (e.g. good working relationships, trust, etc.) other groups can be equally 
valuable and inimitable creating sustained, rather than short-term, competitive advantage.  
This approach is supported by Milkovich (1987) who argues that any employee group can 
be critical to organisational performance and therefore considered strategically important.  
But despite acknowledging that employee groups besides executives and top management 
have the potential to contribute to organisational competitive advantage, not all groups will 
do so, and this distinction is dependent on both industry requirements and the type of work 
performed.  For example, both Lawler (1986) and Gomez-Mejia and Balkin (1992) 
highlight that particularly in knowledge-work and high technology sectors, strategic pay 
practices that support depth of technical expertise, horizontal career orientation, team 
working, integration of activities, fluid tasks, knowledge exchange and problem solving will 
be far more effective than the traditional pay model. Suff, Reilly and Cox (2007) highlight 
the organisational benefits of pay plans for knowledge-workers that combine performance-
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related pay within a mix of short- and long-term incentives and non-financial awards.  And 
Bussin, Nicholls and Nienaber (2016) find that pay preferences are related to occupational 
culture for knowledge-workers in South Africa’s ICT industry.  It therefore appears likely 
that organisations might benefit from differentiating pay design for certain types of 
employment groups. 
A contribution from McDonnell, Gunnigle, Lavelle and Lamare (2016, p.1299) suggests a 
strategic and differentiated emphasis on employee pay for those with “the greatest capacity 
to enhance competitive advantage”. Using survey evidence from 260 multinational 
companies (MNCs) in Ireland, the study explores the extent to which ‘key groups’ of 
employees (those critical to the ﬁrm’s core competence) are formally recognised and 
whether they are subject to differential pay practices (measured as pay-level policy; financial 
participation schemes; and variable pay).  The results demonstrate that around half of MNCs 
identify a key group as distinct from both managers and the largest non-management 
occupational group in the workforce.  They find that the most common categorisation of 
occupations forming key groups are technical staff, research and development (R&D) 
specialists, chemists, engineers, quality technicians and product designers.  Findings also 
provide strong evidence for considerable differentiation in the pay practices between these 
three groups.  Key groups are more likely to have pay-level positioned in the top quartiles 
relative to market comparators and are slightly more likely to be offered financial 
participation schemes (although managers were more likely to be given stock options) but 
there was no significant difference in performance-based pay for managers and key groups.  
Overall, the authors conclude that pay is differentiated for employee groups with key groups 
treated as being of sufﬁciently greater strategic value than those performing the more 
operational activities of the organisation. They also conclude that key group pay practices 
are similar to those of managerial groups. 
Although the literature in this area is fairly limited, there is a clear indication that 
organisations make strategic differentiations between managers, professional and technical 
staff on one hand and lower skilled, broad-based employee groups on the other.  
Organisations may therefore seek to configure pay practices to support human capital 
enhancement for these different employment groups.  
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2.3.3.2.2 Configuration typologies 
In configuring pay practices to support human capital enhancement for employment 
groupings there are a number of wider HR configurations proposed in the literature.  
Miles and Snow’s (1984) defender-type A / prospector-type B typology is the archetypal 
configuration of business strategies and HR systems.  Delery and Doty (1996), drawing on 
Kerr and Slocum (1987); Osterman (1987); and Sonnenfeld and Peiperl (1988), propose a 
similar framework to Miles and Snow (1984) comprised of two differing employment 
systems; internal and market-based. Drawing these frameworks together, two strategic 
HRM systems emerge: 
Type A / Internal / Developmental systems ‘make’ human resources. They rely on internal 
labour markets, extensive training, formal staff planning, process- and development-
oriented appraisals. Some jobs will have tightly defined job descriptions. Pay is based on 
hierarchy and internal equity; there are few incentives and profit-sharing is minimal 
(algorithmic pay configuration).   
Type B / Market-based / Acquisition systems ‘buy’ human resources from the market and 
emphasise sophisticated recruitment and selection, informal staff planning and little training 
and development. Performance appraisals and compensation are results oriented. There is 
little employment security and employee voice, and jobs are usually broadly defined.  Pay 
is driven by incentives for individual performance, extensive profit-sharing and recruitment 
needs (experiential pay configuration). (Adapted from Miles and Snow, 1984; Youndt and 
Snell, 2004; Delery and Doty, 1996). 
None of these proposed HR systems recommend differentiating practices according to 
employment group within organisations. Following configuration perspective logic, the 
implication is that these typologies are ‘ideal types’ which organisations will conform to, to 
varying degrees. 
Lepak and Snell (2002), however, do seek to construct differentiated HR configurations for 
a framework of four different employment ‘modes’ based on the theorised level of the 
strategic value and uniqueness of human capital.  According to the authors’ proposition, 
employees working in a ‘knowledge-based employment mode’ are likely to be viewed as 
core to the organisation; they possess unique human capital and directly contribute to 
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strategic objectives. The knowledge-based employment mode is structured around “the 
skills and competencies of employees rather than the execution of programmed tasks and 
job routines” (Ibid., p.520). These are knowledge workers (e.g. analysts, middle 
management, engineers, functional managers, professional employees, R&D employees, 
research scientists) and the employment relationship is based on long-term commitment.  
Lepak and Snell (2002) propose that for this employment mode the most appropriate HR 
configuration is commitment-based practices aimed at enhancing long-term orientation and 
developing proprietary knowledge.  Commitment-based practices are aligned to the ‘make’ 
orientation and emphasise promotion from within, employment security, employee voice in 
decision making, financial participation and developmental appraisals (Lepak and Snell, 
2002).  
The other group of employees theorised to hold high strategic value for the organisation 
work under a ‘job-based employment mode’. While these employees may have human 
capital that has strategic value, it has limited uniqueness i.e. it does not provide a 
differentiating source of competitiveness.  As Lepak and Snell (2002, p.520) explain, these 
workers “are able to make signiﬁcant contributions to a ﬁrm while possessing skills that are 
widely transferable”.  Employees in this employment mode are hired to perform 
predetermined tasks and might include: administrative positions, salespeople, customer 
service agents, drivers/delivery representatives and assembly-line workers as well as semi-
professionals such as account managers, engineers, HR practitioners, legal workers and 
trainers (Ibid).  According to the model, employees working in job-based employment are 
likely to be managed through a productivity-based HR system similar to a ‘buy’ 
conﬁguration.  Given that their human capital is easily transferable, jobs will be 
standardised, skills will be acquired from the market rather than internally developed, 
appraisals will focus on job performance and be short-term and results oriented (Ibid).  
Despite clear alignments between the commitment-based ‘make’ configuration proposed 
by Lepak and Snell (2002) and the defender / type A / internal / developmental types 
proposed by Miles and Snow (1984), Delery and Doty (1996) and Youndt and Snell (2004) 
respectively, the operationalisation of commitment-based pay practices does not wholly 
conform with the proposed algorithmic pay configuration (see Table 3.3). The pay elements 
of the commitment-based HR system include extensive benefits package, employee stock 
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ownership programs, incentives for new ideas and a lack of focus on short-term 
performance (Lepak and Snell, 2002).  Conversely, despite apparent alignment between the 
productivity-based ‘buy’ configuration and the prospector / type B / market-based / 
acquisition type, the operationalisation of productivity-based pay does not conform to the 
experiential pay configuration. Instead it comprises compensation based on straight salary; 
valuing seniority; paying market-based wages; providing internal equity; and individual 
incentive / bonus focused on short-term productivity targets (Ibid.).     
Lepak and Snell’s (2002) results overall indicate support for a theoretical configuration of 
HR practices according to human capital characteristics (uniqueness and strategic value) 
and employment modes.  Specifically, however they find some mixed results for their 
hypothesised alignments of knowledge-based employment with commitment-based HR 
and job-based employment with productivity-based HR.  Some results indicate that the 
commitment-based HR configuration is associated with knowledge-based employment and 
the productivity-based HR configuration is associated with the job-based employment 
mode while others, indicate only weak relationships.  It could be argued that the 
operationalisation of HR configurations without clearly justified links e.g. compensation 
based on market rate and internal equity for the job-based employment mode may be 
responsible for such mixed results.  
Taking the findings in this section together, there are indications of reasonable support for 
links between employment groups and different HR systems.   
2.3.3.2.3 Employment group-pay-performance relationship 
Despite a strong theoretical argument resting on human capital and resource-based 
perspectives, there is scant evidence in the literature for a direct relationship between pay 
configured by employment group and HR / organisational performance.  Where this 
evidence exists, pay is treated as a component of a wider set of HR practices.  For example, 
Collins and Smith’s (2006) study incorporates pay practices such as incentives based on 
organisational performance, high pay level compared to competitors and stock options, into 
a measure of a commitment-based approach to HR for high-tech knowledge workers and 
finds a positive association with firm financial performance.  Similarly, Rodríguez and 
Ventura (2003) focus on managers and professionals only in a study of HR systems, strategy 
and firm performance.  The results indicate that within their sample a ‘make’ HR system 
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has a positive effect on employee turnover and overall ﬁrm performance.  However, the 
algorithmic pay practices associated with the ‘make’ HR system produce a negative effect 
on the ﬁrm’s productivity leading to mixed support for a positive relationship between HR 
system and organisational performance.  
These papers investigate just one employment group, but there are also studies comparing 
different groups, HR and pay practices and HR / organisational performance outcomes. 
McClean and Collins (2011) examine the relationship between high-commitment HR 
practices and perceived firm performance (measured as comparison to competitors, 
reaching potential, staff and customer satisfaction) in professional services firms examining 
the effort and performance of clerical workers and semi-professionals.   The results indicate 
that high-commitment HR practices positively relate to firm performance for both 
employment groups but also that this relationship is moderated by the value of each group 
to firm competitive advantage.  Specifically, when each group is highly valuable to firm 
competitive advantage, the impact of their effort on firm performance is much stronger than 
when that group is less valuable to firm competitive advantage. Furthermore, in their 
findings, semi-professionals (e.g. nurses, paralegals, etc.) are found to have greater 
competitive advantage than clerical workers (support staff, secretaries, payroll, etc.) 
(McClean and Collins, 2011).  These findings are in line to those of Nyberg et al. (2016) 
who find that performance-based pay practices, namely merit pay, and bonus pay, had a 
positive effect on employee performance at all intra-organisational levels. 
The theoretical arguments and empirical evidence presented in this section suggest the next 
two hypotheses concerning relationships between pay practices, employment group and HR 
performance:  
H5.  Organisations will select an algorithmic pay configuration for employees 
working in a knowledge-based employment group (managers and professional 
employees) and an experiential pay configuration for employees working in a job-
based employment group (other, broad-based employee groups). 
H6.  Alignment of employment group and pay configuration will have a positive 
effect on HR performance outcomes.   
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3.3.2.3 Industry sector  
Throughout the strategic pay literature, from both universal and alignment perspectives, the 
role of industry sector is prominent.  Industry sector has been theorised as having the 
potential to influence the pattern of pay practices (as an independent variable in its own right 
e.g. Jackson et al., 1989), to explain a variable’s relationship with pay (as a mediator or 
confounding variable) or to influence the strength of the effect of a variable on pay (as a 
moderator variable). 
Of the studies analysed in this chapter, many are focussed on either manufacturing (e.g. 
Balkin and Gomez-Mejia, 1990; Rodríguez and Ventura, 2003) and its subsets such as high 
technology (e.g. Romero and Cabrera, 2001; Yanadori and Marler, 2006; Tremblay and 
Chênevert, 2008; Tsai et al., 2008) or service-oriented settings (e.g. banks for Delery and 
Doty, 1996; and Boyd and Salamin, 2001; professional services for McClean and Collins, 
2011). This suggests a recognition of a manufacturing and production / service sector 
dichotomy leading many researchers to focus their studies on one industry sector to control 
for industry influence. 
Jackson et al. (1989) propose that there are fundamental differences between the employee 
behaviour requirements of organisations operating in the service sector and those in 
manufacturing. First, services, by their very nature, are intangible rather than tangible; the 
consumption of services occurs as soon as they are produced rather than being stored for a 
later date as with typical manufactured products (Mills and Margulies, 1980).  Because of 
the intangible nature of the ‘product’, employees in service organisations take on a crucial 
role in the organisation’s delivery system; consumers interact with producers in the 
production of services (Ibid.).  This means that it is more difficult to monitor employee 
performance and quality control directly, so employees must be trusted, but incentivised, to 
monitor their own performance (Ibid.). This has implications for pay practices and suggests 
service sector organisations will design pay systems that will both encourage self-
monitoring and emphasise performance.  Indeed, in their study of 267 organisations from 
forty different industries in the US, Jackson et al. (1989) find service organisations are more 
likely than manufacturing organisations to use performance results to determine pay, 
particularly for hourly paid employees.  
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Results of studies focusing on either manufacturing or services lend support to Jackson et 
al.’s (1989) findings. Rodríguez and Ventura (2003) find algorithmic compensation 
practices in manufacturing firms aligned to the ‘make’ HR system such as an emphasis on 
the job rather than employee skills as the basis for pay, internal consistency, and value of 
seniority in pay decisions.  However, evidence also suggests that high-technology sections 
of the manufacturing sector utilise more flexible and adaptable compensation practices too 
(Tremblay and Chênevert, 2008).  Conversely, Delery and Doty (1996) find organisations 
in financial services both utilise, and benefit from, extensive use of profit-sharing; a key 
experiential pay practice.  
Taken together, the literature suggests that there will be different pay practices used by 
organisations operating in different industry sectors and that pay aligned with industry sector 
requirements has potential to have an effect on HR / organisational performance. This helps 
formulate the next pair of hypotheses. 
H7.  Organisations operating in the manufacturing and production sector will be 
more likely to select an algorithmic pay configuration and organisations operating 
in private sector services will be more likely to select an experiential pay 
configuration. 
H8.  Alignment of industry sector and pay configuration will have a positive effect 
on HR performance outcomes.   
3.3.2.4 Organisation size  
Similar to the treatment of industry sector, research studies included in this chapter have 
often sought to control for size of organisation (number of employees). For example, 
Rodríguez and Ventura (2003) only include companies with 100 or more employees 
whereas Lepak and Snell (2002) exclude companies with less than 200 employees.  In both 
cases, this appears to be based on the premise that large organisations are more likely than 
small ones to have formal and well-developed HRM systems (Snell, 1992; Huselid, 1995; 
Huselid and Becker, 1996; De Winne and Sels, 2012).  
Indeed, the indication from many studies is that there is a strong association between 
organisation size and manifestation of HRM (Jackson and Schuler, 1995; Leung, 2003; 
Rutherford, Buller and McMullan, 2003; Van de Woestyne, Dewettinck, and Van 
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Bruystegem, 2010; De Winne and Sels, 2012) and that HRM in small organisations is 
predominantly “informal and emergent” (Harney and Dundon, 2006, p.48).  In seeking to 
explain what it is about the small size of these organisations that determines this approach 
to HRM, economic perspectives focus on SMEs’ typical lack of financial resources; what 
Welsh and White (1981, p.18) refer to as, “resource poverty”. There is also evidence to 
suggest that HR practices in SMEs are characterised by informality and flexibility (Bacon, 
Ackers, Storey and Coates, 1996; Verreynne, Parker and Wilson, 2013) due to external 
uncertainty (Hill and Stewart, 2000), ‘proximity’ to their environment (Westhead and 
Storey, 1996) and the “liability of smallness” (Williamson, 2000, p.30).  However, small 
organisations are also theorised to be adept at innovation and change, based on the often-
niche nature of their chosen markets meaning they actively differentiate from the 
standardised offerings from large competitors and have lower commitment to existing 
practices and products (Storey, 1994; De Winne and Sels, 2012). Conversely, larger 
organisations have the resources to exploit economies of scale in implementing more formal 
and sophisticated practices (Jackson and Schuler, 1995) but might be less ‘fleet of foot’ in 
adapting to market changes.  Institutional theories suggest that larger organisations will also 
pursue more sophisticated HRM as they are more visible in society and under pressure to 
gain legitimacy (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Jackson and Schuler, 1995; Suchman, 1995). 
According to Jackson, et al. (1989) as organisations grow from small to large, a number of 
changes typically occur, including more specialised jobs as a means to increase efficiency; 
more formalised control and the development of internal labour markets. These features are 
theorised to give rise to ‘make’ type HR systems which are characterised by internal 
promotion, career paths, formal procedures, extensive training, and algorithmic 
compensation based on rewards for seniority, hierarchical position, internal equity and low 
levels of variable pay (Ibid.; Miles and Snow, 1984; Delery and Doty, 1996; Youndt and 
Snell, 2004).  While it does not automatically follow that small organisations will adopt a 
‘buy’ HR system just because large organisations adopt a ‘make’ system, the characteristics 
of small firms (resource constraints, informality and flexibility, external uncertainty and a 
propensity for innovation and change) would suggest that an HR system that emphasises 
acquiring skills externally, informal planning, little training and development, and 
experiential, results-oriented compensation would be a natural fit.  
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Empirical research focussing on organisation size, pay and performance is scant.  Indeed, 
Jackson et al. (1989) include organisation size in their wider study of organisational 
characteristics and HR practices as an exploratory comparison of practices in large and small 
organisation because they cannot develop a priori hypotheses given the lack of prior 
research. Overall, they find organisation size has the weakest association with HR practices 
of all the organisational characteristics tested, but results do indicate that hourly paid 
employees in small organisations (250 or fewer employees) were more likely to receive 
bonuses based on company profitability whereas both managers and hourly-paid employees 
in large organisations (1000 or more employees) were more likely to be stockholders.  Given 
that both these pay practices could be classified as experiential (Table 3.3), there is no 
evidence for alignment with a pay configuration type, however this result does point to 
different practices being utilised by large and small organisations. 
In examining the link between size, pay and organisational performance, Carlson, Upton 
and Seaman’s (2006) study of 168 family-owned SMEs in the US tests the consequences 
of HR practices on firm performance. The results suggest that use of market competitive 
compensation designed to recruit and retain key employees is associated with high 
performing ﬁrms. In addition, their findings indicate that high performing ﬁrms use more 
cash incentive compensation at every employee level in the organisation.  These results 
suggest an association between experiential pay practices and performance in SME 
organisations consistent with an alignment premise.  
While there is little empirical evidence for a strong association between organisation size, 
pay practices and organisational outcomes, the theoretical arguments set out above suggest 
the final pair of hypotheses in this study. 
H9.  Large organisations will be more likely to select an algorithmic pay 
configuration and SME organisations will be more likely to select an experiential 
pay configuration. 
H10. Alignment of organisation size and pay configuration will have a positive 
effect on HR performance outcomes. 
This section has critically examined the theoretical basis and empirical evidence for a 
conceptual framework of strategic pay from contingency and configurational perspectives.  
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It is evident from the analysis that there are robust arguments for the alignment of pay 
practices with organisational characteristics, both vertical and horizontal, that suggest 
positive HR performance outcomes will result. Furthermore, contingency approaches 
propose two alternative strategic pay configurations: one experiential that is strongly 
reflective of the new pay set of strategic pay practices; and one algorithmic that is equally 
similar to the traditional pay model. In recognising these similarities, and other broad 
alignments between HRM systems and pay configurations identified in this chapter, and 
aligning these with business strategy typologies, employment groups, industry sectors and 
sizes of organisation, a clear picture of two broadly aligned systems emerges (see Table 3.4).   
The following section incorporates these dichotomous alignment systems in its 
development of a conceptual framework based on the universalistic and alignment 
propositions evaluated in this chapter. It also sets out each hypothesis and its link to the 
proposed model of strategic pay.
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Table3.4 Broad alignments between strategy, employment system, pay configuration, sector and organisation size 
 
Strategic orientation HRM system Employment 
group 
Pay bundle / pattern / configuration Sector Size 
Miles & 
Snow 
(1978, 
1984) 
Porter (1980, 
2004) 
Gerstein  & 
Reisman 
(1983) 
Miles 
& 
Snow 
(1984) 
Delery 
& Doty 
(1996) 
Lepak & 
Snell (2002) 
Youndt & 
Snell 
(2004) 
Lepak & 
Snell (2002) 
Lawler 
(1986) 
Schuster 
& 
Zingheim  
(1992) 
Lawler 
(1990) 
Gomez-
Mejia & 
Welbourne 
(1988) 
Gomez-
Mejia & 
Balkin 
(1992) 
Jackson et al 
(1989) 
- 
Defender Cost leader Extract profit 
-
rationalisation 
Type 
A 
Internal-
based  
Commitment-
based ‘make’ 
Develop-
mental  
Knowledge-
based  
Old pay Traditional 
pay 
Mechanistic Algorithmic  Manufacturing 
& production 
Large 
Prospector Differentiator 
(innovation / 
quality) 
Dynamic 
growth 
Type 
B 
Market-
based  
Productivity-
based ‘buy’ 
Acquisition  Job-based New pay  Strategic 
pay  
Organic Experiential  Services SME 
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3.4 Strategic pay in the UK 
Much of the literature examined in this chapter originates in the United States.  The extent to 
which strategic pay practices have been adopted by UK organisations has received little 
widespread attention in the academic literature.  As Taylor (2000, p.14) notes, there has certainly 
been increased interest in new pay methods and the rhetoric of UK reward practitioners has 
embraced the language of strategic HRM, but “the extent to which any kind of fundamental shift 
has occurred in practice” is still in question.  
Heery (1996, p.58) cites a CBI survey of more than 400 organisations as evidence that that there 
has been “some movement towards the new pay model in Britain”. The survey records recent 
and planned innovation in pay management; increased links between pay and business 
performance; redesign of pay structures to reflect more flexible forms of organisation; 
widespread use of PFP systems and some increase in the incidence of team pay; systems which 
reward skill and competence acquisition; a trend towards greater benefit flexibility and 
increasing proportions of variable pay (Ibid.).  Although this suggests an uptake of strategic pay 
practices, Heery (1996) cautions that the data are not representative, and the observed uptake of 
practices is generally modest rather than widespread.  He also notes that certain changes have 
been driven by changes in legislation, rather than by the adoption of a coherent new pay model. 
Over a decade later, Trevor (2010), in a qualitative exploratory study of UK organisations 
although limited to the fast-moving consumer goods (FMCG) sector, finds more consistent 
evidence of strategic pay practices.  These include flexible base pay structures linked to market 
movements; significant levels of variable pay through the use of short-term incentive bonus 
systems; forms of share schemes and long-term incentive pay, and a comprehensive array of 
financial benefits emphasising choice and value to the individual. 
The 2011 Workplace Employment Relations Survey (WERS) which is representative of British 
workplaces with five or more employees, does not distinguish explicitly between strategic or 
traditional pay practices, but does collect data on rates of collective bargaining and performance-
based pay in organisations (van Wanrooy, Bewley, Bryson, Forth, Freeth, Stokes and Wood, 
2014).  The CIPD Reward Management Survey collects data on an approximately annual basis; 
the most current results in the public domain being from 2017.  CIPD collects data on all the key 
areas of strategic and traditional pay and together with the WERS data can be used to provide a 
picture of the frequency of pay practices in the UK     
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There appears to be good evidence that traditional collective bargaining to determine pay is 
declining in favour of methods more in keeping with strategic pay approaches. Van Wanrooy 
et al. (2014) cite three decades of decline in union influence on pay setting culminating in just 
7% of workplaces using collective bargaining by 2011.  Similarly, the 2017 CIPD survey finds 
only 9% of private sector services firms using collective bargaining although the figure is higher 
for manufacturing and production companies at 19% (Bailey, Marriott and Perkins, 2017).  Job 
evaluation, another traditional method of pay determination is used in combination with market 
rates by approximately a half of the respondents, whereas roughly a third determine pay solely 
on the organisation’s ability to pay (Ibid.).  The two surveys also find similar results on the rates 
of performance pay: WERS cites 60% of private sector organisations using some form of 
performance-based pay whereas CIPD finds 57% of private sector services and manufacturing 
and production companies use such schemes. The CIPD survey also finds that broadbanding, 
job families and individual pay rates are more common than more traditional pay spines or 
narrow-grades for managing base pay, and individual performance, competencies and market 
rates are used much more frequently than traditional service-based pay progression (Bailey et 
al., 2017).  As a whole, the data from both WERS and CIPD indicates that strategic pay practices 
have become commonplace in the UK private sector whilst more traditional practices are used 
less frequently, giving support to the contention that strategic pay has been widely taken up in 
UK organisations. 
There are some however suggestions that the UK has been unwilling to uncritically adopt the 
premise of strategic pay. Thompson (1998, p.67) argues that managing pay is more often 
concerned with “short-term damage limitation” rather than the “strategic lever for change that 
appears so seductive in the writing of American commentators”.  And Druker and White 
(2000b, p.216) note that new pay theories have not been “translated fully or easily” into UK pay 
practice. Armstrong and Brown (2009) also caution against the wholesale acceptance of US pay 
models and propose an alternative perspective; a UK-oriented ‘new realism’ (Armstrong and 
Brown, 2009; Armstrong 2015).  However, the ‘new realism’ remains essentially a softened 
version of new pay, retaining a unitarist emphasis on strategy, flexibility and individualism 
despite some qualifications around best practice universalism.  
Trevor and Brown (2014, p.573), largely based on the previous empirical work of Trevor 
(2010), conclude that institutional and social factors create “unavoidable obstacles to the ability 
of management to implement pay systems aligned to strategic goals” which fundamentally limit 
the strategic applications of pay in UK organisations.  Trevor’s (2010) empirical research raises 
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some significant questions about the fundamental efficacy of the strategic pay model, in 
particular the claim that these practices will positively influence individual and organisational 
performance.  A number of case study firms in the study experienced negative outcomes as a 
result of the ‘strategic’ pay practices they used, leading Trevor (2010) to conclude that these pay 
systems can diminish motivation, give rise to undesirable employee behaviours, absorb 
managers’ time and effort, and misallocate pay spend.  In short, pay managed in this way can 
produce outcomes entirely contrary to those intended, and ultimately has the potential to 
“consume and destroy more value than is created” (Trevor, 2010, p.139). 
Despite acknowledging the failings of the strategic pay model himself, Trevor (2010) recognises 
that there is little by way of an alternative to the orthodoxy.  Much of the criticism lacks empirical 
grounding and therefore inevitably lacks credibility both in the eyes of strategic pay advocates 
and practitioners.  And, despite the misgivings, there is plenty of evidence to suggest that 
strategic pay has become the espoused ‘standard model’ of pay practice in the UK (Trevor and 
Brown, 2014, Perkins et al., 2016). 
3.5 Theorising the problem - framework and hypotheses  
Drawing on the literature reviewed in this and the previous chapter, this section sets out the 
conceptual framework that guides the empirical phases of the study. It brings together the 
various hypothesised relationships between pay practices and organisational contingencies; 
business strategy, employment group, industry sector, and organisation size, with HR 
performance outcomes in one integrated strategic pay model.  
3.5.1 Conceptual framework  
3.5.1.1 Universalistic strategic pay model 
The starting point underpinning the conceptual framework is the universalistic proposition that 
strategic pay practices will have an effect on organisational performance (Lawler, 1990; Delery 
and Doty, 1996; Cadsby, et al., 2007; Eriksson and Villeval, 2008; Gerhart et al., 2009; Fang 
and Gerhart, 2012; Nyberg et al., 2018). Organisational performance in terms of operational and 
financial measures is achieved because pay practices contribute to ‘HR outcomes’, the attraction, 
retention and motivation of productive employees i.e. there is an intermediate stage on the 
critical path from practices to performance (Kaifeng et al., 2012).  For the purposes of this study, 
only hypotheses that test HR performance outcomes will be included given the more distal 
nature of financial and operational performance outcomes and associated methodological 
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constraints (see Chapter 4 for more detail including operationalisation of variables). In addition, 
the conceptual framework incorporates the universalistic idea of ‘bundling’ strategic pay 
practices advocated by new pay proponents (Lawler, 1990; Schuster and Zingheim, 1992) and 
in accordance with best practice HRM approaches maintaining that bundling practices has an 
additive effect on performance outcomes (Martín-Alcázar et al., 2005). Figure 3.1 illustrates this 
foundational, central proposition, showing the hypothesised relationships between pay, HR 
outcomes and organisational performance (this last variable being outside the scope of this study 
and therefore greyed out).   
 
Figure 3.1- Developing a strategic pay model - stage one universalistic concepts 
3.5.1.2 Alignment strategic pay model  
The second stage in the construction of a conceptual framework to guide empirical work is to 
build into the model vertical and horizontal alignment premises of contingency and 
configurational perspectives (Figure 3.2).  First, that as organisations choose how to compete in 
the external product/service markets of their industry sector, pay practices will be selected to 
best meet the needs of fulfilling that business strategy and support organisational success 
through positive HR outcomes (Miles and Snow, 1984; Schuler and Jackson, 1987a, 1987b; 
Jackson et al., 1989; Gomez-Mejia and Balkin, 1992; Montemayor, 1996; Allen and Helms, 
2002; Chen and Jermias, 2014, Tenhiälä and Laamanen, 2016; Andreeva et al., 2017).  Second, 
in order to meet business strategy needs, organisations will configure pay practices that best meet 
human capital requirements for employees working in different employment groups and this 
too will contribute to positive HR / organisational outcomes (Lepak and Snell, 2002; McClean 
and Collins, 2011; McDonnell et al., 2016). Finally, organisational size will also have an effect 
on the configuration of pay practices because of resource constraints, levels of formality and 
flexibility, as well as isomorphic institutional pressures (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Jackson 
and Schuler, 1995; Williamson, 2000; De winne and Sels, 2012; Verreynne et al., 2013). 
 
Strategic pay 
practices 
HR 
performance 
outcomes 
Organisation 
performance 
H1 & H2 
99 
 
 
Figure 3.1 Developing a strategic pay model - stage two – vertical and horizontal alignments 
3.5.1.3 Integrated strategic pay model 
Analysis of the strategic pay literature identified two alternative pay configurations. The first is 
algorithmic pay, characterised by traditional job evaluation; valuing seniority; short-term 
performance orientation; minimal risk sharing; emphasis on internal equity and hierarchical 
position; high pay dispersion; below market pay; high job security; narrowly defined grade 
structures; and pay secrecy. The second is experiential pay, characterised by emphasis on 
individual skills and attributes; performance; extensive risk sharing; market sensitivity; more 
egalitarian compensation; low pay dispersion; multiple rewards at the individual and group 
level; and pay openness.  These two pay configurations are in line with the universalistic 
differentiation of strategic (experiential) / traditional (algorithmic) pay.  And these two ‘ideal 
type’ configurations of pay practices are theorised to align with dichotomous conceptualisations 
of business strategy (low-road and high-road) and employment groups (knowledge-based and 
job-based) as well as differentiated by industry sector (manufacturing and services) and 
organisation size (large and SME) as set out in Table 3.4.  The proposed model of strategic pay 
Strategic pay 
practices 
HR 
performance  
outcomes 
Organisation 
performance 
H1, H2, 
H4, H6, H8, H10 
Business 
strategy 
Industry sector 
Organisation 
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HR capital - 
Employment 
group 
H3 
H5 
H9 
H7 
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delineates this dichotomous model and represents the conceptual framework which informs the 
empirical phases of the study (Figure 3.3). 
 
Figure 3.2 Proposed strategic pay model 
3.5.2 Hypotheses 
H1.  HR performance outcomes will be positively related to experiential pay practices and 
negatively related to algorithmic pay practices.  
H2.  Organisations will bundle strategic pay practices and bundling will have an additive effect 
on HR performance outcomes. 
H3.  Organisations with a low-road strategic orientation will be more likely to select an 
algorithmic pay configuration and organisations with a high-road strategic orientation will be 
more likely to select an experiential pay configuration.  
H4.  Alignment of strategic orientation and pay configuration will have a positive effect on HR 
performance outcomes. 
Algorithmic pay 
HR 
performance 
outcomes 
H1, H2,  
H4, H6, H8, H10 
Industry sector 
Business 
strategy 
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size 
Knowledge-
based 
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H9 
H7 
Experiential pay 
Job-based 
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Manufacturing & 
Production 
Service sector 
Low-road 
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Large 
SME 
H5 
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H5.  Organisations will select an algorithmic pay configuration for employees working in a 
knowledge-based employment group (managers and professional employees) and an 
experiential pay configuration for employees working in a job-based employment group (other, 
broad-based employee groups). 
H6.  Alignment of employment group and pay configuration will have a positive effect on HR 
performance outcomes.   
H7.  Organisations operating in the manufacturing and production sector will be more likely to 
select an algorithmic pay configuration and organisations operating in private sector services 
will be more likely to select an experiential pay configuration. 
H8.  Alignment of industry sector and pay configuration will have a positive effect on HR 
performance outcomes.   
H9.  Large organisations will be more likely to select an algorithmic pay configuration and SME 
organisations will be more likely to select an experiential pay configuration. 
H10. Alignment of organisation size and pay configuration will have a positive effect on HR 
performance outcomes. 
3.6 Chapter summary 
This chapter has synthesised the analysis of strategic pay literature to develop a conceptual 
framework in the form of a proposed model of strategic pay incorporating both universalistic 
and alignment (contingency and configurational) perspectives.  As part of this model, ten 
hypothetical propositions have been articulated which have guided methods for data collection, 
testing and analysis. The methodological framework utilised in designing and executing this 
empirical research is detailed in the following chapter. 
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Chapter 4: Methodology 
4.1 Chapter introduction 
This chapter sets out the methodological approach and methods used in designing and executing 
the primary data collection and analysis for this study.  It considers the philosophical 
assumptions that have informed the research process and situates these within a framework of 
established research paradigms.   The research aim, questions and objectives of the study are 
restated followed by a stage-by-stage outline of the methodological process implemented to 
meet these objectives.  Next, the non-probability sampling strategy is defended and issues of 
potential sample bias and limitations in generalisability are considered.  This is followed by a 
section covering data collection which provides details of an initial ‘study’ (the 2011 CIPD 
Reward Management Survey), subsequent variable operationalisation as well as the 
administration of the final data collection instrument.  A section on data analysis techniques 
follows which charts the preliminary stages of data coding, scale development and statistical 
analysis techniques employed in the analysis stage.  Finally, the research ethics of the process 
are considered and justified. 
4.2 Positivist research philosophy 
In setting out the philosophical assumptions that underlie this study, aspects of knowledge 
development will be considered: ontological assumptions about the nature of reality and 
epistemological assumptions about the nature of knowledge (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 
2015).  Critical reflection on these assumptions can help in both the formulation of a coherent 
research strategy and better understanding of what it is studied and found (Johnson and Clark, 
2006).   
This study is firmly placed within the positivist tradition which conform to an ontological 
standpoint discerning reality in social entities just as there is in physical and natural phenomena 
(Saunders et al., 2015). Within this paradigm, knowledge is judged acceptable if it is based on 
observable and measurable data leading to the production of law-like generalisations (Ibid.).  
The role of researcher is to be as neutral and objective as possible and researchers in this tradition 
generally apply statistical analysis to quantitative data collected from large samples (Ibid.).  
Under the positivist paradigm, it is common to use the science-based hypothetico-deductive 
(HD) method; moving from theory, to hypothesis, operational definitions, measurement, 
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hypothesis testing, and lastly, verification (Jankowicz, 2005) and indeed, this is the method 
chosen for use in this study. 
Despite robust criticism from non-positivist positions which argue for alternative perspectives 
on what constitutes reality and what is deemed to be acceptable knowledge, positivist 
approaches remain dominant in many research disciplines (Jankowicz, 2005; Saunders et al., 
2015).  However, researchers working in non-positivist traditions aiming for richer contextual 
understanding generally work with small samples, qualitative methods and data (Saunders et al., 
2015) and the centrality of the CIPD data set to this study precludes the use of such methods.  
Nevertheless, a positivist position has not been adopted uncritically.  Of key importance in 
ameliorating the potential pitfalls of a research design founded on positivistic principles is 
establishing a robust approach to developing theory. 
4.3 Developing theory through deduction 
Two principal forms of logical reasoning are available to researchers evaluating data, making 
inferences and constructing arguments for conclusions: deduction and induction (Adams, Khan, 
Raeside and White, 2007).   In deductivism (founded on work by Poincare in the early 1900s 
and Popper in the 1930s), theory is developed through the establishment of universal laws which 
continue to be tested and amended where their predictions are found to be false (Adams et al., 
2007).  In inductivism (set out in 1843 by John Stuart Mill (2009b)) the development of theory 
follows from empirical observation of a finite number of occurrences / cases.   
The research questions for this study have been given prominence in determining both the 
approach to theory development and the research method.  The research questions seek to 
establish and explain causal links between pay practices, organisational contingencies and HR 
outcomes (see 4.4.1  for details).  This would suggest that deductive reasoning as a process of 
making logical inferences (Johnson-Laird, 2010) would be the most suitable approach and 
indeed, deductive reasoning is the predominant approach for developing conclusions in this 
study.  Crucially, deduction starts with a set of premises or theory developed into testable 
propositions from which logical conclusions are derived. Conclusions based on deduction are 
deemed ‘true’ whenever all premises are ‘true’; establishing the truth of each premise establishes 
the truth of the conclusion (Ketokivi and Mantere, 2010).   
A deductive approach to research is further characterised by a highly structured methodology in 
order to facilitate the replication of results; reliability being an important aspect of validity in 
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deductive logic (Saunders et al., 2015). Similarly, precise operationalisation of variables is 
necessary, allowing each element of the theory to be measured and tested (Ibid.). Finally, the 
nature of generalisation under deductive logic is directed from the general to the specific; from 
a given model to expected data, or as Gauch (2002, p.160) nicely frames it, “from the mind to 
the world”.  The benefit of this approach is the high level of certainty attained by fulfilling each 
of the elements of deduction; the conclusion will be true insofar as the premises have been 
shown to be true (Gauch, 2002).  It is because of this apparent certainty of conclusions that 
deductive logic came to prominence in the twentieth century usurping the inductive approach as 
the normative method of theory development (Adams et al., 2007). 
The context of the research has also had a bearing on approaches to theory development.  The 
participants in this study are organisations, made up of 10s, 100s or 1000s of people creating, 
negotiating and responding to social meanings and norms as they make decisions relating to 
how their businesses operate and how employees are managed.  Deductive logic can help make 
sense of the myriad effects on, and of, these choices by isolating variables that are related, on an 
a priori basis, and determining, through observation and inference, the validity of these 
assumptions.  But deduction and the HD method are, by necessity, reductive in nature; ideas are 
pared down to their core elements (Adams et al, 2007).  It is only by using limited inductive 
reasoning that sound explanations based on amplified empirical observations and the validity of 
hypothesised relationships between variables can be made.  The research process used in this 
study followed cycles of deduction and induction, there was an iteration between the formulation 
of hypotheses, testing, further empirical observation and examination of the literature as 
inferences were made and conclusions drawn. 
4.4 Research design and methods 
4.4.1 Research aim, questions and objectives 
The aim of this research study is to reassess the strategic pay model by evaluating the extent of 
strategic pay practices in UK organisations and their impact on HR performance outcomes.  
From this aim flow three central research objectives and associated research questions derived 
from critical evaluation of extant theory and research evaluated in Chapters 2 and 3. 
1. Objective: to test the proposition that pay practices will have an effect on HR 
performance outcomes.  
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Research question: what effect do pay practices have on HR performance 
outcomes? 
2. Objective: to test the proposition that organisations will select pay practices that are in 
alignment with internal and external organisational contingencies.   
Research question: to what extent do organisations align pay practices with 
external organisational contingencies such as business strategy and industry 
sector or internal contingencies such as employment group and organisation 
size?  
3. Objective: to test the proposition that positive HR performance outcomes will result 
from selecting pay practices that are strategically aligned with organisational 
contingencies.  
Research question: to what extent does alignment of pay practices with 
organisation contingencies have an effect on HR performance outcomes? 
4.4.2 Hypothetico-deductive (HD) method 
As explained above, in line with a positivist research approach, the overall method for 
addressing the research objectives and answering the research questions followed the HD 
method in the application of a number of distinct stages which were adapted from Jankowicz 
(2005) and Blaikie (2010), as follows: 
1. Putting forward a tentative idea, a premise, a hypothesis (a testable proposition about 
the relationship between two or more concepts or variables) or set of hypotheses to form 
a theory. Through critical analysis of the strategic pay concept, a conceptual framework 
was developed, modelling the relationships between pay practices, business strategy, 
employment group, industry sector and organisation size and HR performance 
outcomes. 
2. Using existing literature, deduce a testable proposition or number of propositions. Ten 
hypotheses were developed based on the theoretical propositions that pay practices have 
an effect on HR performance outcomes, pay will be dependent on organisational 
contingencies and pay aligned with organisational contingencies will have a positive 
effect on HR performance outcomes.  
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3. Examining the premises and the logic of the argument that produced them, comparing 
this argument with existing theories to see if it offers an advance in understanding.  An 
iteration between literature and the developing model took place and clear potential for 
an advance in knowledge and understanding emerged relating to the interaction of 
variables as well as the integration of universalistic and alignment approaches to 
strategic pay. 
4. Testing the premises by collecting appropriate data to measure the concepts or 
variables and analysing them. The variables, ‘pay practices’, ‘business strategy’, 
‘employment group’, ‘industry sector’, ‘organisation size’, and ‘HR performance 
outcomes’ were operationally defined.  Quantitative data were collected using an 
organisational-level survey questionnaire and analysed using a range of statistical tests.   
5. Drawing implications for the verification or falsification of the theory.  Conclusions 
were reached using deductive and inductive reasoning relating to verification of 
hypothetical statements. Implications for the validity of the strategic pay model were 
drawn and an extended strategic pay framework developed.  
4.4.3 Sampling 
4.4.3.1 Population and sampling frame 
The population of interest to this study is UK private sector organisations. The strategic pay 
concept has been largely developed by United States (US) researchers and theorists; a 
contribution of this research project is the testing of the strategic pay model within a UK context, 
on organisations operating in the UK (although not necessarily UK-owned).  
Because ‘business strategy’ as defined by Miles and Snow (Miles et al., 1978; 1984) and Porter 
(1980, 2004) is a key variable, it was decided to admit data solely from private sector 
organisations as opposed to public sector and third sector (charity and not-for-profit) 
organisations which, while they may have business-like strategies, do not fit the standard 
business strategy typologies well.  While the CIPD Reward Management Survey collects data 
from all three organisational groups, for the purposes of this study only private sector data was 
analysed.   
In order to collect organisational-level data from a sample of UK private sector organisations, 
there needed to be representative survey respondents within each organisation who could act as 
a proxy respondent on behalf of their organisation (Lavrakas, 2008).  Balkin and Gomez-Mejia 
(1990) and Montemayor (1996) both used senior HR professionals as informants because they 
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were likely to be intimately involved in formulating pay practices as well as possessing 
knowledge of business and pay strategy. In this research study too, participants were required to 
possess a high level of knowledge and understanding of the technicalities of pay practice in order 
for them to respond accurately to survey questions; they also needed to have knowledge of, and 
access to data on, organisational operations, business strategy and HR outcomes.  Practising 
HR/reward professionals within each organisation were therefore the target proxy respondents 
because they were likely to have both the required knowledge and access to data.  
Having identified a very broad scope for the population to be researched, it was necessary to 
obtain a representative sample (De Vaus, 2002).  The Chartered Institute of Personnel and 
Development (CIPD) is the professional body for HR practitioners in the UK which had a 
membership of approximately 135,000 in 2012 (CIPD, 2013).  Approximately 14,000 of these 
CIPD members had responsibility for pay and reward management and this large body of 
reward professionals provided an appropriate sampling frame from which to draw a sample (De 
Vaus, 2002).  Saunders et al. (2015) stress the importance of accurate and up-to-date information 
when using membership databases such as the one held by CIPD.  While the possibility of the 
database containing out-of-date contact details or email addresses was evident, the fact that to 
retain current CIPD membership (and therefore appear on the current membership database) 
individuals were required to subscribe at least annually, meant there was a likelihood that the 
contact information would be largely accurate.   
4.4.3.2 Sample biases 
3.4.4.2.1 Sample selection bias 
The selection of private sector organisations via the CIPD membership database of HR/reward 
professionals as representative of the population of UK private sector organisations was made 
with some caution.  There is the clear possibility of sample selection bias (Heckman, 1979; Berk, 
1983) where the sample selected is not representative of the entire population because the 
sample is drawn from a sampling frame that differs from the population. And indeed, a crucial 
difference between the entire population of private UK organisations and the ones in the sample 
obtained is that the organisations in this study all employed HR/reward professionals who were 
CIPD members whereas there are many organisations in the UK private sector who do not.  
Indeed, it is reasonable to assume that there are many organisations which do not employ HR 
professionals at all.  It is possible that the presence of HR professionals and CIPD members in 
many organisations materially influenced some of the variables in this study (e.g. pay practices 
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and HR outcomes).  It is worth then assessing the likely impact of this possible bias.  The aim 
of this research is to evaluate the extent of strategically aligned pay practices and their impact on 
HR outcomes and it is arguable that organisations employing HR practitioners who are 
members of the professional body, and indeed are actively engaging in research conducted by 
the professional body, are more likely to be at the forefront of normative strategic pay practice 
than organisations within the general population. Therefore, the risk is that results may over-
state the incidence of strategic pay practices and this has to be considered in the final analysis of 
results.  The corollary of this argument is that if strategic pay is not being practised in the sample 
organisations, it is perhaps less likely to be practised in the population of UK organisations.   
3.4.4.2.2 Non-response bias 
The entire sampling frame of 14,000 CIPD members with responsibility for pay/reward was 
invited to participate in the survey in 2012.  This was standard practice for CIPD research where 
inclusive, open invitations to participate were preferred to some form of probability sampling 
technique which would have limited the number of opportunities organisations had to participate 
in research.  In addition, it was recognised that the complexity and depth of the questionnaire 
was likely to dissuade or exempt some potential respondents and so a large sample was 
contacted in anticipation of a poor response rate.  Indeed, the 2011 CIPD survey which acted as 
a pilot (see section 4.4.4.2. below) showed a response rate of 1.98% could be expected from a 
similar sized sample.  In essence, the sampling strategy was to aim primarily for high quality 
responses and it was accepted that a likely consequence would be a low response rate. 
Of course, this approach came with some disadvantages, primarily that, although all 
organisations had an equal chance of participating, the final sample was comprised of 
organisations that had self-selected into participation.  This had the potential to be problematic 
as it could have created non-response bias in the results i.e. the responses of those that responded 
compared with those that did not respond could have been different and this could have 
influenced the end results (Cascio, 2012).  The difference between non-respondents and 
respondents within the sampling frame is quite difficult to assess.  Non-response could have 
been due to a number of passive factors such as unavailability or incorrect contact details or 
more salient, active non-response issues such as perceptions of sharing bad practice or even fear 
of reprisals (Thompson and Surface, 2007).  Because the researcher’s access to the CIPD 
membership database was restricted due to data protection, it was not possible to run tests for 
non-response bias (e.g. ANOVA) between responding and non-responding organisations.  
Although this issue does need to be factored in to the final assessment of results, similar studies 
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(e.g. Delery and Doty, 1996; Lepak and Snell, 2002) found no significant differences between 
respondents and non-respondents suggesting that this may not be a significant problem in studies 
of this type.      
4.4.3.3 Generalisability   
Taking the potential for sample biases into account, it is not reasonable to claim that the results 
of this study are generalisable to all UK private sector organisations.  However, it is possible to 
generalise these results to organisations operating in the UK private sector that have internal 
HR/pay expertise.  While clearly a limitation of generalisability, this focused applicability 
nevertheless allows for generalisation to a wide range of organisations, indeed, WERS and 
CIPD data suggests nearly a third of workplaces in the UK have an HR specialist present 
(Brown, Bryson, Forth and Whitfield, 2009; CIPD, 2014).  Furthermore, as noted above, it 
might be reasonable to assume that organisations with HR expertise are more likely to be 
practising strategic pay that those with none given the increasing professionalisation of the 
function and its emphasis on ‘strategic’ practices (CIPD, 2014).  It is among these organisations 
that any effects should be evident, and it is on this basis that the study contributes to knowledge 
about relationships between pay, strategy and performance. 
4.4.3.4 Sample size 
The minimum recommended sample size for this study was based on an assessment of the 
required degree of accuracy for the sample and the extent to which there is variation in the 
population regarding key variables (De Vaus, 2002).  On the basis of the first consideration 
alone, accuracy, in aiming for a 95% confidence level with a sampling error of 5% (i.e. 95% 
confidence that the results in the population will be the same as in the sample plus or minus 5%) 
a minimum sample of 400 would be required (Ibid.).  However, the second factor to be 
considered is the degree of diversity in key variables in the study and this can influence the 
minimum required sample size (Saunders et al., 2015).  The relevant variables for this study are 
industry sector (manufacturing / production or private sector services) and organisation size 
(SME or large).  As will be explained below, business strategy was measured on a scored scale 
(1-5) and employment group was measured on an intra-organisation basis (i.e. most 
organisations contained both employee groups rather than one or the other) and therefore 
calculations relating to these variables were not influenced by sample size.  Data from the 2011 
CIPD Reward Management Survey, which acted as a pilot study, was used to establish the likely 
proportions of industry sector and organisation size categories.  2011 data showed the split of 
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24% manufacturing / production to 76% private sector services and 27% SMEs to 73% large 
companies from a total of 182 private sector respondents.  These figures were used to calculate 
the minimum sample required following Saunders et al.’s (2015, p.704) formula: 
n = p% x q% x (z ÷ e%)2 
(n is the minimum sample size required, p % is the percentage belonging to the specified 
category, q % is the percentage not belonging to the specified category, z is the z value 
corresponding to the level of confidence required (always 1.96 for 95% confidence level), e % 
is the margin of error required.) 
So, for industry sector the calculation of minimum required sample size was: 
n = 24% x 76% x (1.96 ÷ 5)2  
= 1824 x (0.392)2 
= 1824 x 0.154 
= 281 
And for organisation size the calculation of minimum required sample size was: 
n = 27% x 73% x (1.96 ÷ 5)2 
= 1971 x (0.392)2 
= 1971 x 0.154 
= 304 
Therefore, a figure of approximately 300 was considered an appropriate overall sample size for 
this study which would provide a 95% confidence level with a sampling error of 5%. 
4.4.4 Data collection  
The main data collection phase took place with the CIPD Reward Management Survey 2012 
which was used to gather a quantitative dataset using a closed-ended, web-based questionnaire.  
The survey collected organisational-level data on: industry sector, size (employee numbers) and 
geographical ownership; business strategy; employee demographics; pay and benefits practices 
by employee category; pay transparency and HR outcomes.  Not all data collected was relevant 
to the thesis but was a necessary part of CIPD’s benchmarking research report (the full survey 
instrument is reproduced in Appendix B). 
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4.4.4.1 CIPD Reward Management Surveys 
The Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development (CIPD) have been annually surveying 
their professional membership and publishing the results in survey reports since 2001.  In late 
2010 the CIPD contracted the University of Bedfordshire (and later London Metropolitan 
University) to produce survey reports bringing the expertise of an academic team (see Appendix 
A for team membership in 2012). The researcher was the lead in terms of questionnaire design 
(developing an existing survey instrument); data analysis and interpretation; and survey report 
writing with the other academic members of the team and the CIPD’s senior adviser on 
performance and reward management contributing advice and guidance as well as input to the 
final published report (e.g. foreword / conclusion).  The output of this collaborative project was 
the production of survey reports from 2011-17 (albeit with changing team personnel).  The 
involvement of the researcher and academic team brought a more theoretical perspective to the 
research with the intention of examining pay issues in greater depth, particularly the relationships 
between strategy, pay and HR outcomes. During completion of the 2011 survey report it became 
clear that there was an opportunity for a notable contribution to theoretical and empirical studies 
of strategic pay, but that a project of such depth was beyond the scope of the annual CIPD survey 
reports.  Nevertheless, the potential for the CIPD reward management data set to be expanded 
to collect relevant data was clear.  The researcher, independently of the CIPD survey project but 
within the remit of the contract for services between the Universities and CIPD (see Appendix 
A4 and A.5), embarked upon the present study. 
4.4.4.2 Development of 2012 CIPD survey 
The 2011 CIPD Reward Management Survey was based on previous iterations of CIPD’s 
Reward Management Surveys and provided data on pay practices, industry sector, organisation 
size and employee category. The researcher added to - and amended - previous 2011 survey 
questions to compile the 2012 survey instrument, for example by gathering data relating to 
different aspects of pay practice, transparency, business strategy and HR outcomes. The 2011 
survey participants’ feedback regarding user-friendliness helped to shape the wording of the 
2012 survey questions as well as the sequence and layout of this survey instrument. The 2011 
survey was also used to facilitate initial development of some of the elements of the theoretical 
framework of the thesis and to provide information to calculate the required minimum sample 
size necessary for the 2012 data collection forming the basis of this research.  
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4.4.4.3 Variable definitions and measures 
The definition of variables and how they will be measured is a fundamental aspect of the HD 
method outlined in 7.3 above (Jankowicz, 2005).  The variables that form each element of the 
theoretical framework detailed in Chapter 3 have been defined and operationalised based on a 
synthesis of the theoretical and empirical studies examined.  The following sub-sections each 
relate to the main variables in this study; pay practices, business strategy, industry sector, 
organisation size, employment group and HR performance outcomes. 
4.4.4.3.1 Pay practices 
Pay practices were categorised as either experiential or algorithmic based on relevant literature, 
as presented in Table 3.3 in Chapter 3.   Table 4.1 shows these categorisations, provides some 
tighter definitions and indicates in the final column the relevant survey question used to gather 
data (see Appendix B for all survey questions).  
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Table 4.1 Experiential and algorithmic pay configurations 
Experiential pay 
 
Algorithmic pay Survey question 
Broadbanding or job family structures 
 
Narrow-graded pay structures or pay 
spines 
 
Q5 
 
Low vertical pay dispersion High vertical pay dispersion 
 
Q31 
Above market pay 
(Upper quartile or decile of market) 
 
 
 
At or below market pay 
(Median, lower quartile or decile of 
market) 
 
Organisation’s ‘ability to pay’ for pay 
level determination and reviews 
Q30 
 
 
Q6 & Q8 
 
 
Market rates to determine pay*  
 
Market rates to progress pay 
 
Movement in market rates, and 
recruitment and retention as pay review 
factors 
 
Job evaluation to determine pay* 
 
Q6 
 
Q7 
 
Q8 
 
Performance, skills, competencies or 
employee value / retention as criteria 
for pay progression 
 
Length of service as a criterion for pay 
progression 
 
 
 
Q7 
Individual base pay rates / salaries Collective bargaining 
 
Q5 & Q6 
Extensive performance-related reward 
(PRR) 
 
Extensive employee coverage of PRR 
schemes  
  
Minimal or no performance-related 
reward (PRR) 
 
Minimal employee coverage of PRR 
schemes 
Q9 
 
 
Q12 
Combination performance-related 
schemes (org./group/indiv.) 
 
Individual bonus / cash incentives 
 
Merit pay 
 
Gainsharing 
 
Goal-sharing 
 
Profit-sharing 
  
Piece rates 
 
 
Sales commission 
 
 
Q10 
 
 
Q10 
 
Q10  
 
Q11 
 
Q11 
 
Q11  
Open pay  
 
Pay secrecy Q32  
Long-term pay (share schemes / long-
term incentives) 
 
No long-term pay (no share schemes / 
long-term incentives) 
Q13 
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Note. * Q6 of the CIPD Reward Management Survey (Appendix B) asked which factor is most important in 
determining pay. CIPD questions were: ‘market rates (with JE)’ or ‘market rates (without JE)’ therefore when 
testing for the variable ‘job evaluation’ ‘market rates (with JE)’ was used.    
 
The categorisation of pay practices as either experiential or algorithmic was largely based on the 
framework as originally conceived by Balkin and Gomez-Mejia (1990) and Gomez-Mejia and 
Balkin (1992) incorporating elements from the strategic / traditional pay model charted by 
Lawler (1990) and Schuster and Zingheim (1992) as well as amendments and additions from  
Hambrick and Snow (1989); Boyd and Salamin (2001); Heneman and Dixon (2001); Allen and 
Helms (2002); Yanadori and Marler (2006); Chen and Jermias (2014); and Tenhiälä and 
Laamanen (2016).   
Some of these categorisations are therefore slightly different from the original Balkin and 
Gomez-Mejia (1990) groupings.  The most obvious one is the categorisation of ‘above market 
pay’ as an experiential pay practice and ‘at or below market pay’ as an algorithmic pay practice.  
As detailed in  Chapter 3, Miles and Snow (1984) and Balkin and Gomez-Mejia (1990) propose 
that above market pay is included in the algorithmic configuration because it is a consequence 
of the low-road organisation’s emphasis on internal equity, minimal risk-sharing and high job 
security.  More recent studies by Boyd and Salamin (2001) and Yanadori and Marler (2006) 
however find that it is instead high-road firms that pay above the market.  This supports 
Hambrick and Snow’s (1989) argument that because low-road firms prioritise cost-control and 
minimising costs, they are more likely to pay at or below market pay whereas because working 
for a high-road firm means less security and higher risk, higher salaries are needed to attract and 
retain the talent required to pursue a strategy of innovation or quality.  It is this argument that has 
led to the decision to place ‘above market pay’ in the experiential configuration and ‘at or below 
market pay’ in the algorithmic configuration but with an acknowledgement that this is a 
contestable categorisation.    
Similarly, the categorisation of the use of competency pay as an experiential pay practice was 
not straightforward.  For Lawler (1990), rewarding the development and demonstration of 
organisationally desired competencies is a key aspect of strategic pay and was thus included in 
the experiential pay configuration.  However, competencies also feature as an element of the 
internal/make HR configurations outlined by Delery and Doty (1996) and Youndt and Snell 
(2004) because these systems are intended to develop competencies internally rather than 
acquiring them from the market; competency pay could therefore easily sit within the 
algorithmic pay configuration.   
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Both of the above cases are examples of slightly unclear alignments with arguments in the 
literature for inclusion in either pay category.  It is therefore only possible to describe the 
configurations presented in Table 3.4, Chapter 3 as ‘broadly aligned’, recognising that there is a 
lack of consistent application in the literature that the present study has the opportunity to 
address. 
Most of the pay practices in Table 4.1 were measured separately for each employment group: 
management and professionals, and other employees.  Respondents’ answers would indicate if 
their organisation used a pay practice for management and professionals only, other employees 
only, both groups, or not at all.  In measuring the occurrence of these pay practices, an 
organisation was considered to operate a pay practice if they had selected it for either one of the 
employee groups or both.  This was measured on a dichotomous basis as ‘selected’ if one or 
both groups were selected and ‘not selected’ if neither group had been selected. 
Some of the survey questions however asked about pay practices that were not specific to 
employee group.  Questions 9 and 13 determined if the organisations operated performance-
related reward schemes and share-schemes or long-term incentives respectively on a yes / no 
basis.  These answers were also measured on a ‘selected’ / ‘not selected’ basis.  Subsequent 
questions then drilled down into which schemes were offered to which employee groups.  This 
was primarily a case of user-friendly questionnaire design, so that if the response was negative, 
the respondent would skip the follow-up questions and be automatically taken to the next 
relevant question. 
There were two other questions which did not collect dichotomous, selected / not selected data.  
Question 31 asked about pay dispersion and question 32 which asked about the level of pay 
transparency.  In order to establish pay dispersion, measured as the range between lowest and 
highest paid employees in the organisation (Shaw, 2014), respondents were asked to provide 
total annual earnings (base pay plus performance pay) for the lowest paid, highest paid and 
median paid individual for each employee group.  It was then possible to calculate the range not 
only within each employee category but also within each organisation.  To establish the 
approach to pay transparency in organisations, respondents were asked the extent to which they 
agreed (on a five-point Likert scale) with four statement items regarding different levels of 
transparency / disclosure of pay within the organisation. Respondents were informed that 
transparency referred to the extent to which their organisation was prepared to disclose to its 
employees’ information about pay scales, the provision of benefits and allowances, grading 
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systems, job evaluation, performance-related pay schemes and how different individuals or 
groups of employees are treated.  A ‘pay secrecy score’ for each organisation was then created 
(see section on scale development below).  
4.4.4.3.2 Business strategy 
The operationalisation of ‘business strategy’ was based on typologies established in relevant 
strategic HRM literature.  The literature points to two main strategy types, identified in Chapter 
3 as ‘high-road’ or ‘low-road’ analogous with Miles and Snow’s (Miles et al., 1978; 1984) 
prospector / defender typology and Porter’s (1980, 2004) differentiator / cost leader types.  Tests 
of this typology’s reliability and validity have shown robustness across a variety of measures 
(Shortell and Zajac 1990, Hambrick, 2003).  
To develop reliable and valid scales for business strategy to use in this study, 23 items were 
included in the questionnaire instrument based on competitive attributes associated with the 
strategy typologies of Miles and Snow (Miles et al.,1978; 1984) and Porter (1980, 2004) (see 
Table 4.2 below).  Although a dichotomous typology has been proposed, the scale items also 
included descriptors from the ‘analyser’ and ‘focus’ types, partly for completeness and to act as 
a check on the dichotomous split. While Miles and Snow (Miles et al., 1978, 1984) identify the 
analyser as a distinct strategy type, they also present it as being a mid-point between prospector 
and defender, with elements of both types present.  For Porter’s ‘focus’ type, the competitive 
strategy will be similar (driven either by cost or differentiation) with only the niche focus of the 
market or product-range being different.  Analyser and focus scale items were therefore included 
in the choices presented to participants. 
Participants were asked to rate the level of importance their organisations attaches to 23 
variables. Each item was rated on a five-point Likert scale from ‘totally unimportant’ to ‘crucial’ 
(see Appendix B, question 34). An exploratory factor analysis was then conducted to determine 
the number and characteristics of strategy types (see section  on scale development below). 
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Table 4.2 Competitive business strategy questionnaire items 
  Miles & 
Snow 
Porter 
 Questionnaire items 1978 1984 1980 2004 
1 Maintaining a safe niche in a relatively stable product / service 
domain 
D A D   
2 Offering a narrower set of products / services than its 
competitors 
D D F  
3 Achieving the best performance in a relatively narrow product / 
service market domain 
D  F F 
4 Paying little attention to changes in the industry that are not 
directly relevant to the firm 
D    
5 Maintaining a limited line of products / services D  F  
6 Leading in innovations in its industry P  Q  
7 Operating in a broad product / service domain P P C Q C Q 
8 Periodically redefining its products / services  P   
9 Being the first in the industry in development of new products  P   
10 Accepting that not all efforts invested in developing new 
products will be profitable 
P    
11 Responding rapidly to early signs of opportunities in the 
environment 
P A    
12 Having its actions lead to a new round of competitive activity 
in the industry 
 P   
13 Reducing operating costs  D C C 
14 Improving co-ordination with customers and suppliers    C 
15 Reorganising the work process  D C C 
16 Improving measures of performance    C 
17 Tight control of overhead costs  D C C 
18 Developing new products and services P  Q Q 
19 Undertaking research and development  P Q Q 
20 Total quality management   Q Q 
21 Developing new operating techniques   Q Q 
22 Providing speciality products / services   Q F  
23 Producing products / services for high-price market segments   Q  
Note. D = Defender, P = Prospector, A = Analyser, C = Cost leader, Q = Differentiator, F = Focus. 
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4.4.4.3.3 Industry sector 
Industry sector was categorised into two main groups: manufacturing and production, and the 
service sector following international standard industrial classifications (United Nations 
Statistics Division, 2017).   
The manufacturing and production category included: agriculture and forestry; chemicals, oils 
and pharmaceuticals; construction; electricity, gas and water; engineering, electronics and 
metals; food, drink and tobacco; general manufacturing; mining and quarrying; paper and 
printing; textiles; and other manufacturing /production. 
Private sector services included: call centres; communications; finance, insurance and real 
estate; hotels, catering and leisure; IT services; media (broadcasting and publishing, etc.); 
professional services (accountancy, advertising, consultancy, legal, etc.); retail and wholesale; 
transport, distribution and storage; and other private services. 
4.4.4.3.4 Organisation size 
Organisational size was categorised by employee numbers as small- and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs) with fewer than 250 employees and large companies with 250 or more 
employees according to European Commission (EC) definitions (EC, 2015).  The EC definition 
also includes measures of turnover and / or balance sheet totals, but these were not collected by 
the CIPD survey in 2012 therefore organisational size was determined solely on a measure of 
employee numbers. 
4.4.4.3.5 Employment groups 
Employment groups were defined according to groupings identified in the literature.  Evidence 
from Schuler and Jackson (1987b) and McDonnell et al. (2016) suggests that pay practices are 
differentiated according to employee group.  Lepak and Snell (2002) identify two employment 
modes that correspond with strategic employee groupings: knowledge-based employment and 
job-based employment.  Knowledge-based employment involves relationships in which firms 
develop and maintain a long-term commitment to full-time employees over time and, according 
to the authors, includes job roles such as analysts, middle management, engineers, functional 
managers, professional employees, research and development employees, and research 
scientists.  Within the present study, the knowledge-based employment group has been 
operationalised as ‘management and professional employees’ which is defined as including 
senior managers, middle and front-line managers, professional, technical and scientific 
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employees.  Lepak and Snell’s (2002) job-based employment mode involves relationships in 
which employees are hired to contribute immediately to the firm by performing a specific, pre-
determined set of tasks and might include: administrative positions, salespeople, customer 
service agents, drivers/delivery representatives and assembly-line workers as well as some semi-
professionals.  This study operationalised the job-based employment group as ‘other employees’ 
i.e. those not in management and professional job roles.  This was defined for participants as 
including: administrative support, trades and production workers as well as customer service 
and sales staff. 
4.4.4.3.6 HR performance outcomes 
Chapter 3 established the variety of ways organisational performance outcomes have been 
operationalised in the HRM and pay literature.  Kaifeng et al. (2012) however make the point 
that HR outcomes are a key stage on the critical path from HR practices to operational and 
financial outcomes and the theoretical framework presented in Chapter 3 delineates this 
relationship while scoping the testable premises of this study as stopping short of attempting to 
explain the link between HR outcomes and more distal measures of performance. 
‘HR performance outcomes’ were defined as: employee relations climate; pay discontent; 
employee productivity levels a) compared with competitor organisations and b) compared with 
3 years earlier; difficulties in recruitment and retention; and absenteeism problems (survey 
questions 35-38). These measures were chosen as a broad representation of human resources 
outcomes based primarily on standardised measures utilised in the research of the European 
Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions (Eurofound, 2009).  
Questions on employee relations climate and labour productivity have also been used in the 
WERS series (Wood and De Menezes, 1998).  And Balkin and Gomez-Mejia (1990) include 
employee attraction and retention as an organisational outcome.   
There are several limitations with these measures.  First, the productivity comparison questions 
are based on subjective (although informed) assessments which may not be accurate. Second, 
some of the other questions may well be reducing quite complex issues (such as the state of the 
employee relations climate) to a unidimensional scale (Wood and De Menezes, 1998).  For these 
reasons it was decided to create an amalgamated ‘HR performance outcomes’ scale (see section 
on scale development below) which by combining the different aspects of this variable could 
improve overall validity (Hair, Black, Babin and Anderson, 2010).      
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4.4.4.4 Administering the survey 
The CIPD’s team contacted the approximately 14,000 members on their database with 
responsibility for pay/reward management and invited them to participate in the web-based 
survey by a direct email communication (see Appendix A, A.1 for the email transcript) at the 
beginning of February 2012. The email contained a link to a secure web-based survey which 
was not accessible in any other way in order to retain control over who completed the survey.  
Participants were informed that the survey would close at the end of March 2012. Two weeks 
before the survey closed, a reminder email was sent in order to maximise the number of 
participants. 
The questionnaire was structured in eight sections with a total of 38 questions although not all 
of them were related to the variables examined in this study.  On accessing the web-based survey 
link, respondents navigated through 22 screens and were able to save and leave the survey at 
any point, only submitting their responses when they reached the final screen.  The survey was 
estimated to take approximately 25 minutes to complete.  This style of formatting and length 
was largely decided on by the CIPD and the academic research team (including the researcher) 
based on their experience and expertise of running multiple surveys over many years and 
balancing user-friendliness, quantity of data per participant and maximisation of quality 
responses.  
4.4.5 Data analysis 
This section details the statistical data analysis undertaken on CIPD Reward Management 
Survey (2012) data relating to this study.  First, it outlines the preliminary steps that were 
undertaken to establish the actual sample size and response rate, then the processes of scale 
development are detailed and finally each phase statistical testing is explained in outline.     
4.4.5.1 Preliminary data cleaning 
When the survey closed at the end of March 2012, the CIPD researchers exported all the survey 
data to an SPSS file ready for analysis.  At this point some ‘cleaning’ had already been 
undertaken which included the removal of six responses that has been started but not completed 
by respondents.  These were classified as ‘break off’ non-responses i.e. the questionnaire had 
been started but less than 50% completed (Saunders et al., 2015). 
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4.4.5.2 Sample size and response rate 
The overall response for the CIPD Reward Management Survey was 455 returned, completed 
submissions.  Of these, 302 were respondents for private sector firms and therefore eligible for 
inclusion in this study.     
Neuman (2014) suggests two ways of calculating response rates.  First, a total response rate can 
be calculated by dividing the total number of responses by the total number in the sample minus 
ineligible responses.  For this study the total response rate was 3.29%, based on 455 total 
responses and a sample of 14,000 minus 153 ineligible responses (non-private sector 
organisations).  Neuman’s (2014) other suggested calculation is an ‘active response rate’ which 
is calculated by dividing the total number of responses by the total number in the sample, minus 
both ineligible and unreachable cases i.e. those that cannot be located or contacted.  
Unfortunately, there is no way of knowing for certain how many of the CIPD database contacts 
could be classified as unreachable; it is not known if the intended respondents received and read 
the emails sent to them.  In a worst-case scenario, with infrequent database updates and CIPD 
members frequently changing jobs, the proportion of unreachable contacts could potentially be 
quite high, but some simple calculations based on estimated unreachable numbers indicates that 
the number of unreachable contacts would have to be very high indeed to improve markedly the 
response rate calculation.  For example, an estimated 10% of unreachable contacts provides an 
active response rate of just 3.66%, 30% would mean a response rate of 4.72% and 50%, 6.66%.  
So even if half the intended sample were unreachable (which is rather unlikely), the response 
rate would still be considerably lower than 10%.  While these low figures are not unusual for 
web-based surveys (De Vaus, 2002), they can have a detrimental effect on the final sample size 
achieved and can increase the risk of non-response bias (Saunders et al., 2015).  Fortunately, the 
final figure of 302 responses met the sample size criteria detailed in  above, but it must be 
acknowledged that non-response bias i.e. that those who responded might have responded 
differently from those that did not respond, was more likely than had a larger response rate been 
achieved. 
4.4.5.3 Coding and recoding 
Most of the coding was done using pre-set numerical codes that were automatically applied at 
the point of data collection (Saunders et al., 2015) using standard CIPD research conventions.  
From this, the majority of questionnaire responses could be recoded in a binary way with a ‘0’ 
122 
 
indicating that a pay practice was not selected and ‘1’ indicating it was selected which made 
them more suitable for the statistical tests to be undertaken. 
 Responses to some questions were recoded to simplify groupings. For example, question 3 on 
organisation size offered respondents nine categories of numbers of employees: fewer than 10, 
10-49, 50-249, 250-999, 1,000-4,999, 5,000-9,999, 10,000-19,999, 20,000-49,999 and more 
than 50,000.  In order to best address the hypothesis and due to the small number of responses 
in some of the higher categories, it was desirable to recode these categories into just two groups: 
SME (fewer than 250 employees) and large (250 or more employees).    
Other questions required respondents to enter actual figures (e.g. question 12 on proportion of 
employees covered by performance-related reward schemes and question 31 on pay dispersion 
that required highest, median and lowest salary figures) which, as continuous data, was used for 
certain tests as it was entered but was also recoded for use in other tests as necessary and 
appropriate.   
4.4.5.4 Missing data 
De Vaus (2014) identifies a number of reasons for missing data.  First, the data might not be 
required from the respondent because of a skip generated by a filter question in the survey.  The 
CIPD survey contained skips that automatically transferred respondents to the next relevant 
question, leaving certain questions unanswered e.g. question 9 asked if respondent organisations 
operated performance-related reward schemes, if the answer ‘yes’ was given then they were 
transferred to questions 10 and 11 on types of scheme.  If the answer ‘no’ was given then the 
survey skipped to question 12, therefore missing questions 10 and 11.  This type of ‘missing’ 
data was not coded differently from data that was left intentionally blank as it implies an answer 
i.e. the pay practice is not selected (De Vaus, 2014).   
Other cases of missing data may have been caused by the respondent refusing to answer the 
question (a non-response); the respondent did not know the answer, or the respondent may have 
missed a question by mistake (De Vaus, 2014).  In cases where this was identifiable (e.g. where 
are respondent had not responded ‘yes’ or ‘no’) the missing data was coded ‘99’ and excluded 
from the subsequent analyses (Saunders et al., 2015). 
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4.4.5.5 Scale development 
In order to conduct the statistical tests needed to test hypotheses, it was necessary to create scales 
for certain variables from the survey data.  Scales for business strategy, the pay practice pay 
secrecy and HR performance outcomes were developed as follows. 
5.4.4.5.1 Business strategy scales 
A factor analysis was conducted in order to establish the number of distinct business strategy 
types in the sample and to form a basis for the development of strategy scales to be used in the 
main phase of testing.  Despite having certain a priori assumptions regarding business strategy 
typologies, the analysis was exploratory, including an amalgam of strategy types and items 
based on theory representing more than one strategy type (Table 4.2).   
A number of assumptions of factor analysis needed to be met.  First, Hair et al. (2010) suggest 
that the most critical assumption relates to conceptual issues associated with the set of variables, 
primarily that some form of underlying structure exists. In this study, there was a good 
theoretical and empirical basis for there being a small number of business strategy types 
underlying the 23 items.   
The factor analysis method was common factor analysis which is most appropriate when the 
primary objective, as in this case, is, “to identify the latent dimensions or constructs” (Hair et al., 
2010, p.108) represented by the variables.  SPSS uses the ‘principal axis factoring’ extraction 
method to do this.  An oblique rotation method was selected because it allows for the possibility 
of correlated factors which in this case was certainly possible if not likely – certain types of 
business strategy may well be negatively correlated with one another.  The oblique rotation 
method used by SPSS is oblimin with Kaiser normalisation. 
Having satisfied the conceptual assumption criteria for factor analysis, statistical issues then 
needed to be addressed.  After the first analysis using the specified method, the 23 competitive 
business strategy items were examined for linearity, to ensure there was a sufficient degree of 
interrelatedness between them (Hair et al., 2010).  21 items of the 23 items correlated at > 0.3 
with at least one other item. The two items correlating at < 0.3 (items 1 and 3) were removed 
from the analysis and it was re-run.  Next, although the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) overall 
measure of sampling adequacy was above the commonly recommended value of 0.6, item 4 
was removed as it was less than the recommended KMO of 0.5 for individual items and the 
analysis was rerun.   Examination of communalities post-extraction showed two items (items 2 
124 
 
and 5) with an extremely low proportion of variance being explained by the factor solution < 
0.3 and these were removed (Hair et al., 2010).    
At this point, an initial assessment of some of the criteria to determine the number of factors 
indicated a possible five-factor model based on retention of factors with eigenvalues greater than 
one and the proportion of total variance explained (Hair et al., 2010).  However, there were still 
a number of items with potentially problematic low communality and the pattern matrix showed 
at least four items cross-loading on more than one factor.  It was decided that in order to reach a 
‘simple structure’ (Thurstone, 1947) a forced extraction of a two-factor model should be adopted 
using the a priori assumptions about a 2-type business strategy structure.  This, according to 
Hair et al. (2010) and Laerd (2015a) is a reasonable criterion for determining the number of 
factors to extract.  After re-running the analysis with a forced extraction, items 7, 8 and 23 were 
removed as these too had a communality of < 0.3.  
The remaining 15 items (see Table 4.3) all correlated at > 0.3 with at least one other item in the 
correlation matrix. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy for the data 
set was 0.86 which is defined by Kaiser (1974) as ‘meritorious’ (in the 0.8s) and the anti-image 
correlation matrix diagonals showed all individual variables conformed to the > 0.5 KMO 
measure.   In addition, Bartlett’s test of sphericity was significant (χ2 (253) = 2084.11, p < .05). 
See Appendix C for correlation matrices, KMO and Bartlett’s test results in full.  Finally, 
examination of post-extraction communalities indicated all were > 0.3 (see Table 4.4). Given 
these overall indicators, factor analysis was deemed to be suitable with the 15 remaining items.  
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Table 4.3 Competitive business strategy questionnaire items retained / removed for factor analysis 
  Miles & Snow Porter 
 Questionnaire items 1978 1984 1980 2004 
1 Maintaining a safe niche in a relatively stable product / 
service domain 
D A D   
2 Offering a narrower set of products / services than its 
competitors 
D D F  
3 Achieving the best performance in a relatively narrow 
product / service market domain 
D  F F 
4 Paying little attention to changes in the industry that are 
not directly relevant to the firm 
D    
5 Maintaining a limited line of products/services D  F  
6 Leading in innovations in its industry P  Q  
7 Operating in a broad product / service domain P P C Q C Q 
8 Periodically redefining its products and services  P   
9 Being the first in the industry in development of new 
products 
 P   
10 Accepting that not all efforts invested in developing 
new products will be profitable 
P    
11 Responding rapidly to early signs of opportunities in 
the environment 
P A    
12 Having its actions lead to a new round of competitive 
activity in the industry 
 P   
13 Reducing operating costs  D C C 
14 Improving co-ordination with customers and suppliers    C 
15 Reorganising the work process  D C C 
16 Improving measures of performance    C 
17 Tight control of overhead costs  D C C 
18 Developing new products and services P  Q Q 
19 Undertaking research and development  P Q Q 
20 Total quality management   Q Q 
21 Developing new operating techniques   Q Q 
22 Providing speciality products / services   Q F  
23 Producing products / services for high-price market 
segments 
  Q  
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Note. shaded items indicate those removed from the final analysis 
The two factors on which the 15 items loaded each had an eigenvalue of greater than one 
indicating that the factor explained more variance that a single variable would and hence should 
be retained (Kaiser, 1960).  Laerd (2015a) suggests that a factor should be retained if it explains 
at least 10% of the total variance and both factors conform to this criterion as they explained 
37.6%, 15.6% of the total variance respectively.  The factors cumulatively accounted for 53.2% 
of the total variance which was somewhat below the ideal that retained factors will explain at 
least 60% of the total variance.  Inspection of the scree plot (Figure 4.1) however indicated a 
fairly clear inflection point above which two factors should be retained (Cattell, 1966).     
 
 
Figure 4.1 Scree plot showing inflection point and number of factors to be retained in model 
The final criterion for number of factors to be extracted, and arguably the most important (Laerd, 
2015a), is interpretability centred around the concept of ‘simple structure’ (Thurstone, 1947).   
The rotated solution exhibited ‘simple structure’ as all items with practical significance - a value 
> 0.5 - loaded on a single factor with no cross-loading (Hair et al., 2010).   
Inflection point 
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Having identified two clear factors, it was then necessary to identify them. The interpretation of 
the data was consistent with the business strategy attributes which question 34 was designed to 
measure with strong loadings of high-road (prospector / differentiator) items on Factor 1, and 
low-road (defender / cost leader) items on Factor 2. Factor loadings and communalities of the 
rotated solution are presented in Table 4.4. 
Table4.4 Factor loadings and communalities (principal axis factoring analysis with oblimin rotation for 15 items, N 
= 252) 
 
Factor 1 
‘High-road’ 
Factor 2 
‘Low-road’ 
Communalities 
6. Leading innovations in industry .790 -.097 .595 
9. Being first in industry to develop new 
products .867 -.097 .719 
10. Accepting not all product 
development will be profitable .656 -.064 .413 
11. Responding rapidly to opportunities .536 .115 .331 
12. Having actions lead to new round of 
competitive activity in industry .662 .021 .446 
13. Reducing operating costs -.064 .563 .303 
14. Improving co-ordination with 
customers / suppliers .242 .620 .518 
15. Reorganising the work process .126 .680 .521 
16. Improving measures of 
performance .078 .617 .411 
17. Tight control of overhead costs -.158 .605 .343 
18. Developing new products / services .723 .004 .525 
19. Undertaking research and 
development .788 -.085 .595 
20. Total quality management .501 .196 .339 
21. Developing new operating 
techniques .637 .275 .570 
22. Providing speciality products / 
services .555 -.025 .301 
Note. bold type indicates a factor loading of > 0.5 and association with Factor 1 or 2. 
As the third column of Table 4.4 shows, eight of the variable items had a post-extraction 
communality of < 0.5 which is potentially problematic (Hair et al., 2010) because any value 
lower than 0.5 indicates that less than half the item’s variance is explained by the factor solution.  
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These variables could have been considered for removal as being poorly represented in the factor 
solution, however because all communalities were above 0.3, the factor loadings for these items 
were significant and these items were considered to contribute to the research model, these eight 
items were retained. 
 
Two summated scales were created for the two factors by combining the individual items into a 
composite measure based on a mean average score of the variables (Ibid.).  Ten items loading 
highly on Factor 1 (6, 9, 10, 11, 12, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22) were combined and averaged to create a 
‘high-road score’ whilst the five items loading highly on Factor 2 (13, 14, 15, 16, 17) created a 
‘low-road score’.  The scale items were assessed for reliability and found to have a Cronbach’s 
alpha of 0.89 for the high-road score and 0.75 for the low-road score which are both in excess 
of the lower acceptable limit of 0.7 (DeVellis, 2003). 
 
5.4.4.5.2 Pay secrecy scale 
The pay secrecy score was created from responses to Question 32 which asked for the 
organisational approach to pay transparency or secrecy based on four items, ranging from the 
most open, to semi-open, semi-secret and most secret.  The ordinal Likert scale values of 
strongly agree, somewhat agree, neither agree nor disagree, somewhat disagree and strongly 
disagree, were ascribed numeric values of 1-5 (reverse coded for the third and fourth items).  
The scale items were assessed for reliability and internal consistency and achieved a Cronbach’s 
alpha of 0.62 which is below the accepted ‘cut-off’ of 0.7 (DeVellis, 2003) meaning that there 
may be a reduction in the analysis’s ability to detect relationships that may exist.  Scrutiny of the 
item statistics revealed that item 2 – semi-open – was poorly correlated with other items and was 
removed from the scale.  The reliability test was rerun, and the scale showed an acceptable level 
of internal consistency with a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.7 (see Appendix D).   
5.4.4.5.3 HR performance outcomes scale 
The HR outcomes score was created from responses to Questions 35 to 38, which contained 
seven distinct items relating to employee relations climate (Q35), labour productivity compared 
with competitors (Q36), labour productivity compared to three years ago (Q37), high employee 
absenteeism (Q38), employee attraction difficulties (Q38), employee retention difficulties (Q38) 
and pay discontent (Q38) (note these last four items were sub-components of one 
question).These were chosen as a broad representation of human resources outcomes and 
established Eurofound (2009) scales. 
129 
 
Questions 35, 36 and 37 were recoded to remove ‘don’t know’ answers and then converted from 
a four-point scale to a three-point scale so they could be combined with the items in question 38 
creating a composite HR outcomes score.  In all three questions this was done by amalgamating 
the first two responses.  For example, Question 36 asked respondents about their labour 
productivity compared with competitors and gave four options: 1) better, 2) somewhat better, 3) 
average, 4) below average. The three new categories were: 1) better / somewhat better, 2) 
average, 3) below average. These were also reverse coded to: 1) below average, 2) average, 3) 
better / somewhat better so the ‘better’ category aligned with the ‘not at all’ category in the 
question 38 items i.e. the higher the HR performance outcomes score, the better the HR 
performance outcomes. 
The HR performance outcomes score scale was assessed for reliability and achieved a 
Cronbach’s alpha of 0.76 which is in excess of the lower acceptable limit of reliability (DeVellis, 
2003). 
4.4.5.6 Statistical testing 
There were three main phases of statistical testing: 
Testing that assessed the extent of vertical alignment of pay practices with business 
strategy and industry sector, and horizontal alignment of pay practices with organisation 
size (this included binomial logistic regression and multiple linear regression analyses). 
These tests and their results are reported in Chapter 5. 
Testing that assessed the extent of horizontal alignment of pay practices with 
employment group (this included McNemar’s tests, paired-samples t-test and Wilcoxon 
signed rank test). These tests and their results are reported in Chapter 6. 
Testing that ascertained if pay practices, bundled pay practices and strategic alignment 
had an effect on HR outcomes (this included cluster analysis, linear regression analysis 
and hierarchical multiple regression analysis). These tests and their results are reported 
in Chapter 7. 
The principles, assumptions and steps taken in the execution of each of these tests are outlined 
in the following chapters as indicated. 
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4.4.6 Ethical procedures 
Saunders et al. (2015) and Chartered Association of Business Schools (2015) (in conjunction 
with The Higher Education Academy and British Academy of Management) outline a number 
of key principles associated with ethical practice in organisational research and particularly with 
data collection.   
The responsibility for adhering to ethical research principles in the collection, management and 
reporting of data was partly dependent on the roles of the various parties involved in these 
activities.   This included the researcher, other members of the research team and the institutions 
associated with the research: Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development, and London 
Metropolitan University.  The researcher was part of the project team contracted by CIPD to 
conduct research and produce Reward Management Survey Reports from 2011 onwards. This 
was done in a collaborative project which included academic staff as well as the CIPD’s Senior 
Adviser on Performance and Reward.  Appendix A details these roles and responsibilities.  For 
example, the researcher’s role included design and formulation of questionnaire questions, data 
analysis and report writing; CIPD employees and third-party contractors were responsible for 
the administration of the questionnaire and collation of online responses into an SPSS file.  
Practices for data collection adhering to research ethics principles were established by the team 
during early stages of the project and confirmation sought from CIPD that these were adhered 
to.  Table 4.5 identifies the ethical issues considered in the research project along with the 
responsible parties and their actions.   
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Table 4.5 Ethical considerations, responsibilities and actions 
Ethical issue identified 
by Saunders et al 
(2015) and CABS 
(2015) 
Responsible 
party(ies) 
Action / response 
Respect for others, 
prevention from harm 
and researcher safety  
 
 
Researcher / 
research team / 
CIPD  
No safety risks were identified. 
CIPD editorial guidelines were followed in 
questionnaire language usage. 
There was collaborative and collegiate working within 
the project team. 
 
Participant privacy, 
anonymity and data 
confidentiality 
 
 
Researcher / 
CIPD  
There was no individual personal data gathered in the 
survey data which only asked questions at an 
organisational level.  
Organisations were not identifiable from the data and 
all responses were anonymous. 
The majority of data collected was of low sensitivity 
i.e. it was not commercially sensitive or otherwise 
confidential information. 
The pre-survey screen for participants provided links to 
CIPD’s privacy policy and terms and conditions of 
website usage advising potential participants of their 
rights and data usage (see Appendix A, A.2 and A.3). 
 
Data management 
compliance 
 
Researcher / 
CIPD 
No personal information or organisationally 
identifiable data was collected. 
CIPD privacy policy – information is kept confidential 
and secure in compliance with Data Protection Act 
1998 (see Appendix A, A.2). 
Data files password protected on researcher’s personal 
computer. 
Permission from CIPD as client for researcher to use 
data was contained in the contract for services (see 
Appendix A, A.4).  
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Ethical issue identified 
by Saunders et al 
(2015) and CABS 
(2015) 
Responsible 
party(ies) 
Action / response 
Voluntary nature of 
participation and right 
to withdraw 
 
CIPD The participants had a free choice in terms of their 
participation.  
They were able choose to withdraw from participation 
at any point in the completion of the online survey.   
 
Informed consent 
 
CIPD The call for participants email advised that the 
information would be used to better understand the 
relationship between reward and performance.  
Links to CIPD’s privacy policy and terms and 
conditions of website usage were provided (see 
Appendix A, A.2 and A.3). 
 
Researcher integrity, 
objectivity and accurate 
reporting of data and 
findings 
 
Researcher The researcher took a reflective approach to personal 
ethical practice and integrity e.g. questioning personal 
motivation and perspectives.   
All data and findings were reported accurately and with 
objective intention. 
 
Governance and 
management of ethical 
research practice 
Researcher / 
London 
Metropolitan 
University 
The Business and Law Research Ethics Review Panel 
(RERP) approved the research (see Research Ethics 
Form Appendix E). 
 
4.4.7 Chapter summary 
In this chapter the quantitative research design was explained and defended.  Following 
positivist principles and logics, the study adopted an HD method including distinct stages of 
hypothesis development, data collection and analysis, and theory verification.  A sampling 
strategy was based  on the availability of participant organisations to the CIPD Reward 
Management Survey series and although this created the potential for sample biases, it also 
meant the final sample participants would be equipped with enough knowledge of 
organisational strategy and practice to provide in-depth, high quality responses.  Additionally, 
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the sample provided an appropriate context for collecting data on pay practices informed by 
expert practitioners, an important population within which to study the development of strategic 
pay.   
This chapter also provided justification for the careful operationalisation of variables based on 
literature, previous research and industry conventions.  The 2012 questionnaire was developed 
from previous iterations to include questions providing data targeted at the research objectives. 
The survey was administered to participants through the CIPD membership database with a 
response rate of 3.29%.  Despite being low, this response rate is arguably not unusual for web-
based surveys and the actual response of 302 met the required sample size criteria providing a 
95% confidence level with a sampling error of 5%.    
Once initial data processing was complete, scales for variables were developed using statistical 
methods such as common factor analysis to determine latent constructs within the business 
strategy items.  Two business strategy types were identified – low-road and high-road with 
summated scales that met Cronbach alpha internal consistency measure of 0.7.   Scales 
developed for pay secrecy and HR performance outcomes achieved similar measures of 
reliability and consistency.   
Finally, the principles and procedures of ethical research practice adopted in this study were 
considered.  The responsibility for some of these ethical issues was dispersed among the original 
project team formed to produce the CIPD Reward Management Survey Report (Jones et al., 
2012) and both CIPD and London Metropolitan University procedures and principles were 
adhered to.  
The next three chapters report and analyse the procedures and results of statistical analysis.  
Chapter 5 analyses the effects of strategy, organisation size and industry sector on pay practice 
selection; Chapter 6 assesses the effect of employment group on pay practice selection and 
finally Chapter 7 evaluates the effect of strategic pay configurations on HR performance 
outcomes. 
 
  
134 
 
Chapter 5: The effect of strategy, sector and 
organisation size on pay practice selection 
5.1 Chapter introduction 
This chapter reports the results of data analysis that tested hypothetical relationships between 
business strategy, organisation size, industry sector and pay practice selection in organisations.  
Figure 5.1 illustrates the strategic pay model highlighting the proposed causal links that are the 
focus of this chapter.  Based on the theoretical model, it is hypothesised that the strategic 
orientation of organisations will predict pay practice selection with low-road strategy being 
associated with an algorithmic pay configuration (traditional and cost-reduction focused pay 
practices) and high-road strategy being associated with an experiential pay configuration 
(strategic, market-oriented and person-centred pay practices).  Furthermore, the model predicts 
that algorithmic pay practices will be selected by large organisations and those operating in the 
manufacturing and production sector, while experiential pay practices will be selected by small- 
and medium-sized (SME) organisations and firms operating in the service sector.  These 
theoretical relationships have been hypothesised as follows: 
H3.  Organisations with a low-road strategic orientation will be more likely to select an 
algorithmic pay configuration and organisations with a high-road strategic orientation will be 
more likely to select an experiential pay configuration.  
H7.  Organisations operating in the manufacturing and production sector will be more likely to 
select an algorithmic pay configuration and organisations operating in private sector services 
will be more likely to select an experiential pay configuration. 
H9.  Large organisations will be more likely to select an algorithmic pay configuration and SME 
organisations will be more likely to select an experiential pay configuration. 
The algorithmic and experiential pay configurations hypothesised to be related to strategic 
orientation, size and industry sector are set out in Table 5.1.  
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Figure 5.1 Hypothesised relationships between business strategy, organisation size, industry sector and pay practice 
selection. 
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Table 5.1 Experiential and algorithmic pay configurations for strategy, size and sector alignments 
Experiential pay 
 
Algorithmic pay 
Broadbanding or job family structures Narrow-graded pay structures or pay spines 
 
Low vertical pay dispersion High vertical pay dispersion 
 
Above market pay 
(Upper quartile or upper decile of market) 
 
 
 
At or below market pay 
(Median, lower quartile or lower decile of 
market) 
 
Organisation’s ‘ability to pay’ for pay setting and 
reviews 
 
Market rates to determine pay *  
 
Market rates to progress pay 
 
Movement in market rates, and recruitment and 
retention as pay review factors 
 
Job evaluation to determine pay* 
Performance, skills, competencies or employee 
value / retention as criteria for pay progression 
Length of service as a criterion for pay 
progression 
 
 
Individual base pay rates / salaries Collective bargaining 
 
Extensive performance-related reward 
 
Minimal or no performance-related reward  
 
Combination (org./group/indiv.) performance-
related schemes 
 
Individual bonus / cash incentives 
 
Merit pay 
 
Gainsharing 
 
Goal-sharing 
 
Profit-sharing 
 
Piece rates 
 
 
Sales commission 
 
 
Long-term pay (share schemes / LTIs) 
 
No long-term pay (no share schemes / LTIs) 
Open pay 
 
Pay secrecy 
Notes. 1) * Q6 of the CIPD Reward Management Survey (Appendix B) asked which factor is most important in 
determining pay. CIPD questions were: ‘market rates (with JE)’ or ‘market rates (without JE)’ therefore when 
testing for the variable ‘job evaluation’ ‘market rates (with JE)’ was used.  
2) The data for pay practice ‘employee coverage of PRR schemes’ was collected separately for employment groups 
and therefore was not suitable for testing in this phase. 
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The chapter begins with a full explanation and justification of methods of data analysis used. In 
subsequent sections, the results for each test are reported in full and the findings are analysed. 
The chapter concludes with a summary of results and an assessment of the extent to which they 
support the hypotheses. 
5.2 Data analysis 
The underpinning research philosophy of the study and overall method have been presented in 
Chapter 4.  The intention in this section is to provide an overview of data analysis methods 
specific to the results in this chapter including a detailed assessment of the extent to which data 
met appropriate assumptions of the two main analytic techniques: binomial logistic regression 
and multiple linear regression.  These regression tests were performed to ascertain the effects of 
organisations’ business strategy, industry sector and organisation size on the likelihood that they 
selected particular pay practices according to hypothesised relationships.  Most of the results 
reported in this chapter are results of logistic regression tests.  However, for two pay practices 
(pay dispersion and pay secrecy) linear regression tests were performed due to the type of data 
collected. 
5.2.1 Binomial logistic regression 
Logistic regression is one test in a wider group of generalised regression models that, unlike 
standard linear regression, allow the modelling of relationships between multiple independent 
variables where the dependent variable is not continuous (Laerd, 2015b).  Logistic regression 
tests were performed to predict the selection of pay practices (the dependent variable) based on 
strategy, sector and size (the independent variables).   
Four aspects of the binomial logistic regression results were examined.  First, how well the data 
fitted the model.  This was determined by a Chi-square measure of significance where a p value 
of < 0.05 was interpreted as a good fit.  In some cases where the Chi-square test was borderline, 
the Hosmer and Lemeshow ‘goodness of fit’ test was applied, where any non-significant value 
i.e. > 0.05 indicates a good fit of data to the model (Hosmer, Lemeshow, and Sturdivant, 2013). 
The second aspect examined was the amount of variance in the dependent variable that was 
explained by the independent variables. This was determined by a so-called pseudo R2 value, 
Nagelkerke R2, which indicates the proportion of variance e.g. a value of 0.1 equates to 10% of 
the variance in selection of a pay practice being explained by organisational strategy, size and 
sector.  It is worth noting at this stage that pseudo R2 values are often more conservative estimates 
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than R2 values used in linear regression (Laerd, 2015b) and so may underestimate the variance 
explained.       
Third, the percentage accuracy in classification (PAC) indicates how accurately the model 
classifies pay practice selection and non-selection based on predicted and observed 
classifications.   
Finally, there is an assessment of which independent variables (if any) have a statistically 
significant effect on the dependent variable and the change in odds of pay practice selection per 
one-unit change in the independent variable by assessment of the odds ratio value.  For the two 
strategy scales this means that for every point increase / decrease on the five-point strategy scale 
there is an x-times increase / decrease in odds of a pay practice being selected.  However, for the 
two categorical independent variables, sector and size, the one-unit increase is from 0 to 1 with 
SMEs and private sector services being classified as ‘0’ and large and manufacturing and 
production being classified as ‘1’.  So, here the change in odds, signified by the odds ratio value, 
indicates how much more likely or less likely large organisations are to select a pay practice than 
SMEs; or manufacturing and production than private sector services.  Odds ratio values < 1.0 
indicate decreased odds for every one-unit increase of the independent variable; so, for the 
categorical variables size and sector, this means values less than one indicate increased 
likelihood of pay practice selection in the ‘0’ coded groups. Because of this, for clarity, the odds 
ratio is sometimes inverted (divided by 1.0) so that increase in odds for SMEs and private sector 
services (both coded ‘0’) can be reported.  
5.2.2 Multiple linear regression 
Two pay practices, pay dispersion and pay secrecy were analysed using multiple linear 
regression analysis because both were continuous, scale variables as opposed to the 
dichotomous selected / not selected categories of the other pay practices being tested.  Linear 
regression assesses overall significance of the model through ANOVA and the significance of 
the F-test statistic.  The variance in the dependent variables (pay dispersion and pay secrecy) is 
measured by the R2 and adjusted R2 values which provide the percentage variance in the sample 
and expected percentage variance in the population respectively.  The R2 values also provide an 
estimate of effect size based on Cohen’s (1988) and Rosenthal’s (1996) classifications of small 
(.10), medium (.30), large (.50) and very large (.70).  
The unstandardised B coefficients indicate the change in the dependent variable per one-unit 
change in the independent variable, so in the case of pay dispersion the change is measured in 
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pounds sterling.  Similar to the logistic regression interpretation explained above, for the two 
strategy scales this is fairly self-explanatory but for the two categorical independent variables 
the B coefficient represents the difference between ‘0’ and ‘1’; SME and large; private sector 
services and manufacturing / production.  
In each of the pay practices analyses examined, interpretation of the data further determines if 
significant results support the hypothesised relationships between low-road strategy, large, 
manufacturing / production, and algorithmic pay on one hand and high-road strategy, SME, 
private sector services and experiential pay on the other. 
5.2.3 Assumptions  
Binomial logistic regression and multiple linear regression analyses require certain assumptions 
to be met to produce accurate and valid results (Hair et al., 2010).  These assumptions include 
the type of data suitable for testing; linearity between variables; the absence of multicollinearity; 
assessment of the impact of outliers, leverage and influential points; sample size; independence 
of observations, homoscedasticity and normality of distribution (Ibid.). Each assumption is 
considered in the following sub-sections and in overview in Table 5.2. 
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Table5.2 Summary of data assumptions for binomial logistic regression and linear regression. 
Note. *binary variables coded as dummy variables ‘0’ or ‘1’, + continuous variables only 
5.2.3.1 Data type 
The first assumption relates to a research design issue and the suitability of the types of data 
collected for the required tests.  For binomial logistic regression the test requires a dichotomous 
dependent variable: a pay practice is either ‘selected’ or ‘not selected’; and continuous and/or 
nominal independent variables: low-road strategy score (continuous), high-road strategy score 
(continuous), industry sector (nominal, two categories: manufacturing and production or private 
sector services), and organisation size (nominal, two categories: large organisations (250+ 
employees) and SMEs (< 250 employees)).    
Statistical tests Assumption How met / tested 
Binomial logistic regression 
 
Multiple linear regression  
 
 
 
 
One or more IVs measured at the 
continuous or binary level 
 
One DV measured at the binary 
level (logistic regression) 
 
One DV measured at the 
continuous level (linear regression) 
Sector*, size*, business strategy 
scores  
 
Pay practices* 
 
 
Pay practices (dispersion and 
secrecy) 
 
Independence of observations 
 
Study design 
Durbin-Watson test 
Linearity Scatterplot of studentised residuals 
by unstandardised predicted values+ 
Homoscedasticity Scatterplot of studentised residuals 
by unstandardised predicted 
values+ 
Normal distribution   Histogram, Normal P-P Plot, 
Normal Q-Q Plot, z-score for 
skewness+ 
No significant outliers Box plot, residual statistics / case 
diagnostics 
Sample size and minimum number 
of cases (logistic regression) 
Maximum sample of 302 cases 
Event per variable (EPV) measures 
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For linear multiple regression tests, the dependent variable must be in the form of continuous 
data: pay dispersion (difference between lowest and highest salaries in pounds sterling) and pay 
secrecy score; as well as continuous and/or nominal independent variables (as above). 
Therefore, the assumption for the required type of data is met for both sets of tests. 
5.2.3.2 Independence of observations 
Similarly, the second assumption is a largely a study design issue in that all observations must 
be independent of one another (Laerd, 2015b, 2015c).  Data was collected and processed in a 
way that meant there was no relationship between categories of variables.  For example, an 
organisation could select or not select narrow-grading, but not both; and they could be 
categorised as large or SME, but not both.  This ensured the assumption of independence of 
observations was met for both logistic and linear tests.  As a check however, the Durbin-Watson 
test was used which tests independence of residuals. A statistic value of approximately 2.0 
indicates residuals and therefore observations are not auto-correlated. In all cases this 
assumption was met. 
5.2.3.3 Linearity 
A further assumption relates to linearity between variables; that there should be some sort of 
linear relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variable.  For binomial 
logistic regression, linearity of the continuous variables with the dependent variable had to be 
assessed with respect to the logit of the dependent variable.  This was assessed via the Box-
Tidwell (1962) procedure which created natural log transformations and associated interaction 
terms for the two continuous independent variables (high-road and low-road strategy scores). A 
Bonferroni correction was applied using all seven terms in the model (two categorical 
independent variables, two continuous variables, two interaction terms and the intercept) 
resulting in statistical significance being accepted when p < .007143 (Tabachnick and Fidell, 
2014).  Based on this assessment, as all p values were greater than .007143, both continuous 
independent variables were found to be linearly related to the logit of the dependent variable in 
each logistic test (see Appendix F).  
Linearity for the two multiple linear regression analyses (pay dispersion and pay secrecy) was 
assessed by scatterplots of studentised residuals against unstandardised predicted values, both 
collectively - that the independent variables were linearly related to the dependent variable; and 
individually - that each continuous independent variable was approximately linearly related to 
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the dependent variable (Laerd, 2015c) (see Appendix G for pay dispersion, Appendix H for pay 
secrecy).   
5.2.3.4 Homoscedasticity  
The assumption of homoscedasticity, that the residuals are equal for all values of the predicted 
dependent variable, is only relevant to the two multiple linear regression analyses reported in 
this chapter.  Homoscedasticity is assessed by inspection of the same scatterplot of studentised 
residuals by unstandardised predicted values used to assess linearity.  A fairly constant spread 
of data points across the scatterplot indicates homoscedasticity (Laerd, 2015c).  Scatterplots of 
both the pay dispersion and pay secrecy tests indicate that this assumption was met (see 
Appendices G and H). 
5.2.3.5 Absence of multicollinearity 
Multicollinearity occurs when two or more independent variables are highly correlated with 
each other and can potentially cause problems in understanding which independent variables 
contribute to the variance in the dependent variable (Laerd, 2015c).  But as Hair et al. (2010) 
accept, some level of multicollinearity is almost unavoidable; it would be odd to find 
independent variables highly related to the dependent variable, but with no relationships among 
themselves.   
The presence and extent of multicollinearity was ascertained through examination of 
tolerance/variation inflation factor (VIF) values resulting from a set of regression analyses where 
each independent variable was treated as a dependent variable.  Multicollinearity is considered 
to be acceptable when VIF < 3.0 and tolerance > 0.2 (O’Brien, 2007). In all cases only extremely 
weak multicollinearity was detected (Appendix I) and therefore the assumption of absence of 
multicollinearity was met. 
5.2.3.6 Normal distribution 
Normality of data distribution in the independent variables is a requirement of linear regression 
analysis (Hair et al., 2010).  Normality was assessed by inspection of histograms with super-
imposed normal curve, P-P plots (probability-probability plot) and z-scores for skewness ±2.58 
(Laerd, 2015c).  In both the pay dispersion and pay secrecy tests, the data was skewed and 
therefore breached the assumption of normal distribution. Logarithmic transformations of the 
data were applied in both cases which corrected the skewness (see Appendices G and H and 
sections 5.4.8 and 5.4.9.1 below for further detail). 
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5.2.3.7 Outliers 
Outliers (data points that do not follow the usual pattern of other observations i.e. they are very 
different from their predicted value) can be detrimental to the fit or generalisation of the 
regression equation (Laerd, 2015b, 2015c). The presence of outliers was identified in logistic 
and linear regression tests using studentised residuals > ±3 SD (Hair et al., 2010). 
Logistic regression tests for piece rates and for lower decile pay positioning both identified cases 
which were outliers.  These cases were inspected but no data errors identified, and the outliers 
were therefore retained.  In both tests, few organisations selected these particular practices, and 
this could well have had a bearing on the data (see section 5.2.3.8 below on ‘events per 
variable’).    
Linear regression tests for pay dispersion identified two outlier cases both of which were 
inspected and retained.  Case diagnostics for pay secrecy (transformed data) identified no 
outliers. 
For linear regression tests, further unusual points were tested for. High leverage points i.e. those 
observations made at extreme values of the independent variable, are data points with leverage 
values > 0.2; none were detected in the tests run for pay dispersion and secrecy.  Influential 
points i.e. outlying observations that greatly influence the regression result, are measured by 
Cook’s Distance values > 1.0 (Laerd, 2015c).  Again, none were detected in the tests reported 
in this chapter. 
5.2.3.8 Sample size and number of cases (EPV) 
The final assumption relates to sample size and the number of ‘events per variable’.  According 
to Hair et al. (2010) sample size is a particularly important consideration when using logistic 
regression analysis as the test utilises maximum likelihood as the estimation technique (MLE) 
and MLE requires larger sample sizes than standard multiple linear regression.  Lower sample 
sizes can lack statistical power to identify significant results leading to increased risk of type II 
errors i.e. false negatives (Ibid.).  An overall sample size of 400 is recommended (Hosmer et al., 
2013) and additionally a division of the sample into an analysis sample and a ‘holdout’ sample 
is recommended to enable validation (Hair et al., 2010). This in effect requires a doubling of the 
sample size (Ibid.).  Given that the total possible maximum sample size (not taking account of 
any missing data) for this study is 302, the recommended overall sample size for logistic 
regression was not met and a division of the sample was not possible.  It was deemed important 
therefore to be especially rigorous regarding the minimum number of cases in the sample using 
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the ‘event per variable’ (EPV) measure (Peduzzi, Concato, Kemper, Holford and Feinstein, 
1996).  Peduzzi et al. (1996) established that logistic regression measures such as regression 
coefficients, estimates of sample variance and Wald statistics were all influenced by low EPV 
values that undermined the validity of the logistic model.  These authors found no major 
problems with EPV values above 10 however, and this is therefore recommended as a minimum 
EPV level (Ibid.).  The event per variable is calculated by Peduzzi et al. (1996) as the number of 
cases in the smaller of the binary groups in the dependent variable, divided by the number of 
independent variables, as follows:   
    g ÷ c = EPV 
(g = the number of cases in the smallest group of the dependent variable; c = the number of 
covariates). 
For example, to calculate the EPV for a logistic regression analysis in this study using 
broadbanding as the dependent variable (with 72 respondents selecting broadbanding and 177 
respondents not selecting broadbanding) and low-road strategy, high-road strategy, size and 
sector as the four independent variables this calculation would be as follows: 
72 ÷ 4 = 18 (above the minimum threshold of 10) 
This calculation can be extrapolated to determine the minimum number of cases required for 
sample groups of the dependent variable (Medcalc, 2017) as follows:    
N = 10c  
(N = the minimum dependent variable group size; c = the number of covariates) 
For all the logistic regression analyses in this study there are four independent variables which 
means N will be 40 for all tests conducted.   These calculations were made for all dependent 
variables and seven were determined to fall below the required minimum of 40 cases per group 
/ 10 EPV.  These dependent variables were: pay spines, individual performance-related pay 
(progression), piece rates, gainsharing, upper decile pay, lower quartile pay, and lower decile 
pay.  For individual PRP this was due to low numbers of non-selections; in all other cases it was 
due to low number of selections (see full summary of calculations in Appendix J). For the sake 
of fullness of testing, these tests were retained, and the results reported (with ‘low EPV’ noted).   
So, it is acknowledged that there may be a reduction in statistical power and an associated 
increased risk of type II error because the overall sample was on the low side, but adherence to 
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the minimum number of cases per dependent variable group following Peduzzi et al. (1996) 
helped to counterbalance this deficiency.   
5.3 Experiential pay results 
5.3.1 Broadbanding    
The logistic regression model for broadbanding was statistically significant, χ2(4) = 13.310, p = 
.010. The model explained 7.4% (Nagelkerke R2) of the variance in selection of broadbanding 
and correctly classified 72.3% of cases.  Of the four predictor variables two were statistically 
significant: size and high-road strategy (as shown in Table 5.3). Large organisations had more 
than twice the odds of selecting broadbanding to manage base pay than SME firms. Increasing 
high-road strategy scores were also associated with an increased likelihood of selecting 
broadbanding. 
In terms of hypothesis support, there is a mixed picture here.  As broadbanded pay structuring 
is an experiential practice, the theoretical model predicts that it will be more often selected by 
organisations with high-road business strategies, SME and private sector service organisations.  
While there is clearly good support for the association between broadbanding and high-road 
strategy, its use by large organisations is counter to the hypothesis.  However, from a practical 
point of view any type of more formal pay structuring would seem more likely in larger 
organisations as the larger number of employees presumably necessitates more structure in order 
to manage the array of job titles and pay levels which could explain the result. 
Table 5.3 Logistic regression predicting likelihood of selection of broadbanding based on size, sector, high-road 
strategy and low-road strategy. 
    95% C.I. for Odds Ratio 
 B SE Odds ratio Lower Upper 
Size .731 .293 2.078* 1.169 3.693 
Sector .246 .311 1.279 .695 2.355 
High-road 
strategy 
.474 .212 1.606* 1.060 2.434 
Low-road 
strategy 
-.343 .257 .710 .429 1.175 
Constant -1.680 1.106 .186   
Note. * = p ≤ .05, ** = p ≥ .005, B = unstandardised regression coefficient, SE = standard error of regression 
coefficient, C.I. = confidence intervals. 
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5.3.2 Individual base pay 
For individual pay rates, ranges and spot salaries, the logistic regression model was statistically 
significant, χ2(4) = 12.317, p = .015. The model explained 6.5% (Nagelkerke R2) of the variance 
in selection of individual base pay and correctly classified 57.0% of cases.  Of all the predictor 
variables only high-road strategy added significantly to model (as shown in Table 5.4).  
Organisations with a high-road strategic orientation had deceased odds of selecting individual 
pay rates, ranges and/or spot salaries to manage base pay.   
This result is counter to the hypothesis that proposes organisations with high-road strategies are 
more likely to use individualised base pay arrangements that are flexible, non-mechanistic and 
allow for managerial discretion.  The results for this test show no such association. 
Table 5.4 Logistic regression predicting likelihood of selection of individual base pay based on size, sector, high-
road strategy and low-road strategy 
    95% C.I. for Odds Ratio 
 B SE Odds ratio Lower Upper 
Size -.226 .265 .798 .475 1.341 
Sector -.249 .287 .779 .444 1.369 
High-road 
strategy 
-.550 .187 .577** .400 .832 
Low-road 
strategy 
.117 .232 1.124 .714 1.770 
Constant 1.902 1.016 6.702   
Note. * = p ≤ .05, ** = p ≥ .005, B = unstandardised regression coefficient, SE = standard error of regression 
coefficient, C.I. = confidence intervals. 
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5.3.3 Competency pay  
The logistic regression model for competency pay was right on the borderline of being 
statistically significant, χ2(4) = 9.446, p = .051.  Given that this was so close to the threshold of 
p ≥ .050, a second test of model fit, the Hosmer and Lemeshow test (Laerd, 2015b) was carried 
out which demonstrated that the regression model was not a poor fit, χ2(8) = 6.896, p = .548. 
The model explained 5.0% (Nagelkerke R2) of the variance in selection of competencies for 
progressing base pay and correctly classified 53.8% of cases.  Only high-road strategy was 
statistically significant as a predictor variable (as shown in Table 5.5).  Increasing high-road 
strategy scores predicted increased likelihood of selecting competencies to progress pay (for 
every increase in score the organisation was over one and a half times more likely to use this pay 
practice).  This is in line with the hypothesis that pay progression based on competencies will be 
used by high-road strategy organisations as they reward individual behaviours that are required 
to compete on product or service quality or innovation. 
Table 5.5 Logistic regression predicting likelihood of selection of competency pay based on size, sector, high-road 
strategy and low-road strategy 
    95% C.I. for Odds Ratio 
 B SE Odds ratio Lower Upper 
Size -.312 .263 .732 .438 1.225 
Sector -.153 .287 .858 .489 1.506 
High-road 
strategy 
.503 .182 1.653** 1.157 2.362 
Low-road 
strategy 
-.155 .229 .856 .547 1.340 
Constant -.919 .996 .399   
Note. * = p ≤ .05, ** = p ≥ .005, B = unstandardised regression coefficient, SE = standard error of regression 
coefficient, C.I. = confidence intervals. 
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5.3.4 Skills-based pay 
The logistic regression model for skills-based pay was statistically significant, χ2(4) = 13.300, p 
= .010.  The model explained 6.9% (Nagelkerke R2) of the variance in selection of skills for 
progressing base pay and correctly classified 56.2% of cases.  Only high-road strategy was 
statistically significant as a predictor variable (as shown in Table 5.6).  Increasing high-road 
strategy scores predicted increased likelihood of selecting skills to progress pay (for every 
increase in high-road strategy score the organisation was over one and three-quarter times more 
likely to use this pay practice). 
Similar to the result for competency pay, this result supports the hypothetical association 
between high-road strategy organisations and pay systems designed to reward the development 
of skills that are required to produce high quality or innovative products.   
Table58.6 Logistic regression predicting likelihood of selection of skills-based pay based on size, sector, high-road 
strategy and low-road strategy 
    95% C.I. for Odds Ratio 
 B SE Odds ratio Lower Upper 
Size -.042 .265 .958 .571 1.610 
Sector .286 .289 1.332 .756 2.344 
High-road 
strategy 
.574 .185 1.775** 1.236 2.549 
Low-road 
strategy 
-.037 .229 .964 .615 1.511 
Constant -1.965 1.013 .140   
Note. * = p ≤ .05, ** = p ≥ .005, B = unstandardised regression coefficient, SE = standard error of regression 
coefficient, C.I. = confidence intervals. 
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5.3.5 Movement in market rates (pay review) 
The logistic regression model was statistically significant, χ2(4) = 15.001, p = .005.  The model 
explained 7.9% (Nagelkerke R2) of the variance in selection of movement of market rates as a 
top-three factor in reviewing pay during 2011 and correctly classified 65.9% of cases.  Both 
high-road strategy and low-road strategy were statistically significant as predictor variables (as 
shown in Table 5.7).  Increasing high-road strategy scores predicted increased likelihood of 
selecting movement in market rates as an important pay review factor (for every increase in 
high-road strategy score the organisation was over one and a half times more likely to select this 
pay review factor).  Conversely, increasing low-road strategy scores predicted decreased 
likelihood of firms selecting movement in market rates as an important pay review factor. 
This result provides good support for the hypothesis that high-road strategy organisations will 
select pay practices that are more market driven compared with low-road strategy organisations 
which de-emphasise market considerations in pay decision-making. 
Table5.7 Logistic regression predicting likelihood of selection of movement in market rates (pay review) based on 
size, sector, high-road strategy and low-road strategy 
    95% C.I. for Odds Ratio 
 B SE Odds ratio Lower Upper 
Size .499 .273 1.647 .965 2.811 
Sector -.409 .302 .664 .368 1.200 
High-road 
strategy 
.522 .195 1.685** 1.150 2.469 
Low-road 
strategy 
-.591 .241 .554* .345 .888 
Constant -.019 1.016 .982   
Note. * = p ≤ .05, ** = p ≥ .005, B = unstandardised regression coefficient, SE = standard error of regression 
coefficient, C.I. = confidence intervals. 
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5.3.6 Performance-related reward schemes 
The logistic regression model for performance-related reward (PRR) was statistically 
significant, χ2(4) = 18.660, p = .001.  The model explained 10.7% (Nagelkerke R2) of the 
variance in use PRR schemes and correctly classified 76.3% of cases.  Of the four independent 
variables, three were statistically significant: size, sector and high-road strategy (as shown in 
Table 5.8).  Large organisations were over twice as likely to use performance-related reward 
schemes compared to SMEs.  Service sector firms were over two and a half times more likely 
to use these schemes than manufacturing and production sector firms (odds ratio inverted). And 
finally, increasing high-road strategy scores predicted increased likelihood of using 
performance-related reward (for every increase in high-road strategy score, the organisation was 
over one and a half times more likely to use PRR). 
This result, for a core experiential pay practice, offers some good support for the hypothesis that 
high-road strategy and service sector organisations are more likely to select pay practices that 
are variable, where elements of pay need to be re-earned, and that emphasise performance.  
However, the finding that large organisations are significantly more likely to use PRR schemes 
than smaller firms is counter to the hypothesis. It could be that large organisations are more likely 
to have the resources and expertise not available to SMEs to develop these schemes.   
Table 5.8 Logistic regression predicting likelihood of selection of performance-related reward schemes based on 
size, sector, high-road strategy and low-road strategy 
    95% C.I. for Odds Ratio 
 B SE Odds ratio Lower Upper 
Size .773 .317 2.165* 1.162 4.034 
Sector -.987 .330 .373** .195 .711 
High-road 
strategy 
.482 .202 1.619* 1.090 2.406 
Low-road 
strategy 
-.283 .269 .753 .444 1.277 
Constant .580 1.180 1.785   
Note. * = p ≤ .05, ** = p ≥ .005, B = unstandardised regression coefficient, SE = standard error of regression 
coefficient, C.I. = confidence intervals. 
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5.3.7 Share schemes and long-term incentives 
The logistic regression model for share schemes and long-term incentives (LTIs) was also 
statistically significant, χ2(4) = 25.377, p < .0005. It explained 13.2% (Nagelkerke R2) of the 
variance in selection of these schemes and correctly classified 64.7% of cases. Of the four 
independent variables, two were statistically significant: size and low-road strategy (as shown 
in Table 5.9). Large organisations were over three times more likely to use share / long-term 
incentive schemes compared to SMEs, whereas increasing low-road strategy scores were 
associated with a reduction in the likelihood of using shares/LTIs. 
Share schemes and LTIs were classified as experiential pay practices because they emphasise 
the sharing of financial success or risk between employer and employee.  The result for this pay 
practice partially supports the hypothesis finding that low-road strategy organisations are less 
likely to use this experiential practice.  However, large organisations, hypothesised to use 
algorithmic practices are significantly more likely to use LTIs.  Again, there may be a practical 
element at play here; larger, publicly traded organisations would presumably be in a position to 
offer share schemes much more readily than smaller, private firms. 
Table 5.9 Logistic regression predicting likelihood of selection of shares / long-term incentives based on size, sector, 
high-road strategy and low-road strategy 
    95% C.I. for Odds Ratio 
 B SE Odds ratio Lower Upper 
Size 1.142 .283 3.133** 1.800 5.454 
Sector .539 .302 1.715 .948 3.101 
High-road 
strategy 
.285 .194 1.330 .910 1.944 
Low-road 
strategy 
-.611 .249 .543* .333 .883 
Constant .240 1.052 1.272   
Note. * = p ≤ .05, ** = p ≥ .005, B = unstandardised regression coefficient, SE = standard error of regression 
coefficient, C.I. = confidence intervals. 
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5.3.8 Merit pay 
The logistic regression model for merit pay was right on the borderline of being statistically 
significant, χ2(4) = 9.441, p = .052.  Given that this was so close to the threshold of p ≤ .050, a 
second test of model fit, the Hosmer and Lemeshow test (Laerd, 2015b) was carried out which 
demonstrated that the regression model was not a poor fit, χ2(8) = 10.963, p = .204. 
The model explained 5.0% (Nagelkerke R2) of the variance in selection of merit pay rises and 
correctly classified 59.4% of cases.  Only high-road strategy was statistically significant as a 
predictor variable (as shown in Table 5.10).  Increasing high-road strategy scores predicted 
increased likelihood of using merit pay rises (for every increase in high-road score the 
organisation was more likely to use merit pay by a factor of 1.603). 
The use of merit pay, a consolidated increase to base salary based on individual performance or 
contribution, and its association with high-road organisations would be expected if the 
theoretical model was accurate.  
Table5.10 Logistic regression predicting likelihood of selection of merit pay based on size, sector, high-road 
strategy and low-road strategy 
    95% C.I. for Odds Ratio 
 B SE Odds ratio Lower Upper 
Size .427 .266 1.532 .910 2.578 
Sector -.186 .291 .830 .469 1.469 
High-road 
strategy 
.472 .186 1.603* 1.113 2.308 
Low-road 
strategy 
-.137 .231 .872 .554 1.372 
Constant -1.608 1.012 .200   
Note. * = p ≤ .05, ** = p ≥ .005, B = unstandardised regression coefficient, SE = standard error of regression 
coefficient, C.I. = confidence intervals. 
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5.3.9 Individual cash incentives 
The logistic regression model with all four independent variables was not statistically significant 
indicating a poor overall model fit, χ2(4) = 7.867, p = .097.  Despite this, inspection of the 
variables in the equation showed a significant odds ratio value for the sector variable.   A 
univariate logistic analysis was then run with sector as the sole independent variable and this 
model was statistically significant χ2(1) = 9.491, p = .002.  The model explained 5.3% 
(Nagelkerke R2) of the variance in selection of individual cash incentives and correctly classified 
80.3% of cases.  The odds ratio value showed that manufacturing and production organisations 
were over three times more likely to use individual cash incentives compared to private sector 
services (see Table 5.11).   
This result is not consistent with the hypothesis that firms in the service sector will be more likely 
to use experiential, variable pay practices such as individual cash incentives.  Additionally, the 
initial result of the multivariate logistic regression indicates that the four-variable model could 
well be deficient in determining pay practice selection in some cases. 
Table5.11 Logistic regression predicting likelihood of selection of individual cash incentives based on sector 
    95% C.I. for Odds Ratio 
 B SE Odds ratio Lower Upper 
Sector 1.144 .407 3.139** 1.413 6.974 
Constant -2.277 .371 .103   
Note. * = p ≤ .05, ** = p ≥ .005, B = unstandardised regression coefficient, SE = standard error of regression 
coefficient, C.I. = confidence intervals. 
 
  
154 
 
5.3.10 Upper quartile pay 
The logistic regression model for upper quartile pay was statistically significant, χ2(4) = 
10.453, p = .033. The model explained 6.5% (Nagelkerke R2) of the variance in positioning pay 
level in the upper quartile of the market and correctly classified 79.9% of cases. Of the four 
predictor variables, only high-road strategy was statistically significant (as shown in Table 5.12). 
Increasing high-road strategy scores predicted increased likelihood of upper quartile pay (for 
every increase in high-road strategy score the organisation was more likely to position pay in the 
upper quartile by a factor of 1.664). 
As represented in Chapter 4, there is some debate in the literature as to whether above market 
pay should be classified as experiential or algorithmic.  This result supports the proposition that 
high-road strategy organisations are more likely to position pay levels at high levels in the 
market; potentially to secure better quality employees or to offset some of the risk of outcome 
uncertainty associated with other variable forms of pay (Hambrick and Snow, 1989). 
Table 5.12 Logistic regression predicting likelihood of upper quartile pay based on size, sector, high-road strategy 
and low-road strategy 
    95% C.I. for Odds Ratio 
 B SE Odds ratio Lower Upper 
Size .064 .328 1.066 .561 2.026 
Sector .651 .338 1.917 .988 3.720 
High-road 
strategy 
.509 .243 1.664* 1.033 2.680 
Low-road 
strategy 
-.119 .292 .888 .501 1.575 
Constant -3.045 1.279 .048   
Note. * = p ≤ .05, ** = p ≥ .005, B = unstandardised regression coefficient, SE = standard error of regression 
coefficient, C.I. = confidence intervals. 
Results examined in this section so far indicate partial support for H3, H7 and H9; organisations 
with high-road strategies are more likely to select experiential pay practices such as broadbanded 
pay structures, competency and skills-based pay, market-driven pay reviews, performance-
related reward and above market pay levels, as predicted in the theoretical model.  However, 
only performance-related reward is significantly more likely to be selected by private sector 
services firms whereas none of the experiential pay practices are significantly more likely to be 
practised by SMEs.  On the contrary, three experiential practices, broadbanding, performance-
related reward and long-term pay practices are more likely to be selected by large organisations.  
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In addition, there are many more results for experiential pay practices that, according to the 
hypothesised model, should show an association with high-road strategy, SMEs and the service 
industry, but do not.  These non-significant results suggest there is no relationship between 
strategy, size and sector and certain pay practices.  
5.3.11 Non-significant results  
Table 5.13 shows the list of experiential pay practices that showed no significant results in 
logistic regression tests.  In most cases this meant there was no overall significance to the model 
and there were no significant odds ratio values for the four independent variables i.e. none of the 
four variables, size, sector, high-road and low-road strategy had a significant effect on the 
selection of the pay practice being tested (see Table 5.23 in the chapter summary for full results).  
In two cases, individual bonuses and gainsharing, there were significant odds ratio values but no 
overall significance of the model.  As with individual cash incentives, a univariate test was run 
with the significant predictor variable (high-road strategy score in both cases) but these did not 
yield significant results. 
Two of the non-significant pay practices, upper decile pay, and gainsharing had low event per 
variable (EPV) values which could well have had an effect on the result (see full discussion on 
EPV in section 5.2.3.8 above). 
Aside from these issues, there are clearly some key experiential practices on this list such as 
market-driven pay determination and progression and group-based performance schemes such 
as profit-sharing and gainsharing which, if the strategic alignment model was accurate, would 
be significantly associated with high-road strategy, SME and service sector firms.  The absence 
of significant results for these practices indicates that the model may well be deficient in fully 
explaining why organisations select their pay practices. 
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Table5.13 Experiential pay practices with no significant association with size, sector, high-road strategy and low-
road strategy 
Job family pay structures 
Market rates to determine base pay  
Market rates to progress base pay 
Individual performance-related pay (IPRP)*  
Employee value / retention as a criterion for base 
pay progression 
Recruitment and retention as pay review factor 
Combination (org./group/indiv.) performance-
related reward schemes 
Individual bonus 
Goal-sharing 
Profit-sharing  
Gainsharing*  
Upper decile pay* 
Note. * = low EVP 
 
5.4 Algorithmic pay results 
5.4.1 Pay spines (low EPV) 
The logistic regression model for pay spines was statistically significant, χ2(4) = 13.839, p = 
.008. The model explained 10.0% (Nagelkerke R2) of the variance in selection of pay spine base 
pay structures and correctly classified 87.1% of cases. Two predictor variables were statistically 
significant: size and high-road strategy (as shown in Table 5.14).  Large organisations had higher 
odds of selecting pay spines compared with SMEs by a factor of 2.355 whereas increasing high-
road strategy scores were associated with a reduction in the likelihood of using pay spines to 
manage base pay.  Both these results show good support for the theorised association between 
organisation size and pay practice selection and strategy and pay practice selection although low 
EPV, due to very small numbers of organisations in the survey using pay spines, means this 
result should be treated with caution. 
Table5.14 Logistic regression predicting likelihood of selection of pay spines based on size, sector, high-road 
strategy and low-road strategy 
    95% C.I. for Odds Ratio 
 B SE Odds ratio Lower Upper 
Size .857 .404 2.355* 1.067 5.199 
Sector .728 .406 2.071 .934 4.590 
High-road 
strategy 
-.519 .250 .595* .365 .971 
Low-road 
strategy 
.508 .353 1.662 .832 3.320 
Constant -2.920 1.575 .054   
Note. * = p ≤ .05, ** = p ≥ .005, B = unstandardised regression coefficient, SE = standard error of regression 
coefficient, C.I. = confidence intervals. 
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5.4.2 Job evaluation  
The logistic regression model for job evaluation (JE) was statistically significant, χ2(4) = 
21.287, p < .0005. The model explained 11.2% (Nagelkerke R2) of the variance in selection of 
job evaluation to determine base pay and correctly classified 66.3% of cases.  Of the four 
independent variables, three were statistically significant: size, high-road strategy and low-road 
strategy (as shown in Table 5.15).  Organisations with a high-road strategic orientation had 
increased odds of selecting JE to determine pay level (for every increase in strategy score the 
organisation was two and a quarter times more likely to use JE) whereas increasing low-road 
strategy scores were associated with a reduction in the likelihood of using this method of pay 
determination.  Large organisations were also one and three-quarter times more likely to select 
this practice in comparison to SMEs. 
These results are partially supportive of the hypothetical association between large organisation 
size and increased use of algorithmic pay practices.  However, the key finding here is that, rather 
than being more likely to be used by low-road strategy firms as the theoretical model predicts, 
JE appears to be not only less likely to be used by these organisations, but also significantly more 
likely to be used by firms with high-road strategic orientation.  The explanation for this result is 
not readily apparent but may centre on the low-road firm’s attachment to cost efficiency, given 
job evaluation has been perceived to be a costly and inflationary pay practice (Lawler, 1986).   
Table5.15 Logistic regression predicting likelihood of selection of job evaluation based on size, sector, high-road 
strategy and low-road strategy 
    95% C.I. for Odds Ratio 
 B SE Odds ratio Lower Upper 
Size .552 .280 1.737* 1.004 3.006 
Sector .000 .302 1.000 .553 1.809 
High-road 
strategy 
.807 .214 2.242** 1.474 3.410 
Low-road 
strategy 
-.527 .250 .590* .362 .964 
Constant -1.620 1.057 .198   
Note. * = p ≤ .05, ** = p ≥ .005, B = unstandardised regression coefficient, SE = standard error of regression 
coefficient, C.I. = confidence intervals. 
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5.4.3 Collective pay bargaining 
The logistic regression model for collective pay bargaining was statistically significant, χ2(4) = 
25.152, p < .0005. The model explained 15.7% (Nagelkerke R2) of the variance in use of 
collective bargaining to determine base pay and correctly classified 82.3% of cases.  Of the four 
independent variables, two were statistically significant: size and sector (as shown in Table 
5.16). Large organisations were nearly three times more likely to use collective bargaining 
compared to SMEs. Manufacturing and production sector firms were three and a half times 
more likely than service sector firms to determine pay levels, rates and ranges this way.  Both 
results support the hypothesis that traditional pay determination practices will be used to a 
greater extent in large firms and those operating in the manufacturing / production sector.  
Table 5.16 Logistic regression predicting likelihood of selection of collective pay bargaining based on size, sector, 
high-road strategy and low-road strategy 
    95% C.I. for Odds Ratio 
 B SE Odds ratio Lower Upper 
Size 1.033 .365 2.810** 1.374 5.745 
Sector 1.257 .363 3.515** 1.725 7.160 
High-road 
strategy 
-.307 .234 .736 .465 1.163 
Low-road 
strategy 
.373 .319 1.452 .777 2.713 
Constant -3.056 1.420 .047   
Note. * = p ≤ .05, ** = p ≥ .005, B = unstandardised regression coefficient, SE = standard error of regression 
coefficient, C.I. = confidence intervals. 
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5.4.4 Ability to pay (pay determination) 
The logistic regression model for ability to pay as the most important pay determination factor 
was statistically significant, χ2(4) = 34.035, p < .0001. The model explained 17.0% 
(Nagelkerke R2) of the variance in use of ability to pay and correctly classified 64.7% of cases.  
All four predictor variables were statistically significant (as shown in Table 5.17).  Organisations 
in the manufacturing and production sector were one and a half times as likely to select ability 
to pay.  Inverting the odds ratio for organisational size (dividing 1.0 by the odds ratio) shows 
SMEs were more likely to determine pay levels based on their ability to pay than their large 
counterparts by a factor of 2.58.  Every point decrease in high-road strategy score equates to a 
reduction in odds of using ability to pay by a factor of 2.31 whereas every increase in low-road 
strategy score means the organisation is twice as likely to use ability to pay. 
This set of results supports the theoretical proposition that manufacturing and low-road strategy 
organisations will use pay practices driven by cost reduction imperatives and suggests that firms 
with high-road strategies are less likely to treat cost as the most important factor in pay decisions.  
The finding that SMEs are more likely than large organisations to base pay levels on their 
assessment of affordability is perhaps unsurprising given the resource poverty and liabilities of 
smallness associated with small organisation size (Welsh and White, 1981; Williamson, 2000; 
Verreynne et al., 2013) discussed in Chapter 3.  It is however counter to the hypothesis that large 
organisations will use algorithmic pay practices and gives rise to further questions as to the 
applicability of the model to organisational size as a variable. 
Table5.17 Logistic regression predicting likelihood of selection of ability to pay (pay determination) based on size, 
sector, high-road strategy and low-road strategy 
    95% C.I. for Odds Ratio 
 B SE Odds ratio Lower Upper 
Size -.947 .279 .388** .224 .670 
Sector .460 .304 1.584* .873 2.873 
High-road 
strategy 
-.837 .202 .433** .291 .644 
Low-road 
strategy 
.726 .250 2.066** 1.265 3.376 
Constant .301 1.043 1.351   
Note. * = p ≤ .05, ** = p ≥ .005, B = unstandardised regression coefficient, SE = standard error of regression 
coefficient, C.I. = confidence intervals. 
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5.4.5 Service-based pay 
The logistic regression model for length of service with all four independent variables was not 
statistically significant indicating a poor overall model fit, χ2(4) = 5.276, p = .260.  Despite this, 
inspection of the variables in the equation showed a significant odds ratio value for the high-
road strategy variable.   A univariate logistic analysis was then run with high-road strategy as 
the sole independent variable and this model was statistically significant χ2(1) = 4.380, p = .025.  
The model explained 2.5% (Nagelkerke R2) of the variance in selection of length of service for 
pay progression and correctly classified 80.3% of cases.    
The odds ratio value showed that for every increase in high-road strategy score there was a one 
and a half times reduction in likelihood of selecting length of service as a pay progression 
criterion (see Table 5.18).  Although the result supports the hypothesis that high-road 
organisations will be less likely to use algorithmic pay practices, the poor fit of the full four 
variable model gives rise to questions as to its appropriateness in all cases. 
Table 5.18 Logistic regression predicting likelihood of selection of length of service-based pay based on high-road 
strategy 
    95% C.I. for Odds Ratio 
 B SE Odds ratio Lower Upper 
High-road 
strategy 
-.400 .191 .670* .461 .974 
Constant .021 .684 1.022   
Note. * = p ≤ .05, ** = p ≥ .005, B = unstandardised regression coefficient, SE = standard error of regression 
coefficient, C.I. = confidence intervals. 
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5.4.6 Sales commission 
The logistic regression model for sales commission was statistically significant, χ2(4) = 17.575, p 
= .001. The model explained 9.5% (Nagelkerke R2) of the variance in its use and correctly 
classified 64.3% of cases. Of the four predictor variables, sector and high-road strategy were 
statistically significant (as shown in Table 5.19).  Service sector firms were over three times 
more likely to use commission than manufacturing and production companies.  In addition, 
increasing high-road strategy scores predicted increased likelihood of using sales commission; 
for every increase in high-road strategy score the organisation was over one and a half times 
more likely to use sales commission.   
Both of these results are counter to the hypothetical proposition that commission will be used by 
low-road and manufacturing firms.  The classification of commission as an algorithmic pay 
practice stems from the new pay writers’ differentiation between new, flexible forms of variable 
pay versus traditional individual incentives including commission and piece rates (e.g. Lawler, 
1990) discussed in Chapter 3. This classification could be challenged on the basis that 
commission schemes meet the experiential criteria being variable, risk/benefit sharing, and 
performance-oriented.  It is also worth considering this result from a functional point of view; 
commission can be associated with sales roles which might be arguably more common in the 
service industry and in organisations pursuing growth-oriented business strategies.   
Table5.19 Logistic regression predicting likelihood of selection of sales commission based on size, sector, high-road 
strategy and low-road strategy 
    95% C.I. for Odds Ratio 
 B SE Odds ratio Lower Upper 
Size .042 .284 1.043 .598 1.819 
Sector -1.208 .343 .299** .153 .585 
High-road 
strategy 
.479 .199 1.614* 1.092 2.385 
Low-road 
strategy 
-.090 .246 .914 .565 1.479 
Constant -1.749 1.073 .174   
Note. * = p ≤ .05, ** = p ≥ .005, B = unstandardised regression coefficient, SE = standard error of regression 
coefficient, C.I. = confidence intervals. 
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5.4.7 Lower quartile pay (low EPV) 
The logistic regression model for lower quartile pay was statistically significant, χ2(4) = 
11.797, p = .019. The model explained 9.3% (Nagelkerke R2) of the variance in positioning pay 
level in the lower quartile of the market and correctly classified 88.4% of cases.  Of the predictor 
variables, both high-road strategy and low-road strategy were statistically significant (as shown 
in Table 5.20).  Increasing high-road strategy scores predicted a reduced likelihood of paying in 
the lower quartile; with every one-point increase equating to a reduced likelihood by a factor of 
1.99.  Conversely, increasing low-road strategy scores were associated with increased likelihood 
of paying in the lower quartile; for every increase in low-road strategy score the organisation 
was 2.278 times more likely to position pay in the lower quartile. 
These results support the hypothesis that low-road strategy organisations will be more likely to 
pay at lower levels and high-road organisations at higher levels and is consistent with the finding 
in section 5.3.10 above that high-road organisations are more likely to pay in the upper quartile 
of the market.  However, as another case of low EPV, the result should be treated with some 
caution. 
Table 5.20 Logistic regression predicting likelihood of lower quartile pay based on size, sector, high-road strategy 
and low-road strategy 
    95% C.I. for Odds Ratio 
 B SE Odds ratio Lower Upper 
Size .307 .426 1.360 .590 3.135 
Sector -.286 .487 .752 .289 1.953 
High-road 
strategy 
-.691 .259 .501* .302 .832 
Low-road 
strategy 
.823 .389 2.278* 1.063 4.882 
Constant -3.238 1.735 .039   
Note. * = p ≤ .05, ** = p ≥ .005, B = unstandardised regression coefficient, SE = standard error of regression 
coefficient, C.I. = confidence intervals. 
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5.4.8 High pay dispersion 
A multiple linear regression analysis was run to predict pay dispersion (pounds sterling) from 
organisation size, sector, high-road strategy and low-road strategy. All assumptions were met 
with the exception of normality (see Appendix G). There was linearity and homoscedasticity as 
assessed by partial regression plots and a plot of studentised residuals against the predicted 
values. There was no evidence of multicollinearity of independent variables, as assessed by 
tolerance values > 0.2 (Appendix I). There were two studentised deleted residuals > ±3 standard 
deviations which were inspected and retained, but no leverage values greater than 0.2, nor values 
for Cook's distance > 1.0.  As the data was strongly positively skewed, as assessed by histogram, 
P-P Plot of standardised residuals and z-score of skewness ±2.58 (9.466), a logarithmic 
transformation was applied to the pay dispersion data to attempt to gain a normal distribution.  
The log transformed data met the assumption of normality (z-score = -1.586) and the regression 
analysis was re-run. It was clear  from comparison of results however that the non-normality of 
the original pay dispersion scale had little impact on the outcomes of the test.  It was therefore 
decided to report the original data (results from the transformed data are presented in Appendix 
G for comparison) for the sake of clarity; reporting pounds sterling difference in change in pay 
dispersion rather than the log value.  
So, for the original test, the regression model was statistically significant, F(4, 80) = 2.890, p = 
.027, and the effect size was adj. R2 = .083, i.e. the model explained 8.3% of the variance from 
the mean pay dispersion.  Regression coefficients and standard errors can be found in Table 
5.21. 
One predictor variable, size of organisation, added statistically significantly to the prediction, p ≤ 
.005. The unstandardised regression coefficient indicates that large organisations are likely to 
have a pay dispersion between the highest and lowest paid of nearly £71,000 more than SME 
organisations. This result supports the theoretical proposition that large organisations will have 
higher pay dispersion as an algorithmic pay practice but also makes practical sense in terms of 
the number of people and roles within larger firms being more likely to result in a larger spread 
of salaries.   
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Table 5.21 Multiple regression analysis predicting pay dispersion based on size, sector, high-road strategy and low-
road strategy 
    95% C.I. for B coefficient 
 B SE β Lower Upper 
(Constant) 204501.44 93275.87  18876.54 390126.34 
Size 70914.58** 24375.68 .308 22405.44 119423.72 
Sector -39472.18 26916.15 -.158 -93037.02 14092.66 
High-road 
strategy 
5358.00 16318.23 .036 -27116.30 37832.31 
Low-road 
strategy 
-27433.06 21570.76 -.141 -70360.24 15494.11 
Note. * = p ≤ .05, ** = p ≥ .005, B = unstandardised regression coefficient, SE = standard error of regression 
coefficient, β = standardised coefficient, C.I. = confidence intervals (all rounded to 2 decimal places except β). 
 
The significant results for algorithmic pay practices show very few of the associations predicted 
by the theoretical model and H3, H7 and H9.  Just two algorithmic practices, the organisation’s 
ability to pay as a determiner of pay level and lower quartile pay are more likely to be selected 
by organisations with low-road strategic orientations.  Large organisations are more likely to use 
pay spine pay structures, job evaluation, collective pay bargaining and have higher pay 
dispersion whereas manufacturing and production firms are also more likely to use collective 
bargaining for pay determination.  There are some results counter to the hypotheses: job 
evaluation and sales commission are more likely to be selected by organisations with high-road 
strategies, and service sector firms are also more likely to use commission.  Additionally, there 
are more results for algorithmic pay practices that, according to the hypothesised model, should 
show an association with low-road strategy, large organisations and the manufacturing / 
production sector but do not.  These non-significant results suggest there is no relationship 
between strategy, size and sector and certain pay practices.  
5.4.9 Non-significant results 
Table 5.22 shows results from logistic tests on algorithmic pay practices that did not yield any 
significant results (see Table 5.24 in chapter summary for full results).  Two of the results, piece 
rates and pay positioning in the lower decile of the market, had low event per variable (EPV) 
values as well as outlier cases due to very small numbers of respondents selecting these practices, 
and this could well have had an effect on these results.  Of the other non-significant results, that 
narrow-grading is not more likely to be selected by large organisations, manufacturing and 
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production firms or those pursuing a low-road strategy is perhaps the most surprising given its 
clear connection with the traditional, algorithmic pay model.  Pay secrecy too, despite 
assumptions that it will be associated with more traditional, bureaucratic organisations, shows 
no relationship with organisational contingencies. 
Table 5.22 Algorithmic pay practices with no significant association with size, sector, high-road strategy and low-
road strategy 
Narrow-grading 
Ability to pay (pay review) 
Median pay 
Lower decile pay*+ 
Piece rates*+ 
Pay secrecy 
Note: *=low EPV, +=outlier(s) 
5.4.9.1 Pay secrecy 
A multiple linear regression was run to predict pay secrecy from organisation size, sector, high-
road strategy and low-road strategy. All assumptions except for normality of distribution were 
met.  Normality was assessed by histogram, P-P Plot and z-score for skewness which indicated 
the pay secrecy scale data was strongly negatively skewed (Appendix H).  A reflect and 
logarithmic transformation was applied to correct the distribution (Laerd, 2015d) and the 
multiple regression analysis was run for a second time.  All other assumptions were met 
(Appendix H).  The multiple regression model was not statistically significantly, F(4, 251) = 
1.418, p ≥.05, adj. R2 = .007.   The coefficient for the sector variable however was significant, p 
= .036 indicating that increased secrecy scores could be associated with private sector services 
and so a univariate linear regression analysis was run subsequently.  In this analysis there was 
no significance, F(1, 267) = 3.425, p ≥.05, adj. R2 = .009.  In summary, no relationship between 
pay secrecy and size, sector, high-road strategy and low-road strategy was found. 
5.5 Summary of results and key findings 
There are a number of findings that emerge from the results in this chapter.  First, despite the 
relatively small number of significant results (see Tables 5.23, 5.24 and 5.25 below for a full 
summary of results), there are a number of experiential and algorithmic pay practices that are 
related to strategy, size and sector in ways that correspond to the theoretical alignment model.  
High-road strategy organisations were more likely to use many of the experiential practices such 
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as broadbanding, individual competencies and skills for pay progression, market-driven pay 
reviews, performance-related pay schemes and above market pay levels.  They were also less 
likely to use certain algorithmic practices such as pay spines, length of service to progress pay, 
below market pay and ability to pay.  Conversely, low-road strategy organisations were more 
likely to select algorithmic practices, ability to pay and below market pay, while being less likely 
to use experiential practices such as market-rates for pay reviews and long-term incentives.  
These results support the hypothesis (H3) that organisations pursuing business strategies based 
on growth and diversification of products and services will favour pay practices that are 
performance-driven, market competitive and flexible while those organisations pursuing 
strategies associated with stable product markets and efficient operations will select pay 
practices that are cost-focused.  There are also results for the size and sector variables that support 
the theoretical model and hypotheses H7 and H9.  Large organisations were more likely to use 
algorithmic pay practices such as pay spines (although low EPV should be noted), job evaluation 
and collective pay bargaining as well as having higher pay dispersion than SMEs.  
Manufacturing and production firms were more likely than service sector companies to use 
collective bargaining and ability to pay whereas the service industry was much more likely to 
use performance-related reward schemes than manufacturing.  Taken as a whole, the above 
results appear to provide good evidence for the use of certain experiential and algorithmic 
practices being related to the type of business strategy adopted, as well as the organisation’s size 
and the industry they are operating in.   
However, not all significant results supported these hypothetical relationships. There are a 
number of results that run counter to the theoretical model.  As well as being more likely to use 
some experiential pay practices, high-road strategy organisations were also more likely to use a 
number of algorithmic practice such as job evaluation to determine pay levels and sales 
commission.  High-road organisations were also found to be less likely to use the experiential 
individual base pay arrangements and low-road organisations were less likely to use the 
archetypal algorithmic pay practice, job evaluation.  Similarly, large organisations were found 
to be more likely than SMEs to use broadbanding, performance-related reward and long-term 
incentives.  In addition, algorithmic sales commission was more likely to be used by the service 
sector and experiential individual cash incentives by manufacturing.  The clear implication of 
these counter-hypothetical results is that the two theoretical pay configurations, experiential and 
algorithmic pay, are not being used exclusively by the organisations in this study.  Instead there 
appears to be relationships between practices from both configurations with organisational 
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characteristics.  This suggests that some organisations are using both algorithmic and 
experiential practices alongside one another in a blended approach rather than opting for one 
configuration or the other.   
One of the common features of the significant results shown in Tables 5.23 and 5.24 is the 
apparently low Nagelkerke R2 values which typically indicate less than 10% of the change in 
selection of pay practices is accounted for by the four-variable model tested.  It is recognised that 
these logistic regression R2 values will be lower than those for more common linear regression 
(Hair et al., 2010) but the low proportions indicate only a small effect size (Cohen, 1988).  This 
suggests that the selection of pay practices is determined by (an)other factor(s) besides strategies, 
size or sector and that these three factors have only a limited effect on organisational pay choices.  
Glass (1976) argues that effect size needs to be understood in the context of the research and in 
this case, it would not be reasonable to suggest pay decisions were driven entirely by these three 
factors.  Nevertheless, the apparently very low effect size of the model on pay practice selection 
is an important finding in addressing the research questions of this study. 
Aside from the significant results reported in this chapter, there are a large number of pay 
practices for which no significant results were found.  Some of these, including market rates to 
determine and progress pay, IPRP, profit-sharing and gainsharing from the experiential 
configuration and narrow-grading, pay secrecy and piece rates from the algorithmic list, are 
surprising omissions.  The results clearly show no relationship between these practices and the 
three hypothesised factors, strategy, size and sector. The implication is that factors other than 
these three organisational contingencies determine whether or not these practices are selected.  
Another finding emerging from this set of results is the clear indication that while business 
strategy (and particularly high-road strategy) has an effect on pay practice selection, the 
relationship between pay practice selection and organisation size and sector may not be as 
strong.  There were fewer significant relationships between pay practices and size or sector than 
there were for high- and low-road strategies.  It seems clear that of the three factors hypothesised 
to influence pay practice selection, business strategy is predominant.  Why size, and particularly 
sector, do not have the same impact is not immediately clear although it is noted that the literature 
contributing to the theoretical model for these factors was far sparser than that for strategy. 
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Table 5.23 Summary of logistic regression results predicting likelihood of selection of experiential pay practices 
based on organisation characteristics 
Pay policy 
area 
Experiential 
pay practice 
Nagelkerke  
R2 
χ2(4) Odds ratios H support 
Base pay 
management / 
structures 
Broadbanding 7.4% 13.310* 
Size 2.078* N 
Sector 1.279 N 
High-road 1.606* Y 
Low-road .710 N 
 Job families 0.5% 0.906 
Size 1.017 N 
Sector 1.062 N 
High-road 1.127 N 
Low-road 1.125 N 
 Individual base pay 6.5% 12.317* 
Size .798 N 
Sector .779 N 
High-road .577** N 
Low-road 1.124 N 
Pay level 
determination Market rates 0.9% 1.586 
Size 1.024 N 
Sector .779 N 
High-road .901 N 
Low-road .933 N 
Base pay 
progression 
criteria 
Individual PRP 
(low EPV) 0.6% 0.770 
Size 1.092 N 
Sector 1.427 N 
High-road .914 N 
Low-road .983 N 
 Competency-pay 5.0% 
9.446 
H&L:   
χ2(8) = 6.896,  
p = .548 
Size .732 N 
Sector .858 N 
High-road 1.653** Y 
Low-road .856 N 
 Skills-based pay 6.9% 13.300* 
Size .958 N 
Sector 1.332 N 
High-road 1.775** Y 
Low-road .964 N 
 Market rates 3.5% 6.538 
Size 1.640 N 
Sector .883 N 
High-road 1.283 N 
Low-road .688 N 
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Pay policy 
area 
Experiential 
pay practice 
Nagelkerke  
R2 
χ2(4) Odds ratios H support 
Pay review 
factors 
Employee 
value / 
retention 
3.0% 5.648 
Size .738 N 
Sector 1.546 N 
High-road 1.242 N 
Low-road .862 N 
 Movement in market rates 7.9% 15.001** 
Size 1.647 N 
Sector .664 N 
High-road 1.685** Y 
Low-road .554* Y 
 Recruitment and retention 2.5% 4.694 
Size 1.465 N 
Sector 1.203 N 
High-road 1.234 N 
Low-road .770 N 
Performance-
related reward 
Performance-
related reward 10.7% 18.660** 
Size 2.165* N 
Sector .373** Y 
High-road 1.619* Y 
Low-road .753 N 
Individual 
variable pay 
Combination 
schemes 2.2% 3.988 
Size 1.631 N 
Sector .980 N 
High-road 1.069 N 
Low-road .784 N 
 Merit pay  5.0% 
9.441 
H&L:  
χ2(8) = 10.963,  
p = .204 
Size 1.532 N 
Sector .830 N 
High-road 1.603* Y 
Low-road .872 N 
 Individual bonus 3.5% 6.664 
Size 1.515 N 
Sector .887 N 
High-road 1.428* N 
Low-road .846 N 
 Individual cash incentives 5.3% 9.491** 
Size - N 
Sector 3.139** Y 
High-road - N 
Low-road - N 
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Pay policy 
area 
Experiential 
pay practice 
Nagelkerke  
R2 
χ2(4) Odds ratios H support 
Long-term 
pay 
Share 
schemes/Long-
term incentives 
13.2% 25.377** 
Size 3.133** N 
Sector 1.715 N 
High-road 1.330 N 
Low-road .543* Y 
Group PRR Gainsharing (low EPV) 4.4% 5.939 
Size .922 N 
Sector .928 N 
High-road 1.880* N 
Low-road 1.091 N 
 Goal-sharing 3.1% 5.348 
Size 1.708 N 
Sector .667 N 
High-road .899 N 
Low-road 1.073 N 
 Profit-sharing 2.2% 3.639 
Size 1.091 N 
Sector .641 N 
High-road 1.375 N 
Low-road .853 N 
Market 
positioning of 
pay 
Upper  
decile pay (low 
EPV) 
3.9% 4.961 
Size .869 N 
Sector 1.191 N 
High-road 1.646 N 
Low-road 1.272 N 
 
Upper quartile 
pay 6.5% 10.453* 
Size 1.066 N 
Sector 1.917 N 
High-road 1.664* Y 
Low-road .888 N 
Note. * = p ≤ .05, ** = p ≥ .005, χ2 = chi square statistic, (4) = degrees of freedom, N = no, Y = yes, H&L = Hosmer 
and Lemeshow test. 
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Table5.24 Summary of logistic regression results predicting likelihood of selection of algorithmic pay practices 
based on organisation characteristics 
Pay policy 
area 
Algorithmic 
pay practice 
Nagelkerke  
R2 
χ2(4) Odds ratios H support 
Base pay 
management / 
structures 
Pay spines 
(low EPV) 10.0% 13.839* 
Size 2.355* Y 
Sector 2.071 N 
High-road .595* Y 
Low-road 1.662 N 
 Narrow-grading 1.8% 3.106 
Size 1.230 N 
Sector 1.386 N 
High-road 1.038 N 
Low-road 1.192 N 
Pay level 
determination 
Job 
evaluation  11.2% 21.287** 
Size 1.737* Y 
Sector 1.000 N 
High-road 2.242** N 
Low-road .590* N 
 Collective bargaining 15.7% 25.152** 
Size 2.810** Y 
Sector 3.515** Y 
High-road .736 N 
Low-road 1.452 N 
 Ability to pay 17.0% 34.035** 
Size .388** N 
Sector 1.584* Y 
High-road .433** Y 
Low-road 2.066** Y 
Base pay 
progression 
criteria 
Service-based 
pay 2.5% 4.380* 
Size - N 
Sector - N 
High-road .670* Y 
Low-road - N 
Pay review 
factors Ability to pay 3.4% 5.311 
Size .638 N 
Sector .665 N 
High-road .886 N 
Low-road 1.623 N 
Individual 
variable pay 
Piece rates 
(low EPV) 14.1% 5.382 
Size .783 N 
Sector 2.153 N 
High-road .455 N 
Low-road 6.341 N 
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Pay policy 
area 
Algorithmic 
pay practice 
Nagelkerke  
R2 
χ2(4) Odds ratios H support 
 Sales commission 9.5% 17.575** 
Size 1.043 N 
Sector .299** N 
High-road 1.614* N 
Low-road .914 N 
Market 
positioning of 
pay 
Median 1.6% 2.986 
Size 1.148 N 
Sector 1.448 N 
High-road 1.032 N 
Low-road .763 N 
 
Lower 
quartile pay 
(low EPV) 
9.3% 11.797* 
Size 1.360 N 
Sector .752 N 
High-road .501* Y 
Low-road 2.278* Y 
 
Lower decile 
pay (low 
EPV) 
9.5% 2.914 
Size .869 N 
Sector 1.191 N 
High-road 1.646 N 
Low-road 1.272 N 
Note. * = p ≤ .05, ** = p ≥ .005, χ2 = chi square statistic, (4) = degrees of freedom, N = no, Y = yes, H&L = Hosmer 
and Lemeshow test. 
 
Table5.25 Summary of regression results predicting extent of pay dispersion and secrecy based on organisation 
characteristics 
Pay policy 
area 
Adjusted R2 F(df,  
residual df) 
β H Support 
Pay dispersion 8.3% 2.890* (4, 80) 
Size .308* Y 
Sector -.158 N 
High-road .036 N 
Low-road -.141 N 
      
Pay secrecy 0.7% 1.418 (4, 251) 
Size .036 N 
Sector -.136* N 
High-road .082 N 
Low-road .022 N 
Note. * = p ≤ .05, ** = p ≥ .005; Adjusted R2 = proportion of variance explained by model adjusted for population; 
F = F-test statistic; (df) = degrees of freedom; β = standardised regression coefficients; N = no, Y = yes 
Finally, taking these findings together, despite the small effect size, the lack of evidence for two 
clear pay configurations and the considerable number of non-significant results, one clear 
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indication arising from the results is that strategy, and to some extent size and sector, do have an 
effect on the selection of some pay practices.  Table 5.26 sets out the significant findings by pay 
practice and organisation contingency and shows some clear differences in pay practice 
selection according to different strategic orientations, size and sector of operation.    
Table 5.26 Summary of significant logistic regression and linear regression results – pay practices and organisation 
characteristics 
 Business strategy Size Sector 
 High-road Low-road SME Large Private 
sector 
services 
Manufact-
uring & 
production 
Broadbanding √  X √   
Individual base 
pay 
X      
Competency pay √      
Skills-based pay √      
Movement in 
market rates 
(review) 
√ X     
Performance-
related reward 
√  X √ √ X 
Shares / LTI 
schemes 
 X X √   
Upper quartile pay √      
Pay spines X  X √   
Job evaluation √ X X √   
Collective 
bargaining 
  X √ X √ 
Ability to pay 
(determination) 
X √ √ X X √ 
Service-based pay X      
Sales commission √  X √ √ X 
Merit pay √      
Lower quartile 
pay 
X √     
High pay 
dispersion 
  X √   
Note. √ = more likely to select, X = less likely to select. 
The following chapter will report and analyse the results of tests undertaken to establish the 
extent to which organisations select pay practices according to workforce employment group. 
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Chapter 6: The effect of employment group 
on pay practice selection  
6.1 Chapter introduction 
This chapter sets out results for data analysis testing the hypothesised associations between 
employment group and pay practice selection.  Figure 6.1 illustrates the proposed relationships 
between the job-based employment group and experiential pay practices and between the 
knowledge-based employment group and algorithmic pay practices as organisations, in theory, 
select different pay practices for different groups of employees depending upon the human 
capital requirements of the type of work performed.  These theorised associations have been 
framed as Hypothesis 5: 
H5. Organisations will select an algorithmic pay configuration for employees working 
in a knowledge-based employment group (managers and professional employees) and 
an experiential pay configuration for employees working in a job-based employment 
group (other, broad-based employee groups). 
The two employment groups have been operationalised in this study as: management and 
professional employees (includes senior managers, middle and front-line managers, 
professional, technical and scientific employees) representing the knowledge-based 
employment group; and other employees (includes administrative support, trades and 
production workers as well as customer service and sales staff) representing the job-based 
employment group.  Pay practices that form algorithmic and experiential pay configurations for 
these employment groups are detailed in Table 6.1. 
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Figure 6.-1 Hypothesised relationships between employment group and pay practice selection. 
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Table6.1 Experiential and algorithmic pay configurations for job-based and knowledge-based employment groups 
Experiential pay Algorithmic pay 
Broadbanding or job family structures Narrow-graded pay structures or pay spines 
Low vertical pay dispersion High vertical pay dispersion 
Above market pay (upper quartile or upper decile of 
market) 
 
At or below market pay (median, lower 
quartile or lower decile of market) 
Organisation’s ‘ability to pay’ for pay setting 
and reviews 
Market rates to determine pay*  
Market rates to progress pay 
Movement in market rates, and recruitment and 
retention as pay review factors 
Job evaluation to determine pay* 
Performance, skills, competencies or employee value 
/ retention as criteria for pay progression 
Length of service as a criterion for pay 
progression 
Individual base pay rates / salaries Collective bargaining 
Extensive employee coverage of performance-related 
reward schemes  
Minimal employee coverage of 
performance-related reward schemes 
Combi (org./group/indiv.) performance-related 
schemes 
Individual bonus / cash incentives 
Merit pay  
Gainsharing 
Goal-sharing 
Profit-sharing 
Piece rates 
Sales commission 
 
Notes. 1) * Q6 of the CIPD Reward Management Survey (Appendix B) asked which factor is most important in 
determining pay. CIPD questions were: ‘market rates (with JE)’ or ‘market rates (without JE)’ therefore when 
testing for the variable ‘job evaluation’ ‘market rates (with JE)’ was used.    
2) The data for pay practices ‘PRR schemes’ and ‘shares / LTIs’ was not collected separately for employment 
groups and therefore was not suitable for testing in this phase. 
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The chapter begins with a with a full explanation and justification of methods of data analysis 
used. Following this, the results for each test are reported in full and the findings analysed. The 
chapter concludes with a summary of results to the extent they support the hypothesis. 
6.2 Data analysis  
Three different sets of statistical tests were performed to generate the results considered in this 
chapter: McNemar’s test, paired-samples t-test and Wilcoxon signed-rank test.  These tests were 
chosen for suitability in terms of the study design and types of data collected.  All of the tests 
reported in this chapter were performed to ascertain the effects of workforce employment group 
on pay practice selection, specifically to determine if there were differences in selection of pay 
practices between the knowledge-based employment group and the job-based employment 
group. Each type of test and associated assumptions are considered below. 
6.2.1 Assumptions 
McNemar’s test, paired-samples t-test and Wilcoxon signed-rank test have certain data 
requirements that must be met in order to gain accurate and valid results. Table 6.2 summarises 
these assumptions and demonstrates how the variables tested in this study met these 
requirements. 
  
178 
 
Table 6.2 Summary of data assumptions for McNemar test, paired-samples t-test and Wilcoxon signed rank test 
Statistical 
tests 
Independent 
variable (IV) 
requirements 
IV tested Dependant 
variable (DV) 
requirements 
DVs tested Other 
requirements 
McNemar’s 
test 
 
One IV with 
two 
categorical 
related groups 
Employment 
group – 
knowledge-
based and job-
based 
One 
dichotomous 
DV with two 
mutually 
exclusive 
groups 
Pay practices 
‘selected’ or 
‘not selected’  
- 
Paired-
samples  
t-test 
One IV with 
two 
categorical 
related groups 
Employment 
group – 
knowledge-
based and job-
based 
One DV 
measured at 
the continuous 
level 
Pay dispersion 
- measured in 
£ 
a) Distribution 
of differences 
between 
groups is 
normal.  
b) There are 
no significant 
outliers. 
Wilcoxon 
signed-rank 
test 
One IV with 
two 
categorical 
related groups 
Employment 
group – 
knowledge-
based and job-
based 
One DV 
measured at 
the continuous 
level 
Employee 
coverage in 
performance-
pay schemes - 
measured in % 
employees 
Distribution of 
differences 
between 
groups is 
symmetrical. 
Adapted from Laerd, 2015e, 2015f, 2015g. 
6.2.1.1 Data types 
Table 6.2 shows that one common assumption for all three tests is that the independent variable 
must be comprised of two categorical related or paired groups.  For this study, the 302 participant 
organisations were each considered as having two employment group categories a) a 
knowledge-based employment group (managers and professionals) and b) a job-based 
employment group (all other non-management employees including administrative support 
staff, trades and production workers as well as customer service and sales staff) based on Lepak 
and Snell’s (2002) employment mode model. Therefore, the requirement for an independent 
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variable with two related categories (management and professional, and other employees) was 
met. 
Table 6.2 shows the different requirements for dependent variable data according to the different 
tests. For McNemar’s test the dependent variable must be dichotomous and each category must 
be mutually exclusive.  In this study, each pay practice response was coded as ‘selected’ or ‘not 
selected’ for each of the two employment group conditions. This meant that the dependent 
variable requirements for the McNemar test were met: there was a dichotomous dependent 
variable (pay practice selected or not selected)  
For both the paired-samples t-test and the Wilcoxon signed-rank test, the dependent variable 
was required to be measured at the continuous level (i.e. ratio or interval data).  Again, the 
specific pay practices, pay dispersion (measured in pounds sterling) and extent of employee 
coverage in performance-pay schemes (measured in percentage of employees) met these 
requirements.  
6.2.1.2 Normal Distribution  
Normal distribution of differences between the independent variable categories is a requirement 
of paired-samples t-tests (Laerd, 2015f).  Normality for pay dispersion difference data was 
assessed by inspection of a Normal Q-Q (quantile-quantile) plot and was found to be positively 
skewed.  A logarithmic transformation of the data corrected this skewness (see Appendix K). 
Data for difference in employee coverage in performance-pay schemes was initially assessed 
for normality of distribution and found to be normal, however due to large numbers of outliers 
(see 9.2.1.3) the data was not suitable for a paired-samples t-test.  Instead a Wilcoxon signed-
rank test was used being far less affected by outliers than the paired-samples t-test because it 
tests medians rather than means (Laerd, 2015g).  However, a requirement of the Wilcoxon 
signed-rank test is that the shape of the distribution of the differences must be symmetrical 
(Ibid.). Symmetricity was assessed by histogram and found to be adequate for the Wilcoxon 
signed-rank test (Appendix L). 
6.2.1.3 Outliers 
The absence of significant outliers among the independent variable observations is a 
requirement of the paired-samples t-test (Laerd, 2015f).  The presence of outliers in pay 
dispersion data was assessed by box-plot. Two outliers (more than 1.5 times the inter-quartile 
range from the upper quartile) and four extreme outliers (more than 3 times the inter-quartile 
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range from the upper quartile) were identified by SPSS. A box-plot of logarithmically 
transformed data showed an absence of outliers (Appendix K).  
6.2.2 McNemar’s test 
The majority of the results presented in this chapter are results of McNemar’s tests carried out 
to establish differences in pay practice selection between groups within organisations.  The test 
starts with the assumption that the proportion of non-selections will be equal between different 
groups and then compares this assumed proportion with the actual observed figure.  A 
statistically significant difference in proportions (using the chi-squared χ2 measure) indicates that 
organisations select pay practices according to employee group and supports the proposition that 
pay will be configured with employment group.  In this chapter ‘McNemar’ or ‘McNemar’s 
test’ refers to the procedure defined by McNemar (1947) with continuity correction (Edwards, 
1948). 
The McNemar test assesses equality of (marginal) proportions (Laerd, 2015e).  In the tests 
computed for this study, this means that the test determines if there is a difference between the 
proportions of non-selection of each pay practice for the knowledge-based employment group 
and the job-based employment group. The null hypothesis is that the proportion of selections 
and non-selections of pay practice x will be equal across both the knowledge-based and job-
based employment groups.   
Table 6.3 McNemar test compares ‘discordant pairs’ 
Management & professional 
group 
Other employees group 
Not selected Selected 
Not selected A B 
Selected C D 
 
McNemar’s test tests this null hypothesis by comparing the ‘discordant pairs’ B and C in the 
cross-tabulation above (Table 6.3) where organisations have chosen to apply a pay practice to 
either management and professionals (C) or other employees (B) but not both groups.  If the 
proportions are unequal and statistically significant (using the chi-squared χ2 measure) then the 
null hypothesis is rejected in favour of the alternative hypothesis. In this case, the alternative 
hypothesis is that the proportion of selections and non-selections will not be equal across both 
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employment groups i.e. that organisations select different pay practices for different groups of 
employees. 
6.2.3 Paired-samples t-test 
Another statistical test used to produce results in this chapter is a paired samples t-test which is 
used specifically to determine if pay dispersion (measured as the range of salaries within each 
group) is different for knowledge-based employees compared to job-based employees.  The 
paired samples t-test is similar in principle to the McNemar test in that it compares differences 
between groups where the groups are related (in this case, they are within the same organisation).  
However, the test is parametric, as outlined above it assumes normality of distribution and is 
suitable for continuous data (in this case pounds sterling differences in salaries).  It also has a 
different starting assumption in that it compares the difference in observed means to zero.   If 
this is statistically significant (using the t-value measure), the indication is that pay dispersion 
levels are different for the different employment groups.   
6.2.4 Wilcoxon signed-rank test 
The Wilcoxon signed-rank test was used to determine if there was a difference in median 
proportions of employees covered by variable performance-based reward schemes in 
organisations (% of employees).  This test is a non-parametric alternative to the paired samples 
t-test and does not require data to be normally distributed or to have an absence of outliers, as 
discussed above.  As the Wilcoxon signed rank test tests differences between medians rather 
means, outliers could be retained in the data set and a useful assessment made as to differences 
in proportions of knowledge-based and job-based employee groups being covered by variable 
pay schemes.      
In the following four sections of this chapter the results of the tests outlined above are reported.  
In all cases, interpretation of the data further determines if significant results support the 
hypothesised relationships between knowledge-based employment and algorithmic pay on one 
hand and job-based employment and experiential pay on the other. 
6.3 Job-based employment and experiential pay results 
This section details the results that support the first part of H5; that job-based employment is 
associated with experiential pay practices aimed largely at supporting the ‘acquisition’ of 
required human capital from the labour market (Youndt and Snell, 2004).  For each pay practice 
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the percentage of organisations in the survey selecting the pay practice is provided along with 
the McNemar’s test statistic and p value indicating statistical significance. 
6.3.1 Individual base pay 
If organisations were conforming to the theoretical model illustrated in Figure 6.1, it would be 
expected that pay for job-based employees would be managed through flexible pay 
arrangements such as individual pay rates or salaries that can flex to suit individual employee 
value and market comparisons.  And results show that 64.2% of organisations use individual 
base pay arrangements for job-based employees whereas a considerably smaller proportion, 
48.7%, use this practice for knowledge-based groups (McNemar statistic: χ2(1) = 28.986, p < 
.005).  This result supports the hypothesised association between experiential pay and job-based 
employment.         
6.3.2 Individual performance-related pay  
Pay progression driven by individual performance (IPRP) is classified as an experiential pay 
practice in the strategic pay model and therefore associated with job-based employment. And 
indeed 37.8% of organisations use this practice for their job-based employees compared to only 
15.9% for knowledge-based employee groups (McNemar test statistic: χ2(1) = 55.592 , p < 
.005).  This result indicates support for the hypothesis that organisations will select experiential 
pay practices for employees in job-based employment. 
6.3.3 Merit pay 
Merit pay, the consolidated increase in pay associated with individual merit, is widely used for 
both groups being selected by 60.3% of organisations for the knowledge-based employment 
group and 67.6% of organisations for their job-based groups.  However, the McNemar test result 
was significant χ2(1) = 14.7, p < .005 and demonstrated merit pay was more often selected for 
job-based employees.  
6.3.4 Market rates (pay determination) 
The strategic pay model predicts that in determining base pay rates and ranges, organisations 
will use market rates for job-based employees. The survey found that 34.8% of organisations 
used this method of pay determination for job-based employees while only 25.8% used it for 
knowledge-based employees (McNemar statistic: χ2(1) = 11.429, p < .005) demonstrating 
support for this hypothesis.  
183 
 
6.3.5 Movement in market rates (pay review) 
Similarly, the hypothetical model predicts market-driven pay reviews for job-based employees 
and 69.9% of organisations choose to base pay reviews for job-based employees on a movement 
in market rates compared to 59.9% for knowledge-based employee groups (McNemar test 
statistic: χ2(1) = 26.281 , p < .005).  Again, this indicates that a market pay approach, a key aspect 
of the experiential pay configuration, is used for job-based employee groups. 
6.3.6 Recruitment and retention issues (pay review) 
70.5% of organisations chose recruitment and retention issues as an important factor in 
reviewing base pay for job-based employee groups compared to 63.3% for knowledge-based 
employees. The McNemar test statistic was significant, χ2(1) = 12.250, p < .005 indicating that 
this factor was more relevant to pay reviews for job-based employees.  
6.3.7 Profit-sharing 
Profit-sharing is a staple of the strategic pay formula recommended by the new pay writers as a 
powerful lever in directing employee efforts at improving organisational performance (Lawler, 
1990; Schuster and Zingheim, 1992).  As such it is hypothesised that this key experiential pay 
practice will be selected more frequently for job-based employees and results confirm that this 
is the case.  83.4% of organisations use profit-sharing for job-based employee groups compared 
to 79.5% for knowledge workers (McNemar test statistic: χ2(1) = 4.654 , p = .031).   
The results above provide good support for H5 and there are a number of clear themes emerging 
from these findings.  First, the association of both individual pay rates / salaries to manage base 
pay and individual PRP with job-based employment points to an individualisation of pay for 
this group of employees.  Individual (rather than collective) pay systems and the use of 
individual performance-related pay decisions are very much a feature of the strategic, 
experiential pay model and the association between these practices and the job-based 
employment group is entirely consistent with the strategic pay model.  Second, it appears that 
market rates are a significant determinant of setting pay levels for job-based workers as well as 
in reviewing their pay.  That the market appears to drive pay for job-based groups rather than 
knowledge-based employees is logical if organisations are protecting their higher value 
knowledge workers from the vagaries of labour market volatility or stagnation in the internal 
labour market model consistent with a ‘make’ algorithmic model (Miles and Snow, 1984; 
Youndt and Snell, 2004) and conversely ‘buying’ job-based labour directly from the market.  
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Lastly, alongside the individualisation of base pay, results suggest that broad-based variable pay 
schemes such as profit-sharing are not only widespread among organisations but are selected 
significantly more often for job-based employees with more transferable human capital.   
However, there are a number of results that, according to the hypothesised model, should show 
an association between job-based employment and experiential practices but do not.  These non-
significant results suggest organisations do not differentiate between employment groups when 
selecting certain pay practices.  
6.3.8 Non-significant results 
Table 6.4 shows experiential pay practices for which McNemar tests showed no significant 
results for either job-based employment (as hypothesised) or knowledge-based employment.  
Figures in bold type indicate higher rates of selection and, despite lack of significance, there are 
actually slightly higher percentages of experiential pay practice selection for knowledge-based 
employees in the majority of cases.  But in terms of theorised associations between job-based 
employment and key aspects of the experiential pay model such as broadbanded pay structures, 
skills-based pay, market-driven pay progression and gainsharing there is no significant 
difference in the use of these practices between job- and knowledge-based employee groups. 
This suggests that if organisations choose to use these practices then they do so for both groups.  
Table 6.4 Non-significant results of McNemar tests for experiential pay practices 
Pay practice % organisations 
selecting for 
knowledge-based 
employees 
% organisations 
selecting for job-based 
employees 
McNemar test statistic  
χ2(1) 
Broadbanding 
 
25.5 21.5 3.361 
Job families 
 
18.2 19.2 0.129 
Skills-based pay 
 
41.1 40.7 0.000 
Market rates (base pay 
progression) 
 
56.3 53.3 1.255 
Individual cash 
incentives  
14.6 17.2 1.531 
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Gainsharing 
 
10.3 8.3 1.250 
Upper decile pay 
 
9.3 6.3 3.048 
Upper quartile pay 
 
15.2 20.9 0.973 
Note. * = p ≤ .05, ** = p ≥ .005, bold type = higher selection rate. 
 
6.4 Knowledge-based employment and algorithmic pay results 
The results for algorithmic pay practices examined in this section are theorised to be selected by 
organisations for application to their knowledge-based employees (those working as managers, 
technical and professional staff).   
6.4.1 Job evaluation (pay determination) 
Whereas pay determination for job-based employment groups has been found to be driven by 
market rates alone, it was hypothesised that for knowledge-based employment groups, more 
traditional job evaluation schemes would be used alongside market rates as a way of balancing 
internal and external equity considerations.  Of 302 participant organisations, 34.8% use job 
evaluation for knowledge-based groups as opposed to 25.8% for job-based workers.  The 
McNemar test statistic was significant χ2(1) = 20.485, p < .005 demonstrating a significant 
difference in the proportion of non-selections between groups and supporting the hypothesis that 
algorithmic pay practices will be selected for knowledge-based groups. 
6.4.2 Ability to pay (pay review) 
It was proposed that an algorithmic pay configuration would involve closer attention to 
controlling the cost of pay decisions although this logic was drawn predominantly from theories 
relating to the connection between low-road business strategies that sought to control operational 
costs generally. The theoretical reason for organisations using their ability to pay as a criterion 
for reviewing pay of knowledge workers is less clear, but the McNemar test provides evidence 
that this is the case.  84.1% of organisations used ability to pay in 2011 pay reviews compared 
to 80.1% for job-based employees.  Although seemingly a small difference, the McNemar test 
statistic was significant, χ2(1) = 4.321, p = .038, indicating that ability to pay as a pay review 
186 
 
criterion may well be related to knowledge-based employment as part of an algorithmic pay 
configuration. 
6.4.3 Sales commission 
Sales commission, an individual output-based pay scheme where employees receive a variable 
amount related to the value of products sold, is identified by new pay writers as a traditional, 
algorithmic form of incentive (Lawler, 1990).  It is used by 26.8% of organisations for their 
knowledge-based employees compared to 20.5% for job-based employees (McNemar test 
statistic: χ2(1) = 5.891, p = .015).  This result suggests commission is used more extensively for 
employees in the knowledge-based employment group. 
6.4.4 High pay dispersion 
According to the hypothesis, knowledge-based employment groups will conform to the 
algorithmic pay system with high pay dispersion evident in comparison to job-based 
employment groups that should have lower pay dispersion. 
A paired-samples t-test was used to determine whether there was a statistically significant mean 
difference between the pay dispersion of the knowledge-based employee group compared to the 
job-based employee group. Data are mean ± standard deviation, unless otherwise stated.   
As discussed in sections 6.2.1.2 and 6.2.1.3, the assumption of normality was violated as the 
data was positively skewed and six outliers were detected.  In order to assess whether or not 
either the outliers and/or violation of normality were having an appreciable effect on the analysis, 
tests were rerun (Laerd, 2015f). In the first re-test, pay dispersion data distribution was 
normalised through logarithmic transformation (Laerd, 2015d).  In the second re-test, the six 
outlier cases were removed from the data-set.  Neither of the rerun tests showed markedly 
different results from the original in terms of statistical significance or effect size indicating that 
results were not appreciably affected by either the outliers or violation of normality, therefore it 
was decided the original paired-samples t-test results were valid and would be reported (see 
Appendix K for test results for normality and outliers, and paired-samples t-test results for 
logarithmically transformed data with outliers removed).       
Results showed that organisations (N=88) had higher pay dispersion for the knowledge-based 
employment group with a mean difference between the highest and lowest paid of £114,803 (± 
£113,838). The job-based employment group had a mean difference of just £24,424 (± £31,945) 
between the lowest and highest paid. There was a statistically significant increase of £90,378 
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(95% CI, 68,018 to 112,739), t(87) = 8.034, p < .005, d = 0.86, classified as a large effect 
(Cohen, 1988; Rosenthal, 1996). 
This result indicates that pay dispersion is greater within knowledge-based groups of employees 
providing support for the hypothesised relationship between knowledge-based work and high 
pay dispersion.    
Results examined in this section so far indicate some reasonable support for H5; knowledge-
based employment is associated with traditional pay practices such as job evaluation and sales 
commission alongside characteristics of algorithmic pay configurations such as high pay 
dispersion between the highest and lowest paid employees, and an emphasis on salary control.  
However, given the range of different algorithmic pay practices this is a fairly limited selection.  
There are many more results for algorithmic pay practices that, according to the hypothesised 
model, should show an association with knowledge-based employment but do not.  These non-
significant results suggest organisations do not differentiate between employment groups when 
selecting certain pay practices.  
6.4.5 Non-significant results 
The results in Table 6.5 show the algorithmic pay practices that have no statistically significant 
relationship with either knowledge-based employment or job-based employment. Figures in 
bold type indicate the higher rate of selection between job- and knowledge-based groups and it 
is interesting to note that although none are statistically significant, there are higher percentages 
for the job-based employment group in all but two cases, perhaps indicating that some 
algorithmic practices are more commonly associated with job-based employment.  In addition, 
the p value for the difference in non-selections between employee groups for lower quartile pay 
positioning was just outside the acceptable cut off of 0.05 suggesting there could be a 
relationship between this pay practice and job-based employment. Additionally, the numbers of 
organisations positioning pay in the lower decile of the market and those using piece rates are 
very small indeed, which does not influence the validity of the test statistic, but clearly very small 
proportions might be more susceptible to sampling fluctuations (Hair et al., 2010).   
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Table 9.5 Non-significant results of McNemar tests for algorithmic pay practices 
Pay practice % organisations 
selecting for 
knowledge-based 
employees 
% organisations 
selecting for job-based 
employees 
McNemar test statistic  
χ2(1) 
Narrow-grading 17.2 20.5 1.761 
Ability to pay 
(determination) 
40.1 41.7 0.356 
Service-based pay 13.3 13.6 0.000 
Piece rates 0.7 1.7 0.571 
Median pay  59.3 58.3 0.78 
Lower quartile pay  4.6 8.0 3.375 
Lower decile pay  1.3 1.0 0.000 
Note. * = p ≤ .05, ** = p ≥ .005, bold type = higher selection rate. 
 
Taking these results at face value suggests that only the minority of algorithmic pay practices 
have any relationship with the knowledge-based employment group and, given the lack of 
significance found in McNemar tests for many algorithmic practices, there is only partial support 
for the hypothesis that organisations select algorithmic pay practices for knowledge-based 
employees. 
Findings examined so far in this chapter have focused on significant results that have provided 
support for H5, or for non-significant results.  The following two sections analyse significant 
results that are contrary to expected associations; first, where algorithmic pay practices have 
been found to be more commonly selected for job-based employment groups and, in the 
following section, where experiential pay practices have been selected for knowledge-based 
employment groups.  
6.5 Significant results counter to hypothesised associations - Job-
based employment and algorithmic pay  
A number of algorithmic pay practices that were hypothesised to be associated with knowledge-
based employment appear instead to be more commonly selected by organisations for their job-
189 
 
based employee groups.  This section will analyse these results and suggest potential 
explanations for these findings that are counter to the hypothesis. 
6.5.1 Pay spines 
Pay spines, a traditional method of managing base pay, with ascending incremental pay points 
and usually tied closely to job evaluation outcomes, was only selected by 5.0% of the 302 survey 
participants for the knowledge-based group (management and professionals) whereas 10.9% 
selected pay spines for the job-based employment group (other employees).  A McNemar's test 
determined that the difference in the proportion of non-selections between employment groups 
was statistically significant, χ2(1) = 9.031, p = .003.  This result is contrary to the hypothetical 
relationships between employment groups and pay configurations suggesting, that while 
organisations clearly differentiate between job- and knowledge-based employment groups in 
their selection of pay spines, they use them less frequently for knowledge workers. 
6.5.2 Collective bargaining 
Similarly, for the use of collective bargaining to determine pay levels, there was also a clear 
association with the job-based employment group. Whereas just 3.6% of organisations used 
collective bargaining for their management and professional employee group, over four times 
as many, 15.6%, selected this for the job-based group.  The McNemar test statistic was χ2(1) = 
25.521, p < .005 demonstrating a significant difference in the use of collective bargaining 
between groups.  
These two results support the hypothesis that organisations select pay practices according to 
employment group, but they provide direct evidence against algorithmic pay practices being 
solely used for knowledge-based employees.  The use of pay spines and collective bargaining 
for job-based employees suggests that some organisations may be using traditional, algorithmic 
methods for these employees to determine and manage base pay. However, the percentages for 
both pay spines and collective bargaining are small for both groups and therefore the results may 
be more susceptible to sampling variations (Hair et al., 2010).   
6.6 Significant results counter to hypothesised associations - 
Knowledge-based employment and experiential pay  
In addition to the algorithmic pay practices found to be associated with the job-based 
employment group, there were a number of experiential pay practices that were found to be 
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more commonly used for knowledge-based employees instead of job-based employee groups.  
This section will analyse these results and suggest potential explanations for these findings that, 
similar to those in the previous section, are counter to the hypothesis. 
6.6.1 Competency pay 
The majority of organisations use competencies as criteria for base pay progression for the 
knowledge-based employee group (48.3%) as opposed to the job-based employee group 
(38.1%).  The McNemar test statistic was significant, χ2(1) = 19.149, p < .005, indicating an 
association between this experiential pay practice and the knowledge-based employment group.  
The reason for this contrary finding is perhaps easy enough to explain and highlights some of 
the inconsistencies in the configurational classifications of make / buy, algorithmic / experiential.  
The sort of work knowledge workers perform requires the development and expression of 
competencies to a greater extent than is required for other types of work (Lawler, 1990; Lepak 
and Snell, 2002) and so rewarding these competencies through base pay progression would be 
a logical way for organisations to encourage and support these behaviours.   
6.6.2 Employee value / retention (pay progression) 
Many more organisations (59.9%) make base pay progression decisions based on an assessment 
of an employee’s potential, value and / or the likelihood of retention for knowledge-based 
employee groups, compared to job-based employee groups (34.1%).  The McNemar test 
statistic was significant χ2(1) = 60.052, p < .005.  This result suggests support for the theory that 
the human capital of knowledge workers is of greater value to organisations than that of job-
based employees (Lepak and Snell, 2002) and will be rewarded accordingly.  But it does not fit 
with the proposition that pay for employees in the knowledge-based employment group should 
be aligned with a ‘make’ / algorithmic configuration that downplays the value of the individual.      
6.6.3 Combination performance-related-pay schemes 
Combination schemes, where the award depends on a mix of individual, group and/or 
organisational performance, are more likely to be used for knowledge-based employees (32.5%) 
than job-based employees (22.5%).  The McNemar statistic was χ2(1) = 18.283, p < .005.  
Again, this result indicates that organisations use experiential pay practices for employees 
working in the knowledge-based employment group rather than the job-based group as 
hypothesised.   
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6.6.4 Individual bonus 
Individual bonuses are also associated with knowledge-based employment, with 44.4% of 
organisations selecting them for knowledge-based employees compared to just 28.5% for job-
based employees (McNemar: χ2(1) = 35.629, p < .005).  Both this practice and the combination 
performance-related scheme result above suggest that organisations seek to share the risk of 
performance with this group of employees to a greater extent than with job-based groups.  On 
the one hand it makes sense that managers, technical and professional staff who can influence 
organisational performance more than those in roles that have less direct influence (Lepak and 
Snell, 2002) will share the both the benefits of success and risks of poor performance to a higher 
degree than their colleagues.  However, pay variability is a key tenet of the strategic, experiential 
pay model and is not consistent with the low-risk sharing, algorithmic pay configuration. This 
result is contrary to the theory that these practices are used more commonly for knowledge-
based workers.   
6.6.5 Goal-sharing 
Another key proposition of the strategic pay model is that group-based incentives, as opposed 
to individual schemes alone, would be more effective in encouraging creative collaborative 
behaviours that improve organisational performance (Lawler, 1990).  As such, group-based 
performance-related reward schemes such as goal-sharing, where group bonuses are paid based 
on group/sub-unit/team achievement of specific group performance objectives, are hypothesised 
to be part of the experiential framework of pay practices utilised for job-based employees.  
However, 24.5% of organisations use goal-sharing schemes for knowledge-based employee 
groups compared to 17.6% for job-based groups with a significant McNemar statistic of χ2(1) = 
13.793, p < .005.  Once again, this result suggests that some experiential pay practices are being 
used more commonly for knowledge-based workers rather than job-based employees. 
6.6.6 Extensive employee coverage of PRR schemes 
A Wilcoxon sign-rank test was used to determine if there was a statistically significant difference 
in median proportions of each employee group covered by performance-related reward 
schemes.  Higher proportions of employees in variable, performance-based schemes would be 
expected in experiential pay configurations where organisations are sharing the benefit and/or 
risk of organisational success with employees.  According to the hypothesis, it would be 
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expected that the job-based employee group would have a higher median proportion of 
employees covered by such schemes.  
Of the 220 participants responding to this question, there was no difference between proportions 
of knowledge-based employees and proportions of job-based employees being covered by 
variable pay schemes in 109 cases. In 25 cases the proportion of employee coverage was higher 
for job-based employees and in 86 cases it was higher for knowledge-based employees. The 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test determined that there was a statistically significant median difference 
in variable pay scheme coverage between the knowledge-based employment group (100%) and 
the job-based group (80%), z = -4.626, p < .005.  This result indicates that there are greater 
proportions of knowledge-based employees included in variable performance-based reward 
schemes than job-based employees and is consistent with findings above for the greater use of 
combination, bonus and goal-sharing schemes among knowledge-based employee groups.  
From the results outlined above it is clear that organisations do appear to be choosing 
experiential pay practices for employees working in the knowledge-based employment group 
when it comes to making choices about the criteria for progressing base pay through pay grades 
/ bands and in variable pay schemes linked to performance. This finding is in direct opposition 
to the H5 proposition that experiential pay practices will be selected for job-based employee 
groups rather than knowledge-based groups.  In explaining why these particular experiential pay 
practices are being used for knowledge-based employees, there appear to be some fairly logical 
arguments as to why organisations might choose to treat this group of employees differently.  
Using competencies and an assessment of employee potential / value to progress base pay 
increments for managers and technical / professional staff is very much in line with the view of 
these groups as valuable core employees who possess unique human capital attributes which the 
organisation wishes to encourage and retain (Lepak and Snell, 2002).  Given that organisations 
may assume this unique human capital will contribute directly to organisational strategic 
objectives, sharing the financial benefits (or the risk) with employees who have the most 
influence on organisational performance is also a good way of incentivising and retaining them.  
Therefore, using bonuses, group and combination performance schemes may be expected for 
this group.  The finding that greater proportions of knowledge-based employees are covered by 
variable pay schemes also suggests these experiential pay practices are targeted at this group.  
Taken together then, there has to be a question over whether these results indicate that the 
proposed experiential / algorithmic pay configurations are adequately capturing the nuances of 
organisational decision-making on pay for different groups of employees.   
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6.7 Summary of results and key findings 
The full list of results of tests conducted to establish support for hypothesised associations 
between pay configurations and employment group are listed in Tables 6.6 to 6.9.  There are 
some key themes that emerge from considering the results as a whole.  First, while there are 
results for certain pay practices that support the hypothesis, overall there is little support for the 
proposition that organisations select an experiential pay configuration for job-based 
employment group and an algorithmic pay configuration for knowledge-based employment 
group.  Tables 6.6, 6.7, 6.8 and 6.9 show the nine practices that do conform to the hypothetical 
model (indicated by a ‘Y’ in the final column).  Individualised base pay management and IPRP, 
market-driven pay setting and reviews and profit-sharing are selected in significantly greater 
proportions for employees working in the job-based employment group whereas job evaluation, 
commission, high pay dispersion between the highest and lowest paid, and pay reviews based 
on the organisation’s ability to pay are selected in greater proportions for employees in the 
knowledge-based employment group.   In pay practice selection for job-based groups there does 
appear to be a somewhat co-ordinated approach; there are practices that emphasise both 
individualisation and market-based pay for example but also those that give less emphasis to 
variable pay and are more traditional (collective bargaining and pay spines).  It is more difficult 
to discern a coherent pattern in the pay practices selected for knowledge-based workers, but 
there appears to be an emphasis on internal equity, rewarding individual value and behaviours 
and greater pay variability.  Overall though, there is very little evidence that organisations select 
only algorithmic practices for their managers, technical and professional staff and only 
experiential practices for their administrative, trades, production, sales and service staff.  
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Table6.6 Summary of results for McNemar tests for differences in experiential pay practice selection according to 
employment group 
Pay policy 
area 
Experiential pay 
practice 
Organisations selecting for 
employment groups 
(N=302) 
 
χ2(1) H5 support 
Base pay 
management / 
structures 
Broadbanding Both  
Job-based 
Knowledge-based 
Neither 
53 
12 
24 
213 
 
3.361 N 
 Job families Both  
Job-based 
Knowledge-based 
Neither 
41 
17 
14 
230 
 
0.129 N 
 Individual base pay Both  
Job-based 
Knowledge-based 
Neither 
134 
60 
13 
95 
 
28.986** Y 
Pay level 
determination 
Market rates Both  
Job-based 
Knowledge-based 
Neither 
197 
28 
7 
70 
 
11.429** Y 
Base pay 
progression 
criteria 
Individual 
performance 
Both  
Job-based 
Knowledge-based 
Neither 
43 
71 
5 
183 
 
55.592** Y 
 Competencies Both  
Job-based 
Knowledge-based 
Neither 
107 
8 
39 
148 
 
19.149** N 
 Skills Both  
Job-based 
Knowledge-based 
Neither 
96 
27 
28 
151 
 
0.000 N 
 Market rates Both  
Job-based 
Knowledge-based 
Neither 
140 
21 
30 
111 
 
1.255 N 
Pay review 
factors 
Employee value / 
retention 
Both  
Job-based 
Knowledge-based 
Neither 
99 
4 
73 
126 
 
60.052** N 
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Pay policy 
area 
Experiential pay 
practice 
Organisations selecting for 
employment groups 
(N=302) 
 
χ2(1) H5 support 
 Movement in 
market rates 
Both  
Job-based 
Knowledge-based 
Neither 
180 
31 
1 
90 
 
26.281** Y 
 Recruitment & 
retention 
Both  
Job-based 
Knowledge-based 
Neither 
 
184 
29 
7 
82 
12.250** Y 
Individual 
variable pay 
Combination 
schemes 
Both  
Job-based 
Knowledge-based 
Neither 
60 
8 
38 
196 
 
18.283** N 
 Individual bonus Both  
Job-based 
Knowledge-based 
Neither 
79 
7 
55 
161 
 
35.629** N 
 Individual cash 
incentives 
Both  
Job-based 
Knowledge-based 
Neither 
32 
20 
12 
238 
 
1.531 N 
 Merit pay rises Both  
Job-based 
Knowledge-based 
Neither 
178 
26 
4 
94 
 
14.700** Y 
Group PRR Gainsharing Both  
Job-based 
Knowledge-based 
Neither 
18 
7 
13 
263 
 
1.250 N 
 Goal-sharing Both  
Job-based 
Knowledge-based 
Neither 
49 
4 
25 
224 
 
13.793** N 
 Profit-sharing Both  
Job-based 
Knowledge-based 
Neither 
233 
19 
7 
43 
 
4.654* Y 
Market 
positioning of 
pay 
Upper decile market 
pay 
Both  
Job-based 
Knowledge-based 
Neither 
13 
6 
15 
268 
 
3.048 N 
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Pay policy 
area 
Experiential pay 
practice 
Organisations selecting for 
employment groups 
(N=302) 
 
χ2(1) H5 support 
 Upper quartile 
market pay 
Both  
Job-based 
Knowledge-based 
Neither 
24 
15 
22 
241 
0.973 N 
Note. * = p ≤ .05, ** = p ≥ .005;  χ2 = chi square statistic, (1) = degrees of freedom, N = no, Y = yes. 
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Table6.7 Summary of results of McNemar tests for differences in algorithmic pay practice selection according to 
employment group. 
Pay policy 
area 
Algorithmic pay 
practices 
Organisations selecting for 
each employment group 
(N=302) 
 
χ2(1) H5 support 
Base pay 
management / 
structures 
Narrow-grading Both  
Job-based 
Knowledge-based 
Neither 
34 
28 
18 
222 
 
1.761 N 
 Pay spines Both  
Job-based 
Knowledge-based 
Neither 
8 
25 
7 
262 
 
9.031* N 
Pay level 
determination 
Job evaluation Both  
Job-based 
Knowledge-based 
Neither 
75 
3 
30 
194 
 
20.485** Y 
 Collective 
bargaining 
Both  
Job-based 
Knowledge-based 
Neither 
5 
42 
6 
249 
 
25.521** N 
 Ability to pay Both  
Job-based 
Knowledge-based 
Neither 
101 
25 
20 
156 
 
0.356 N 
Base pay 
progression 
criteria 
Length of service Both  
Job-based 
Knowledge-based 
Neither 
23 
18 
17 
244 
 
0.000 N 
Pay review 
factors 
Ability to pay Both  
Job-based 
Knowledge-based 
Neither 
234 
8 
20 
40 
 
4.321* Y 
Individual 
variable pay 
Piece rates Both  
Job-based 
Knowledge-based 
Neither 
0 
5 
2 
295 
 
0.571 N 
 Sales commission Both  
Job-based 
Knowledge-based 
Neither 
44 
18 
37 
203 
5.891* Y 
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Pay policy 
area 
Algorithmic pay 
practices 
Organisations selecting for 
each employment group 
(N=302) 
 
χ2(1) H5 support 
Market 
positioning of 
pay 
Median market pay Both  
Job-based 
Knowledge-based 
Neither 
152 
24 
27 
99 
 
0.078 N 
 Lower quartile 
market pay 
Both  
Job-based 
Knowledge-based 
Neither 
7 
17 
7 
271 
 
3.375 N 
 Lower decile 
market pay 
Both  
Job-based 
Knowledge-based 
Neither 
2 
1 
2 
297 
0.000 N 
Note. * = p ≤ .05, ** = p ≥ .005, N = no, Y = yes. 
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Table6.8 Summary of results of paired-samples t-test  
 Job-based  
employment group 
Knowledge-based 
employment group 
 
 H5 
support 
 M SD M SD t 
 
df  
Pay dispersion (£) 24,424 31,945 114,803 113,838 8.034** 87 
 
Y 
Note. Pay dispersion measured as £ range between highest and lowest salaries within each group,  
M = Mean, SD = Standard Deviation, t = t-test value, * = p ≤ .05, ** = p ≥ .005, N = no, Y = yes 
 
Table6.9 Summary of results of Wilcoxon signed rank test 
 Job-based 
employment group 
Knowledge-based 
employment group 
 
 H5 support 
 Mdn 
 
Mdn 
 
z  
Employees 
covered by 
variable pay 
schemes (%) 
80 
 
100 -4.626** N 
Note. Mdn = Median, z = z value, * = p ≤ .05, ** = p ≥ .005, N = no, Y = yes 
 
Another finding arising from this set of results is the clear indication that when using some pay 
practices, organisations do not treat employee groups markedly differently. The substantial 
number of non-significant results suggests that it is often the case that organisations selecting a 
pay practice will use it for employees regardless of which employment group they are working 
in.  This appears to be true for some ‘core’ algorithmic practices such as narrow-grading, piece 
rates and service-based pay as well as for ‘core’ experiential practices such as broadbanding, 
skills-based pay and gainsharing. It is also the case for market positioning of pay levels across 
the board; whether organisations choose to position their pay levels in the upper or lower 
quartile, upper or lower decile or at the median rate, if they do so for one group, they do so for 
both.  This may well be down to a number of factors.  A commitment to narrow-grading or 
service-based progression could be a legacy issue; it is what the organisation has always done 
and is retained either because it works well or there is no stomach for reform.  Adoption of 
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‘newer’ practices such as broadbanding, skills-based pay or gainsharing may well be a firm 
statement about doing things differently.   In both cases these practices seem to be ‘all or nothing’ 
policy decisions that imply wholesale implementation.  Similarly, market positioning of pay 
level appears to be consistently applied across employment groups implying an organisation-
wide policy perhaps in line with espoused values.  Another explanation might relate to the size 
of organisation; presumably organisations with fewer employees have no requirement for 
narrow-grading for example and so there are practical reasons for non-selection across both 
groups of workers.  Regardless of the reasons however, the finding that organisations do not 
differentiate employee groups in their use of some pay practices further undermines the 
proposition that pay will be configured algorithmically or experientially according to 
employment group.  
The third finding from these results is that, although the algorithmic / experiential pattern does 
not appear to be in evidence, in the majority of the tests conducted there was a significant 
difference in pay practice selection according to employment group.  All pay practices with 
significant results are detailed in Table 6.10 according to employment group.  The breakdown 
shows a mix of pay practices from both algorithmic and experiential configurations being 
applied for both employment groups.  There are results that are wholly contrary to expected 
selections based on the hypothesis but that nonetheless make logical sense; pay spines for job-
based employees and competencies for knowledge-based employees are two notable examples 
(see sections 6.5.1 and 6.6.1).   
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Table6.10 Results for pay practices associated with employment groups 
 Job-based employment group Knowledge-based employment 
group 
Base pay management / 
structures 
Pay spines  
 Individual base pay arrangements 
 
 
Pay level determination Market rates  
 
Market rates with job evaluation 
 Collective bargaining 
 
 
Base pay progression 
criteria 
Individual PRP 
 
Competency pay 
 
  Employee value / retention 
 
Pay review factors Movement in market rates 
 
Ability to pay 
 Recruitment and retention 
 
 
   
Individual PRR Merit pay rises Individual bonus 
 
  Sales commission 
 
  Combination PRR schemes 
 
Group PRR Profit-sharing Goal-sharing 
 
Variable pay coverage Lower employee coverage Higher employee coverage 
 
Pay dispersion Lower pay dispersion Higher pay dispersion 
 
This chapter has tested the proposition that pay practice selection is dependent on workforce 
employment groups and, in summary, organisations do appear to select many pay practices 
according to the knowledge-based or job-based employment group of their employees.  
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However, there is no compelling evidence for associations between employment groups and 
experiential or algorithmic pay configurations. 
The next chapter brings together the various elements of the strategic pay model illustrated in 
Figure 6.1.  Chapter 7 reports the results of tests assessing the proposition that strategic pay 
practices have an effect on HR outcomes and furthermore that configurations of pay practices 
with strategy, employment group, organisation size and industry sector have an enhanced effect 
on HR performance. 
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Chapter 7:  The effect of strategic pay 
configurations on HR performance 
outcomes 
7.1 Chapter introduction 
This final results chapter reports and analyses results and findings associated with tests of the 
hypothesised relationship between strategic pay practices and human resource performance 
outcomes.  As in previous results chapters, this one opens with an explanation of the statistical 
procedures undertaken to test the hypothetical relationships highlighted in Figure 7.1.  This final 
phase of the strategic pay model proposes that organisations will ‘bundle’ pay practices and 
these bundles will have different effects on HR outcomes. These relationships have been framed 
as Hypotheses 1 and 2:  
H1.  HR performance outcomes will be positively related to experiential pay practices and 
negatively related to algorithmic pay practices. 
H2.  Organisations will bundle strategic pay practices and bundling will have an additive effect 
on HR performance outcomes. 
The following four hypotheses propose that aligning pay bundles with business strategy (H4), 
employment group (H6), industry sector (H8) and organisation size (H10) will have a further 
effect on the relationship between pay and HR performance outcomes: 
H4.  Alignment of strategic orientation and pay configuration will have a positive effect on HR 
performance outcomes. 
H6.  Alignment of employment group and pay configuration will have a positive effect on HR 
performance outcomes.   
H8.  Alignment of industry sector and pay configuration will have a positive effect on HR 
performance outcomes.   
H10. Alignment of organisation size and pay configuration will have a positive effect on HR 
performance outcomes. 
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HR performance outcomes have been operationalised as a scale score based on seven distinct 
items relating to employee relations climate, labour productivity compared with competitors, 
labour productivity compared to three years previously, employee absenteeism, employee 
attraction, employee retention and pay discontent (see Chapter 4, for full details).  The 
hypothetical strategic pay configurations, ‘experiential’ and ‘algorithmic’ are delineated in Table 
7.1 below. 
 
Figure 7.1 Hypothesised associations between strategic pay configurations and HR performance outcomes. 
 
  
Algorithmic pay 
HR 
performance 
outcomes 
H1, H2,  
H4, H6, H8, H10 
Industry sector 
Business 
strategy 
Organisation 
size 
Job-based 
employment 
mode 
H3 
H5 
H9 
H7 
Experiential pay 
Knowledge 
employment 
mode 
Manufacturing & 
Production 
Service sector 
Low-road 
High-road 
Large 
SME 
H5 
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Table7.1 Experiential and algorithmic pay configurations  
Experiential pay Algorithmic pay 
Broadbanding or job family structures Narrow-graded pay structures or pay spines 
Low vertical pay dispersion High vertical pay dispersion 
Above market pay (upper quartile or upper decile of 
market) 
 
At or below market pay (median, lower 
quartile or lower decile of market) 
Organisation’s ‘ability to pay’ for pay setting 
and reviews 
Market rates to determine pay *  
Market rates to progress pay 
Movement in market rates, and recruitment and 
retention as pay review factors 
Job evaluation to determine pay* 
Performance, skills, competencies or employee value 
/ retention as criteria for pay progression 
Length of service as a criterion for pay 
progression 
Individual base pay rates / salaries Collective bargaining 
Combination (org./group/indiv.) performance pay 
schemes 
Individual bonus / cash incentives 
Merit pay  
Gainsharing 
Goal-sharing 
Profit-sharing 
Piece rates 
Sales commission 
 
Long-term pay (share schemes / LTIs) No long-term pay (no share schemes / LTIs) 
Open pay  Pay secrecy 
Notes. 1) * Q6 of the CIPD Reward Management Survey (Appendix B) asked which factor is most important in 
determining pay. CIPD questions were: ‘market rates (with JE)’ or ‘market rates (without JE)’ therefore when 
testing for the variable ‘job evaluation’ ‘market rates (with JE)’ was used.    
2) The data for pay practice ‘employee coverage of PRR schemes’ was collected separately for employment groups 
and therefore was not suitable for testing in this testing phase. 
3) The data for pay practice ‘PRR schemes’ was not included as a separate practice in this testing phase because, on 
the questionnaire it acted as a ‘gateway’ question to further questions on types of PRR scheme and could have 
adversely effected the cluster analysis results. 
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7.2 Data analysis 
In order to test the hypotheses detailed in the previous section, three different sets of statistical 
tests were performed.  First, linear regression analysis was used to test the universalistic 
proposition, H1, that there would be relationships between pay practices and HR performance 
outcomes.  Second, in order to test the first part of H2 that organisations will ‘bundle’ pay 
practices, a cluster analysis was performed to identify pay bundles.  Using the results of the 
cluster analysis, the final set of statistical tests used hierarchical multiple regression analysis to 
test the second part of H2 that bundles of pay will have additive effects of HR performance 
outcomes.  These tests also assessed whether, when configured with pay bundles, organisational 
contingencies, strategic orientation (H4), employment group (H6), industry sector (H8) and 
organisation size (H10) would have further effects on HR performance.  These tests were chosen 
for suitability in terms of the study design and types of data collected.  Each type of test and 
associated assumptions are considered below. 
7.2.1 Linear regression analysis 
Linear regression analysis (also referred to as simple linear regression) was used to test H1 - HR 
performance outcomes will be positively related to experiential pay practices and negatively 
related to algorithmic pay practices.   In this series of tests, the HR outcomes score was the 
dependent variable in all cases while each of the pay practices in Table 7.1 were the independent 
variables tested one by one.  All pay practices were dichotomous (selected / not selected) except 
for pay secrecy and pay dispersion which were both continuous scale data.  Pay data was for 
either or both employment groups.  If H1 was true it would be expected that the HR performance 
outcomes score would significantly increase in cases where experiential pay practices were 
present and decrease where algorithmic pay practices were used. 
7.2.2 Cluster analysis 
To test the first part of H2, that organisations will ‘bundle’ pay practices, a cluster analysis was 
performed.  This was done as an alternative to straightforward adoption of the experiential / 
algorithmic pay configurations because empirical evidence from data analysis reported in 
previous chapters indicated potential alternative combinations (see Tables 5.26 and 6.10).  
Cluster analysis is an exploratory multivariate method which classifies cases or variables into a 
number of different groups so that similar objects are placed in the same group (Cornish, 2007).  
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Hair et al. (2010) stress the importance of underpinning theoretical connections between the 
objects being grouped, in this case pay practices.  This is because cluster analysis has no 
mechanism for differentiating the relevance of connections (Cornish, 2007).  There is good 
theoretical support for pay practices being used in bundles (Prince et al., 2016) and the strategic 
pay framework developed a priori provides a sound argument for organisations selecting 
patterns of pay practices based on encouraging role behaviours aligned to support of 
organisational contingencies.  Because cluster analysis is an exploratory technique it does not 
specify the number of clusters to be formed (Hair et al., 2010).   
In deciding the procedures for cluster analysis, sample size, the binary nature of the data and the 
objective of seeking connections between variables (rather than cases) determined which 
options were selected.  Pay practices were entered into the cluster analysis as binary variables.  
The procedure followed for forming clusters was hierarchical with an agglomerative method in 
which each observation begins as a single cluster and is successively joined to the next most 
similar cluster, forming progressively fewer clusters (Ibid.; Norusis, 2012).  The clustering 
algorithm used was Ward’s method (with squared Euclidean distance) where the mean for each 
cluster is calculated and then the distance to the next cluster mean is calculated.  At each step of 
the procedure, the two clusters that are joined to form a new cluster are those that result in the 
smallest increase in the overall sum of the squared within-cluster distances (Norusis, 2012).  For 
the pay practices being clustered in this analysis the coefficients used as measures of similarity 
relate to their selection (1) or non-selection (0) by organisations responding to the survey.  This 
means, in short, that the cluster analysis is seeking to group pay practices with similar selection 
profiles.  The results of cluster analysis will therefore group together pay practices with similar 
rates of selection, but the analysis cannot determine if the same pay practices are being selected 
by the same organisations which is a clear limitation.  This means that a) the ‘bundles’ identified 
by the analysis must have clear theoretical support in terms of their associations and b) the 
bundles can only be a suggested pattern of pay practice usage. 
7.2.3 Hierarchical multiple regression analyses 
Hierarchical multiple regression analysis is a form of linear regression that allows understanding 
of the unique contribution of different independent variables in predicting the dependent variable 
(Hair et al., 2010).  In this study, hierarchical multiple regression analysis was used to test 
whether the bundles of pay practices emerging from the cluster analysis had an effect on HR 
outcomes and if strategy, size and sector had an additive effect on this relationship.  For each 
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pay bundle identified by cluster analysis, two hierarchical regression analyses were run; one 
using pay practices for knowledge-based employees and one for job-based employees.  In both 
cases the HR performance outcome scale was the dependent variable.  First, pay practice 
bundles were entered into the multiple regression analysis to test the relationship between 
bundled pay and HR outcomes (H2); next, predictor variables size and sector were added to the 
model to test their effect on HR outcomes in addition to pay practices (H8 and H10); and finally, 
the two strategy scores, high-road and low-road, were entered into the model to test their additive 
effect on HR outcomes in combination with the pay bundles, size and sector (H4).  H6, that pay 
practices aligned with employment group will have a positive effect on HR performance 
outcomes, was tested by comparing results for each different pay bundle for the two 
employment groups, knowledge-based and job-based. 
7.2.4 Assumptions 
Both simple linear regression and hierarchical multiple regression analyses have certain data 
requirements that must be met in order to gain accurate and valid results. Table 7.2 summarises 
these assumptions and demonstrates how the data were tested in this study to ensure these 
requirements were met.  Cluster analysis does not have the same assumption requirements as 
the regression analyses, but in the following sections, where relevant, procedures for cluster 
analysis are referred to. 
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Table7.2 Summary of data assumptions for linear regression and hierarchical multiple regression. 
Statistical tests Assumption How met / tested 
Linear regression  
 
 
Multiple hierarchical regression 
 
One IV measured at the continuous 
or binary level 
 
One or more IVs measured at the 
continuous or binary level 
Pay practices* 
 
 
Pay practices*, sector*, size*, 
business strategy scores 
One DV measured at the 
continuous level 
HR outcomes score 
Independence of observations Study design 
Durbin-Watson test 
Linearity Scatterplot of studentised residuals 
by unstandardised predicted 
values+ 
Homoscedasticity Scatterplot of studentised residuals 
by unstandardised predicted 
values+ 
Normal distribution   Histogram, Normal P-P Plot, 
Normal Q-Q Plot, z-score for 
skewness 
No significant outliers Box plot, residual statistics / case 
diagnostics 
Note. *binary variables coded as dummy variables ‘0’ or ‘1’, + continuous variables only 
7.2.4.1  Data type 
For the simple linear regression and hierarchical multiple regression tests, continuous 
independent variables such as pay secrecy, pay dispersion, high-road business strategy and low-
road business strategy met the required data type following coding procedures described in 
Chapter 4.  Similarly, binary independent variables were suitable for regression as they had all 
been previously coded as ‘dummy’ variables i.e. with a ‘0’ or ‘1’ coding so that a difference in 
the HR outcomes score could be discerned from a one-unit change (0 to 1) in the independent 
variable(s).  In all of the regression tests the dependent variable was the continuous HR outcomes 
score scale. 
Only binary (‘1’ selected; ‘0’ not selected) variables were included in the cluster analysis as it is 
desirable for cluster analysis data to be in standard format (Hair et al., 2010). For pay dispersion 
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and pay secrecy this meant transforming the data from scale to categorical data to match the 
other dichotomous variables.  This was done for each scale by assigning ‘1’ to all values ≥ mean 
and ‘0’ for all values < mean.  
Therefore, all assumptions regarding data types for independent and dependent variables in 
regression analyses and cluster analysis were met. 
7.2.4.2  Independence of observations 
For the regression tests, there was independence of observations built into the study design and 
data collection / processing.  For example, an organisation could select or not select narrow-
grading, but not both; and they could be categorised as large or SME, but not both.  However, 
in order to ensure there was no violation of independence of observations due to autocorrelation 
(correlation arising from data processing procedures) the Durbin-Watson test was used.  The 
Durbin-Watson statistic should be approximately 2.0 for observations to be independent (Laerd, 
2015c) and this was the case for all of the regression tests reported in this chapter. 
Cluster analysis and the final groupings formed by the analysis can be influenced by the ordering 
of variables in the procedure. Therefore, the procedure was run a second and third time with 
different ordering, achieved by randomised selection of variables, to validate the stability of the 
cluster groupings (Hair et al., 2010). 
7.2.4.3  Linearity 
Linearity for both the simple regression and hierarchical multiple regression analyses was 
assessed by scatterplots of studentised residuals against unstandardised predicted values. This 
was done both collectively, in that the independent variables were linearly related to the 
dependent variable; and individually, that each continuous independent variable was linearly 
related to the dependent variable (Laerd, 2015c) (see Appendix M). 
7.2.4.4  Absence of multicollinearity 
The presence and extent of multicollinearity was ascertained through examination of 
Tolerance/variation inflation factors (VIF) values resulting from a regression analyses where 
each continuous independent variable (high-road strategy and low-road strategy) were treated 
as a dependent variable.  In both cases only extremely weak multicollinearity was detected; all 
tolerance values were > 0.1 with corresponding VIF values of < 10.0 (Appendix N) and 
therefore the assumption of absence of multicollinearity was met. 
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7.2.4.5  Homoscedasticity 
The assumption of homoscedasticity, that the residuals are equal for all values of the predicted 
dependent variable, was assessed by inspection of the same scatterplot of studentised residuals 
by unstandardised predicted values used to assess linearity.  Scatterplots of all tests indicated a 
fairly constant spread of data points and therefore homoscedasticity (Laerd, 2015c) (Appendix 
M). 
7.2.4.6  Normal distribution 
Normality of data distribution in the independent variables is a requirement of linear regression 
analysis (Hair et al., 2010).  Normality of the HR outcomes scale was initially assessed by 
Normal Q-Q plot and z-score for skewness ±2.58 (Laerd, 2015d) for the whole scale (i.e. prior 
to running any statistical tests).  Results indicated that the HR outcomes scale was not normally 
distributed; analysis of skewness showed that the scale was negatively skewed (z = -6.45). It 
was therefore decided to transform the HR outcomes scale data using ‘reflect and logarithmic’ 
transformation (Laerd, 2015d). The transformed data (referred to as the HR log scale) met all 
assumptions of normality (z score for skewness = 2.38) (Appendix O).  Subsequently, normality 
of distribution for each simple linear regression test and each hierarchical multiple regression 
test was assessed by inspection of histogram with super-imposed normal distribution curve and 
Normal P-P plot and in all cases the HR log scale data was approximately normally distributed 
(see Appendices P and Q). 
7.2.4.7  Outliers 
Box-plot analysis of the HR outcomes score scale showed there were nine outliers that could 
influence the outcomes of linear and hierarchical multiple regression tests, although there were 
no extreme outliers (see Appendix O).  The logarithmic transformation of the scale undertaken 
to correct the data skewness also eliminated the nine outliers.  Outlier cases within each test were 
identified using studentised residuals > ±3 SD (Hair et al., 2010).  No outliers were evident in 
simple linear regression tests with the HR log scales as dependent variable.  One outlier was 
identified in two hierarchical multiple regression tests; it was inspected but retained in the 
analysis.    
For regression tests, further unusual points were tested for. There were no high leverage points 
(i.e. data points with leverage values > 0.2) and no influential points (i.e. data points with Cook’s 
Distance values > 1.0) (Laerd, 2015c). 
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No outlier screening for cluster analysis was undertaken because of the binary nature of the data 
there were no ‘normal distributions’ to be calculated for each variable.   
7.2.5 Reporting test results 
Comparing regression test results for the original HR outcomes score scale and HR log scale 
there were only minor differences in significance levels, R2 values and F values indicating that 
neither the data distribution (discussed in 10.2.4.6) nor the outliers (10.2.4.7) had a substantive 
influence on results.  It was therefore decided to report both sets of results for the sake of clarity, 
particularly because the direction of logarithmic data is reversed so, counter-intuitively, negative 
values actually indicate an increase in the unstandardised B coefficient (HR score). 
7.3 Pay practices and HR outcomes 
Results of simple linear regression analyses with statistical significance are reported in this 
section; first for experiential pay practices, followed by those for algorithmic practices. 
7.3.1 Experiential pay 
7.3.1.1  Competency pay 
The selection of competency pay significantly predicted the HR outcome score (HR log), F(1, 
297) = 9.48, p ≤ .005 and accounted for 3.1% of the variation in HR outcomes, with adjusted R2 
= 2.8%. However, this is a very small effect size based on Cohen’s (1988) and Rosenthal’s 
(1996) classifications.  Using competencies as a criterion for pay progression positively 
increased HR performance outcomes by .140 (-.037 in HR log scale). Despite the small effect, 
this significant result supports the hypothetical positive relationship between a strategic pay 
practice and positive HR outcomes.  
7.3.1.2  Skills-based pay 
Similarly, the selection of skills as pay progression criteria base pay significantly predicted HR 
performance outcome score (HR log), F(1, 297) = 4.01, p ≤ .05 and accounted for 1.3% of the 
variation in HR performance outcomes, with adjusted R2 = 1.0%, again another very small effect 
size.  Nevertheless, using skills-based pay progression positively increased HR outcome scores 
by .087 (-.024 in HR log scale).   
7.3.1.3  Merit pay  
Results for merit pay, show a statistically significant prediction of HR performance outcome 
score (HR log), F(1, 297) = 5.10, p ≤ .05.  Merit pay accounted for 1.7% of the variation in HR 
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outcomes, with adjusted R2 = 1.4% and improved HR outcomes score by .096 (-.028 on HR log 
scale).   
7.3.1.4  Profit-sharing  
Regression results for the practice of profit-sharing also show a statistically significant positive 
relationship with HR outcomes (HR log) F(1, 297) = 7.34, p ≤ .05.  Profit-sharing accounted for 
2.4% of the variation in HR outcomes, with adjusted R2 = 2.1% and improved HR outcomes 
score by .141 (-.039 in HR log scale). 
7.3.1.5  Recruitment and retention issues (pay review) 
Finally, among experiential pay practices, using recruitment and retention as a pay review factor 
has a statistically significant association with HR outcomes (HR log) F(1, 297) = 14.82, p ≤ .005 
and accounted for 4.8% of the variation in HR outcomes, with adjusted R2 = 4.4%.  Determining 
pay reviews using recruitment and retention issues reduced HR outcomes score by -.183 (.047 
in HR log scale).   
Of all the linear regression results for separate experiential pay practices, pay reviews based on 
recruitment and retention needs is the only one that has a negative relationship with HR 
outcomes and does not support H1.  Results from the other four experiential pay practices 
reported in this section all have small but positive effects on HR performance outcomes.  An 
initial assessment of these results appears to indicate therefore that some experiential practices 
do have positive effects but not all of them; providing generally good support H1. 
7.3.2 Algorithmic pay  
7.3.2.1  Ability to pay (pay determination)  
Using the organisation’s ability to pay as a criterion for base pay determination also statistically 
significantly predicted HR performance outcomes score (HR log), F(1, 297) = 12.66, p ≤ .005 
and accounted for 4.1% of the variation in HR outcomes (adjusted R2 = 3.8%).  Basing pay on 
ability to pay decreased HR outcomes score by -.155 (.042 on HR log scale) providing further 
support for H1. 
7.3.2.2  Lower quartile and lower decile pay  
Positioning pay in the lower quartile and lower decile both significantly predicted HR outcomes 
scores (HR log); lower quartile, F(1, 297) = 14.61, p ≤ .005; lower decile, F(1, 297) = 4.10, p ≤ 
.05.  Lower quartile pay positioning accounted for 4.7% of the variation in HR outcomes 
(adjusted R2 = 4.4%) while lower decile pay positioning accounted for 1.4% of the variation in 
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HR outcomes (adjusted R2 = 1.0%).  Low pay positioning decreased HR outcome scores: by -
.282 for lower quartile (.074 on HR log scale) and by -.397 for lower decile (.095 on HR log 
scale).  These two results clearly support the H1 proposition that algorithmic pay practices will 
have an adverse effect on HR outcomes. 
7.3.2.3  Pay secrecy  
Finally, in this section, pay secrecy significantly predicted HR outcomes score (HR log), F(1, 
286) = 5.60, p ≤ .05 and accounted for 1.9% of the variation in HR outcomes (adjusted R2 = 
1.6%).  For every point increase on the 5-point pay secrecy scale, HR outcomes scores decreased 
by .051 (.014 on HR log scale).   
The results outlined in this section have provided reasonable support for H1, but these must be 
considered alongside the large number of non-significant results finding many experiential and 
algorithmic pay practices had no significant effect on HR outcomes (see Appendix R).  Indeed, 
the majority of pay practices do not appear, at least individually, to have a significant effect on 
HR performance which could suggest that the role of pay in influencing employee performance 
has been over-stated.  
Moreover, H1, and the resultant analysis, are limited to examining the association between 
specific pay practices and HR outcomes whereas the assumption evident in much of the strategic 
pay literature is that pay practices will be used in conjunction with one another in ‘bundles’ of 
practice.  This is the proposition of H2, that organisations will bundle strategic pay practices and 
this bundling will have an additive effect on HR performance outcomes. 
7.4 Identifying pay bundles 
In order to identify potential bundles a cluster analysis was run with dichotomous (selected / not 
selected) pay practice variables and the 302 respondent cases.  Because of the large amount of 
missing pay dispersion data, this variable was excluded from the final cluster analysis which 
therefore contained 34 pay practice variables.  Table 7.3 shows part of the agglomeration 
schedule resulting from the analysis.  In determining the final number of clusters in the model, 
Hair et al. (2010) recommend a cut-off point before the percentage increase in agglomeration 
coefficient shows a marked increase.  This is because the coefficient is a measure of similarity 
between variables with the largest numbers indicating greater dissimilarity.  Table 7.3 shows the 
average proportionate increase for the final 10 stages in the procedure (stages 24 to 33) is 8.3% 
and this served as a rough indicator in determining what constituted a marked increase in 
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dissimilarity (Ibid.).  On this basis, a three-cluster solution which occurred at the stage before a 
10.1% increase in heterogeneity appears to be a sensible cluster definition point (circled, Table 
7.3). 
Table7.3 Agglomeration schedule for hierarchical cluster analysis with Ward’s method of clustering and squared 
Euclidean distance measure 
Stage Cluster 1* Combined 
with cluster 
Coefficient** 
(Similarity 
measure) 
Difference 
from 
previous 
coefficient 
Proportion 
increase in 
heterogeneity 
No. of 
clusters after 
combining 
24 10 14 1048.9 64.7 6.6% 10 
 
25 7 18 1114.4 65.5 6.2% 9 
 
26 19 22 1185.8 71.4 6.4% 8 
 
27 2 31 1261.0 75.2 6.3% 7 
 
28 7 19 1338.7 77.7 6.2% 6 
 
29 5 10 1426.5 87.8 6.6% 5 
 
30 2 7 1518.7 92.2 6.5% 4 
 
31 5 11 1629.1 110.4 7.3% 3 
 
32 1 2 1793.1 164.0 10.1% 2 
 
33 1 5 2167.5 374.4 20.9% 1 
 
Note. *each number indicates a specific pay practice, **rounded to nearest 0.1, bold type signifies the stage at which 
a marked increase in dissimilarity, circle signifies the cluster solution number. 
 
Hair et al. (2010) emphasise the importance of a conceptual rationale for the clustering of groups 
in the analysis.  At a theoretical level, this study has developed a framework of two distinct pay 
bundles, experiential and algorithmic, although empirical work undertaken thus far has 
suggested there may be alternative groupings (see Table 5.26, Chapter 5 and Table 6.10, Chapter 
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6).  This provides a solid foundation for examination of the three-cluster solution resulting from 
the cluster analysis.  The diagrammatic representation of the cluster formations shows some 
familiar groupings despite the formation of three rather than two clusters (Figure 7.2).  
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Figure 7.2 Three pay practice cluster solution resulting from hierarchical cluster analysis 
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7.4.1 Pay bundle 1: Traditional pay 
Cluster 1, composed of 11 pay practices, is broadly similar to the algorithmic / traditional pay 
model including: base pay management using pay spines and narrow-grading; pay 
determination through collective bargaining; service-based pay and piece rates.  There are two 
pay practices in this cluster that are usually associated with experiential pay; gainsharing and job 
families.  If these pay practices are being used by the same organisations, which is speculative 
seeing that cluster analysis only gave an indication of association based on selection, it might 
indicate that organisations use hybrid pay structures with a narrow-graded structure super-
imposed on a pay spine or job family framework.  The connection between job families and 
higher pay levels would also give support to the use of internal-type pay systems which 
emphasise career development and both job and economic security (Delery and Doty, 1996).  
7.4.2 Pay bundle 2: Market / flexible pay 
The second cluster emerging from the three-cluster solution contains 14 pay practices and is 
broadly reflective of the strategic / experiential pay model.  It includes core experiential practices 
such as broadbanded pay structures, combination variable pay schemes (based on individual, 
group and organisation performance), share schemes / long-term incentives and a range of other 
flexible and variable pay practices.  Practices aimed at market-competitiveness are clearly in 
evidence from market-based pay determination and reviews as well as pay levels positioned at 
the market median.  Sales commission which has been classified as a more traditional pay 
practice is included in this bundle although it does have a pedigree as a long-standing variable 
pay practice.  However, job evaluation which has long been cast as the archetypal traditional 
algorithmic pay practice (Lawler, 1986; Risher, 1999) was also included.  Again, while the 
cluster analysis only gives a suggested association, it is noteworthy that both of these practices 
have been shown to be related to high-road strategy alongside experiential practices (see  
Chapter 5) indicating a relationship. 
7.4.3 Pay bundle 3: Individual / cost-driven pay 
The final pay practice cluster suggests a distinct set of pay practices from the experiential / 
algorithmic model.  This is the smallest cluster containing nine pay practices and there is a clear 
theme emerging from the types of variables included.  Five practices are explicitly related to 
individual forms of pay management and pay driven by individual contribution either in the 
form of IPRP or more input-based contributions such as skills and competencies.  Alongside the 
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emphasis on individual pay is the inclusion of both organisational ‘ability to pay’ variables, one 
relating to pay level determination and the other relating to pay reviews.  The other variable of 
note in this bundle is pay secrecy which could be seen as a logical fit with individualised pay 
arrangements as presumably organisations might wish to keep these, potentially iniquitous, 
arrangements confidential.  Together these variables indicate the possibility of fairly 
unstructured, closed pay arrangements; paying on an individual basis determined by what the 
organisation can afford.   
The three-cluster solution clearly indicates a different model from the dichotomous algorithmic 
/ experiential pay configuration hypothesised. However there remains a clear pattern of practices 
albeit spread over three rather than two clusters.  Moreover, those patterns are broadly reflective 
of both the traditional / algorithmic practices grouped together and market-driven, flexible / 
experiential practices grouped together.  While certain practices do not appear to conform to the 
original groupings, in broad terms there is evidence here for associations between practices that 
are in line with aspects of the theoretical model.  On this basis, it was decided to use these three 
bundles of pay practices to provide the framework for pay configurations, with the potential to 
interact with strategy, organisation size, industry sector and employment group to have a 
hypothesised effect on HR performance outcomes.   
The following section examines multiple hierarchical regression results for each of the pay 
configurations and covariates.       
7.5 Pay configurations, strategy, size, sector, employment group 
and HR performance outcomes 
7.5.1 Bundle 1: Traditional pay 
Two sets of hierarchical multiple regression analyses were run to determine if the addition of 
size and sector, and then strategy, improved the prediction of HR performance outcomes over 
and above traditional / algorithmic pay practices alone.  The first hierarchical multiple regression 
was run using pay practice data from the knowledge-based employment group (management 
and professional and technical employees); the second used pay practice data from the job-based 
employment group (other employees including administrative support, trades and production, 
sales and customer services staff). 
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7.5.1.1  Knowledge-based employment 
The first hierarchical multiple regression was run to determine if the addition of sector and size 
and then of high-road and low-road strategy scores improved the prediction of HR performance 
outcomes over and above traditional / algorithmic pay practices for knowledge-based 
employees.  See Table 7.4 for full details of each regression model.  The full model of traditional 
pay practices, sector, size and strategy to predict HR outcomes (Model 3, + Strategy) was 
statistically significant, R2 = .159, F(15, 232) = 2.933, p ≤ .005; adjusted R2 = .105. The addition 
of sector and size to the prediction of HR outcomes (Model 2, + Sector & Size) led to an increase 
in R2 of .016, F(2, 234) = 2.031, but this was not statistically significant p ≥ .05. The addition of 
strategy scores to the prediction of HR outcomes (Model 3, + Strategy) did however lead to a 
statistically significant increase in R2 of .062, F(2, 232) = 8.508, p ≤ .005.  These results indicate 
that neither sector nor size had an effect on the relationship between algorithmic pay practices 
and HR performance outcomes but that strategy, when added to other predictor variables, did 
have an effect on HR outcomes and with the addition of strategy into the model, size too had an 
effect. 
Only two predictor variables added significantly to the final regression model.  The use of pay 
spines for knowledge-based employees significantly reduced the HR performance outcome 
score by .425, p ≤ .005 whereas high-road strategy was associated with an increase in HR 
performance; for every one-unit increase in high-road strategy score there was a corresponding 
increase of .136 in the HR performance outcome score, p ≤ .005.  
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Table7.4 Hierarchical multiple regression predicting HR performance outcome scores from traditional pay 
practices for knowledge-based employees, by sector, size, high-road strategy and low-road strategy (N=248) 
 HR performance outcome score 
 Pay bundle 1 + Sector & Size + Strategy 
Variable B
 Blog B Blog B Blog 
(Constant) 2.462 .178 2.514 .164 2.224 .238 
Narrow-grading .023 -.009 .032 -.012 .023 -.010 
Job families -.030 .005 -.030 .004 -.030 .004 
Pay spines -.481** .120** 
-
.460** .114** 
-
.425** .104** 
Collective bargaining .102 -.038 .117 -.042 .111 -.040 
Service-based pay .040 -.011 .027 -.007 .027 -.007 
Piece rates .166 -.020 .105 -.004 .212 -.034 
Gainsharing -.080 .020 -.082 .021 -.113 .029 
Upper decile pay  .076 -.023 .073 -.022 .054 -.017 
Upper quartile pay  -.037 .006 -.033 .005 -.067 .014 
Lower quartile pay  -.232 .055 -.219 .051 -.184 .041 
Lower decile pay  .110 -.025 .105 -.024 .121 -.028 
Sector   -.029 .009 -.063 .018 
Size   -.094 .026 -.095 .025* 
High-road score     .136** -.037** 
Low-road score     -.044 .013 
R2 .082 .075 .098 .091 .159 .158 
F 1.919* 1.730 1.950* 1.810* 2.933** 2.913** 
∆ R2 .082 .075 .016 .017 .062 .067 
∆ F 1.919* 1.730 2.031 2.156 8.508** 9.252** 
Note. * = p ≤ .05, ** = p ≥ .005; B = unstandardised regression coefficient HR outcome score; Blog = unstandardised 
regression coefficient logarithmic transformed HR outcome score; ∆ = change. 
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7.5.1.2  Job-based employment 
A subsequent hierarchical multiple regression was run to determine if the addition of sector and 
size and then of high-road and low-road strategy scores improved the prediction of HR 
performance outcomes over and above traditional pay practices for job-based employees (see 
Table 7.5 for full details).  The full model of traditional pay practices, sector, size and strategy to 
predict HR outcomes (Model 3, + Strategy) was statistically significant, R2 = .162, F(11, 236) = 
2.984, p ≤ .005; adjusted R2 = .108. The addition of sector and size to the prediction of HR 
outcomes (Model 2, + Sector & Size) led to an increase in R2 of .021, F(2, 234) = 2.690, but this 
was not statistically significant p ≥ .05. The addition of strategy scores to the prediction of HR 
outcomes (Model 3, + Strategy) did however lead to a statistically significant increase in R2 of 
.057, F(2, 232) = 7.829, p ≤ .005.   
Similar to the results for knowledge-based employees, the R2 results for how well the data fits 
the model indicate that the addition of sector and size to the model does not significantly 
influence HR performance outcomes. However, examination of the model coefficients (see 
Table 7.5) suggests that size does contribute significantly to the model, with large organisations 
seeing a reduction of .107 in HR performance score, p ≤ .05.  Once again, high-road strategy, 
when added to the model, is responsible for an improvement in HR outcomes (a .134 increase 
in HR performance score for every one-unit increase in high-road strategy score).  The only pay 
practices that significantly contributed to the model are both to do with the positioning of pay in 
the market.  Upper decile pay was responsible for a .195 increase in HR performance scores (p 
= .070; HR log B = -.058, p ≤ .05) whereas lower quartile pay was responsible for a .195 
reduction in HR performance scores, p ≤ .05.   
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Table7.5 Hierarchical multiple regression predicting HR performance outcome scores from traditional pay 
practices for job-based employees, by sector, size, high-road strategy and low-road strategy (N=248) 
 HR performance outcome score 
 Pay bundle 1 + Sector & Size + Strategy 
Variable B
 Blog B Blog B Blog 
(Constant) 2.458 .177 2.511 .163 2.226 .241 
Narrow-grading .040 -.009 .047 -.011 .035 -.008 
Job families .004 -.001 .013 -.003 -.004 .002 
Pay spines .100 -.022 .115 -.026 .122 -.029 
Collective bargaining -.083 .020 -.037 .008 -.016 .002 
Service-based pay -.007 -.001 -.014 .001 .020 -.009 
Piece rates -.172 .041 -.159 .037 -.115 .025 
Gainsharing -.126 .035 -.117 .033 -.161 .045 
Upper decile .237* -.070* .240* -.070* .195 -.058* 
Upper quartile -.053 .012 -.039 .009 -.072 .018 
Lower quartile -.244* .064* -.243* .063* -.195* .050* 
Lower decile -.530 .106 -.530 .106 -.498 .097 
Sector   -.055 .014 -.087 .023 
Size   -.105* .028* -.107* .028* 
High-road score     .134** -.037** 
Low-road score     -.045 .013 
R2 .085 .080 .105 .101 .162 .164 
F 1.982* 1.874* 2.115* 2.019* 2.984** 3.032** 
∆ R2 .085 .080 .021 .021 .057 .063 
∆ F 1.982* 1.874* 2.690 2.672 7.829** 8.750** 
Note. * = p ≤ .05, ** = p ≥ .005; B = unstandardised regression coefficient HR outcome score; Blog = unstandardised 
regression coefficient logarithmic transformed HR outcome score; ∆ = change. 
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7.5.2 Bundle 2: Market / flexible pay 
The next set of hierarchical multiple regression analyses were run to determine the effect of pay 
bundle 2 practices, industry sector and organisation size and finally strategy, on HR performance 
outcomes.   
7.5.2.1  Knowledge-based employment 
The first hierarchical multiple regression in this set was run to determine if the addition of sector 
and size and then of high-road and low-road strategy scores improved the prediction of HR 
performance outcomes over and above market / flexible pay practices for knowledge-based 
employees (see Table 7.6 for full details of each regression model). The full model of traditional 
pay practices, sector, size and strategy to predict HR outcomes (Model 3, + Strategy) was 
statistically significant, R2 = .242, F(18, 229) = 4.055, p ≤ .0005; adjusted R2 = .182.  The 
addition of sector and size to the prediction of HR outcomes (Model 2, + Sector & Size) led to 
a statistically significant increase in R2 of .044, F(2, 231) = 6.109, p ≥ .005. The addition of 
strategy scores to the prediction of HR outcomes (Model 3, + Strategy) also led to a statistically 
significant increase in R2 of .067, F(2, 229) = 10.063, p ≤ .0005. 
A number of predictor variables added significantly to the final regression model.  The use of 
recruitment and retention as a pay review factor and sales commission for knowledge-based 
employees were associated with a reduction in HR performance outcomes (.211, p ≤ .0005; 
.147, p ≤ .05 respectively).  Merit pay and profit-sharing however were both associated with 
increased HR performance (.138, p ≤ .05; .146, p ≤ .05 respectively). Table 7.6 also shows that 
in the final regression model, the sector organisations operate within had a significant effect on 
HR outcomes with a .117 reduction in HR scores for manufacturing and production compared 
with those in private sector services, p ≤ .05.  Similarly, size of organisation also added 
significantly to the final regression model; large organisations having a .131 reduction in HR 
scores compared to SMEs, p ≤ .05.  High-road strategy and low-road strategy significantly 
contributed to the final regression model; for every one-unit increase in high-road score there 
was a .146 increase in HR outcome score, p ≤ .0005 whereas for every one unit increase in low-
road score there was a .078 reduction in HR outcome score, p = .063 (HR log B coefficient, p ≤ 
.05). 
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Table7.6 Hierarchical multiple regression predicting HR performance outcome scores from market / flexible pay 
practices for knowledge-based employees, by sector, size, high-road strategy and low-road strategy (N=248) 
 HR performance outcome score 
 Pay bundle 2 + Sector & Size + Strategy 
Variable B
 Blog B Blog B Blog 
(Constant) 2.392 .194 2.461 .176 2.322 .210 
Broadbanding .010 -.002 .039 -.010 .024 -.006 
Job evaluation .019 -.009 .037 -.013 -.022 .002 
Market rates (pay 
determination) 
.062 -.017 .076 -.021 .050 -.014 
Market rates (review) -.030 .007 -.034 .008 -.055 .014 
Recruit & retain 
(review) 
-
.184*** 
.047** -
.199*** 
.051*** -.211*** .054*** 
Combi PRR .002 -.002 .014 -.005 .013 -.005 
Commission -.097 .023 -.119* .028 -.147* .036* 
Merit pay .132* -.033* .144* -.037* .138* -.035* 
Individual bonus .045 -.015 .050 -.016 .026 -.010 
Individual cash 
incentives 
-.035 .007 -.057 .013 -.035 .007 
Goal-sharing .037 -.011 .039 -.012 .060 -.017 
Profit-sharing .164* -.041* .153* -.038* .146* -.036* 
Shares / LTI  schemes -.010 .007 .035 -.005 .023 -.002 
Median pay .016 .001 .018 .000 .018 .000 
Sector   -.084 .020 -.117* .029* 
Size   -.152** .040** -.131* .034* 
High-road score     .146*** -.039*** 
Low-road score     -.078 .022* 
R2 .131 .128 .175 .171 .242 .241 
F 2.518** 2.454** 3.063*** 2.968** 4.055*** 4.036*** 
∆ R2 .131 .128 .044 .042 .067 .070 
∆ F 2.518** 2.454** 6.109** 5.850** 10.063*** 10.611*** 
Note. * = p ≤ .05, ** = p ≤ .005, *** = p ≤ .0005; B = unstandardised regression coefficient HR outcome score; Blog 
= unstandardised regression coefficient logarithmic transformed HR outcome score; ∆ = change. 
 
7.5.2.2  Job-based employment 
Another hierarchical multiple regression was run to determine if the addition of sector and size 
and then of high-road and low-road strategy scores improved the prediction of HR performance 
outcomes over and above market / flexible pay practices for job-based employees.  See Table 
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7.7 for full details of each of the three regression models. The full model of experiential pay 
practices, sector, size and strategy to predict HR outcomes (Model 3, + Strategy) was statistically 
significant, R2 = .176, F(18, 229) = 2.719, p ≤ .0005; adjusted R2 = .111.  The addition of sector 
and size to the prediction of HR outcomes (Model 2, + Sector & Size) led to a statistically 
significant increase in R2 of .028, F(2, 231) = 3.661, p ≤ .05. The addition of strategy scores to 
the prediction of HR outcomes (Model 3, + Strategy) also led to a statistically significant 
increase in R2 of .049, F(2, 229) = 6.821, p  ≤ .0005.  These results clearly indicate that size, 
sector and strategy have an incremental additional effect with experiential pay practices on HR 
performance outcomes. 
Table 7.7 shows two predictor pay practice variables contributed significantly to the final 
regression model.  Similar to the results for knowledge-based employees, the use of recruitment 
and retention as a pay review factor for job-based employees was associated with a .162 
reduction in HR performance outcomes, p ≤ .005.  However, the selection of profit-sharing for 
employees in the job-based employment group was responsible for an increase of .149 in HR 
scores, p ≤ .05.  Size of organisation also added significantly to the final regression model; large 
organisations having a .113 reduction in HR scores compared to SMEs, p ≤ .05.  High-road 
strategy significantly contributed to the final regression model; for every one-unit increase in 
high-road score there was a .125 increase in HR outcome score, p ≤ .0005. 
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Table7.7 Hierarchical multiple regression predicting HR performance outcome scores from market / flexible pay 
practices for job-based employees, by sector, size, high-road strategy and low-road strategy (N=248) 
 HR performance outcome score 
 Pay bundle 2 + Sector & Size + Strategy 
Variable B
 Blog B Blog B Blog 
(Constant) 2.324 .210 2.393 .192 2.222 .236 
Broadbanding .021 -.006 .034 -.009 .015 -.004 
Job evaluation .081 -.026 .084 -.027 .036 -.014 
Market rates (pay 
determination) 
.088 -.024 .078 -.021 .047 -.013 
Market rates (review) -.021 .004 -.010 .001 -.028 .006 
Recruit & retain (review) -.141* .040* -.157* .044** -.162** .045** 
Combi PRR -.007 .000 -.010 .001 -.021 .004 
Commission .010 < .000 -.010 .005 -.028 .010 
Merit pay .084 -.024 .076 -.022 .063 -.018 
Individual bonus .069 -.019 .065 -.018 .075 -.020 
Individual cash incentives -.072 .017 -.071 .016 -.061 .014 
Goal-sharing .081 -.022 .077 -.021 .071 -.020 
Profit-sharing .146* -.037* .156* -.040* .149* -.038* 
Shares / LTI schemes -.006 .005 .033 -.006 .020 -.002 
Median pay .079 -.016 .080 -.016 .077 -.015 
Sector   -.056 .013 -.098 .024 
Size   -.126* .033* -.113* .030* 
High-road score     .125*** -.034*** 
Low-road score     -.055 .016 
R2 .099 .105 .127 .132 .176 .186 
F 1.835* 1.958* 2.100* 2.202* 2.719*** 2.902*** 
∆ R2 .099 .105 .028 .027 .049 .053 
∆ F 1.835* 1.958* 3.661* 3.609* 6.821** 7.505** 
Note. * = p ≤ .05, ** = p ≤ .005, *** = p ≤ .0005; B = unstandardised regression coefficient HR outcome score; Blog 
= unstandardised regression coefficient logarithmic transformed HR outcome score; ∆ = change. 
  
  
7.5.3 Bundle 3: Individual / cost-driven pay 
The final set of hierarchical multiple regression analyses were run to determine the effect of pay 
bundle 3 practices, industry sector and organisation size and strategy, on HR performance 
outcomes.   
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7.5.3.1 Knowledge-based employment 
Table 7.8 shows results for the first hierarchical regression analysis which was run to determine 
if the addition of sector and size and then of high-road and low-road strategy scores improved 
the prediction of HR performance outcomes over and above individual / cost-driven pay 
practices for knowledge-based employees.  The full model of individual / cost-driven pay 
practices, sector, size and strategy to predict HR outcomes (Model 3, + Strategy) was statistically 
significant, R2 = .147, F(13, 242) = 3.036, p ≤ .0005; adjusted R2 = .099.  The addition of sector 
and size to the prediction of HR outcomes (Model 2, + Sector & Size) led to a statistically 
significant increase in R2 of .038, F(2, 231) = 4.979, p ≥ .05. The addition of strategy scores to 
the prediction of HR outcomes (Model 3, + Strategy) also led to a statistically significant 
increase in R2 of .027, F(2, 229) = 3.574, p ≤ .05. 
Only one predictor pay practice added significantly to the regression models; organisational 
‘ability to pay’ as a criterion for base pay progression was associated with a reduction of .120 in 
HR outcomes in the final model.  Size and high-road strategy both significantly contributed to 
the prediction of HR outcomes.  Large organisations had a reduction in HR performance score 
of .150 compared to SMEs, p ≥ .05 and high-road strategy was associated with an improvement 
of .095 in HR outcomes for every one-unit increase, p ≤ .05. 
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Table7.8 Hierarchical multiple regression predicting HR performance outcome scores from individual / cost-driven 
pay practices for knowledge-based employees, by sector, size, high-road strategy and low-road strategy (N=243) 
 HR performance outcome score 
 Pay bundle 3 + Sector & Size + Strategy 
Variable B B
log B Blog B Blog 
(Constant) 2.669 .112 2.779 .082 2.544 .146 
Individual base pay -.035 .012 -.054 .017 -.031 .011 
Ability to pay 
(determination) 
-.124* .032* -.148* .039* -.120* .031* 
Individual PRP -.106 .029 -.091 .025 -.071 .019 
Competency pay .100 -.025 .074 -.018 .062 -.014 
Skills-based pay .042 -.011 .045 -.012 .040 -.010 
Market rates (progression) .026 -.008 .035 -.010 .021 -.006 
Employee value / retention 
(progression) 
-.057 .013 -.052 .012 -.064 .016 
Ability to pay (review) -.014 .006 -.027 .010 -.014 .006 
Pay secrecy -.032 .010 -.034 .010 -.033 .010 
Sector   -.042 .011 -.063 .017 
Size   -.152** .041** -.140* .038** 
High-road score     .095* -.026** 
Low-road score     -.034 .010 
R2 .082 .088 .120 .127 .147 .157 
F 2.327* 2.496* 2.875** 3.067** 3.036*** 3.275*** 
∆ R2 .082 .088 .038 .039 .027 .029 
∆ F 2.327* 2.496* 4.979* 5.226* 3.574* 3.987* 
Note. * = p ≤ .05, ** = p ≤ .005, *** = p ≤ .0005; B = unstandardised regression coefficient HR outcome score; Blog 
= unstandardised regression coefficient logarithmic transformed HR outcome score; ∆ = change. 
 
7.5.3.2  Job-based employment 
The final hierarchical regression analysis was run to determine if the addition of sector and size 
and then of high-road and low-road strategy scores improved the prediction of HR performance 
outcomes over and above individual / cost-driven pay practices for job-based employees (see 
results in Table 7.9). The full model of individual / cost-driven pay practices, sector, size and 
strategy to predict HR outcomes (Model 3, + Strategy) was statistically significant, R2 = 
.163, F(13, 229) = 3.441, p ≤ .0005; adjusted R2 = .116.  The addition of sector and size to the 
prediction of HR performance outcomes (Model 2, + Sector & Size) led to a statistically 
significant increase in R2 of .042, F(2, 231) = 5.689, p ≥ .0005.  The addition of strategy scores 
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to the prediction of HR outcomes (Model 3, + Strategy) also led to a statistically significant 
increase in R2 of .025, F(2, 229) = 3.471, p ≤ .05. 
Similar to the results for knowledge-based employees, using ability to pay to determine pay 
added significantly to all three regression models. In the final model, using ability to pay reduced 
HR performance outcomes by .118, p ≤ .05.  And again, both size and high-road strategy 
incrementally added to the prediction of HR outcomes over and above pay practices alone.  The 
HR outcome score was reduced by .151, p ≤ .005 for large organisations compared to SMEs 
and increased by .092, p ≤ .005 for every increase in high-road strategy score. 
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Table7.9 Hierarchical multiple regression predicting HR performance outcome scores from individual / cost-driven 
pay practices by job-based employees, sector, size, high-road strategy and low-road strategy (N=243) 
 HR performance outcome score 
 Pay bundle 3 + Sector & Size + Strategy 
Variable B B
log B Blog B Blog 
(Constant) 2.619 .128 2.730 .098 2.530 .151 
Individual base pay -.060 .016 -.064 .017 -.047 .013 
Ability to pay 
(determination) 
-.124* .032* -.151** .039* -.118* .030* 
Individual PRP -.033 .008 -.054 .014 -.062 .016 
Competency pay .124 -.028 .105 -.023 .100 -.022 
Skills-based pay .024 -.010 .049 -.017 .028 -.011 
Market rates 
(progression) 
.018 -.006 .036 -.011 .027 -.009 
Employee value / 
retention 
(progression) 
.026 -.004 -.004 .004 -.007 .005 
Ability to pay 
(review) 
-.072 .020 -.072 .020 -.072 .020 
Pay secrecy -.031 .009 -.030 .009 -.029 .009 
Sector   -.053 .014 -.078 .021 
Size   -.162** .044** -.151** .041** 
High-road score     .092* -.026** 
Low-road score     -.032 .010 
R2 .096 .096 .138 .141 .163 .170 
F 2.737*** 2.752*** 3.364*** 3.447*** 3.441*** 3.618*** 
∆ R2 .096 .096 .042 .045 .025 .029 
∆ F 2.737*** 2.752*** 5.689*** 6.037*** 3.471* 4.056* 
Note. * = p ≤ .05, ** = p ≤ .005, *** = p ≤ .0005; B = unstandardised regression coefficient HR outcome score; Blog 
= unstandardised regression coefficient logarithmic transformed HR outcome score; ∆ = change. 
 
7.6 Summary of results and key findings 
There are a number of findings emerging from the all results analysed in this chapter.  First, there 
is some support for the hypothesis (H1) that HR performance outcomes will be positively related 
to experiential ‘strategic’ pay practices and negatively related to algorithmic ‘traditional’ pay 
practices.  Where there are statistically significant results, these largely support hypothesised 
associations; ‘experiential’ pay practices, such as using competency and skills-based pay, merit 
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pay and profit-sharing significantly improved HR performance outcomes whereas traditional 
practices such as pay secrecy and cost control-related pay positioning and determination 
significantly worsened HR scores (see Table 7.10 below).  These results provide good evidence 
for the universalist ‘new’ pay idea that basing pay practices on ‘the person’ and their 
performance or contribution, linking pay to individual skills and behaviours and enabling 
employees to share in the financial success of the business has a positive effect on human 
resource outcomes which are then assumed to positively influence organisational performance.  
The results simultaneously cast traditional and algorithmic pay arrangements, such as high pay 
secrecy and cost-driven pay, as detrimental to achieving such outcomes. 
However, one significant result runs counter to the hypothesis. Pay driven by recruitment and 
retention needs, which has been identified as an experiential practice (Miles and Snow, 1984), 
was associated with deteriorating HR outcomes rather than improvements.  This may well be 
because one of the seven items on the HR outcomes score scale is ‘difficulties in recruitment 
and retention’ and it would be logical that organisations experiencing these recruitment and 
retention difficulties would be more likely to make pay decisions based on this issue.  
Nevertheless, the result does indicate that this particular experiential pay practice has a negative 
impact on HR outcomes.   
On the face of it, aspects of the new pay proposition appear to be borne out by these results, but 
these tests also showed a large number of non-significant results indicating no relationship 
between many strategic or traditional pay practices and HR performance outcomes.  These 
included non-significant results for key experiential practices such as gainsharing and 
broadbanding as well as key algorithmic practices such as job evaluation.  In addition, as 
subsequent analysis showed, organisations do not practise single pay practices; they are likely 
to use practices in parallel with one another, sometimes in bundles, and therefore results for 
specific practices can only provide limited information on their effectiveness.  So overall, while 
the significant results from the initial regression analyses provides some good evidence in 
support of H1, the complete picture suggests that only certain practices, and quite a limited 
number of practices, have any effect on HR performance.   
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Table7.10 Summary of significant linear regression results of single pay practices on HR performance outcomes 
Pay practices with a positive effect on HR 
outcomes 
Pay practices with a negative effect on HR 
outcomes 
Competency pay Recruitment and retention driven pay reviews 
Skill-based pay  Lower quartile and lower decile pay positioning 
Merit pay Ability to pay as criteria for pay determination 
Profit-sharing Pay secrecy 
 
As regards H2 and bundling of pay practices, cluster analysis indicated that a three-bundle model 
of pay practices might be used by respondent organisations in this study as opposed to the 
dichotomous model evident in the strategic pay literature.  Hair et al. (2010) caution against 
generalising from cluster analysis data to the general population, and the limitations of the cluster 
analysis have been flagged.  Nevertheless, that the three clusters appear to conform to aspects of 
algorithmic / experiential theoretical model indicates potential for a wider application than to 
this sample alone.  Two of the identified bundles broadly reflect key elements of either the 
algorithmic / traditional pay model or the experiential / strategic pay model.  The third pay 
bundle is formed of elements of both types centring on individualised base pay arrangements 
(experiential), cost-driven pay determination and review, and pay secrecy (algorithmic).  The 
common factor for pay practices in this third ‘hybrid’ pay bundle is the lack of structured, 
formalised pay systems.  In this pay bundle there are no pay structures; base pay is set for the 
individual based on the organisation’s ability to pay and progressed according to the individual’s 
performance, behaviours, skills and their value to the organisation; pay reviews are determined 
by movements in market rates and what the organisation can afford; there is also an 
organisational preference for secrecy over pay matters.  Putting all this together, the emerging 
picture is of a rather reactive, informal pay system.  This is not a pay system evident in the 
strategic pay literature – even as a counter-point to pro-active practices of experiential pay or 
formalised structures of algorithmic pay.  So, while these findings must be treated with a caution 
given the analysis limitations, there is some support for the first element of H2, that organisations 
will bundle strategic pay practices. 
The final set of findings is related to results from the multiple hierarchical regression analyses 
and H4, H6, H8 and H10; that aligning pay practice configurations with business strategy, 
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employment group, organisation size and industry sector will have greater positive effects on 
HR performance outcomes than pay practices alone. 
The first finding of note here is that none of the pay configurations, either on their own or aligned 
with strategy, size and sector, had a clear positive or negative effect on HR performance 
outcomes.  Table 7.11 below summarises significant results for each configuration.   
Table7.11 Summary of significant multiple regression results of pay configurations on HR performance outcomes 
(based on final regression model in each test).  
 Positive HR outcomes 
 
Negative HR outcomes 
 Knowledge-
based 
employees 
Job-based 
employees 
Knowledge-
based 
employees 
 
Job-based 
employees 
Traditional pay 
practices 
- Upper decile 
pay 
 
Pay spines Lower quartile 
pay 
 High-road 
strategy 
 
High-road 
strategy 
- - 
 SME size 
 
SME size 
 
Large size Large size 
Market / flexible pay 
practices 
Profit-sharing Profit-sharing Recruitment & 
retention (pay 
review) 
 
Recruitment & 
retention (pay 
review) 
 Merit pay - Sales 
commission 
 
- 
 High-road 
strategy 
 
High-road 
strategy 
Low-road 
strategy 
- 
 SME size 
 
SME size Large size Large size 
 Private sector 
services 
- Manufacturing 
& production 
- 
Individual / cost-driven 
pay practices 
- - Ability to pay 
(determination) 
Ability to pay 
(determination) 
 
 High-road 
strategy 
 
High-road 
strategy 
 
- - 
 SME size 
 
SME size 
 
Large size Large size 
 
It is apparent that two of the three pay configurations contains pay practices that improve HR 
performance outcomes and pay practices that worsen HR outcomes.  The results for the 
traditional bundle show that using pay spines for knowledge-based employees and lower 
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quartile pay for job-based employees negatively affected HR performance outcomes whereas 
positioning pay in the upper decile for job-based employees had a positive effect on HR 
outcomes.  Results for the market / flexible pay configuration show that recruitment and 
retention as a pay review factor and using sales commission for knowledge-based employees 
reduced HR performance outcomes whereas merit pay for knowledge-based employees and 
profit-sharing increased HR outcomes.  For the final pay configuration, individual and cost-
driven pay practices, using the organisation’s ability to pay as a pay determination criterion had 
a negative effect on HR performance outcomes and there were no pay practices in this 
configuration with positive effects. It is therefore not possible to claim any one pay configuration 
is associated with entirely positive HR outcomes although the individual / cost-driven pay 
configuration is only associated with negative HR performance.   
It is interesting to note that most of the pay practices shown to have a significant effect on HR 
outcomes in the linear regression tests (see Table 7.10) continue to have an effect when part of 
a pay bundle.  Merit pay, profit-sharing, recruitment and retention pay review criteria, lower 
quartile pay positioning and ability to pay all have similar effects on HR outcomes when they 
form part of their respective pay configurations.  Other pay practices such as competency and 
skills-based pay, and pay secrecy, although having significant effects on HR outcomes 
individually, do not appear to have the same effect when part of a configuration.  Furthermore, 
there are other practices such as pay spines, sales commission and upper decile pay positioning 
that individually have no significant effect on HR outcomes but do when part of a configuration.  
Potentially, this result is because, when bundled, the effect of individual practices is either 
mitigated or enhanced.  If this is the case, it would be evidence to support the latter proposition 
in H2, that bundling pay practices will have an additive (or indeed subtractive) effect on HR 
performance outcomes. 
An alternative explanation for the different effects of single and bundled pay practices may be 
to do with alignment by employment group (linear regression results were for single pay 
practices selected by the organisation as a whole whereas the bundled pay practices were for one 
employee group or another).  In general, different pay configurations have different HR 
performance effects according to employment group which lends some support to the proposal 
of H6; that alignment of employment group and pay practices will have a positive effect on HR 
performance outcomes.  For knowledge-based employees only market / flexible pay practices, 
profit-sharing and merit pay, have a positive HR effect.  However, sales commission and pay 
reviews based on recruitment and retention needs, also market / flexible pay practices, have a 
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negative effect on HR performance outcomes.  For employees working in the job-based 
employment group, both upper decile pay positioning (traditional) and profit-sharing (market / 
flexible) have positive effects on HR outcomes.  So again, there are no clear wholly positive or 
negative configurations.  In addition, a number of pay practices (profit-sharing, recruitment and 
retention pay reviews and ability to pay) appear to have an effect on organisational HR outcomes 
when applied to both employment groups suggesting alignment by employment group is not 
playing a role in the impact on HR outcomes.  But, despite a mixed picture for H6, there are 
some results here, for pay positioning, pay spines, merit pay and commission, that suggest using 
pay practices according to employment group can have an effect on HR outcomes, albeit in most 
cases this effect is negative.   
In all three pay configurations, in nearly all cases, the addition of the variable size of organisation 
has a significant effect on HR performance outcomes.  Aside from knowledge-based employees 
with traditional pay where there is no significant effect for size, in all other configurations, HR 
performance outcomes are negatively affected by large size of organisation and positively 
affected by SME size of organisation.  This finding appears to contradict the proposition of H10, 
that alignment of organisation size and pay practices will have a positive effect on HR 
performance outcomes; the assumption being that large organisations using traditional pay 
practices and SMEs using experiential pay practices would benefit from improved HR 
outcomes.  The results of regression appear to show that HR outcomes are positive for SMEs 
and negative for large organisations regardless of alignment or non-alignment of pay 
configurations.  The only result that provides a modicum of support for the hypothesis is that in 
organisations where there are knowledge-based workers with traditional pay practices, the 
negative effect of larger size is not significant, although if H10 were true, there would be a 
positive effect of larger size in this aligned configuration.  While these findings clearly show no 
support for H10, it is interesting that smaller organisations appear to have more positive HR 
scores than their larger counterparts indicating that size of organisation does have a role in 
determining HR outcomes, albeit seemingly unrelated to pay configuration. 
Whereas size of organisation was found to be significantly contributing to changes in HR 
performance outcomes, there were a lack of significant results for industry sector.  In only one 
of the final regression models (when the strategy variables are added) does industry sector have 
a significant effect on HR outcomes.  In organisations where there are knowledge workers with 
market / flexible pay practices, operating in the manufacturing and production sector has a 
detrimental effect on HR outcomes whereas operating in private sector services has a positive 
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effect.  This finding appears to support the hypothesised association between private sector 
services and experiential pay practices (see Table 3.4, Chapter 3) but if fully aligned this would 
be for job-based not knowledge-based employees. Furthermore, there are no results indicating 
any relationship between industry sector and other pay configurations.  At best then, the results 
only provide very limited support for H8 that alignment of industry sector and pay practices will 
have a positive effect on HR performance outcomes.   
Finally, to turn to results for H4, alignment of strategic orientation and pay configuration will 
have a positive effect on HR performance outcomes.  The results show positive significant 
effects of high-road strategy on HR outcomes in each of the six regression models.  Similar to 
results for size of organisation, these results could indicate that high-road strategy has positive 
effects on HR outcomes regardless of alignment with pay configuration and therefore does not 
support H4.  Nonetheless, there are some interesting aspects to highlight here.  High-road 
strategy had the most impact when used in conjunction with market / flexible pay for 
knowledge-based employees (where HR outcomes scores improved by .146 per point of the 
high-road scale) and least impact when used with individual / cost-driven pay for job-based 
employees (where the improvement in HR score was .092 per high-road point).  Despite not 
strictly conforming to the hypothetical model, these differentiated effects perhaps indicate that 
aligning pay practices and employment groups with high-road strategy will be more effective in 
some combinations than others.   
There was only one statistically significant result for low-road strategy.  The effect of low-road 
strategy was to significantly worsen HR outcomes where the market / flexible pay configuration 
was used for knowledge workers.  Seeing that this configuration was the one which high-road 
strategy had the most positive impact on, this result suggests quite clearly that organisations with 
high-road business strategies will see better HR performance outcomes by paying knowledge-
based employment groups according to market / flexible pay practices, than those pursuing low-
road business strategies.   
Overall, while the hypothesised effects of alignment on HR performance outcomes (H4, H6, 
H8, H10) do not appear to have been supported by these results, there is evidence for certain 
combinations of pay practices, employment group, size, sector and business strategy having a 
positive or negative effect on HR outcome scores.  
The following chapter of this thesis takes the main findings from this and the preceding two 
chapters and examines them in the round, examining their significance and identifying the extent 
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to which a deeper understanding of the research problem has been achieved in the light of extant 
theory and research.    
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Chapter 8: Discussion  
8.1 Chapter introduction 
This chapter identifies the significance of the findings presented in the preceding three chapters 
in light of the extant strategic pay theory. It discusses theoretical and methodological 
explanations for the results and interprets the findings in the context of the literature in order to 
evaluate the implications arising from the findings of this study for the normative strategic pay 
model delineated in Chapter 3. 
8.2 Research questions and key findings 
The research objectives and questions that directed this research study focused on three aspects 
of the strategic pay model.  First, determining the effect of pay practices on HR performance 
outcomes; second, establishing the extent to which pay practices are aligned with organisational 
contingencies and third, establishing the extent to which the alignment of pay practices with 
organisational contingencies had an effect on HR performance outcomes.  The results and 
findings presented in Chapters 5-7 provide evidence upon which to base answers to these three 
lines of enquiry. 
8.2.1 What effect do pay practices have on HR performance outcomes? 
8.2.1.1  Finding 1: Specific pay practices can have positive or negative effects on HR 
performance outcomes 
Results reported in Chapter 7 showed that the selection of certain pay practices and 
combinations of practices (bundles) can have a positive or negative effect on HR performance 
outcomes (employee relations climate; pay discontent; employee productivity; difficulties in 
recruitment and retention; and absenteeism problems).  Although there were large numbers of 
non-significant results and the effect size of the significant results was generally small, there 
were clearly a number of individual practices that were associated with improved or worsened 
HR outcomes.  Furthermore, it appears that the pay practices associated with either positive or 
negative HR performance fell into two recognisable groups. ‘Experiential’ pay practices 
(competency pay, skills-based pay, merit pay and profit-sharing) were associated with improved 
HR performance, whereas ‘algorithmic’ practices (pay secrecy, low market positioning of pay 
and cost-driven pay determination) were associated with worsened HR performance outcomes.  
So, some pay practices do have a small effect on HR performance (although many appear not 
240 
 
to) and the type of practice, whether based on either algorithmic pay principles or the experiential 
model, largely determines if this effect is positive or negative.    
These findings appear to provide fairly good support for H1 - HR performance outcomes will 
be positively related to experiential ‘strategic’ pay practices and negatively related to algorithmic 
‘traditional’ pay practices.  Clearly, of the pay practices associated with an effect on HR 
outcomes, the ones identified as ‘strategic’ by new pay writers (e.g. Lawler, 1990; Schuster and 
Zingheim, 1992; Cira and Benjamin, 1998) have had a small, but significant, positive effect.  
Furthermore, these positive practices appear to be associated with certain aspects of the new pay 
approach, namely, pay should be person-focused (rather than job-focused) i.e. competency pay, 
skills-based pay and merit pay; and based on organisational performance i.e. profit-sharing.  But 
it should also be noted that not all practices classified as ‘strategic’ have a positive effect on HR 
outcomes. Pay reviews driven by recruitment and retention needs are associated with worsened 
HR performance, so it is not a uniformly positive result for strategic pay. 
The position is also rather unclear for the latter part of H1 – that algorithmic / traditional pay 
practices will be associated with poorer HR outcomes.  The practices with significant effects on 
HR performance outcomes are certainly identifiable as ‘algorithmic’ following Gomez-Mejia 
and Balkin’s (1992) framework, but do not feature in the list of ‘traditional’ pay practices 
denounced by new pay writers (see Table 3.1, Chapter 3).  Indeed, the core traditional practices 
determined by new pay proponents to be detrimental to organisational performance such as job 
evaluation, narrow-grading and collective bargaining have no significant effect on HR 
performance outcomes at all.  The pay practices that do have a negative effect on HR 
performance appear to be related to a cost-driven approach to pay i.e. organisational ability to 
pay for pay setting and low positioning of pay in the market or are to do with pay secrecy. This 
indicates that particular approaches, or drivers of pay practice selection, rather than all traditional 
pay practices, are associated with worsened HR performance.  
What this means then, in terms of responding to the research question, is that a limited number 
of pay practices have a small effect on HR outcomes.  However, the finding that strategic pay 
practices focussing on individual contribution / attributes and organisational performance have 
a positive effect on HR performance, and conversely traditional pay practices driven by low-
cost and secrecy have a negative effect on HR performance, is of critical importance in 
furthering understanding of the relationship between pay and its effects.  The notable 
contribution here is not that strategic practices are primarily positive and traditional practices 
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primarily negative, but that pay practices resulting from certain drivers or orientations towards 
employees are likely to have an effect. Organisations valuing individual inputs and sharing the 
profits from organisational performance are likely to reap positive HR outcomes whereas 
organisations driven by low-cost principles and keeping employees uninformed of, and un-
consulted about, pay issues are likely to suffer from worsened HR performance.  This seems to 
be as much to do with principles of policy-making than with the mechanics of the practices 
themselves and as such is an important finding and contribution. 
8.2.1.2  Finding 2: Pay bundles are evident but there is little evidence for an additive effect on 
HR outcomes 
Moving on to discuss the findings related to H2 - organisations will bundle strategic pay 
practices and bundling will have an additive effect on HR performance outcomes - results in 
Chapter 7 provided evidence for organisations bundling pay practices. These bundles were 
defined as ‘traditional pay’, ‘market / flexible pay’ and ‘individual / cost-driven pay’.  The 
identification of three bundles of pay practices was an unexpected result of cluster analysis. As 
was explored in Chapter 3, the strategic pay literature most often presents a dichotomous view 
of pay bundles; new or old (Lawler 1986; Schuster and Zingheim, 1992), strategic or traditional 
(Lawler, 1990); organic or mechanistic (Gomez-Mejia and Welbourne, 1988) and of course, 
experiential or algorithmic (Gomez-Mejia and Balkin, 1992).  Two of the bundles identified in 
Chapter 7 are broadly in line with these dichotomous pay patterns. The bundle labelled 
‘traditional pay’ is mostly composed of practices that are found in the old / traditional / 
mechanistic / algorithmic models whereas the ‘market / flexible pay’ bundle broadly comprised 
practices evident in the new / strategic / organic / experiential models.  The big difference of 
course, was that the analysis identified a distinct third bundle, mixing elements from both 
models.  Identified as an ‘individual / cost-driven pay’ bundle, this set of practices contained the 
person-focused aspects of new / strategic pay alongside affordability related practices and pay 
secrecy from traditional / algorithmic models.   
This finding could be related to the specific composition of the CIPD survey sample as cluster 
analysis is acknowledged as limited in generalisability of findings (Hair et al., 2010).  However, 
it could also indicate that the dichotomous model of pay bundles or patterns, now over 25 years 
old, should be questioned.  The literature on strategic pay practices treats them as components 
of either HRM bundles of ‘best practice’ (Purcell et al, 2003; Pfeffer, 2005) or HRM 
configurations (Martín-Alcázar et al. 2005; Medcof and Song, 2013), or as noted by Prince et 
al. (2016, p.64), the literature examines pay practices independently of one another ignoring “the 
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reality that firms adopt combinations of practices” in operationalising their pay strategy.  
Another key contribution of this study is the identification of the potential for a three-bundle 
model of pay practices which suggests that while the dichotomous split of pay practices along 
strategic / traditional or experiential / algorithmic lines is not wholly unjustified, there is scope 
to explore a more nuanced adoption of combinations of pay practices.   
That organisations might be operating a ‘third way’ characterised by loosely structured pay, 
closed pay arrangements and pay determined individually by what the organisation can afford, 
seems to be a previously unexamined aspect of strategic pay systems in organisations.  This is 
perhaps because, given the nature of the practices in this bundle, the approach is informal and 
reactive, the very antithesis of rationalist notions of deliberate ‘strategy’ as planned and 
formalised (Whittington, 2001).  But, as noted in Chapter 3, strategic pay researchers tend to 
follow the emergent view of strategy as responsive to organisational conditions and discernible 
in patterns of action over time (Milkovich and Newman, 2002); a ‘strategic pragmatism’ 
(Brown and Perkins, 2007) or ‘strategic flexibility’ (Xiu et al., 2017).  So, if confirmed, this 
finding may well indicate a shift in practice that has not yet been charted in the strategic pay 
literature.  Traditional pay systems may be declining (Van Wanrooy et al., 2013; Bailey et al., 
2017), but the uptake of the ‘standard model’ of strategic pay practices in the UK has been 
fraught with difficulties and unintended consequences (Trevor, 2010; Trevor and Brown, 2014).  
This may well have created space for a hybrid pay approach, with elements of both models; 
either organisations are on a journey towards ‘being more strategic’ or existing in such a tough 
economic environment that pay choices are both constrained and reactive. To speculate further 
is outside the scope of this thesis, but this tentative finding suggests that the dichotomous 
strategic / traditional or experiential / algorithmic view of pay patterns in organisations may not 
be the complete picture.   
What is more, when the bundles are related to HR performance outcomes, the ‘individual / cost-
driven’ pay bundle appears to be the only one which had a clear negative effect.  None of the 
pay practices in this bundle had a significant positive effect on HR outcomes, even those such 
as competency pay or merit pay that had positive effects when tested independently.  Despite 
the data being segmented by employment group (job-based or knowledge-based employees 
rather than one or both) this finding could suggest bundling pay practices has the potential for 
an additive, or in this case subtractive, effect on HR performance outcomes. The only significant 
result in the bundle was for the use of ‘ability to pay’ to determine pay which reduced the HR 
outcomes score, whereas competency pay, skills-based pay and merit pay had no significant 
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effects.  One possible explanation for this is that the bundling of individual / cost-driven pay 
practices diminished the positive effects of these practices i.e. combinations of practices can 
have different combined effects than individual practices. This suggests, at least the potential for, 
bundling as a means of enhancing positive effects or mitigating negative effects of pay practices 
on HR performance outcomes.  Given the very scant evidence for this from this study however, 
this would need to be confirmed by further research. 
So, in answering the research question, there is no clear evidence that bundling pay practices has 
any additive effect on HR performance outcomes.  However, there is reason to believe that 
organisations do not tend to operate individual pay practices, they bundle them (although most 
likely in different formations from established models) and that these combinations of bundled 
practices have the potential to mitigate or enhance the effects of the individual practices 
contained within them.     
8.2.2 To what extent do organisations align pay practices with organisational 
contingencies?  
8.2.2.1  Finding 3: Organisations align pay practices with business strategy 
Of all the organisational contingencies examined by this study, the clearest results were found 
for business strategy.  There was good evidence for H3 – that organisations with a low-road 
strategic orientation will be more likely to select an algorithmic pay configuration and 
organisations with a high-road strategic orientation will be more likely to select an experiential 
pay configuration.  Specifically, high-road strategy organisations were more likely to use 
broadbanding, individual competencies and skills for pay progression, market-driven pay 
reviews, performance-related pay schemes and above market pay levels.  They were also less 
likely to use certain algorithmic practices such as pay spines, service-based pay, below market 
pay and ability to pay for pay determination.  Conversely, low-road strategy organisations were 
more likely to select algorithmic practices such as ability to pay and below market pay, while 
being less likely to use experiential practices such as market-rates for pay reviews and long-term 
incentives.   
This finding provides good evidence for the broad theoretical framework of aligned pay 
practices and business strategy typologies originally developed by Miles and Snow (1984) and 
Gomez-Mejia and Balkin (1992) examined in Chapter 3.  Overall the results are similar to the 
findings of Montemayor (1996), Heneman and Dixon (2001), Allen and Helms (2002) and 
Chen and Jermias (2014) all of whom found broad support for organisations with low-road 
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strategies being more likely to select more traditional and algorithmic pay practices, and high-
road strategy organisations more likely to select performance-based ‘strategic’ pay practices. 
While the results of this study clearly demonstrate an alignment between business strategy and 
pay practice selection, there were some results that did not fit neatly with the experiential / high-
road, algorithmic / low-road framework.  Similar to Romero and Cabrera’s (2001) findings, 
there was no apparent relationship found between low-road strategies and selection of service-
based pay progression, or between high-road strategies and either long-term incentives or pay 
transparency.  Whereas Long and Fang (2015) found partial support for a relationship between 
profit-sharing and low-road strategy (entirely at odds with the alignment framework), in this 
study there was no evidence for profit-sharing being associated with either business strategy 
type.  There were also elements of the alignment framework that were found in previous studies 
but were not in evidence in this study. For example, Montemayor (1996) found high-road 
strategy organisations were more likely to favour pay transparency and Romero and Cabrera 
(2001) found low-road strategy was associated with pay secrecy.  Romero and Cabrera (2001) 
also found high-road strategy was associated with IPRP.  None of these findings were confirmed 
by results from this study.  
Conversely, Chapter 5 details wholly unexpected results that were both counter to the 
algorithmic / experiential model and previous research.  High-road strategy organisations were 
more likely to use both job evaluation and sales commission; both classified as algorithmic 
practices whereas low-road organisations were less likely to use job evaluation.  In addition, 
there were some notable non-significant results for key pay practices from both models e.g. 
market-based pay, individual bonuses, narrow-graded pay structures and pay secrecy which 
suggested no clear relationship with either business strategy and thus were unexpected findings.  
Lastly, there was also a notable difference between the number of pay practices associated with 
each strategic orientation; there were far more significant results for high-road strategy than for 
low-road strategy.  
Given that there does appear to be generally good evidence for alignment between business 
strategy and pay practices, these anomalous and unexpected results might be explained by a 
number of factors.  First, the rigid experiential / algorithmic framework of pay practices might 
be questioned.  Indeed, as indicated by the cluster analysis results discussed in Finding 2 above, 
there appears to be sound reasons to reject the notion that organisations select pay practices 
according to a dichotomous, either / or choice.  Second, it appears that certain pay practices are 
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selected by organisations for reasons unrelated to business strategy, some of which might be 
related to other organisational contingencies yet to be discussed, but may well be related to 
factors outside the immediate control of organisations.  Third, alignment of pay practices with 
business strategy appears to be something more commonly undertaken by organisations 
pursuing a high-road strategy. This could be because the conditions that give rise to 
organisations pursuing such business strategies also give rise to the selection of specific pay 
practices (potentially reverse causality) or alternatively, high-road business strategies 
(differentiation, growth or diversification) require organisations to adopt particular pay practices 
in a way that those pursuing low-road strategies do not need to.  Either way, the finding that 
high-road strategies are more likely to have an effect on pay practice selection than low-road 
strategies is an important one and another contribution of this study.  
As the evidence of further findings is analysed, these explanations will be revisited and 
developed further.  For now however, it seems clear that for the most part, the counter-
hypothetical results were fairly minor departures from the overall direction of the results 
indicating that the selection of many pay practices is associated with the organisation’s business 
strategy.  And, while not every practice selected clearly conforms to the alignment model, on 
the whole, high-road strategy organisations appear more likely to select experiential practices 
while low-road strategy organisations appear more likely to select algorithmic pay practices.  
Taken as a whole then, it can be claimed with some confidence that the results in this study 
support the hypothesis (H3).  This is a key contribution to understanding pay practice selection 
in organisations: that organisations pursuing business strategies based on growth, differentiation 
and diversification of products and services will favour pay practices that are performance-
driven, market competitive and flexible while those organisations pursuing strategies associated 
with stable product markets and efficient operations will select pay practices that are cost-
focused.  
8.2.2.2  Finding 4: Organisations align pay practices with workforce employment group 
Results reported in Chapter 6 showed that organisations in this study selected significantly 
different pay practices according to employment group (see Table 6.10, Chapter 6).  The job-
based employment group (administrative support, trades and production workers, customer 
service and sales staff) was associated with pay spines or individual base pay structures, market-
based pay determination and reviews, collective bargaining, individual PRP, merit pay, profit-
sharing, low proportions of employees in PRR (variable pay) schemes and low pay dispersion.  
The knowledge-based employment group (senior managers, middle and front-line managers, 
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professional, technical and scientific employees) meanwhile, was associated with job 
evaluation, pay progression based on competencies and employee value / retention, ability to 
pay as a pay review factor, individual bonuses or combination schemes, sales commission, goal-
sharing, high proportions of employees in PRR schemes and high pay dispersion.    
These results provided partial support for elements of H5 - organisations will select an 
algorithmic pay configuration for employees working in a knowledge-based employment group 
and an experiential pay configuration for employees working in a job-based employment group.  
Results certainly show organisations are selecting different pay practices for employment 
groups but there is very little evidence that organisations select only algorithmic practices for 
their managers, technical and professional staff and only experiential practices for their 
administrative, trades, production, sales and service staff.  Indeed, the final lists of practices 
associated with each employment group bear little resemblance to either the experiential or 
algorithmic pay configuration (Table 6.10, Chapter 6). 
These results conform to findings apparent in the extant literature.  Suff et al. (2007) and 
McDonnell et al. (2016) found that pay practices were differentiated according to human capital 
characteristics that have the potential for organisational strategic advantage.  Lepak and Snell 
(2002) found some support for a theoretical relationship between human capital characteristics, 
employment mode and HR practices, although their operationalisation of HR configurations 
does not entirely conform with the experiential / algorithmic pay framework despite drawing on 
analogous models: Miles and Snow (1984), Delery and Doty (1996) and Youndt and Snell 
(2004).   
So, while there is clear evidence for organisations aligning pay by employment group, once 
again the dichotomous pay model based on a distinction between experiential and algorithmic 
practices receives little support from findings in this study, further undermining this aspect of 
the theoretical strategic pay framework.   
Furthermore, the substantial number of non-significant results suggests that when using some 
pay practices, organisations do not always treat employee groups markedly differently.  For 
several practices including narrow-grading, piece rates, service-based pay, broadbanding, skills-
based pay and gainsharing as well as market positioning of pay levels, organisations do not 
appear to distinguish significantly between employment groups. This indicates that selection of 
these practices is based on factors besides the intended human capital characteristics of the 
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workforce.  As mentioned in Chapter 6, the reasons may be to do with organisational culture or 
values but may equally be related to external factors beyond the scope of this study. 
In answer to the research question then, organisations do appear to align some pay practices 
according to workforce employment groups although not all of them.  Again, this is an important 
finding in contributing to knowledge about pay practice selection in organisations.  Internal 
human capital differences between employee groups accounts for differences in pay practice 
selection as well as external drivers such as business strategy.   
8.2.2.3  Finding 5: There is limited alignment between pay practices and industry sector 
In Chapter 5, results for testing the hypothesis that organisations operating in the manufacturing 
and production sector would be more likely to select an algorithmic pay configuration and 
organisations operating in private sector services would be more likely to select an experiential 
pay configuration (H7) showed some, but limited, evidence for such a proposition.  The only 
significant results were in line with the hypothesis; manufacturing and production firms were 
more likely than service sector companies to use both collective bargaining and ability to pay – 
algorithmic practices; the service industry was much more likely to use performance-related 
reward schemes – experiential practices.  This is in line with Rodríguez and Ventura (2003) who 
find algorithmic pay practices in manufacturing firms, although not specifically these two 
practices.  And both Jackson et al. (1989) and Delery and Doty (1996) find performance-based 
pay in some form associated with the service industries.  These results were expected given the 
different role of the employee in the production of goods (in manufacturing) as opposed to 
services and the subsequent differences in pay design: particularly emphasising employee 
performance in the customer-oriented service sector (Mills and Margulies, 1980; Jackson et al., 
1989). 
But with just three significant results from tests of 36 different pay practices (see Chapter 5 for 
details) there is clearly not a body of evidence to suggest organisations in this study are broadly 
aligning their pay practices based on the industry sector they operate in.  Explanations for why 
this might be centre on alternative factors having a more powerful effect on pay practice 
selection.  It has been already observed that business strategy has a more obvious effect on pay 
practice selection than industry sector and this might account for these limited results.  Similarly, 
there might well be other factors not considered within this study that determine organisational 
choices regarding pay design. 
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8.2.2.4  Finding 6: There is limited alignment between pay practices and organisation size 
Chapter 5 also showed limited support for H9 - large organisations will be more likely to select 
an algorithmic pay configuration and SME organisations will be more likely to select an 
experiential pay configuration.  The findings showed that large organisations were more likely 
to use algorithmic pay practices such as pay spines, job evaluation, collective pay bargaining 
and sales commission as well as having higher pay dispersion than SMEs.  These results provide 
some support for Jackson et al.’s (1989) theory of the development of more formal, internally-
oriented pay systems aligned to the ‘make’ HR configuration (i.e. developmental, internal, 
secure employment) in large organisations but there is no evidence of SMEs adopting the 
experiential pay practices – market-based pay and cash incentives – found by Carlson et al. 
(2006) or any others.   Furthermore, large organisations in this study also selected a number of 
experiential pay practices such as broadbanding, performance-related reward and long-term 
incentives while the only pay practice significantly more likely to be used by SMEs was using 
the organisation’s ability to pay as the basis for pay determination. 
It was proposed in Chapter 3 that SMEs, constrained by resource poverty and proximity to an 
uncertain environment (Welsh and White, 1981; Westhead and Storey, 1996; Hill and Stewart, 
2000; Williamson, 2000), would develop informal and flexible pay systems (Harney and 
Dundon, 2006; Verreynne et al., 2013) and may be more experimental and adaptive than their 
larger counterparts (Storey, 1994; De Winne and Sels, 2012).  These aspects of SMEs could 
make the experiential pay configuration a natural fit for SMEs; reactive to the market, flexible 
and innovative, and yet the SMEs in this study do not appear to have adopted these practices.  
That ‘ability to pay’ features as the only pay practice significantly more likely to be adopted by 
SMEs in this sample lends support to the view that the pay decisions of these organisations are 
largely constrained by their resources, but this does not appear to have translated to a flexible 
and innovative approach to pay design. 
However, that there are some clear differences in pay practice selection between large 
organisations and SMEs suggests there is a relationship between organisation size and pay 
practices.  Given the type of pay practices selected by large organisations – broadbanding, job 
evaluation, pay spines, collective bargaining, share / LTI schemes, PRR schemes – there is no 
evidence for either an experiential or an algorithmic pay configuration being associated with 
large organisation size. What is apparent from these results is that large organisations seem to be 
adopting pay practices facilitating formalisation, structure and stability; an entirely logical 
consequence of managing pay for large numbers of employees. So, while there is little evidence 
249 
 
to suggest clear pay configurations associated with organisation size, the results of this study do 
show a relationship between the type of pay practices selected and the size of organisation, albeit 
on a piecemeal basis.   
8.2.2.5  Finding 7:  Alignment of pay with organisational contingencies is evident but not 
extensive and systematic 
Taking the evidence of the previous four findings together, although there are clear indications 
of relationships between organisational contingencies and specific pay practices, there are also 
suggestions that the associations are often limited and ad hoc.  There are many examples of pay 
practices that seem to have no significant relationship with organisational contingencies and 
examples of relationships unanticipated by the standard strategic pay model.  Small effect sizes 
across the board also indicate that other factors may exert a far greater effect on pay practice 
selection.  In making sense of this finding, both methodological and theoretical explanations will 
be considered later in the chapter, but for now, it is clear that while alignment is evident it is not 
extensive and systematic. 
8.2.3 To what extent does alignment of pay practices with organisation 
characteristics have an effect on HR outcomes?  
8.2.3.1  Finding 8: Alignment of pay with high-road business strategy can have a positive 
effect on HR outcomes 
Results analysed in Chapter 7 show the positive effects of high-road strategy on HR 
performance outcomes for each of the three proposed pay configurations and for both job-based 
and knowledge-based employment groups.  This could well indicate that organisations pursuing 
a high-road business strategy are likely to have better HR performance outcomes regardless of 
the pay configuration adopted.  However, results also show that when organisations used a 
market / flexible pay configuration for knowledge-based workers, the addition of high-road 
strategy had the most impact on HR outcomes.  Conversely, when organisations used individual 
/ cost-driven pay for job-based employees, high-road strategy has the least impact.  It seems 
then, that different combinations of configurations of pay practices, business strategy and 
employment groups can have different effects on HR performance outcomes and therefore these 
results indicate some support for H4 – alignment of strategic orientation and pay configuration 
can have a positive effect on HR performance outcomes.   
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Results in Chapter 7 also show that low-road strategy appears to have virtually no significant 
effects on HR outcomes aside from worsening HR outcomes where organisations used a market 
/ flexible pay configuration for knowledge workers. As noted in Chapter 7, this was the pay 
configuration upon which high-road strategy had the most positive impact, which suggests that 
organisations with high-road business strategies will see better HR performance outcomes by 
paying knowledge-based employee groups according to market / flexible pay practices, than 
those pursuing low-road business strategies.   
Despite this finding, the results as a whole do not provide overwhelming support for the sort of 
comprehensive aligned pay-strategy-performance relationship found by Balkin and Gomez-
Mejia (1990) and subsequently by Montemayor (1996), Chen and Jermias’s (2014) and 
Tenhiälä and Laamanen’s (2016).  In some ways, the results of this study echo findings of Tsai 
et al. (2008) who found only partial support for a relationship between pay policy, innovation 
strategy and organisational performance and question the universal application of the strategy-
pay alignment model.  Caveats around operationalisation of business strategy and the scope of 
pay practices included in these studies aside, that high-road strategy and market / flexible pay 
practices appear to interact to impact positively with HR outcomes in this study is in line with 
previous research findings. It is, however, only an indication rather than a definitively positive 
finding – after all, even within the market / flexible pay configuration only two pay practices 
have positive effects on HR outcomes, two others have negative effects and the rest have no 
significant effect at all.  
8.2.3.2  Finding 9: Alignment of pay with employment group can have an effect on HR 
outcomes 
The results in Chapter 7 indicate quite clearly that different pay practices have different HR 
performance effects according to employment group.  This finding lends some support to the 
proposal of H6: that alignment of employment group and pay practices will have a positive 
effect on HR performance outcomes.   Where employees working in a knowledge-based 
employment group have a market / flexible pay system which contains profit-sharing and merit 
pay there is a positive effect on HR outcomes.  But the results are ambiguous; other elements of 
the market / flexible pay configuration – sales commission and pay reviews based on recruitment 
and retention needs – when applied to knowledge-workers, have a negative effect on HR 
performance outcomes.  Basing pay determination on the organisation’s ability to pay also 
worsens HR outcomes.  So, the theoretical premise formed in Chapter 3, that aligning the 
knowledge-based employment group with traditional pay practices based on a commitment-
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oriented, ‘make’ HR system would result in positive HR performance (Miles and Snow, 1984; 
Delery and Doty, 1996; Lepak and Snell, 2002; Youndt and Snell, 2004) has not been verified.  
But the results are similar to those of Collins and Smith (2006) who found incentives based on 
organisational performance for knowledge workers improved firm performance and to those of 
Rodríguez and Ventura (2003) who found that algorithmic pay practices associated with the 
‘make’ HR system produced a negative effect on the ﬁrm’s productivity. 
Similarly, for employees working in the job-based employment mode, there is no clear 
indication from the results that alignment with one pay configuration results in better HR 
outcomes.  Positioning pay in the upper decile (from the traditional pay configuration) and 
profit-sharing (from the market / flexible pay configuration) when applied to job-based workers 
both have positive effects on HR outcomes. However, for job-based employees, lower quartile 
pay, recruitment and retention-based pay reviews and pay determination by ability to pay, all 
from different pay configurations, have negative effects on HR performance.  Again, there is no 
indication from these results that aligning the job-based employment group with an experiential 
pay configuration based on Lepak and Snell’s (2002) productivity-based HR which in turn was 
based on the market-oriented ‘buy’ HR system (Miles and Snow, 1984; Delery and Doty, 1996) 
produces better HR outcomes.   
Another issue arising from these results is the evidence of pay practices (profit-sharing, 
recruitment and retention as a pay review factor and ability to pay) that have effects on HR 
outcomes when applied to both employment groups suggesting alignment by employment 
group is not playing a role here. This finding is similar to that of McClean and Collins (2011) 
whose results indicated that high-commitment HR practices positively related to firm 
performance for both employee groups in their study and Nyberg et al. (2016) who find 
performance-pay positively influences performance for all employee levels. The results of this 
study too suggest that a commitment-oriented performance pay practice – profit-sharing – has 
positive effects when applied to each group.  There is also good evidence to suggest that certain 
pay practices, in this case pay reviews based on recruitment and retention needs and pay 
determination based on ability to pay, universally have negative effects on HR outcome 
regardless of employment group. 
Overall, although the specific theoretical effects of aligning employment groups with pay 
configurations have not been borne out by the results of this study, the key finding here is that 
selecting pay practices according to employment group can have a positive, or indeed negative, 
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effect on organisational HR outcomes.  Again, however there seems to be a piecemeal approach 
to practice adoption rather than a configurational one. 
8.2.3.3  Finding 10: Alignment of pay with industry sector does not have an extensive effect 
on HR outcomes 
The results analysed in Chapter 7 showed very little support for H8 – alignment of industry 
sector and pay practices will have a positive effect on HR performance outcomes.  In all but one 
case, the addition of industry sector to the regression models had no significant effects on HR 
outcomes indicating that there is no clear HR benefit for organisations selecting their pay 
practices according to whether they operate in manufacturing and production or the service 
sector.  That said, one result showed that in organisations where there were knowledge workers 
with a market / flexible pay configuration, operating in private sector services had a positive 
effect on HR outcomes.  This finding appears to support the hypothesised association between 
private sector services and experiential pay practices and indicates that, at least for knowledge-
workers, service sector organisations choosing market / flexible pay practices could see 
improved HR performance.  This echoes the findings of Delery and Doty (1996), who found 
organisations in the financial services industry using profit-sharing saw better firm performance.  
However, there is scant literature in this area and the results of this study do little to establish a 
clear connection between pay practices, alignment with industry and performance. 
8.2.3.4  Finding 11: Alignment of pay with organisation size does not appear to have an effect 
on HR outcomes but size itself does 
The results detailed in Chapter 7 show that HR outcomes are nearly always positive for SMEs 
and negative for large organisations regardless of alignment or non-alignment with pay 
configurations.  This finding appears to offer very little support for the proposition of H10 – that 
alignment of organisation size and pay practices will have a positive effect on HR performance 
outcomes.  As discussed in Chapter 7, the only result that provides a small degree of support for 
the hypothesis is that in organisations where there are knowledge-based workers with traditional 
pay practices, the effect of larger size is not significant.  This rather neutral finding could indicate 
that the seemingly universal negative effect of larger organisation size on HR outcomes is 
mitigated because organisation size and pay configuration are aligned, but this is certainly not 
clear evidence for the effect of alignment on HR performance.   These results largely confirm 
Jackson et al.’s (1989) finding that organisation size has a weak association with HR practices 
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and there is no evidence to support Carlson et al.’s (2006) findings which suggest a relationship 
between experiential pay practices and high performance in SMEs.   
As noted in Chapter 7, although findings from this study clearly show no support for H10, it is 
interesting that SMEs appear to have more positive HR outcomes than their larger counterparts. 
This might well indicate that size of organisation has a role in shaping HR performance, but 
seeking to determine why this might be is outside the scope of this research.  One thing that is 
fairly clear from the findings of this study however is that HR outcomes appear unrelated to the 
alignment of pay configuration with size of organisation. 
8.2.3.5  Finding 12: Alignment of pay with organisational contingencies has a minimal effect 
on HR performance outcomes 
In pulling the previous four findings together then, there appears to be very little evidence for a 
significant relationship between alignment of pay with organisational contingencies and HR 
performance outcomes.  Clearly, some contingency factors, notably high-road business strategy, 
do appear to work in conjunction with pay configurations to have a positive effect on HR 
performance. And there does seem to be a clear difference in HR outcomes for using different 
pay practices according to employment group. There are however many discrepancies, 
unexpected or non-significant results, and small effect sizes which suggest a mixed picture.  In 
short, this study has not found a uniformly conclusive set of results for the effect of pay 
alignment on HR performance. 
8.3 Universalistic, contingency and configurational perspectives  
The twelve main findings of this study have implications for the universalistic and alignment 
perspectives on strategic pay explored in Chapter 3.   
8.3.1 Evidence for new pay  
First, there appears to be good evidence for aspects of the universalistic, new pay proposition 
that certain strategic pay practices will enhance organisational performance (Lawler, 1990, 
2000; Schuster and Zingheim, 1992; Delery and Doty, 1996; Martocchio, 1998; Risher, 1999; 
Zingheim and Schuster, 2000; Milkovich and Newman, 2002). Finding 1 indicates that basing 
pay practices on ‘the person’ and their performance or contribution, linking pay to individual 
skills and competencies and enabling employees to share in the financial success of the business 
has a positive effect on HR performance outcomes. Clearly, not all strategic pay practices were 
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shown to have positive effects on HR outcomes but on balance, where there were significant 
positive effects, these were associated with the experiential rather than algorithmic practices.  
That certain types of pay practice can influence employee behaviours and attitudes to the extent 
that there is an effect on HR performance follows not only from the universalistic perspective 
on strategic pay but also from antecedent theories of sorting, incentive and equity effects 
discussed in Chapter 2.  Pay does appear to act as an economic and psychological lever 
influencing decisions to join and stay with organisations, employee motivation, satisfaction, and 
ultimately behaviour with the potential to contribute to the achievement of organisational 
objectives.  However, as discussed above, aside from supporting prior research in this area, the 
new contribution made by this study is that the overall driver of or approach to pay design – 
whether it is based on principles of low-cost and minimal information sharing or person-centred 
reward and sharing profit – is as important as the individual practices themselves and certainly 
more important than whether it is a practice categorised as strategic or traditional. 
Second, the universalistic idea that organisations bundle practices, derived from the ‘best 
practice’ approach to HRM strategy (Pfeffer, 1998, 2005; Appelbaum et al., 2000; Purcell et al., 
2003), also appears to be supported by findings of this study. Three potential bundles were found 
in this study; one representing the traditional pay model rejected by the strategic pay proponents 
and the other two representing segmented aspects of the new pay’s orthodoxy of pay flexibility, 
market competitiveness, and individualism.  However, there was no solid evidence to suggest 
that these bundles had any marked additive effect on HR outcomes although one of the bundles 
– an individual / cost-driven approach to pay – did have wholly negative consequences for HR 
performance. So, there were only suggestions that bundling had potential to mitigate or enhance 
the negative or positive effects of individual practices but no firmer evidence than this.  This 
finding is important because organisations rarely use pay practices in isolation, so understanding 
the combined effect of practices is imperative to understanding the influence on HR 
performance outcomes.  Despite the lack of any hard evidence for positive effects of bundles in 
this study, because there is an indication that selecting practices in combination can have 
different outcomes than when used independently, the logical consequence is that there might 
well be certain combinations that prove more effective than others at enhancing HR 
performance.  An elusive ‘golden’ pay bundle may exist, although this study has not found it. 
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8.4 Contingencies and configurations 
Other findings suggest that organisations select practices based on organisational characteristics 
which is much more in line with an alignment perspective as opposed to the universalistic 
approach.   Contingency approaches tend to differentiate between alignment of organisational 
practices either vertically related to external factors such as industry sector or competitive 
business strategy (Miles and Snow, 1984; Schuler and Jackson, 1987a, 1987b; Jackson et al., 
1989; Christiansen and Higgs, 2008), or horizontally related to internal factors such as 
organisation size (Jackson et al., 1989), and the employment groupings of its workforce (Wright, 
et al., 1994; Wright and Snell, 1998; Wright, et al., 2001; Lepak and Snell, 2002). This study 
found selection of pay practices associated with both vertical and horizontal factors suggesting 
good support for this element of the contingency proposition. 
8.4.1 Vertical alignment 
In relation to the first vertical factor investigated, business strategy, finding 3 is unambiguous; 
organisations, particularly those pursuing high-road business strategies, select pay practices that 
are aligned with their strategy.  Contingency theory suggests organisations do this to encourage 
desired employee role behaviours consistent with achieving specific business strategies 
(Schuler, 1987; Schuler and Jackson, 1987a, 1987b).  And results strongly suggest pay practices 
in high-road organisations are more likely to emphasise individual contribution (basing pay 
progression on competencies and skills) high levels of reward (upper quartile pay positioning) 
but with a variable element based on performance (PRR schemes) and flexible pay structures 
(broadbanding), presumably designed to encourage the sorts of employee behaviours – 
autonomy, creativity, quality work and high performance – needed to pursue successful high-
road business strategies of growth, diversification and differentiation.  For low-road strategy 
organisations, the findings are less convincing.  Schuler and Jackson (1987a) suggest these 
organisations will select practices based on encouraging repetitive and predictable employee 
behaviours with an emphasis on results.  The finding that the only two pay practices more likely 
to be selected by low-road strategy organisations were lower quartile pay positioning and pay 
levels determined by ability to pay certainly suggests ‘cost reduction’ as a driver for pay practice 
selection.  Lower pay levels would also presumably secure routine rather than high performance 
consistent with low-road requirements, but besides this there is no strong evidence for selection 
of pay practices to shape employee behaviour in these organisations.  As discussed in 11.2.2.1 
above, the reason for the lack of association between low-road strategy and pay practices other 
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than the cost-oriented ones, is difficult to determine without further research.  But given the 
evidence from findings appears to suggest that cost-orientated practices are often associated with 
poorer HR performance outcomes, then the association of low-road strategy with cost-driven 
pay is likely to be an important one. 
The other vertical alignment factor examined in this study was industry sector, and findings 
suggest only limited alignment here compared with business strategy.  Manufacturing and 
production companies’ use of collective bargaining and ability to pay to determine pay levels as 
well as the service sector’s use of PRR schemes are in alignment with the different employee 
behaviours required to produce goods (repetition and routine behaviours) and services 
(customer-service and self-monitored performance) but this is only limited evidence for use of 
a contingency model.  Clearly, organisations do not appear to be selecting pay practices 
contingent upon the industry sector they operate in as proposed by contingency theorists (e.g. 
Jackson et al., 1989) and the results are limited compared with those for business strategy. 
8.4.2 Horizontal alignment 
Based on human capital enhancement theories (Becker, 1993; Wright et al., 1994; Youndt and 
Snell, 2004; Wright and McMahan, 2011), the horizontal alignment concept proposes that 
unique employee knowledge, skills and abilities helps develop an organisation’s core 
competencies and leads to desired organisational outcomes sustaining competitive advantage 
for the firm, when they are supported by appropriate HR practices.  Lepak and Snell (2002) 
proposed designing different practices according to different employment groups based on the 
type of strategic advantage their knowledge, skills and abilities bring to the firm.  Findings from 
the present study indicate that organisations do align many pay practices with the employment 
group of the workforce; knowledge work and job-based employment are associated with 
different practices across the spectrum of strategic pay dimensions.  Pay practices for job-based 
employees appear to be more market-oriented, with less emphasis on variable pay and include 
more traditional practices such as collective bargaining and pay spine structures.  Knowledge 
work meanwhile is associated with an emphasis on internal equity, rewarding individual value 
or behaviours and much more pay variability.  Despite being contrary to hypothesised pay 
patterns, these findings can still be interpreted within the context of alignment between pay and 
the differing human capital requirements of different employment groups.  For example, it 
makes logical sense for organisations to pay job-based employees according to the market in 
which they trade their transferable skills and abilities but to have greater emphasis on internal 
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equity for knowledge-based employees whose more specialist skills need to be retained longer-
term within the organisation.  It is also reasonable to offer the broad-base of job-centred 
employees a standardised pay plan with predictable costs but to tailor variable pay schemes 
according to myriad individual, group or organisation outcomes for the knowledge-based 
employees who have more direct influence on those outcomes.  So, it is apparent that horizontal 
alignment, at least according to workforce employment group, is in evidence.   
The other horizontal alignment factor examined in this study was size of organisation and, as 
discussed above, these results indicate that large organisations select pay practices that help to 
facilitate formalisation, structure and stability in keeping with managing pay for large numbers 
of employees whereas SMEs determine pay levels according to their ability to pay consistent 
with the resource constraints that come with smaller size. So, the results of this study do show a 
relationship between the type of pay practices selected and the size of organisation consistent 
with a contingency perspective although the specific predictions of the strategy pay model are 
not evident.  
8.4.3 Alignment effects 
A key premise of the contingency and configurational perspectives on pay is that alignment, 
with either individual organisational characteristics in the case of contingency approaches or 
multidimensional internal and external organisational features in the case of configurational 
perspectives, will lead to a significant improvement in HR, and ultimately organisational, 
performance outcomes (Delery and Doty, 1996; Martín-Alcázar et al., 2005). There are 
indications that aligning pay with high-road strategies (finding 8) and employment group 
(finding 9) can have a positive effect on HR outcomes.  However, analysing findings 8 to 11 
together, there is very little compelling evidence that alignment either by organisational 
contingencies individually or in configurations leads to enhanced HR outcomes (finding 12). 
8.5 Methodological explanations for results 
Considering the body of literature theorising a relationship between pay, HR outcomes and 
organisational contingencies as well as the considerable evidence for the incentive and sorting 
effects of pay on employee behaviours, the finding that there are limited indications of such a 
relationship is surprising.  In making sense of this set of findings a number of possible 
explanations might be considered.   First there are a number of possible methodological 
explanations for the absence of strong evidence for the effect of pay alignment on HR 
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performance outcomes.  It is possible that the operationalisation of one or more variables could 
be invalid or inappropriate for the sample.  However, the six variables groups in this study (pay 
practices, business strategy, employment groups, industry sector, organisation size and HR 
outcomes) were operationalised with careful consideration for reliability and validity based on 
both previous research and practical means of measurement as detailed in Chapter 4.  There is 
also the possibility that the sample biases, both sample selection bias (that the sampling frame 
differed in some key respects from the whole population because the organisations in the sample 
were very likely to employ professional HR practitioners who were CIPD members) and non-
response bias (that there were likely to be some key differences between respondents and non-
respondents to the survey) meant the results were invalid.  However, as discussed in Chapter 4, 
if they had an effect, these biases were more likely to mean the results would over-state the extent 
of strategic pay practices rather than under-state it. That the results showed a lack of evidence 
for alignment effects suggests they are less likely to be found in the wider population of UK 
organisations even than the results of the sample have found.  Finally, there is also the possibility 
that alternative analytic techniques might have found evidence for the effect of aligned pay on 
HR outcomes missed by the multiple hierarchical regression analyses.  Again, Chapter 4 details 
the suitability of this statistical testing procedure for the type of data collected as well as for the 
specific hypotheses being tested but this does not rule out scope for future research to employ 
alternative techniques.   
8.6 Theoretical explanations for results 
Having considered and largely rejected methodological explanations for the lack of evidence for 
a relationship between strategic pay alignment and HR performance outcomes, another possible 
explanation is to question the soundness of the perspectives from which the hypotheses were 
formed.  There have long been criticisms of the universalistic approach for its emphasis on 
unidimensional, linear relationships between isolated variables rather than strong theoretical 
foundations (Martín-Alcázar et al., 2005). However, this thesis has demonstrated a robust basis 
for examining the effect of pay practice selection on HR outcomes given the substantial literature 
providing evidence for the economic and psychological effects of pay on employee behaviour.  
Despite this, there are still real concerns that strategic pay is a myth, rhetoric rather than reality, 
and this is certainly a view that has been expressed by critical voices over recent years (e.g. 
Taylor, 2000; Trevor, 2010; Trevor and Brown, 2014).  Like previous studies (e.g. Delery and 
Doty, 1996), the results of this research project have demonstrated good evidence for a 
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relationship between pay practices and HR outcomes but found very little benefit in aligning 
those pay practices with business strategy or other employment or organisational characteristics.  
This gives weight to Milkovich’s (1987, p.3) description of strategic pay alignment as a mere 
“leap of faith” and to both Gerhart and Rynes (2003) and Shields (2015) who conclude that there 
is limited evidence for pay alignment improving HR outcomes or organisational performance. 
It is possible that if other internal organisational characteristics such as organisation life-cycle 
stage (Baird and Meshoulam, 1988; Delery, 1998), organisational culture (Cabrera and 
Bonache, 1999), and the organisation’s structure or technology (Jackson et al., 1989) had been 
included in the study, there could have been different results.  However, given the very mixed 
picture for the contingencies studied as well as previous findings, this is by no means certain. 
Perhaps then, it is the premise of the contingency and configurational perspectives that needs to 
be examined as being inadequate to fully capture pay decision-making in organisations.  It was 
noted in Chapter 3 that the contingency approach tends towards framing organisational choices 
as dichotomous decisions (Doty and Glick, 1994). The choices are presented as polar: external 
or internal alignment; vertical or horizontal alignment; alignment with business strategy or 
human capital.  And whilst the configurational perspective is heralded as more suited to 
capturing the complexity of organisations because it emphasises holistic combinations of 
internal and external factors and their synergistic interactions (Delery and Doty, 1996; Martín-
Alcázar et al., 2005), there remains a dichotomous framing of organisational choices.  The 
configuration typologies, although often acknowledged as ‘ideal’ types, are always opposites: 
Type A or Type B (Miles and Snow, 1984); internal or market-type (Delery and Doty, 1996); 
commitment or productivity-based (Lepak and Snell, 2002); acquisition or developmental 
(Youndt and Snell, 2004).  Using these perspectives, this study sought to delineate pay 
configurations based on the strategic pay literature, and as noted above, these too tend to be 
dichotomous: old or new; strategic or traditional; experiential or algorithmic.  However, 
indications from this study suggest that pay configurations selected by organisations may not 
conform to a dichotomous model.  Furthermore, recurrent themes through the analysis of 
findings show a) the apparent mixing of practices from different configurations, contrary to 
hypothesised associations (e.g. high-road strategy firms selecting algorithmic job evaluation and 
sales commission alongside experiential practices); b) for certain pay practices no significant 
difference in selection rates between organisations with different characteristics (e.g. levels of 
pay secrecy were not significantly different across organisation with different business 
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strategies) and c) small effect sizes for almost all of the significant test results indicating that the 
predicted associations do not fully explain changes in the response variables. 
Taken together, this analysis of results points towards deficiencies in the contingency / 
configurational model in explaining pay practice selection and the effect on HR outcomes.  
Arguably this is because, despite offering a more holistic perspective than universalistic 
approaches, there is still a failure to take account of the complexity of competing, often 
contradictory, pressures organisations may face.   
8.7 Chapter summary 
This chapter has synthesised an analysis of findings from results reported in previous chapters 
and, based on the evidence drawn from primary and secondary research, it has provided 
responses to the research questions posed at the beginning of this thesis.  There is good evidence 
that pay practices can have an effect on HR performance outcomes but no clear indication that 
bundling has an additive effect, at least not in the bundles formations suggested in this study.  
There is also fairly good evidence that organisations select pay practices that align with aspects 
of their internal and external environment.  Externally, organisations pursuing different 
competitive business strategies select different pay practices broadly in line with the experiential 
and algorithmic models but there is only limited alignment between pay and industry sector.  
Internally, organisations also differentiate pay practices according to employment group 
providing some evidence for organisations aligning pay with human capital enhancement 
requirements, although here too there is no evidence for an experiential / algorithmic pay pattern, 
and there is only limited evidence for alignment with organisational size.  However, the 
proposition that alignment with these organisational characteristics would lead to positive HR 
performance outcomes has not been evidenced by findings from this study.  Despite some 
indications that individual pay practices have positive or negative effects on HR outcomes, when 
configured in pay bundles aligned with strategy, employment group, sector and size there is no 
compelling evidence to suggest that organisations benefit from strategic pay alignment, at least 
not in terms of HR performance outcomes. 
So, while aspects of the universalistic and alignment perspectives to strategic pay have been 
confirmed by these findings, key features including evidence for benefits of a configurational 
approach have not been found.  In explaining why this might be, this chapter explored some 
possible methodological explanations as well as deficiencies in the standard treatment of 
strategic pay.   
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Chapter 9:  Conclusions 
9.1 Chapter introduction 
This chapter briefly restates the research problem addressed in this thesis and outlines the steps 
taken in conducting the enquiry before drawing together the main findings of this research study 
to reach key overall conclusions.  Limitations of the research are examined, in terms of the 
validity of results and the extent to which the conclusions can be generalised.   The contribution 
of this work to both theory and practice is also stated with reference to useful implications for 
practice and recommended avenues for future research in this field.  
9.2 Strategic pay unpacked 
In outline then, the thesis aimed to reassess the strategic pay model by evaluating the extent of 
strategic pay practices in UK organisations and their impact on HR performance outcomes.  This 
investigation was prompted by an apparent disconnect between the rhetoric of strategic pay 
presented in much of both the extant academic literature and practitioner commentary and the 
seeming lack of evidence for these claims.  This perceived reality gap had provoked calls for 
better thinking and better evidence about the reality of relationships between organisational 
contingencies, pay and performance in organisations (Bevan, 2005; Gupta and Shaw, 2014).  
And this study was designed to provide both a clearer theoretical basis upon which to conduct 
research and firmer evidence about the reality of strategic pay in the UK.   
The secondary research for this study was drawn from multi-disciplinary research evidence and 
theoretical literature from fields including strategic HRM, organisation behaviour, psychology 
and economics.  The power of pay to shape employee responses is an established feature of the 
literature; there is solid evidence that pay can have a sorting effect by determining who joins and 
leaves organisations (Lazear, 2000; Gerhart and Fang, 2014) and a powerful incentive effect by 
changing employee effort and behaviour (Locke, et al., 1980; Cadsby, et al., 2007) although the 
longer-term organisational benefit of this behaviour change is disputed (Kohn, 1993; Deci, et 
al., 1999).  The principle of strategic pay rests on an assumption that organisations can harness 
these powerful effects by designing pay systems to attract and retain employees with appropriate 
qualities and to motivate them to behave and perform in ways consistent with achieving 
organisational objectives.  These ideas were given much attention as forces of competitive 
globalisation prompted huge structural changes to Western economies requiring rapidly 
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changing human capital needs.  The ‘new pay’ concept appeared to offer a response to this new 
world order by proposing greater pay flexibility driven by market forces and, by emphasising 
high performance working aimed at achieving organisational success; new pay was considered 
a ‘strategic’ management tool (Lawler, 1990, 2000).  Furthermore, this strategic set of pay 
practices was framed as distinctively different from the existing traditional pay model seen as 
encumbered with bureaucratic, internally-focused and expensive practices unsuitable for a 
changed (and changing) economic environment.  However, this universalistic perspective of 
strategic pay was regarded by some as both unidimensional and insufficient in explaining why 
different organisations might benefit from choosing different practices (Delery and Doty, 1996).  
Contingency and configuration perspectives appeared to offer a more nuanced and holistic 
understanding of organisational pay practice selection and performance outcomes (Martín-
Alcázar et al., 2005).  The theoretical proposition being that organisations would achieve 
enhanced employee performance outcomes if they aligned their pay practices with 
organisational contingencies; externally with business strategy and industry; internally with 
employee human capital needs and numbers.  And, broadly based on the distinction between 
strategic pay practices and traditional pay practices, a framework for selecting appropriate pay 
practices aligned with organisational requirements was developed which included two types of 
pay practice: experiential (market-competitive, performance-oriented, individualised and 
variable pay) and algorithmic (emphasising hierarchy, internal equity and cost-control / 
reduction) (Gomez-Mejia and Balkin, 1992).   
Having established a theoretical basis for the strategic pay model, in order to test its propositions 
empirically, a research strategy was designed using the Hypothetico-Deductive (HD) method, a 
mono-method, quantitative survey in line with explanatory and evaluative research objectives. 
Data was gathered using the CIPD Reward Management Survey in 2012, in which the author 
played a significant design and analysis role, with a final sample of 302 respondents from a 
cross-section of private-sector UK-based organisations. Ten hypotheses based on the literature 
were developed which were tested using a range of statistical techniques including non-
parametric tests, linear and logistic regression analyses, cluster analysis and hierarchical multiple 
regression.   
9.3 Alignment 
Findings showed some support for elements of the strategic pay model.  First, there is good 
evidence for a level of alignment between business strategy and pay practices; high-road strategy 
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organisations generally selecting strategic pay practices and low-road strategy firms choosing 
cost-driven pay practices.  There was also clear evidence for organisations choosing different 
practices according to employment group with pay practices for the knowledge-based group 
being based on internal equity, individual value or behaviours and pay variability; and pay 
practices for job-based employees being more market-oriented, fixed and traditional.  And, 
despite there being more limited alignment between pay practices and industry sector or 
organisation size, there was evidence that manufacturing firms select more traditional and cost-
driven practices whereas the service sector is more likely to use performance-driven reward.  
Similarly, large organisations adopt pay practices facilitating formalisation, structure and 
stability whereas reward in SMEs is based on ability to pay.  So, there is certainly evidence for 
alignment; the selection of pay practices depends, to some extent, on business strategy, differing 
human capital requirements, industry and organisation size. 
9.4 Bundling 
Second, there are indications that organisations may choose pay practices in co-ordinated 
bundles.  Some organisations operate ‘traditional’ pay practices; structured base pay determined 
by collective bargaining, service-related progression, piece rates or gainsharing and pay 
positioning either higher or lower than the market-median.  Others adopt ‘market / flexible’ 
practices with broadbanded pay structures, variable pay schemes and pay determined, reviewed 
and positioned according to market pay conditions.  But this study also proposes a third pay 
bundle; some organisations choose loosely structured pay, determined individually, by what the 
organisation can afford and operated with minimal transparency.  
9.5 Performance outcomes 
Finally, this study found some evidence for pay practices having an effect on HR performance 
outcomes.  Profit-sharing and paying according to merit, skills and competencies will improve 
HR outcomes whereas pay secrecy, low market positioning of pay, cost-driven pay setting and 
pay reviews based on recruitment and retention needs all worsen HR outcomes.  When pay 
bundles are configured with strategy, employment group, sector and size, there are slightly 
different results but still evidence that combinations of practices and organisational 
characteristics can have effects on HR performance.  For SMEs operating in the service sector 
with high-road business strategies, using profit-sharing and merit pay for knowledge-based 
employees has positive effects.  Profit-sharing also has a positive effect on HR outcomes for 
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job-based employees in similar contexts.  In contrast, for large organisations in manufacturing 
with low-road strategies, using sales commission and recruitment / retention needs to review 
pay for knowledge workers has negative effects. This suggests that certain combinations of pay 
practices, in combination with organisational contingencies, do have differing effects.  There is 
no clear evidence for certain pay configurations being superior to others, but there is an 
indication that choice of pay practices according to specific organisational conditions can partly 
determine the level of HR performance.  This may suggest that there may be other benefits of 
aligning pay with organisational contingencies besides HR outcomes.  These could be to do with 
legitimisation, what is culturally and politically acceptable within the organisation or even just 
cost-saving, but outside the scope of this study. 
9.6 Explaining unexpected results 
The findings above need to be qualified however.  Alongside the good evidence for relationships 
between certain pay practices, organisational contingencies and HR performance outcomes 
were large numbers of non-significant results indicating the absence of any relationship.  Many 
pay practices appeared to have no clear association with business strategy, employment group, 
industry sector or organisation size.  Equally, many pay practices appeared to have no 
relationship with HR performance outcomes, not even when combined in aligned 
configurations with those organisational characteristics.  Furthermore, even for the significant 
results, the effect sizes were small – the associations only explained a small part of the change 
in either pay practice selection or HR outcome.   
9.7 Conclusions 
From these findings a number of conclusions have been determined: 
1. Organisations select some pay practices according to their business strategy and the 
employment groups of their workforce.  In doing so they are likely to be intending to create 
conditions in which the behaviour and performance of employees is directed at achieving 
particular outcomes; there is a strategic intention in pay practice selection. 
2. The industry sector and size of organisations will also shape the pay practices selected 
although to a more limited extent.  Within industry sectors this is likely to be related to the 
differences in employee behaviours in producing either goods in manufacturing and 
production firms (routine behaviours) or customer-oriented services in the service sector 
(performance behaviours).  For organisations of different sizes, large organisations select 
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practices associated with formality, structure and stability which is both practical for 
managing large numbers of employees and bestows institutional legitimacy. The constraints 
of resource-paucity in SMEs are likely to be responsible for their focus on pay affordability.  
3. Organisations use pay practices in bundles which may have distinctive characteristics: 
traditional pay, market / flexible pay or individual / cost-driven pay.  
4. The selection of pay practices can have an impact on HR outcomes.  Organisations can 
benefit from using person-based pay practices and profit-sharing whilst using non-
transparent, low-cost pay will have a detrimental effect on HR performance.  Certain 
configurations of organisational contingencies and pay practices have positive or negative 
effects suggesting the potential for effects on HR outcomes. It is clear that organisational 
selection of pay practices and the resultant impact on HR outcomes is not solely related to 
alignment of pay with contingency factors.  Other pressures and factors may well be shaping 
the selection of pay practices in organisations.  
 
9.8 Limitations 
There are a number of methodological limitations that might have an effect on the validity and 
generalisability of the empirical results.  First, there are limitations associated with the HD 
methodological approach.  Deductive reasoning is non-ampliative, the validity of conclusions is 
dependent on the validity of its premises and it can fail to account for alternative explanations.  
The HD method is also reductionist – big, complex and sometimes nebulous ideas are 
necessarily reduced down to a tightly defined set of operationalised variables.  Again, detailed 
consideration of variable operationalisation based on extant literature was taken in this study.  
But, despite these attempts to mitigate the limitations of the HD approach, there is room to 
assume that a different methodological approach may have found, if not different results, then 
certainly the opportunity for a broader scope of possible explanatory factors.  The use of a mono-
method and a quantitative, cross-sectional research design allowed a certain amount of focus, 
definition and the discovery of statistically robust relationships in the data, but this design is 
limited in its ability to explore both the nuanced and unpredictable nature of human decision-
making in organisations as well as changes in longer term trends and emphases.  
There were also some constraints related to working within the scope of an established survey 
instrument.  The CIPD Reward Management Survey was, and still is, primarily used as a 
benchmarking tool, reporting frequencies of reward practices within the practitioner 
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community. Trends in these frequencies would be reported year-on-year and therefore there 
were certain restrictions in terms of consistency of approach and specific questions that needed 
to be maintained.  For this research project, additional questions were added to the 2012 survey 
to collect the required data, but concerns around the length of the questionnaire and user-
friendliness meant there were limits to the number of questions that could be asked.  This meant 
that many of the questionnaire questions were not relevant to the hypotheses but also there was 
no opportunity to ask a wider range of questions (for example on other possible organisational 
contingencies such as wider HR practices, organisational life-cycle stage, structure or culture) 
which would have widened the scope of the present study.  Limitations in identity tracking of 
participant organisations as well as changes to some questions year-on-year also meant a 
longitudinal study would have been extremely challenging using this data source.   
The potential sample biases arising from using the CIPD survey for data collection discussed in 
Chapter 4 may also limit the generalisability of findings.  The results tell us about the extent and 
effects of strategic pay practices among UK private sector organisations that employ 
professional HR practitioners.  It is possible that if the study had targeted organisations with little 
or no HR presence the results would have been profoundly different.  The rationale for collecting 
data on strategic pay through CIPD was based on an assumption that organisations employing 
qualified HR professionals would be more likely to use normative strategic pay practices than 
those with minimal HR support i.e. if strategic pay was going to be found anywhere it would be 
among this sample frame. It was also necessary to target respondents with enough technical 
knowledge to be able to answer the questionnaire accurately.  So, it is accepted that the results 
may overstate the incidence of strategic pay alignment and that in the general population of UK 
organisations the pattern of practices and their effects may be somewhat different. 
9.9 Implications for further research and practice  
The conclusions of this study provide important evidence with which to inform the development 
of strategic pay theory and practice.  First, this study has established evidence for theorised 
relationships between pay, strategy, human capital needs, organisational context and HR 
performance outcomes in UK private sector organisations.  That these relationships exist has 
implications; strategic pay is not ‘all myth and no reality’ as often claimed.  Organisations do 
align pay practices with their strategic context and specific pay practices do have positive effects 
on HR outcomes.  However, the varying extent of these relationships and especially the lack of 
evidence for positive effects of pay alignment, also has implications. Linear assumptions about 
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organisational conditions informing management intentions, leading cleanly to effectively 
implemented pay practices and onwards to desired HR outcomes are shown to be a simplistic 
interpretation of reality that may not take account the potential for competing internal and 
external pressures and the possibility of complex human responses.   
The outcomes of this study contribute towards bridging the gap between theoretical strategic 
pay perspectives developed more than 25 years ago in a time of global economic transition, and 
a new perspective of pay, strategy, performance and context in a twenty-first century that 
continues to see huge economic and political upheavals.  Because, undoubtedly pay continues 
to be important; the findings of this study have established that pay choices have consequences 
for employees and organisations, and those choices, while not always free and without 
constraint, should be made with care and consideration.  HR and reward practitioners have an 
important role to play in guiding their organisations to make pay choices that not only take 
account of desired organisational outcomes but that also respond to an array of pressures. With 
greater awareness and understanding of the forces shaping pay practice selection and their 
potential consequences, professionals will be better placed to help organisations make those 
decisions.  Evidence about organisational approaches to pay will also contribute to ongoing 
debates about managing people. The knowledge that approaches focused on valuing individual 
attributes and sharing the benefits of organisational performance can have a positive effect on 
HR performance whereas low-cost imperatives and secrecy can have a negative effect, may be 
useful for practitioners not only in designing and implementing pay systems but in wider issues 
around how values and culture shape people management and organisational success.   
It is anticipated that it would be beneficial for future researchers in the strategic pay field to 
explore the utility of alternative approaches to universalism and alignment perspectives. There 
is a need here to develop a new or extended model of strategic pay based on alternative 
perspectives; not excluding the role of organisational contingencies but framing them in a less 
linear and static way. Widening the scope of variables to include a greater variety of contextual 
contingencies and their interaction would also help to further develop the theoretical model of 
strategic pay.  Longitudinal research into strategic pay patterns within organisations over time 
would also contribute to a deeper understanding of pay choices and consequences than this 
cross-sectional study has been able to provide.  Finally, different methodological approaches to 
this topic, for example qualitative or mixed-method studies, would provide additional 
dimensions of understanding this complex and multi-faceted concept.   
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9.10 Chapter summary 
In summary, this thesis makes a significant contribution to knowledge about why organisations 
choose the pay practices they do and the consequences of these choices. These choices are based 
partly on organisational conditions such as strategic orientation and human capital needs but are 
unlikely to be appear systematic or co-ordinated. The outcomes of these choices too may not 
always be as intended, but, this thesis has shown, there is potential for the selection of pay 
practices to have a positive effect on HR performance outcomes which, if realised, could shape 
employee and organisational experience of pay practice in the UK.    
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Glossary 
The Glossary is provided for information and clarification. The entries are not intended to be 
definitive definitions but are the meanings ascribed to terms used in this thesis based generally 
on those used by Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development.  
Bonus: a non-consolidated payment (i.e. not added to salary) which can be discretionary or non-
discretionary.  May be used in an attempt to influence employee performance or behaviour to 
meet pre-set objectives or used on a more ad hoc or retrospective basis to reward past 
achievements. 
Broadbanding: a pay structure using a small number of pay bands / grades, typically four or five. 
Competency pay: basing pay rises on an assessment of employee competencies in a range of 
areas (focusing on employee input to the job, rather than performance or achievement), for 
example customer service or communication skills. 
Gainsharing: a group bonus based on improvements in group / sub-unit / team productivity or 
production cost against historical benchmarks.  
Goal-sharing: a group bonus based on improvements in group / sub-unit / team achievement of 
specific group performance goals / objectives. 
Incentive: a non-consolidated cash payment (i.e. not added to salary) aiming to influence future 
employee behaviour or performance, usually through the use of targets.  
Job evaluation: a method of determining pay level / grade on a systematic basis according to the 
relative importance / value of the job within the organisation. 
Job family: a pay structure system grouping jobs within similar occupations or functions together 
(e.g. Sales, R&D, etc.), usually with around six to eight levels. There are usually separate pay 
structures for different ‘families’. Career families are a variant system which involves the use of 
a common pay structure across all job families, rather than operating separate pay structures for 
each family. 
Long-term incentives (LTIs) / share schemes: schemes which deliver company shares to 
employees in some form. LTIs may have specific conditions attached that the employee must 
meet before shares are released. 
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Merit pay: a way of managing pay by linking awards to an assessment of individual merit, often 
including performance or contribution and usually measured against pre-agreed objectives. The 
salary increase is usually consolidated but can involve non-consolidated cash payments.  
Narrow-grading: a pay grading structure comprising a large number of grades, typically 10 or 
more, with jobs of broadly equivalent worth slotted into each of the grades. 
Pay-for-performance (PFP): a system of linking pay to performance outcomes, often relating 
to variable pay schemes i.e. those that are not consolidated into salary payments. 
Pay positioning: positioning pay level in the market; either in the upper decile (top 10%), upper 
quartile (top 25%), median (mid-point), lower quartile (bottom 25%) or lower decile (bottom 
10%). 
Pay spine: a pay grading structure similar to narrow-grading, based on a series of incremental 
points that usually allow for pay progression through the spinal salary points. 
Performance-related-pay (PRP) or individual PRP: a way of managing pay by linking salary 
progression to an assessment of individual performance, measured against pre-agreed 
objectives. 
Piece rates: a variable payment made retrospectively according to the number of units produced. 
Profit-sharing: a formal system to share organisational or business unit profits usually in a bonus 
or other non-consolidated payment. 
Skills-based pay: pay rises are linked to the acquisition of additional skills or specific 
qualifications levels. 
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Appendix A: CIPD Reward management 
survey information 
Table A.1 Research team participants and responsibilities 
Name and institution in 2012 
 
Primary role Responsibilities 
Sarah Jones (University of 
Bedfordshire)   
Researcher  Questionnaire design, data 
analysis and interpretation, 
report writing lead 
Liz Marriot (University of 
Bedfordshire)   
Data analyst Data analysis 
Professor Stephen Perkins (University 
of Bedfordshire)   
Researcher  Questionnaire design, report 
writing contribution 
Professor Michelle Brown 
(University of Melbourne)  
Researcher  Data analysis support 
Professor John Shields (University of 
Sydney)  
Researcher  Questionnaire design, report 
writing contribution 
Charles Cotton (CIPD Senior Adviser 
on Performance and Reward)   
Client  Questionnaire design, data 
collection co-ordination, 
report writing contribution 
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A.2 Email text to CIPD members inviting participation in CIPD Reward Management 
Survey 2012: 
 
Dear  
As a reward/HR professional, you know the impact that reward has on your organisation and 
what effective reward management looks like. That's why I'm inviting you to complete our 
online survey. 
Your contribution will benefit us all 
Your response will help us understand the key reward management issues in today's 
workplace and the impact that they're having on business performance. It's also an opportunity 
for you to reflect on the success of your own strategies and help us set standards for good 
practice. 
Easy to complete 
The survey is easy to complete and should take no longer than 25 minutes. You don't need to 
complete it in one sitting; you can save your answers and come back to them at a later date. 
The survey will close on 31 March 2012. 
We respect your confidentiality 
Each completed survey will be collated and analysed independently and we will not see 
individual responses. Please also note that we will not update any membership data based on 
the information that you provide in this survey. 
Thank you in advance for your support; it is very much appreciated by us all at the CIPD 
Please complete the survey [link to survey] 
Charles Cotton 
CIPD Adviser, Performance and Reward 
 
On clicking the ‘please complete the survey’ link, participants were taken to a pre-survey 
screen:  
“The survey has been designed to give you the opportunity to help us understand the key 
reward management issues in today's workplace and the impact that they're having on business 
performance. The survey is also an opportunity for you to reflect on the success of your own 
strategies. 
The survey is easy to complete and should take no longer than 25 minutes. You don't need to 
complete it in one sitting; you can save your answers and come back to them at a later date. 
The survey will close on 31 March 2012.  
For your security and peace of mind, CIPD and its subsidiaries will not supply your details to 
any organisation for marketing purposes. By submitting this response you confirm that you 
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agree to the use of your information as set out in our privacy policy and agree to our website 
terms and conditions of use.”  
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A.3  CIPD Privacy Policy 
1. Data Protection and privacy 
1.1 "CIPD" shall mean the Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development and its 
subsidiaries, including, but not limited to, CIPD Enterprises Limited and any future names by 
which these entities may be known. 
1.2 This privacy policy applies to any information acquired by and/or provided to CIPD 
including but not limited to: 
  1. This privacy policy applies to any information acquired by and/or provided to CIPD 
including but not limited to:  
  2. information acquired/provided through use of the following websites: the CIPD website 
(including the CIPD Professional Communities) at www.cipd.co.uk and the HR Talking 
Talent website at www.hrtalkingtalent.asia (together the “Websites”);  
  3. information acquired/provided during the course of orders, transactions and bookings;  
  4. information acquired/provided through enquiries or by the completion of any request and 
or invitation for information;  
  5. information acquired/provided through awards and competition entries;  
  6. information acquired/provided through any other source which we obtain in relation to 
you. 
1.3 CIPD recognises that your privacy is important to you. The information you submit to 
CIPD will be kept confidential and secure once received. The information will be processed by 
CIPD or on its behalf under strictly regulated conditions in accordance with the provisions of 
the Data Protection Act 1998.  
2. How we use your personal information 
2.1. Any personal information provided by you to or obtained from other sources by CIPD 
will only be used for the following purposes: 
  1. updating and enhancing customer, contact and membership records and those of other 
related CIPD activities  
  2. compiling information relating to your use of CIPD's products and services and defining 
areas of interest to you  
  3. improving the Websites to meet users' habits and requirements and compiling information 
relating to users' movements across the Website in accordance with our Cookie Policy  
  4. handling orders, delivering products and services, processing payments, communicating 
with you about orders, products and services and generally maintaining your account  
  5. advising you of other products and services which may be of interest  
  6. inviting you to participate in research studies and/or market research activities  
  7. compiling case studies in relation to the purpose for which the information was submitted 
(eg. awards nominations), or otherwise in an anonymised format unless otherwise expressly 
notified to you in advance  
  8. responding to queries from members of the public about your membership status  
  9. providing you with information about and communications from your local branch 
network.  
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3. Disclosure 
3.1 CIPD will only disclose this information in the following circumstances: 
  1. where your consent has been obtained  
  2. where there is a legal obligation  
  3. where there is a public duty or  
  4. in connection with the assignment or transfer of all or any of its rights and obligations to 
any of its group companies or to any other third party. 
3.2 For operational reasons and/or in order to meet specific requests data may also be: 
  1. processed on behalf of CIPD by external organisations under strictly regulated conditions 
in accordance with the provisions of the Data Protection Act 1998.  
4 Accuracy 
4.1 CIPD will take reasonable steps to create an accurate record of any personal data you have 
submitted. However, CIPD does not assume responsibility for confirming the ongoing 
accuracy of your personal data. You can update your personal data by making amendments in 
the 'My Profile' section of the Website by emailing us at database@cipd.co.uk or by calling us 
on +44 (0)20 8612 6208. Please note that it will take up to 21 days for the changes to come 
into effect. 
4.2 If you wish to change your mailing preferences or opt-out of specific marketing 
communications sent from CIPD and its subsidiaries you may notify us by clicking here and 
completing the notification form. Alternatively you may contact us on +44 (0)20 8612 6208. It 
may take up to 21 days for the changes to come into effect. Please note that this will not alter 
your current email subscription preferences. 
4.3 If you would like to request a copy of your personal data under the Data Protection Act 
1998, or have any other related queries, please email secretariat@cipd.co.uk. Please note that 
proof of your identity, payment and/or other information may be required in order to respond 
to your request. 
5. Cookies and Google Analytics 
5.1. CIPD may gather information about you when you use our Website by using cookies. 
Information collected in this way will be anonymised and aggregated. Please view our Cookie 
Policy for further information. 
5.2. CIPD and/or its subsidiaries reserve the right to anonymously track and report a user's 
activity inside of the Websites. The Website uses Google Analytics, a web analytics service 
provided by Google, Inc. (“Google”). Google Analytics uses cookies and or an Application 
Programming Interface (“API”) to help analyse how the Website is used. The information 
generated by the cookie or API about your use of the Websites (including your IP address) will 
be transmitted to and stored by Google on servers in the United States. 
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5.3. Google will use this information for the purpose of evaluating your use of the Websites, 
compiling reports on Website activity for Website operators and providing other services 
relating to Website activity and internet usage. Google may also transfer this information to 
third parties where required to do so by law, or where such third parties process the 
information on Google's behalf. Google will not associate your IP address with any other data 
held by Google. 
5.4. By using the Websites, you consent to the processing of data about you by Google in the 
manner and for the purposes set out above.  
6. Policy Modification 
Any modifications to the privacy practices of CIPD will be reflected first within this area of 
our website. If there is a material change in our privacy practices, CIPD will indicate on this 
site that CIPD’s privacy practices have changed, and make the necessary amendments to the 
current privacy policy. If CIPD considers using the information collected from you in a 
manner materially different from that stated at the time of collection, CIPD will send written 
notice by email of the change. 
7. Consent 
By disclosing personal information to CIPD you consent to the collection, storage and 
processing of information in the manner described in this policy. Please note that your 
continued use of the Websites and/or products and services constitutes your agreement to any 
changes to this policy, the CIPD Website Terms and Conditions and the HR Talking Talent 
Website Terms and Conditions. 
CIPD Privacy Policy  
January 2012 
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A.4  CIPD Website Terms and Conditions 
These Website Terms and Conditions govern your access to and use of the website including 
the CIPD Professional Communities (the 'Website'). By accessing, using or contributing to the 
Website you agree that you have read and accept these Website Terms and Conditions and 
that they shall apply to your use. If you do not wish to be bound by these Website Terms and 
Conditions, please leave the Website and or cease to contribute to the CIPD Professional 
Communities. 
1. Contact details 
1.1 This Website is operated by the Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development (CIPD). 
The CIPD is a registered charity and a company incorporated by Royal Charter. Its registered 
office is at 151 The Broadway, London SW19 1JQ, registered charity number 1079797 and 
VAT number GB 756 202 737. 
1.2 Through the Website you may gain access to the commercial products and services of 
CIPD Enterprises Limited (CIPDE), CIPD’s 'Subsidiary') which is wholly owned by the 
CIPD, and of Haymarket Media Group ('Haymarket'), the CIPD’s publishers, who produce 
and distribute People Management Magazine (the 'Magazine'), the HR News Application by 
People Management Magazine for Smartphones and the People Management Magazine App 
for Tablets for and on behalf of the CIPD. You may also gain access to the subscription 
services of Alliance Media, who administer magazine subscriptions on behalf of Haymarket. 
In addition to these Website Terms and Conditions the provision of such products and services 
will be governed by such additional terms and conditions as you may be made aware of at the 
time of ordering. 
1.3 If you have any queries relating to your registration with and use of the Website, 
please email web support 
2. Registration 
2.1 In order to register with the Website you are required to submit your first and last names, 
email address, user name and password. You must also indicate whether you are a guest, 
CIPD member, a member through an organisational subscription or a People 
Management subscriber. If you have any queries about your details on the CIPD database, 
please email database@cipd.co.uk. 
2.2 You are able to provide additional information including your postal addresses, another 
email address and sign up and or manage your newsletters subscriptions via the ‘My Profile' 
area of the Website. You are not obliged to submit this additional information in order to 
register with or to use the Website, but if you choose to do so, then, subject to paragraph 4 
below, the CIPD may use this information in order to provide you with a more personalised 
service. 
2.3 We may suspend and/or terminate (either in whole or in part) your use of any user name, 
password or this Website immediately for any reason. 
3. Use of the jobs service and display advertising by members and non-members 
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PM jobs is a service for recruiters and job applicants to facilitate the transfer of information for 
recruitment purposes. Please view People Management Jobs: User Information and/or People 
Management Terms of Business for Recruiters for more information. 
4. Data protection and privacy 
For your security and peace of mind, the CIPD and its Subsidiaries will not supply your details 
to any organisation for marketing purposes. Please view our Privacy Policy for further 
information. 
5. Intellectual Property 
5.1 All intellectual property rights (IPRs) in the design and layout of the Website and, save as 
described in 5.3 below, in the material and information published on the pages of the Website, 
including, but not limited to, copyright and rights in registered and unregistered trademarks, 
are owned by or licensed to the CIPD. 
5.2 Save as may be incidental to you obtaining authorised access to the content on the Website, 
you must not reproduce, download, transmit or retransmit, manipulate or store on paper, 
electronic (including, but not limited to any database or any part of the Internet), CD Rom or 
other offline product on any other format in whole or in part the design and layout of the 
Website or the information or material published on the pages of it, nor hypertext or otherwise 
link to it, without the prior written consent of the CIPD, such permission to be given or 
withheld at the CIPD's absolute discretion. 
5.3 IPRs in any contribution shared by you on the CIPD Professional Communities shall 
remain with you and by making a contribution (in whatever form, including but not limited to 
text, graphic, photo, other image type or audio) you agree to grant to the CIPD, free of charge, 
perpetual and irrevocable worldwide licence to use the contribution in whatever manner it may 
wish. 
5.4 In making a contribution to the CIPD Professional Communities, you confirm that your 
contribution is your own original work, is not defamatory, does not infringe any laws or the 
rights of others in any jurisdiction, and that you have the right to grant the CIPD a licence to 
use the materials as specified above. 
5.5 If you do not wish to grant the CIPD a licence to use your contribution as envisaged by 
these Website Terms and Conditions, please do not submit or share your contribution on the 
Website. 
6. ‘Link to us’ policy 
6.1 The CIPD ‘Link to us’ logos may be downloaded and used on your website to provide a 
hypertext link to the CIPD Website. They are available from this area of the site. 
6.2 The CIPD ‘Link to us’ logos are provided at the CIPD’s absolute discretion and may be 
altered, or removed from your site, by us, at any time. 
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6.3 The CIPD’s ‘Link to us’ logos must not be presented on your site in a way which suggests 
that the CIPD has an official association with your organisation or has endorsed any of your 
products. 
6.4 The CIPD is not responsible for the content contained on any website using one of our 
‘Link to us’ logo links. 
7. CIPD professional communities use 
The CIPD Professional Communities is a CIPD Member-only resource. The purpose of the 
CIPD Professional Communities is to allow Members to exchange ideas, views, advice and 
resources with other Members in a secure and supportive environment. Please view the CIPD 
Professional Communities Guidelines for further information. 
8. Disclaimer 
8.1 The material and information contained on the Website is for general information only and 
does not constitute any form of offer for sale (except for products available to purchase on our 
online sales website at www.cipd.co.uk/bookstore), advice or recommendation by the CIPD. 
You should not rely on the material or information on the Website as a basis for making any 
business, legal or other decisions. You should seek appropriate independent advice before 
making any such decisions. 
8.2 The CIPD does not warrant or represent and excludes all warranties or representations that 
the material and information, including advertising material, on the Website is accurate, true or 
complete or that it is free of viruses or that it does not contain any material which is 
defamatory, obscene or illegal in any way. 
8.3 In no circumstances will the CIPD be liable to you or any other third parties for any loss or 
damage (whether direct or indirect, including loss of profits, loss of opportunity or any 
consequential loss) resulting from or in any way connected with your use of the Website or its 
content, whether caused by negligence, misrepresentation, breach of any statutory duty, or 
breach of contract or otherwise. The CIPD does not limit or exclude its liability for death or 
personal injury resulting from its negligence. 
8.4 The content contained within the CIPD Professional Communities is provided by 
individual contributors. You are advised to treat any information contained within the CIPD 
Professional Communities with an appropriate level of caution. Contributors’ views are their 
personal views alone and neither the CIPD nor its Subsidiaries are responsible for any content, 
unless specifically stated otherwise. 
8.5 You may access other websites via hypertext links from the Website. You use such links 
and other websites entirely at your own risk. Such websites are provided by independent third 
parties and neither the CIPD nor its Subsidiaries accept any responsibility for the availability, 
content or use of such websites or information contained on them. Any links to third party 
websites do not amount to any endorsement of that site by the CIPD or its Subsidiaries. 
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8.6 The CIPD endeavours to ensure that the information it provides through the Website is 
accurate and accepts no liability for any errors and omissions, misuse of copyright or personal 
information in breach of the above rules. 
9. Indemnity 
You agree to indemnify and to keep the CIPD indemnified from and against any costs, claims, 
demands, expenses and liabilities suffered or incurred by the CIPD arising from or which are 
directly or indirectly related to your access to and/or use of the Website and/or any other 
person or entity's use of the Website, including but not limited to where such person or entity 
was able to access the Website using your password. 
10. General 
10.1 The CIPD reserves the right to assign or transfer all or any of its rights and obligations 
under these Website Terms and Conditions to any of its group companies or to any other third 
party. In the event of assignment or transfer to any other third party, notification will either be 
given to you by email or posted on the Website. 
10.2 Failure by the CIPD to exercise or enforce any right conferred upon it shall not be 
deemed to be a waiver of any such right nor operate so as to bar the exercise or enforcement of 
that or any other right on any later occasion. 
10.3 The CIPD reserves the right to vary these Website Terms and Conditions from time to 
time. Such changes will either be notified to you by email or posted on the Website. Changes 
in this manner shall be deemed to have been accepted if you continue to use the Website after 
a period of 2 (two) weeks from the date of transmission of the email or of posting on the 
Website, whichever occurs later. 
10.4 These Website Terms and Conditions are governed by and will be interpreted in 
accordance with English law. The English courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction to settle any 
claim or dispute which may arise out of or in connection with these Website Terms and 
Conditions. 
11. The CIPD Profession Map 
HR professionals and organisations are using the Profession Map standards to define great 
HR, assess areas of success and improvement, build capability in relevant areas and recognise 
achievement through professional qualifications and membership. 
Please view our terms and conditions for further information. 
12. Comment and Insight: contributor terms and conditions 
12.1 By providing any Comment and Insight contribution to the CIPD, you grant us a 
worldwide, irrevocable, exclusive, royalty-free licence to use your contribution in any way and 
in any current or future media format (including modifying and adapting it for operational or 
editorial reasons). You also grant us the right to sub-license these rights and to bring an action 
for any infringement. 
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12.2 CIPD reserves the right to decline to publish any Comment and Insight contribution at its 
absolute discretion. You indemnify CIPD and its subsidiaries from any claims or actions 
arising from any of your Comment and Insight contributions including, but not limited to, 
where content is considered illegal, unlawful or to infringe any third party’s legal or other 
rights. 
12.3 By affirming your acceptance or providing any contribution for use on Comment and 
Insight, you agree to the above terms and conditions. 
CIPD Website Terms and Conditions  
Last update: January 2012 
 
A.5  Extract from contract of services CIPD / London Metropolitan University. 
“Special Terms: The Supplier is permitted to use the Services/Deliverables for their 
own academic purposes, such as teaching, lecturing and research.”  
A.6  Email statement from Charles Cotton, CIPD Senior Advisor on Performance and Reward 
Management regarding independence of thesis. 
Subject Re: Sarah Jones - independent research for PhD 
From Stephen Perkins 
To Sarah Jones 
Cc Susan Shortland 
Sent 03 October 2018 15:42 
  
Dear Sarah, 
Please find below Charles's confirmatory message to meet one of your examiners' conditions. 
Best wishes 
Stephen 
On Wed, 3 Oct 2018 at 15:31, Charles Cotton <C.Cotton@cipd.co.uk> wrote: 
  
Dear Stephen 
  
I’m happy to confirm that Sarah’s PhD thesis is an independent piece of work. 
  
Kind regards, 
  
Charles  
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From: Stephen Perkins [mailto:s.perkins@londonmet.ac.uk]  
Sent: 03 October 2018 15:27 
To: Charles Cotton <C.Cotton@cipd.co.uk> 
Subject: Sarah Jones - independent research for PhD 
  
Dear Charles, 
  
We spoke. If you are content with the form of words below, kindly respond with confirmation. This will 
be conveyed to Sarah Jones's PhD examiners. 
  
"Following consultation with Professor Perkins, I am writing to confirm that, while I understand that 
Sarah Jones has drawn on the 2011 and 2012 reward management surveys developed for the CIPD, 
her subsequent PhD thesis is an independent piece of work." 
  
With thanks and best wishes 
  
Stephen   
Professor Stephen J. Perkins JP DPhil (Oxon) Chartered FCIPD CMgr FCMI FHEA 
Emeritus Professor, London Metropolitan University | Electra House | 84 Moorgate | London EC2M 6SQ 
Web | Twitter Editor-in-Chief: Routledge Companion to Reward Management 
  
London Metropolitan University is a limited company registered in England and Wales with registered number 974438 and VAT registered 
number GB 447 2190 51. Our registered office is at 166-220 Holloway Road, London N7 8DB. London Metropolitan University is an exempt 
charity under the Charities Act 2011. Its registration number with HMRC is X6880. 
 
  
Book your place today 
Think before you print - save energy and paper 
This email may contain personal views which are not the views of The Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development 
(CIPD) and its subsidiaries unless specifically stated. The Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development, 151 The 
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Broadway, London, SW19 1JQ. Incorporated by Royal Charter and registered as a charity in England and Wales 
(1079797) Scotland (SCO45154) and Ireland (20100827).  
London Metropolitan University is a limited company registered in England and Wales with registered number 974438 and VAT registered 
number GB 447 2190 51. Our registered office is at 166-220 Holloway Road, London N7 8DB. London Metropolitan University is an exempt 
charity under the Charities Act 2011. Its registration number with HMRC is X6880. 
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Appendix B: Survey questionnaire 
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Appendix C: Factor analysis subsidiary tests  
Table C.1 Factor analysis correlation matrix  
 Competitive business strategy items (Question 34) 
 6.  9.  10.  11.  12.  14.  15.  16.  18.  19.  20.  21.  22.  17.  13.  
6. Leading innovations in industry 1.000 .731 .436 .460 .536 .263 .134 .125 .548 .569 .372 .501 .394 -.081 .059 
9. Being first in industry to develop new products .731 1.000 .529 .492 .603 .267 .151 .085 .681 .603 .368 .533 .443 .017 .089 
10. Accepting not all product development will be profitable .436 .529 1.000 .383 .454 .250 .178 .096 .450 .567 .291 .413 .356 -.097 .040 
11. Responding rapidly to opportunities .460 .492 .383 1.000 .632 .352 .258 .148 .309 .315 .270 .377 .250 .066 .097 
12. Having actions lead to new round of competitive activity in 
industry 
.536 .603 .454 .632 1.000 .269 .236 .125 .401 .455 .319 .462 .232 -.024 .099 
14. Improving co-ordination with customers/suppliers .263 .267 .250 .352 .269 1.000 .518 .526 .239 .210 .347 .432 .204 .284 .325 
15. Reorganising the work process .134 .151 .178 .258 .236 .518 1.000 .539 .180 .128 .285 .459 .159 .293 .337 
16. Improving measures of performance .125 .085 .096 .148 .125 .526 .539 1.000 .128 .172 .297 .356 .136 .286 .209 
18. Developing new products and services .548 .681 .450 .309 .401 .239 .180 .128 1.000 .656 .378 .523 .450 .129 .118 
19. Undertaking research and development .569 .603 .567 .315 .455 .210 .128 .172 .656 1.000 .468 .527 .466 -.020 .033 
20. Total quality management .372 .368 .291 .270 .319 .347 .285 .297 .378 .468 1.000 .542 .434 .067 .072 
21. Developing new operating techniques .501 .533 .413 .377 .462 .432 .459 .356 .523 .527 .542 1.000 .392 .087 .119 
22. Providing speciality products/services .394 .443 .356 .250 .232 .204 .159 .136 .450 .466 .434 .392 1.000 -.021 -.047 
17. Tight control of overhead costs -.081 .017 -.097 .066 -.024 .284 .293 .286 .129 -.020 .067 .087 -.021 1.000 .621 
13. Reducing operating costs .059 .089 .040 .097 .099 .325 .337 .209 .118 .033 .072 .119 -.047 .621 1.000 
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Table C.2 Factor analysis anti-image correlation matrix 
 Competitive business strategy items (Question 34) 
 6.  9.  10.  11.  12.  14.  15.  16.  18.  19.  20.  21.  22.  17.  13.  
6. Leading innovations in industry .896 -.420 .073 -.120 -.059 -.043 .077 -.051 -.032 -.143 -.025 -.089 -.042 .193 -.106 
9. Being first in industry to develop new products -.420 .878 -.142 -.075 -.230 -.024 .070 .083 -.346 -.003 .038 -.083 -.110 -.058 .001 
10. Accepting not all product development will be profitable .073 -.142 .906 -.094 -.077 -.094 -.060 .052 -.016 -.306 .061 -.027 -.073 .169 -.066 
11. Responding rapidly to opportunities -.120 -.075 -.094 .852 -.443 -.167 -.062 .058 .062 .076 .001 .019 -.057 -.111 .089 
12. Having actions lead to new round of competitive activity in industry -.059 -.230 -.077 -.443 .869 .046 -.070 .013 .054 -.101 -.042 -.091 .145 .097 -.068 
14. Improving co-ordination with customers/suppliers -.043 -.024 -.094 -.167 .046 .879 -.167 -.318 .006 .084 -.101 -.091 -.014 -.042 -.142 
15. Reorganising the work process .077 .070 -.060 -.062 -.070 -.167 .820 -.325 -.026 .132 -.002 -.284 -.054 -.014 -.177 
16. Improving measures of performance -.051 .083 .052 .058 .013 -.318 -.325 .784 .067 -.120 -.068 -.063 .011 -.161 .107 
18. Developing new products and services -.032 -.346 -.016 .062 .054 .006 -.026 .067 .888 -.333 .021 -.133 -.108 -.170 .022 
19. Undertaking research and development -.143 -.003 -.306 .076 -.101 .084 .132 -.120 -.333 .884 -.178 -.102 -.108 .015 -.005 
20. Total quality management -.025 .038 .061 .001 -.042 -.101 -.002 -.068 .021 -.178 .907 -.257 -.225 -.008 .012 
21. Developing new operating techniques -.089 -.083 -.027 .019 -.091 -.091 -.284 -.063 -.133 -.102 -.257 .924 -.012 .013 .063 
22. Providing speciality products/services -.042 -.110 -.073 -.057 .145 -.014 -.054 .011 -.108 -.108 -.225 -.012 .916 -.005 .112 
17. Tight control of overhead costs .193 -.058 .169 -.111 .097 -.042 -.014 -.161 -.170 .015 -.008 .013 -.005 .588 -.576 
13. Reducing operating costs -.106 .001 -.066 .089 -.068 -.142 -.177 .107 .022 -.005 .012 .063 .112 -.576 .620 
                
Note. bold type = KMO measures of sampling adequacy > 0.5 
Table C.3 Factor analysis KMO measure of sampling adequacy and Bartlett’s test of sphericity 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy .861 
Bartlett's test of sphericity Approx. Chi-Square 1748.323 
degrees of freedom 105 
Sig. .000 
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Appendix D: Pay secrecy scale reliability 
tests 
Table D.1 Scale reliability statistics for 4 items, Question 32 
Reliability statistics 
Cronbach's 
Alpha 
Cronbach's 
Alpha based on 
standardised 
items No. of items 
.623 .624 4 
 
Table D.2 Item-total statistics for 4 items, Question 32 
Item-total statistics 
 
Scale mean if 
item deleted 
Scale variance if 
item deleted 
Corrected item-
total correlation 
Squared multiple 
correlation 
Cronbach's alpha 
if item deleted 
Q32 1 open 10.2757 6.953 .607 .380 .395 
Q32 2 semi-open 10.7390 9.448 .183 .249 .706 
Q32 3 semi-secret 10.5662 9.036 .266 .329 .646 
Q32 4 secret 10.2206 6.719 .620 .421 .379 
Note. bold type = Cronbach’s Alpha > 0.7 
 
Table D.3 Scale reliability statistics for 3 items, Question 32 (item 2 removed) 
Reliability statistics 
Cronbach's 
Alpha 
Cronbach's 
Alpha based on 
standardised 
items No. of items 
.703 .702 3 
Note. bold type = Cronbach’s Alpha > 0.7 
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Appendix E: Research ethics approval 
UNIVERSITY RESEARCH ETHICS REVIEW FORM     
  
In the case of postgraduate research student projects (i.e. MRes, MA by 
Project/Dissertation, MPhil, PhD and DProf), this form should be completed by the student 
concerned in full consultation with their supervisor. 
 
In the case of staff research projects, this form should be completed by the member of staff 
responsible for the research project (i.e. as Principal Investigator and/or grant-holder) in full 
consultation with any co-investigators, research students and research staff.  
 
Further guidance on the University’s Research Ethics Policy and Procedures, along with 
links to relevant research ethics materials and advice, can be found on the Research & 
Postgraduate Office Research Ethics webpage: 
 
http://www.londonmet.ac.uk/research/the-research-and-postgraduate-office/current-
students/research-ethics.cfm 
 
This form requires the completion of the following three sections – 
 
 SECTION A: APPLICANT DETAILS 
 SECTION B: THE PROJECT - ETHICAL ISSUES 
 SECTION C: THE PROJECT - RISKS AND BENEFITS 
  
SECTION A: APPLICANT DETAILS 
 
A1 Background information 
Research project title: Strategic pay: does it exist and does it impact HR outcomes? 
 
Date of submission for ethics approval: September 2014 
Proposed start date for project: January 2011 
Proposed end date for project: September 2015 
Ethics ID no: 17/14                                                  * (to be completed by RERP) 
               
A2 Applicant details, if for a research student project 
Name: Sarah Jones 
London Met Email address: SAJO503@my.londonmet.ac.uk or 
sarah.jones@beds.ac.uk (preferred) 
 
A3 Principal Researcher/Lead Supervisor  
Member of staff at London Metropolitan University who is responsible for the 
proposed research project either as Principal Investigator/grant-holder or, in the case 
of postgraduate research student projects, as Lead Supervisor 
Name: Professor Stephen Perkins 
Job title: Dean of Faculty of Business and Law 
London Met Email address: s.perkins@londonmet.ac.uk  
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SECTION B: THE PROJECT - ETHICAL ISSUES 
 
B1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The  Research Proposal 
Please attach a brief summary of the research project including: 
 
• Background/rationale 
• Aims/objectives 
• Research methodology 
• Review of the key literature in this field & conceptual framework for study 
• References 
 
Please see attached summary. 
 
Research Ethics 
Please outline any ethical issues that might arise from this study and how they are to be addressed. 
  
NB all research projects have ethical considerations.  Please complete this section as fully as possible 
using the following pointers for guidance.  
 
• Does the project involve potentially deceiving participants? No 
• Will you be requiring the disclosure of confidential or private information?  No 
• Is the project likely to lead to the disclosure of illegal activity or incriminating information 
about participants?  No 
• Does the project require a Criminal Records Bureau check for the researcher? No 
• Is the project likely to expose participants to distress of any nature?  No 
• Will participants be rewarded for their involvement?  No 
• Are there any potential conflicts of interest in this project?  No 
• Any other potential concerns?  No 
 
If you answered yes to any of the points above, please explain. 
 
Does the proposed research project involve: 
 
• The analysis of existing data, artefacts or performances that are not already in the public 
domain (i.e. that are published, freely available or available by subscription)?  Yes 
• The production and/or analysis of physical data (including computer code, physical entities 
and/or chemical materials) that might involve potential risks to humans, the researcher(s) or 
the University?  No 
• The direct or indirect collection of new data from humans or animals?  No 
 
If you answered yes to any of the points above, please explain. 
The data that will be used for the research project has been collected by the Chartered Institute of 
Personnel and Development (CIPD) in collaboration with a research team which includes the researc  
student and her Lead Supervisor, Professor Perkins. 
 
The CIPD undertakes an annual Reward Management Survey that is issued by email to selected 
members of CIPD to collect benchmarking data about pay and reward practices within UK 
organisations. Since 2011 the research team have been commissioned by CIPD to produce the Survey 
Report based on this data which is published annually by CIPD research.  
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B4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B5 
It is now proposed to utilise this comprehensive dataset spanning 2011, 2012 and 2013 in order to 
meet the research objectives detailed in the attached summary. 
 
Will the proposed research be conducted in any country outside the UK? No 
 
If so, are there independent research ethics regulations and procedures that either: 
 
• Do not recognise research ethics review approval from UK-based research ethics services?  
Yes/No   and/or 
• Require more detailed applications for research ethics review than would ordinarily be 
conducted by the University’s Research Ethics Review Panels and/or other UK-based research 
ethics services?  Yes/No 
 
If you answered yes to any of the points above, please explain. 
Does the proposed research involve: 
 
• The collection and/or analysis of body tissues or fluids from humans or animals?  No 
• The administration of any drug, food substance, placebo or invasive procedure to humans or 
animals?  No 
• Any participants lacking capacity (as defined by the UK Mental Capacity Act 2005)?  No 
• Relationships with any external statutory-, voluntary-, or commercial-sector organisation(s) 
that require(s) research ethics approval to be obtained from an external research ethics 
committee or the UK National Research Ethics Service (this includes research involving staff, 
clients, premises, facilities and data from the UK National Health Service, Social Care 
organisations and some other statutory public bodies within the UK)?  No 
 
If you answered yes to any of the points above, please contact your faculty’s RERP chair for 
further guidance. 
 
 
SECTION C: THE PROJECT -  RISKS AND BENEFITS 
 
C1 Risk Assessment 
Please outline  
• the risks posed by this project to both researcher and research participants 
• the ways in which you intend to mitigate these risks  
• the benefits of this project to the applicant, participants and any others 
 
The risks for both researcher and participants associated with this research project 
are minimal.  
 
The participants have had a totally free choice in terms of their participation. They 
were able choose to withdraw from participation at any point in the completion of 
the online survey.  There was no individual personal data gathered in the survey 
data which only asked questions at an organisational level. Organisations are not 
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identifiable from the data and all responses are completely anonymous. In addition, 
the majority of data collected is generally of low sensitivity i.e. it is not 
commercially or otherwise confidential information. 
 
The project has high impact potential in both academic and practitioner arenas. 
This is an under-researched area with a lack of solid theoretical and empirical 
studies and it is likely that there will be considerable interest in publications arising 
from the research which will benefit the student, supervisors and University. The 
close links with the CIPD also offer the potential for dissemination of results in the 
practitioner field. There are likely to be direct benefits for HR and management 
practice arising from the research findings in terms of enhancing understanding of 
pay and strategy and its role in organisational performance. 
 
Checklist to be completed by applicant prior to submission of the form 
 
Section Completed 
Section A X 
Section B  X 
Section C X 
Research Proposal attached X 
 
 
Please submit this Form as an email attachment to the Chair of your faculty’s Research 
Ethics Review Panel (RERP)and copy in all of the staff and students who will be involved in 
the proposed research.  
 
See: http://www.londonmet.ac.uk/research/the-research-and-postgraduate-office/current-
students/research-ethics.cfm 
 
Please note that research ethics approval can be granted for a maximum of 4 years or for the 
duration of the proposed research on the condition that: 
 
 
• The researcher must inform their faculty’s Research Ethics Review Panel (RERP) of 
any changes to the proposed research that may alter the answers given to the 
questions in this form or any related research ethics applications  
 
• The researcher must apply for an extension to their ethics approval if the research 
project continues beyond 4 years. 
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Feedback from Ethics Panel 
 
 Approved Feedback where further work required 
Section A Yes  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Section B  Yes  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Section C Yes  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Date of approval 
NB:  Researcher to be 
notified of decision 
within two weeks of 
the submission of the 
application 
 
Approved by Roger Bennett 
17/09/14 
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Appendix F: Linearity test results for logistic regression 
Original alpha level ÷ number of comparisons = adjusted alpha level (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2014)  p < .05  ÷ 7 = .007143 
Table F.1 Linearity tests for logistic regression predicting likelihood of selection of pay practices based on size, sector, high-road strategy and low-road strategy 
 Pay practices (dependent variables) 
Independent 
variables 
Narrow-
grading 
Broadbanding Job 
family 
Pay 
spines 
Indiv  JE Market rates 
(determination) 
Collective 
bargaining 
Ability to pay 
(determination) 
Indiv. 
Perf 
Comp. 
Sector 
(categorical) 
.278 .443 .843 .074 .388 .991 .991 .001 .129 .415 .577 
Size (categorical) .462 .014 .958 .034 .396 .049 .049 .004 .001 .850 .223 
High-road score 
(continuous) 
.883 .450 .760 .269 .778 .634 .634 .162 .622 .032 .321 
Low-road score 
(continuous) 
.459 .253 .768 .173 .866 .446 .446 .220 .293 .411 .221 
High-road score 
by LN High-road 
score  
.872 .540 .792 .212 .941 .825 .825 .196 .851 .030 .422 
Low-road score 
by LN Low-road 
score 
.475 .280 .786 .147 .885 .512 .512 .227 .353 .402 .228 
Constant .440 .590 .561 .552 .935 .732 .732 .351 .407 .738 .543 
Note. bold type = interaction terms with p values > .007143 signifying linearity between continuous independent variables and dependent variables.  
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Table F.2 Linearity tests for logistic regression predicting likelihood of selection of pay practices based on size, sector, high-road strategy and low-road strategy (continued) 
 Pay practices (dependent variables) 
Independent 
variables 
Skills Service Market 
rates 
Employee 
value 
Ability 
to pay 
(review) 
Move 
MR 
R&R PRR Combi Piece rates Commission Merit 
pay 
Sector 
(categorical) 
.341 .953 .681 .140 .484 .165 .192 .003 .915 .755 .000 .502 
Size 
(categorical) 
.861 .992 .071 .243 .030 .065 .483 .016 .066 .772 .894 .115 
High-road score 
(continuous) 
.449 .023 .465 .323 .738 .867 .740 .694 .304 .109 .566 .291 
Low-road score 
(continuous) 
.072 .061 .902 .483 .124 .183 .360 .353 .550 .247 .220 .097 
High-road 
score by LN 
High-road 
score  
.587 .034 .529 .367 .621 .710 .803 .833 .290 .131 .684 .374 
Low-road score 
by LN Low-
road score 
.071 .055 .957 .496 .174 .222 .388 .372 .594 .249 .226 .100 
Constant .206 .215 .954 .770 .148 .181 .532 .404 .292 .260 .580 .352 
Note. bold type = interaction terms with p values > .007143 signifying linearity between continuous independent variables and dependent variables. 
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Table F.3 Linearity tests for logistic regression predicting likelihood of selection of pay practices based on size, sector, high-road strategy and low-road strategy (continued 2) 
 Pay practices (dependent variables) 
Independent 
variables 
Indiv 
bonus 
Indiv. 
cash 
incentive 
Gainsharing Goal-
sharing 
Profit- 
sharing 
Shares 
LTIs 
Upper 
decile 
Upper 
quartile 
Median Lower 
quartile 
Lower 
decile 
Sector (categorical) .665 .008 .857 .203 .195 .079 .714 .055 .182 .182 .997 
Size (categorical) .121 .684 .848 .066 .769 .000 .732 .828 .631 .631 .508 
High-road score 
(continuous) 
.140 .306 .855 .828 .870 .415 .377 .644 .025 .025 .593 
Low-road score 
(continuous) 
.181 .277 .832 .355 .608 .171 .181 .997 .688 .688 .463 
High-road score by 
LN High-road 
score  
.177 .294 .740 .859 .784 .352 .312 .537 .024 .024 .586 
Low-road score by 
LN Low-road 
score 
.187 .273 .838 .349 .633 .212 .176 .981 .714 .714 .462 
Constant .590 .229 .708 .390 .723 .071 .176 .949 .564 .564 .978 
Note. bold type = interaction terms with p values > .007143 signifying linearity between continuous independent variables and dependent variables. 
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Appendix G: Assumption tests for linear 
regression: pay dispersion by strategy, sector 
and size 
 
Figure G.1 Scatterplot of studentised residuals by unstudentised predicted values for pay dispersion and collective 
independent variables (non-transformed data) 
 
 
Figure G.2 Scatterplot of studentised residuals by unstudentised predicted values for pay dispersion and collective 
independent variables (logarithmically transformed data) 
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Figure G.3 Scatterplot of pay dispersion by high-road strategy score (non-transformed data) 
 
Figure G.4 Scatterplot of pay dispersion by high-road strategy score (logarithmically transformed data) 
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Figure G.5 Scatterplot of pay dispersion by low-road strategy score (non-transformed data) 
 
 
Figure G.6 Scatterplot of pay dispersion by low-road strategy score (logarithmically transformed data) 
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Figure G.7 Histogram - pay dispersion score (non-transformed data) 
 
 
Figure G.8 Histogram - pay dispersion score (logarithmically transformed data) 
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Figure G.9 Normal P-P plot for Pay dispersion score (non-transformed data) 
 
Figure G.10 Normal P-P plot for pay dispersion score (logarithmically transformed data) 
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Table G.1 Multiple regression analysis predicting pay dispersion based on size, sector, high-road strategy and low-
road strategy (logarithmically transformed data) 
    95% C.I. for B coefficient 
 B SE β Lower Upper 
(Constant) 5.279 .278  4.725 5.833 
Size .167* .073 .243 .022 .312 
Sector -.136 .080 -.183 -.296 .024 
High-road 
strategy .054 .049 .122 -.043 .151 
Low-road 
strategy -.125 .064 -.216 -.253 .003 
Note. * = p ≤ .05, ** = p ≥ .005, B = unstandardised regression coefficient (rounded to 2 decimal places), SE = 
standard error of regression coefficient, β = standardised coefficient, C.I. = confidence intervals. 
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Appendix H: Assumption tests for linear 
regression: pay secrecy by strategy, sector 
and size 
 
Figure H.1 Scatterplot of studentised residuals by unstudentised predicted values for pay secrecy and collective 
independent variables (non-transformed data) 
 
Figure H.2 Scatterplot of studentised residuals by unstudentised predicted values for pay secrecy and collective 
independent variables (logarithmically transformed data) 
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Figure H.3 Scatterplot pay secrecy by high-road strategy score (non-transformed data) 
 
 
Figure H.4 Scatterplot pay secrecy by high-road strategy score (logarithmically transformed data) 
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Figure H.5 Scatterplot of pay secrecy by low-road strategy score (non-transformed data) 
 
 
 
Figure H.6  Scatterplot of pay secrecy by low-road strategy score (logarithmically transformed data) 
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Figure H.7 Histogram pay secrecy score (non-transformed data) 
 
 
 
 
Figure H.8 Histogram pay secrecy score (logarithmically transformed data) 
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Figure H.9 Normal P-P plot for pay secrecy score (non-transformed data) 
 
 
 
Figure H.10 Normal P-P plot for pay secrecy score (logarithmically transformed data) 
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Appendix I: Multicollinearity test results 
for logistic regression 
Table I.1 Collinearity statistics, DV: Sector  
Dependent variable: Sector 
Collinearity statistics 
Tolerance VIF 
 High-road strategy score .940 1.064 
Low-road strategy score .918 1.089 
Size .974 1.027 
 
Table I.2 Collinearity statistics, DV: Size 
Dependent variable: Size 
Collinearity statistics 
Tolerance VIF 
 High-road strategy score .914 1.094 
Low-road strategy score .919 1.088 
Sector .936 1.068 
 
Table I.3 Collinearity statistics, DV: Low-road strategy score 
Dependent variable: Low-road 
strategy score 
Collinearity statistics 
Tolerance VIF 
 High-road strategy score .957 1.045 
Sector .953 1.049 
Size .992 1.008 
 
Table I.4 Collinearity statistics, DV: High-road strategy score 
Dependent variable: High-road 
strategy score 
Collinearity statistics 
Tolerance VIF 
 Sector .960 1.041 
Size .972 1.029 
Low-road strategy score .941 1.062 
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Appendix J: EPV calculations for logistic 
regression analysis 
Table J.1 Summary of EPV and minimum number of cases calculations for logistic regression analysis 
Pay Practice 
(dependent variable) 
No. of 
independent 
variables 
Lowest no. of 
cases selected / 
not selected 
Event per 
variable 
(EPV) 
 
Broadbanding 4 72 18 
Pay spines 4 33 8.25 
Individual base pay 4 112 28 
Narrow-grading 4 71 17.75 
Job families 4 62 15.5 
Job evaluation 4 91 22.75 
Market rates (pay determination) 4 87 20.25 
Collective bargaining 4 45 11.25 
Ability to pay (pay determination) 4 122 30.5 
Individual PRP 4 31 7.75* 
Competency pay 4 121 30.25 
Skills-based pay 4 123 30.75 
Service-based pay 4 52 13 
Market rates (progression) 4 91 22.75 
Employee value / retention 
(progression) 
4 103 25.75 
Movement in market rates (pay review) 4 98 24.5 
Ability to pay (pay review) 4 47 11.75 
PRR schemes 4 62 15.5 
Combination PRR schemes 4 92 23 
Piece rates 4 4 1* 
Sales commission 4 83 20.75 
Merit pay 4 105 26.25 
Individual bonus 4 120 30 
Individual cash incentives 4 49 12.25 
Gainsharing 4 32 8* 
Goal-sharing 4 69 17.25 
Profit-sharing 4 58 14.5 
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Pay Practice 
(dependent variable) 
No. of 
independent 
variables 
Lowest no. of 
cases selected / 
not selected 
Event per 
variable 
(EPV) 
 
Long-term incentives / share schemes 4 95 23.75 
Upper decile pay positioning 4 28 7* 
Upper quartile pay positioning 4 50 12.5 
Median pay positioning 4 124 31 
Lower quartile pay positioning 4 27 6.75* 
Lower decile pay positioning 4 3 0.75* 
Note. * = EPV ≤ 10 
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Appendix K: Normality and outlier tests 
for paired-samples t-test (pay dispersion 
data) 
 
Figure K.1 Histogram of pay dispersion (non-transformed data) 
 
Figure K.2 Histogram of pay dispersion (logarithmically transformed data)  
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Figure K.3 Normal Q-Q plot of dispersion difference between management and other employees (non-transformed 
data) 
 
 
Figure K.4 Normal Q-Q plot of difference between management and other pay dispersion (logarithmic transformed 
data) 
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Figure K.5 Box plot for dispersion difference (non-transformed data) 
 
Figure K.6 Box plot for dispersion difference (logarithmically transformed data) 
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Table K.1 Paired-samples t-test statistics for management and other pay dispersion (logarithmically transformed 
data with outliers removed) 
 Mean N Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Paired-
sample 
Management dispersion 4.9148 82 .35831 .03886 
Other employee 
dispersion 
4.2026 82 .52526 .05697 
Note. N = number of cases 
 
Table K.2 Paired-samples t-test results for management and other pay dispersion (logarithmically transformed data 
with outliers removed) 
 
Paired differences 
t df 
Sig. (2-
tailed) Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. 
Error 
Mean 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
difference 
Lower Upper 
Paired-
sample 
Management 
dispersion  
Other employee 
dispersion 
.71214 .45610 .04947 .61376 .81052 14.395 84 .000 
Note. t = t-test statistic; df = degrees of freedom 
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Appendix L: Symmetricity assumption 
test for Wilcoxon-signed rank test 
 
Figure L.1 Histogram  of symmetricity for PRR scheme coverage – management and other employees 
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Appendix M: Linearity and 
homoscedasticity tests for simple regression 
and multiple hierarchical regression (HR 
outcomes data) 
 
 
 
Figure M.1 Scatterplot of studentised residuals by unstudentised predicted values for HR outcomes and pay secrecy 
score (logarithmically transformed data) 
 
Figure M.2 Scatterplot of studentised residuals by unstudentised predicted values for HR outcomes and pay 
dispersion (logarithmically transformed data) 
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Figure M.3 Scatterplot of studentised residuals by unstudentised predicted values for HR outcomes and pay bundle 
1 for knowledge-based employee, sector, size, high-road strategy score and low-road strategy score 
(logarithmically transformed data) 
 
 
Figure M.4 Scatterplot of studentised residuals by unstudentised predicted values for HR outcomes and high-road 
strategy score (pay bundle 1 and knowledge-based employees) (logarithmically transformed data) 
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Figure M.5 Scatterplot of studentised residuals by unstudentised predicted values for HR outcomes and low-road 
strategy score (pay bundle 1 and knowledge-based employees) (logarithmically transformed data) 
 
 
 
Figure M.6 Scatterplot of studentised residuals by unstudentised predicted values for HR outcomes and pay bundle 
1 for job-based employee, sector, size, high-road strategy score and low-road strategy score (logarithmically 
transformed data) 
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Figure M.7 Scatterplot of studentised residuals by unstudentised predicted values for HR outcomes and high-road 
strategy score (pay bundle 1 and job-based employees) (logarithmically transformed data) 
 
 
 
 
Figure M.8 Scatterplot of studentised residuals by unstudentised predicted values for HR outcomes and low-road 
strategy score (pay bundle 1 and job-based employees) (logarithmically transformed data) 
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Figure M.9 Scatterplot of studentised residuals by unstudentised predicted values for HR outcomes and pay bundle 
2 for knowledge-based employees, sector, size, high-road strategy score and low-road strategy score 
(logarithmically transformed data) 
 
 
 
Figure M.10 Scatterplot of studentised residuals by unstudentised predicted values for HR outcomes and high-road 
strategy score (pay bundle 2 and knowledge-based employees) (logarithmically transformed data) 
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Figure M.11 Scatterplot of studentised residuals by unstudentised predicted values for HR outcomes and low-road 
strategy score (pay bundle 2 and knowledge-based employees) (logarithmically transformed data) 
 
 
 
Figure M.12 Scatterplot of studentised residuals by unstudentised predicted values for HR outcomes and pay bundle 
2 for job-based employees, sector, size, high-road strategy score and low-road strategy score (logarithmically 
transformed data) 
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Figure M.13 Scatterplot of studentised residuals by unstudentised predicted values for HR outcomes and high-road 
strategy score (pay bundle 2 and job-based employees) (logarithmically transformed data) 
 
 
Figure M.14 Scatterplot of studentised residuals by unstudentised predicted values for HR outcomes and low-road 
strategy score (pay bundle 2 and job-based employees) (logarithmically transformed data) 
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Figure M.15 Scatterplot of studentised residuals by unstudentised predicted values for HR outcomes and pay bundle 
3 for knowledge-based employees, sector, size, high-road strategy score and low-road strategy score 
(logarithmically transformed data) 
 
 
 
Figure M.16 Scatterplot of studentised residuals by unstudentised predicted values for HR outcomes and high-road 
strategy score (pay bundle 3 and knowledge-based employees) (logarithmically transformed data) 
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Figure M.17 Scatterplot of studentised residuals by unstudentised predicted values for HR outcomes and low-road 
strategy score (pay bundle 3 and knowledge-based employees) (logarithmically transformed data) 
 
 
 
 
Figure M.18 Scatterplot of studentised residuals by unstudentised predicted values for HR outcomes and pay bundle 
3 for job-based employees, sector, size, high-road strategy score and low-road strategy score (logarithmically 
transformed data) 
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Figure M.19 Scatterplot of studentised residuals by unstudentised predicted values for HR outcomes and high-road 
strategy score (pay bundle 3 and job-based employees) (logarithmically transformed data) 
 
 
 
Figure M.20 Scatterplot of studentised residuals by unstudentised predicted values for HR outcomes and low-road 
strategy score (pay bundle 3 and job-based employees) (logarithmically transformed data) 
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Appendix N: Multicollinearity test results 
for hierarchical multiple regression 
Table N.1 Collinearity statistics, DV: High-road strategy score 
Dependent Variable: High-road mean 
score 
Collinearity Statistics 
Tolerance VIF 
 Low-road mean score 1.000 1.000 
 
Table N.2 Collinearity statistics, DV: Low-road strategy score 
Dependent variable: Low-road mean 
score 
Collinearity Statistics 
Tolerance VIF 
 High-road mean score 1.000 1.000 
 
  
370 
 
Appendix O: Normality and outlier tests 
for linear regression (HR outcomes and HR 
log data) 
 
Figure O.1 Histogram of HR outcomes scale (non-transformed data)  
 
 
Figure O.2 Histogram of HR outcomes scale (logarithmically transformed data)  
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Figure O.3 Normal Q-Q plot of HR outcomes scale (non-transformed data) 
 
 
Figure O.4 Normal Q-Q plot of HR outcomes scale (logarithmically-transformed data) 
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Figure O.5 Box plot for HR outcomes scale (non-transformed data) 
 
 
 
Figure O.6 Box plot for HR outcomes scale (logarithmically-transformed data) 
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Appendix P: Normality tests for linear 
regression analyses (HR log scale / pay 
practices) 
 
 
 
Figure P.1 Normality tests for regression predicting HR outcomes (logarithmically transformed data) from 
selection of narrow-grading 
 
 
         
 
Figure P.2 Normality tests for regression predicting HR outcomes (logarithmically transformed data) from 
selection of broadbanding 
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Figure P.3 Normality tests for regression predicting HR outcomes (logarithmically transformed data) from 
selection of job families 
 
 
    
Figure P.4 Normality tests for regression predicting HR outcomes (logarithmically transformed data) from 
selection of pay spines 
 
 
     
Figure P.5 Normality tests for regression predicting HR outcomes (logarithmically transformed data) from 
selection of individual base pay  
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Figure P.6 Normality tests for regression predicting HR outcomes (logarithmically transformed data) from 
selection of job evaluation   
 
   
Figure P.7 Normality tests for regression predicting HR outcomes (logarithmically transformed data) from 
selection of market rates (pay determination) 
   
Figure P.8 Normality tests for regression predicting HR outcomes (logarithmically transformed data) from 
selection of collective bargaining 
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Figure P.9 Normality tests for regression predicting HR outcomes (logarithmically transformed data) from 
selection of ability to pay (pay determination) 
   
 
Figure P.10 Normality tests for regression predicting HR outcomes (logarithmically transformed data) from 
selection of individual performance-related pay  
 
   
Figure P.11 Normality tests for regression predicting HR outcomes (logarithmically transformed data) from 
selection of competency pay 
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Figure P.12 Normality tests for regression predicting HR outcomes (logarithmically transformed data) from 
selection of skills-based pay 
 
  
Figure P.13 Normality tests for regression predicting HR outcomes (logarithmically transformed data) from 
selection of service-based pay 
 
   
Figure P.14 Normality tests for regression predicting HR outcomes (logarithmically transformed data) from 
selection of market rates (pay progression) 
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Figure P.15 Normality tests for regression predicting HR outcomes (logarithmically transformed data) from 
selection of employee value / retention (pay progression) 
 
   
Figure P.16 Normality tests for regression predicting HR outcomes (logarithmically transformed data) from 
selection of ability to pay (pay review factor) 
   
Figure P.17 Normality tests for regression predicting HR outcomes (logarithmically transformed data) from 
selection of movement in market rates (pay review factor) 
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Figure P.18 Normality tests for regression predicting HR outcomes (logarithmically transformed data) from 
selection of recruitment and retention (pay review factor)  
 
    
Figure P.19 Normality tests for regression predicting HR outcomes (logarithmically transformed data) from 
selection of performance-related reward schemes 
 
 
   
 
Figure P.20 Normality tests for regression predicting HR outcomes (logarithmically transformed data) from 
selection of combination performance-related reward schemes  
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Figure P.21 Normality tests for regression predicting HR outcomes (logarithmically transformed data) from 
selection of piece rates 
 
  
 
Figure P.22 Normality tests for regression predicting HR outcomes (logarithmically transformed data) from 
selection of sales commission 
 
   
Figure P.23 Normality tests for regression predicting HR outcomes (logarithmically transformed data) from 
selection of merit pay 
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Figure P.24 Normality tests for regression predicting HR outcomes (logarithmically transformed data) from 
selection of individual bonus 
 
 
    
 
Figure P.25 Normality tests for regression predicting HR outcomes (logarithmically transformed data) from 
selection of individual cash incentives 
 
  
Figure P.26 Normality tests for regression predicting HR outcomes (logarithmically transformed data) from 
selection of gainsharing 
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Figure P.27 Normality tests for regression predicting HR outcomes (logarithmically transformed data) from 
selection of goal-sharing 
 
 
    
 
Figure P.28 Normality tests for regression predicting HR outcomes (logarithmically transformed data) from 
selection of profit-sharing 
 
   
Figure P.29 Normality tests for regression predicting HR outcomes (logarithmically transformed data) from 
selection of shares / LTI schemes   
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Figure P.30 Normality tests for regression predicting HR outcomes (logarithmically transformed data) from 
selection of upper decile pay  
 
   
Figure P.31 Normality tests for regression predicting HR outcomes (logarithmically transformed data) from 
selection of upper quartile pay  
 
   
 
Figure P.32 Normality tests for regression predicting HR outcomes (logarithmically transformed data) from 
selection of median pay  
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Figure P.33 Normality tests for regression predicting HR outcomes (logarithmically transformed data) from 
selection of lower quartile pay  
 
 
   
Figure P.34 Normality tests for regression predicting HR outcomes (logarithmically transformed data) from 
selection of lower decile for pay positioning 
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Figure P.35 Normality tests for regression predicting HR outcomes (logarithmically transformed data) from pay 
secrecy  
 
 
 
   
Figure P.36 Normality tests for regression predicting HR outcomes (logarithmically transformed data) from pay 
dispersion 
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Appendix Q: Normality tests for 
hierarchical multiple regression analyses 
(HR log scale / pay configurations) 
 
  
 
Figure Q.1 Normality tests for hierarchical multiple regression predicting HR outcomes (logarithmically 
transformed data) from pay bundle 1 for knowledge-based employees, sector, size, high-road strategy and low-road 
strategy 
 
 
 
  
 
Figure Q.2 Normality tests for hierarchical multiple regression predicting HR outcomes (logarithmically 
transformed data) from pay bundle 1 for job- based employees, sector, size, high-road strategy and low-road 
strategy 
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Figure Q.3 Normality tests for hierarchical multiple regression predicting HR outcomes (logarithmically 
transformed data) from pay bundle 2 for knowledge-based employees, sector, size, high-road strategy and low-road 
strategy 
 
 
 
     
 
Figure Q.4 Normality tests for hierarchical multiple regression predicting HR outcomes (logarithmically 
transformed data) from pay bundle 2 for job-based employees, sector, size, high-road strategy and low-road 
strategy 
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Figure Q.5 Normality tests for hierarchical multiple regression predicting HR outcomes (logarithmically 
transformed data) from pay bundle 3 for knowledge-based employees, sector, size, high-road strategy and low-road 
strategy 
 
 
   
 
Figure Q.6 Normality tests for hierarchical multiple regression predicting HR outcomes (logarithmically 
transformed data) from pay bundle 3 for job-based employees, sector, size, high-road strategy and low-road 
strategy 
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Appendix R: Non-significant regression 
results for pay practices / HR outcomes  
Table R.1 Summary of non-significant linear regression results predicting HR outcomes from pay practice selection 
 HR outcomes (DV) 
Pay practices (IVs) B p Blog p 
Narrow-grading -.017 .741 .003 .820 
Broadbanding -.006 .908 .001 .937 
Job families -.051 .344 .010 .474 
Pay spines -.091 .176 .023 .193 
Individual base pay  -.064 .167 .019 .118 
Job evaluation -.051 .283 -.017 .177 
Market rates (determination) .011 .826 -.003 .798 
Collective bargaining -.071 .236 .016 .319 
Individual PRP -.066 .321 .018 .305 
Service-based pay -.044 .449 .011 .484 
Market rates (progression) .041 .393 -.008 .530 
Employee value / retention (review) -.022 .632 .005 .666 
Ability to pay (review) -.115 .090 .032 .080 
Movement in market rates (review) -.001 .987 -.002 .886 
Performance-related reward schemes .094 .069 -.026 .054 
Combination PRR schemes .051 .291 -.015 .245 
Piece rates -.206 .172 .056 .165 
Sales commission -.050 .304 .012 .358 
Individual bonus .052 .254 -.015 .210 
Individual cash incentives -.033 .533 .008 .592 
Gainsharing -.091 .188 .022 .231 
Goal-sharing -.001 .978 -.001 .941 
Shares / LTI schemes   .018 .704 -.002 .902 
Upper decile pay  .084 .241 -.026 .183 
Upper quartile pay .000 .998 -.002 .899 
Median pay  .001 .979 .004 .754 
Pay dispersion < .000 .305 < .000 .295 
Note. B = unstandardised regression coefficient HR outcome score; Blog = unstandardised regression coefficient 
logarithmically transformed HR outcome score (HR log); p = p-value. 
